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1Chapter I:  Introduction
Citizens have long needed help dealing with legal conflicts.  Both history 
and legend suggest that around 476 B.C., a Sicilian named Corax developed a 
systematic approach for arguing legal probability in order to aid citizens of Sicily in 
reclaiming land seized by a tyrant.  He and his disciple Tisias became forbearers to 
the First Sophistic movement in Greece and, in the process, to modern rhetoric.1
What Corax and Tisias offered the Greeks was more than an appreciation for the 
spoken word or an ability to discuss matters of justice and fairness.2  Corax and 
Tisias created a reliable and efficient system to teach citizens how to make their 
own legal arguments using rhetorical principles.  Their students also developed the 
capacity to effectively assess critically the quality of the judicial tribunal’s ultimate 
decision.  What would Corax and Tisias make of modern legal rhetorical practices? 
They might be puzzled by the permanent place courts now occupy in modern life.  
Could they have rationalized the professional advocates, the expert witnesses, the 
voluminous evidence, the jargon, and the bizarre procedural requirements within 
their own approach to training citizens to argue their own cases? 
A. Overview 
What Corax and Tisias would find disappointing is that modern citizens 
have no equivalent system of arguing or even understanding their legal claims or 
rights.  Nearly 2,400 years after their initial efforts to train citizens in the art of 
legal discourse, the general citizenry of the United States is arguably less prepared 
than the clients of Corax and Tisias to understand what has become an increasingly 
1
 James J. Murphy, “The Origins and Early Development of Rhetoric,” in A Synoptic History of 
Classical Rhetoric. ed. James J. Murphy, Davis, Ca.: Hermagoras, 1983, 6-7; George Kennedy, The 
Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963, 58-61. 
2
 Murphy persuasively argues that the citizens of Athens had probably already accepted most of the 
rhetorical system by the time that Tisias was reputed to have ventured to the Greek mainland. (p. 7). 
The establishment of a school of rhetoric by Gorgias (another Sicilian) in 431 B.C., suggests that 
Athenians already had a deep interest in discourse.  Id.
2more complicated legal system.  The volume of new rules and regulations 
continues to expand and modern legal systems arguably regulate more aspects of a 
citizen’s individual life than ever before.3  Given the complexity of the modern 
legal system, can citizens be effective critics of their legal system or their society’s 
notion of law? This question is a response to a call by rhetorical scholar Hans 
Hohmann for new approaches to scholarship in legal rhetoric that are grounded in 
civic awareness.4  I believe that a grounded rhetorical theory of Law can spur that 
sort of scholarship and be beneficial to citizens trying to understand their Legal 
system and their Law.
Accordingly, this dissertation has two goals: first, to provide a disciplined 
and principled rhetorical method for applying diverse research methodologies in 
the study of legal rhetoric; and second, to challenge scholars to include media 
analyses in their respective projects.  The first goal is merely a continuation of 
Corax and Tisias’ project.  The second goal expands on the framework by 
including media analysis, which is a critical aspect of the modern citizen’s 
relationship with Law and the Legal system.  Through an analysis of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opinions in a pair of companion racial discrimination cases, Gratz 
v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger,5 this dissertation offers a modest example of
how legal rhetorical analyses can be theoretically grounded and practical, all at 
once. The end product of this project will not be a standardized approach to legal 
rhetorical scholarship.  There are too many methodologies being employed across 
various disciplines to establish such a standard.  However, this project does present 
a theoretical framework grounded in a vital, if underappreciated, basic distinction 
3
 It is an open question as to whether modern citizens are more tightly regulated than their ancient 
forbearers.  Although many modern societies are free from the racial, ethnic, gendered, or religious 
restrictions of older societies, the emergence of technology and a larger police state suggests that 
modern citizens are more likely to be disciplined for their abuse of previously unenforceable rules.
4
 Hanns J. Hohmann, “Rhetoric in the Public Sphere and the Discourse of Law and Democracy.” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 358-393.
5 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (U.S. Supreme Court 2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(U.S. Supreme Court 2003).
3between the Law as a commonly recognized body of principles of justice and 
fairness and the Legal system as the forum and linguistic system that provides a 
setting for the resolution of principles of justice and fairness.  The various 
methodologies can be understood within the context of this framework.   Given that 
the interaction between citizens and the Law or the Legal system is through media 
consumption, this framework will emphasize Media as a vital dimension in the 
citizen’s relationship with legal systems and Law.  Armed with a better 
understanding of the Law/Legal distinction, future projects will have the capacity 
to do a better job of investigating what kind of rhetoric is being produced and 
reproduced by the legal system, as well as how citizens come to learn about the 
Law through media consumption.  
This project contains a three-part analysis that incorporates a rhetorical 
understanding the citizen’s relationship with the Legal system, the broader notion 
of Law, and media coverage of legal disputes.  In order to understand the relevance 
of these three entities, I first present a brief introduction to the concept of the 
Law/Legal distinction.  Then, I offer a general explanation as to why scholarship in 
legal rhetoric is presently unable to account for the Law/Legal distinction.  I also 
detail the underlying problem of judicial legitimacy.  In short, the inability of 
citizens to distinguish the broader notions of Law from the specific mechanical 
aspects of the Legal system disempowers citizens from being effective critics of 
both concepts.  Finally, I describe the three-part methodology, demonstrating  how 
all three dimensions can be explored independently or comprehensively when 
looking at a single legal text, in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
companion cases, Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.
B. Understanding the Law/Legal Distinction
The starting point for this dissertation is making a distinction between 
“Law” and the “Legal system.”  Law professor James Boyd White applies a 
4variation of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric in describing “Law” as “the particular 
set of resources made available by a culture for speech and argument on those 
occasions, and by those speakers, we think of as legal.”6  Thus, laws, rules, statutes, 
and judicial opinions are no different than maxims, proverbs, and expressions of 
conventional wisdom as useful tools for the opportunistic lawyer.  While lawyers 
may generally agree upon which tools are relevant, there is never a perfect 
consensus.7  Although the components of legal argument are perhaps objectively 
discoverable through an empirical process, their “reformulation and use [is] an 
inventive or creative one.”8
Citizens do not need a law degree to understand which arguments are 
appropriate for a legal setting. This study understands “Law” as the set of 
principles of justice judged by a rough consensus of society to be appropriate for 
legal arguments.  Principles of justice or fairness such as equal treatment and due 
process, if only in their most abstract meanings, are accepted by a rough consensus 
of citizens.  Some of these principles fall out of fashion, but these changes have all 
the velocity of a glacier as the history of race relations in the United States aptly 
demonstrates.
In contrast, the “Legal system” is the forum in which conflicts between 
principles of Law are usually addressed.  Tribunals are established to allow facts to 
be determined and legal principles to be weighed.  A court ultimately serves as a 
forum for resolving these conflicts between various principles of justice.  The legal 
systems of the world have always been technically sophisticated and constantly 
evolving methods of societal control.  The “Legal” offers citizens an alternative to 
vigilante individual action, in exchange for a general willingness to submit to the 
rule of law.  Legal systems are commonly inherited from previous cultures. 
6
  James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of 
Language, Character, and Community, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 689.
7 Id. 689-90.
8 Id.
5The citizenry learns about the Law and the Legal in different ways.  The 
Legal, both as an institution of courts and a discourse, is an intimate part of 
everyday life for most citizens.  The Legal manifests itself in the form of traffic 
signs, income tax regulations, legal jargon and thousands of other ways.  
Individuals are arrested for or are the victims of criminal acts.  Individuals 
sometimes serve on juries.  In addition, the Legal system is a popular dramatic 
setting for mass media, from the nightly news to fictional comedies and dramas.  
Citizens learn about legal procedures, language, and culture through these media 
and are perhaps disappointed when the “real” Legal system is hardly as compelling.  
The average citizen will have plenty of actual or simulated contacts with the Legal 
system in his or her daily life, thanks to government regulation and mass 
entertainment media.  It is important to note that most of these contacts for most 
citizens are generally quite impersonal, given the enormous size of the justice 
system and the media.
In contrast, the typical citizen’s interaction with the Law is restrained, but 
often deeply personal.  The principles of justice that populate the Law are grounded 
in cultural acceptance and are therefore often part of one’s social identity.  
Contemporary U.S. culture encourages a personal relationship between individual 
citizens and Law through notions of individual rights, civil disobedience, and self-
regulation.  In other cultural contexts, the relationships between the Law and the 
citizen were quite removed.  On one hand, many cultures had such homogenous 
cultural outlooks (or at least professed so) that individuals felt no need to 
differentiate themselves from their peers.  In other instances, the merging of 
religious and legal institutions in theocracies like the Vatican eliminates the 
obligation for individual introspection.  The trend towards a more personal 
relationship between citizen and Law is a particularly vital aspect of a democratic 
society that values individuality.
6Diagram 1.1 offers a simplistic, but descriptive view of the relationship 
between the Law, the Legal, Media, and citizens.  The diagram demonstrates how 
citizens are exposed to the notion of Law through personal experiences with the 
Legal system as well as exposure to the Media.  Likewise, Diagram 1.1 
demonstrates how individual citizens develop a personal understanding of what 
Law should represent.  
Diagram 1.1: Relationship between Law, the Legal, and Citizenry
Law:
1. Pool of Available Principles of Justice
2. Rough Societal Consensus
The Legal:
1. Structures (Courts)
2. Culture (Rituals)
3. Discourse (Language)
Citizenry:
1. Individual experience with Legal
2. Individual experience with private dispute systems
3. Consumption of Mass Media
Mass Media:
1. News Media
2. Entertainment
7In practice, the relationships demonstrated by the Diagram are not nearly so 
clear.  Yet, these distinctions are fundamentally important.  A careful balance must 
be in place in order for the citizen in a democratic culture to feel ownership of the 
Law and to be a willing subject to the Legal system.  The Legal system may 
constantly strive for legitimacy, but must also demonstrate a latent subservience to 
the underlying will of the citizenry who ultimately dictate what counts as Law.  
C. Disorganized Scholarship on Legal Rhetoric
Scholarship in legal rhetoric is itself rhetorical.9  In this respect, a central 
tenet of modern rhetorical theory is that rhetoric, even scholarly rhetoric, is 
situational in the sense that the “situation controls the rhetorical response in the 
same sense that the question controls the answer and the problem controls the 
solution.”10  As Lloyd Bitzer explains, rhetorical situations invite a fitting response, 
not just any response, which is somewhat prescribed by the situation.11  One way of 
criticizing speech is by looking at the “exigence and compiles of persons, objects, 
events, and relations which . . . are located in reality, [which] are objective and 
publicly observable historical facts in the world we experience.”12  Situational 
analysis may be intended to be holistic, and not focus on any one situational 
variable excessively; however, in practice all rhetorical situational analyses 
(regardless of their form) do focus on a set of variables related in one manner or 
another. Given the substantive and rhetorical complexity of Law and Legal 
systems, it is important to find a set of variables that captures the wide variety of 
scholarship in legal rhetoric.  
There is a surplus of quality legal analysis on a diversity of legal subjects 
from financial transactions to equine law.  Unfortunately, the scholarship on the 
9
 Gerald Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse,” Virginia Law Review 76 (1990): 
1545-1597.
10
 Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 1-11.
11 Id. 7.
12 Id. 7-8.
8rhetoric of Law is not as comprehensive.  Modern scholarship on the topic of “legal 
rhetoric” can be categorized in two ways.  First, most scholarship about the 
language of law, legal discourse and jargon, or “legal communication” is about the 
most effective or popular rhetorical methods used in legal arguments, or more 
broadly, legal settings.  Taken at its most basic level, this scholarship examines 
how we communicate within different legal systems.  Law school library shelves 
are full of volumes on effective legal writing.  In addition, an industry of 
consultants stands ready to prepare attorneys and expert witnesses for trial 
presentations and testimony.  On a more theoretical level, scholars have closely 
investigated the culture and rhetorical structure of various legal systems.13  What 
13
 Marouf Hasian is the leading communication studies rhetorical critic on legal culture. See "The 
Public Addresses of Meese and Brennan: Voices in the American Legal Wilderness." 
Communication Studies (1993) 44: 299-319; "Critical Legal Rhetorics: The Theory and Practice of 
Law in a Postmodern World." Southern Communication Journal (1994) 60: 44-56; "The Aesthetics 
of Legal Rhetoric: The Ambiguities of 'Race' in Adarand v. Pena and the Beginning of the End of 
'Affirmative Action." Howard Journal of Communications (1997) 8: 113-27; "The Domestication of 
Legal Argumentation: A Case Study of the Formalism of the Legal Realists." Communication 
Quarterly (1998) 46: 430-45; "Jurisprudence as Performance: John Brown's Enactment of Natural 
Law at Harper's Ferry." Quarterly Journal of Speech (2000) 86: 190-214; Legal Memories and 
Cultural Amnesias in Anglo-American Rhetorical Culture. Boulder, Co., Westview, 2000; 
"Holocaust Denial Debates: The Symbolic Significance of Irving v. Penguin & Lipstadt." 
Communication Studies (2002) 53: 129-45. Hasian has also collaborated with other communication 
scholars similarly interested in a critical rhetorical analysis of the law.  See Marouf Hasian and A. 
C. Carlson. "Revisionism and Collective Memory: The Struggle for Meaning in the 'Amistad' 
Affair." Communication Monographs (2000) 67: 42-62; Marouf Hasian and E. Croasmun. 
"Rhetoric's Revenge: The Prospect of a Critical Legal Rhetoric." Philosophy and Rhetoric (1996) 
29: 384-99; Marouf Hasian and G. Klinger. "Sarah Roberts and the Early History of the 'Separate 
But Equal' Doctrine: A Study in Rhetoric, Law, and Social Change." Communication Studies
(2002); Marouf Hasian and Trevor Parry-Giles. "A Stranger to Its Laws': Freedom, Civil Rights, and 
the Legal Ambiguity of Romer v. Evans." Argumentation and Advocacy (1997) 34: 24-42; Marouf 
Hasian, Celeste M. Condit, et al. "The Rhetorical Boundaries of 'the Law': A Consideration of the 
Rhetorical Culture of Legal Practice and the Case of the 'Separate But Equal' Doctrine." Quarterly 
Journal of Speech (1996) 82: 323-42; Marouf Hasian, Celeste M. Condit, et al. "Judicial Rhetoric in 
a Fragmentary World: 'Character,' and Storytelling in the Leo Frank Case." Communication 
Monographs (1997) 64: 250-69.
Clarke Rountree has closely investigated the relationship between legal argumentative norms and 
rhetoric. See "On the Rhetorical Analysis of Judicial Discourse and More: A Response to Lewis." 
Southern Communication Journal (1995) 61: 166-73; "Instantiating 'The Law' and Its Dissents in 
Korematsu v. United States: A Dramatistic Analysis of Judicial Discourse." Quarterly Journal of 
Speech (2001) 87: 1-24.  Rountree has also recently edited a collection of essays on the rhetorical 
9these projects have in common is a focus on how the Legal system functions, 
whether as a writing system, a performance art, or a cultural structure.
In contrast, the second broadly drawn category of legal rhetorical 
scholarship is a treatment of Law as a symbolic or rhetorical construct that can 
reveal important cultural or philosophical insights about human interaction.  
Scholars interested in understanding Law as a text invariably examine the 
underlying principles that warrant application or enforcement of a particular rule.  
Scholars in the Law and Literature movement even find applications of the Law in 
non-legal settings and non-legal texts, such as in literary works of fiction.14  The 
common focus for these projects is appreciating Law outside the context of the 
Legal system.
This study attempts to transcend both the practical study of the Legal 
system and the broadly abstracted inquiry into the Law as a philosophical or 
rhetorical concept.  This effort is motivated by the practical reality that there is no 
organized body of legal rhetorical scholarship.  To be fair, there are some strongly 
aligned areas of interest such as the Law and Literature movement, which show 
great promise as a disciplinary movement.  However, cross-citation between legal 
and communication scholars is relatively rare.15  Moreover, when communication 
scholars do focus on legal rhetorical topics, their attention span is limited to a 
history of Brown v. Board of Education. See Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: A Rhetorical 
Perspective (ed. Clarke Rountree) Lanham, MD.: Lexington Press, 2004.
14
 The Law and Literature movement represents various investigations into the relationship between 
literary theory and legal discourse.  Representative scholarship includes Sanford V. Levinson and 
Stephen Mailloux. Interpreting Law and Literature. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 
1988; Sanford V. Levinson, "Law as Literature." Texas Law Review (1982) 60: 373-402; Robert A. 
Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre." Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 
(1990) 2: 201-219; Robert A. Ferguson, “Story and Transcription in the Trial of John Brown." Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities (1994) 6: 37.
15
 William Lewis and Clarke Rountree’s debate on the proper role of a rhetorical critic in legal 
rhetoric in the Southern Communication Journal, for example, received no attention from any law 
review author.  William Lewis, “Of Innocence, Exclusion, and the Burning of Flags: The Romantic 
Realism of the Law,” Southern Communication Journal 60 (1994): 4-21; Rountree, “On the 
Rhetorical Analysis of Judicial Discourse and More: A Response to Lewis,” (1995).
10
special issue of a scholarly journal.16  With very few exceptions, the leading 
communication scholars in legal rhetoric are just as active in other areas of 
inquiry.17  In short, true interdisciplinary scholarship on legal rhetoric is rare.
The problem is not just a lack of scholarly output.  Rhetorical scholars often 
examine different aspects of the Legal system or the rhetorical notion of Law.  
Likewise, legal scholars have produced plenty of analyses that adopt rhetorical 
perspectives.  The problem is a lack of a coherent theoretical structure in which to 
order the multiplicity of studies in Law’s rhetorical nature.  Without any framework 
within which to place these references, there is little hope of organizing those 
insights into a growing body of scholarship on legal rhetoric.  This dissertation 
proposes such a framework.
D. A Question of Legitimacy
The benefit of a better organized scholarly framework for investigating 
legal rhetoric is a better informed public.  Modern courts only wield suasory force 
concurrently with the public’s perception of legitimacy.  The historical evolution of 
legal systems explains why modern Legal systems that rely on the cooperation of 
democratically-minded citizens are in trouble when those citizens become 
disengaged from the legal process.  Modern notions of Law and Legal have 
evolved in vastly different ways.  Whereas citizens now have an exceedingly 
personal relationship with Law, their relationship with most Legal systems is 
surprisingly distant.  Ironically, ancient cultures operated in a precisely opposite 
fashion.  Individual citizens were quite comfortable within the Legal system, but 
much more removed from older religious based models of Law.  The difference 
may be a consequence of the rise of the professional legal advocate.
16
 Special issues of the communication journals have focused on the work of James Boyd White, 
Chaim Perelman, and critical legal discourse.  Southern Communication Journal 60 (1994): 1-86; 
Argumentation and Advocacy 30 (1994): 191-247; Legal Studies 17 (1994): 341-436.
17
 Marouf Hasian and Trevor Parry-Giles both focus on presidential rhetoric.  Clarke Rountree is a 
noted Burkean scholar.
11
The following brief review of the history of legal rhetoric as a scholarly and 
professional subject reveals three important points.  First, legal systems are fairly 
“portable” and rarely culturally bound.  What may appear to be a uniquely 
American approach to civil procedure looks very similar to classical legal codes 
used by the Romans.  Second, the rhetorical notion of Law has evolved from a 
statement about a society’s relation with Nature or God into a reflection of the 
individual relations between a citizen and her Law.  Third, the media is an integral 
part of the modern citizen’s interactive relationship with the Law. 
1. Appropriation of Legal Systems.
Legal systems are a ripe source for cultural appropriation.  Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric displayed a “shrewd practical emphasis on technique” inherited from 
Gorgias and the Sophistic tradition.18  Thanks to the cultural preservation efforts of 
the Alexandrian library and the cheerful willingness of the rising Roman Empire to 
appropriate cultural practices from conquered lands, an edited version of Aristotle’s 
system was included with an illustrative canon of great Greek orators as part of a 
standardized form of legal and oratorical training throughout the Roman Empire. 
Like the Greeks, the Romans saw little reason to differentiate the discourse
of the legal system from the art of public oratory.  From 100 B.C. to 500 A.D., the 
Roman Empire promoted a consistent method of education that trained future civic 
leaders in legal and political rhetoric.  The Roman Empire’s propagation of a 
system of laws based on this standard legal training in turn preserved Aristotle’s 
fundamental rhetorical assumptions about proof, audience, and other rhetorical 
notions.  Roman law reflected these rhetorical assumptions by adopting systems of 
proof and contract administration that could be used by any of the diverse peoples 
that made up the Empire.  Under the codified Roman legal tradition, rules of 
procedure calcified organizational tropes, burdens of proof, and appropriate 
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discursive roles for advocates, witnesses, and tribunals.  This systematic discourse 
was exported to cultures conquered by the Romans and, in the case of the Visigoths 
and the medieval Christian Church, by cultures that succeeded the Roman Empire.
The primary differences between the Roman legal system and the Athenian 
system from which it freely borrowed were in scope and economy.  First, the legal 
discourse of Aristotle’s world was essentially limited to Athens.  There was no 
necessary agreement between city-states like Athens and Sparta on basic legal rules 
or norms.  In contrast, the Roman legal system was much more uniform and 
covered an astonishing swath of geography.  Even where local cultures deviated 
from the Roman legal tradition, the differences are cast into relief largely because 
of the general amount of agreement.  Second, the Athenian legal system was based 
on culturally agreed upon notions of good rhetorical practice.  Litigants plead their 
own case before panels of 200 to 500 citizen-judges each paid less than most day 
laborers for their troubles.  There was no need for specialized discursive rules 
unique to a legal setting.  Hearsay, for example, was disapproved of because 
Athenian society rejected hearsay as reliable evidence in general, not just in legal 
settings.  In contrast, Romans regularly relied upon professionally trained 
advocates who were often rewarded for their mastery of the specific rules of legal 
argumentation.  While the Roman system was clearly less specialized than modern 
legal discourse, it is clear that the rhetorical practices of litigants were much more 
focused than their Athenian forbearers.19  The massive economy of the Roman 
marketplace for conflict resolution demanded specialization.
The creation of the professional legal advocate is another crucial historical 
development in legal rhetoric.  In the Golden Age of Athens, citizens were 
expected to prosecute their own civil or criminal matters without the assistance of 
19
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the state or legal counsel.20 In the Roman Republic, the legal representation of a 
fellow citizen was an honor for which payment was unnecessary.21  By the 
seventeenth century, legal advocacy had evolved into a highly lucrative profession 
with enough status to become an object of Shakespearean satire.22  As legal 
discourse has progressively become the domain of trained professional legal 
advocates, common citizens have fewer opportunities to contemplate and judge 
legal language for themselves.  Interestingly, the pedantic relationship between 
legal and rhetorical training has been downplayed by legal historians, although 
lawyers have historically shown an interest in communication training.23
Legal professionalization combines with complicated political structures to 
make the Legal system too complicated for the average lay citizen.24  Consider 
English law as an object of study.  The historian of English law will encounter not 
only three superior courts of common law, but also the Chancery, Star Chamber, 
and High Commission, as well as ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, and a 
multiplicity of local and regional jurisdictions.  Moreover, across common law 
courts, judges could develop significantly different understandings of the scope of 
the law they administered.25  It is no wonder that rules of procedure in the 
expansive English system of law were so formal.  Formality breeds consistency 
regardless of the makeup of a legal audience.  In contrast, a rhetorical approach 
20
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does consider the particular situation of the audience.  Rhetoric became 
increasingly less important than procedure in formal British legal training.  
Does such formality replace the personal and civic involvement of legal 
rhetoric’s Sicilian roots?  British legal scholar S.M. Phillips explains in his essay on 
circumstantial evidence that “the principles of evidence are founded on our 
observations on human conduct, on common life, and living manners: they are not 
just because they are rules of law; but they are rules of law because they are just 
and reasonable.”26  Phillips’ conclusion that a rule of conduct, to be good, must be 
so on general grounds, acknowledges that any rule must be understood in reference 
to the state of society in which the citizenry is placed.27  Ever the optimist, Phillips 
concluded that “[h]appily, the wholesome state of British morals does not require 
that men should be convicted on any evidence but that which is established by law, 
and warranted by sound reason.”28  However, not all societies enjoy such a 
presumption of morality or homogeneous cultural understanding of a central notion 
of morality.  Accordingly, rhetorical scholars should be ready to distinguish 
between the Legal system that presumes cultural consensus and the underlying 
principles of Law that do enjoy a rough societal consensus.
2. Segregating the Law from the Legal.
Friedrich von Von Hayek comments that if ancient law was understood to 
have been “discovered” by legal rhetoricians and medieval law “delivered” by God, 
then law after the Scientific Revolution might be understood as “created” by man.29
Von Hayek argues that it is no accident that we still use the same word “Law” for 
the invariable rules which govern nature and for the rules which govern men’s 
26
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conduct: both were initially conceived independently of human will.30  Von 
Hayek’s overall point notwithstanding, legal rules and procedures are not 
necessarily man-made Law, but often mere attempts by societies to adhere to 
authority in a predictable manner whether the Law is inspired by divinity or 
democracy.  There is a distinction between the Law and the Legal, as is aptly 
demonstrated by the cultural appropriation of legal codes without acceptance of the 
underlying Law.
A serious consequence of the Roman appropriation of Greek legal rhetoric 
was the segregation of the Legal from the Law.  The Romans, like any appropriator 
of legal codes or other language, did not intend to adopt the Greek hierarchy of 
authority that constitutes the Law.  Roman citizens might have turned to Greek 
literature for wisdom, but not binding authority.  Thus, a distinction between the 
Legal and the Law becomes evident.  Consider the development of the modern 
Catholic Church, which has employed a series of different legal codes, but 
continues to support a religious-based version of authority in its Law.  In contrast, 
many Western secular democracies have replaced religious authority for the Law 
with a popular-rule based notion of Law.  At the same time, the popular- based 
notions of Law may employ Legal systems (including texts, lexicons, or logical 
structures) that date back to Roman and early Church-based societies.
Scholarship that ignores the distinction between Law and the Legal risks 
following Von Hayek’s mistaken assumption that human will created both the Law 
and the Legal.  While, in fact, people may acquiesce to any given Legal system, 
such a system is a creation of an intersection of culture, politics, and historical 
30 Id. 73.  It bears mentioning that some scholars still argue that U.S. constitutional law remains pre-
modern and therefore no man-made.  For example, see Samuel P. Huntingdon, American Politics: 
The Promise of Disharmony, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1981.  In practice, even Professor 
Huntingdon would be hard pressed to argue that the entire text of the U.S. Constitution is treated 
with religious reverence. Rather, some Americans (and perhaps most Americans) treat certain
Constitutional concepts with reverence.  Compare the First Amendment to the latest: the protection 
of political dissent is treated differently by citizens than the ability of Congress to give itself pay 
raises. 
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chance.  Citizens of modern day Louisiana are no more responsible for creating the 
State of Louisiana’s legal system, which is a combination of French civil law and 
American constitutionalism, than they would be responsible for creating the Creole 
language.  Both the system and the language are inherited from previous 
generations.  However, the ever-evolving notion of Law is the responsibility of 
citizens.  Louisianan citizens may use ancient methods of resolving conflicts, but 
they still must address contemporary questions of justice and fairness in their 
deliberations.
3. Missing the Media.
Central to a complete understanding of the relationship between Law, the 
Legal, and citizens is the function of the media.  Diagram 1.1 demonstrates the 
media’s capacity to present real and dramatized conflicts of Law.  Citizens learn 
about the Law in part by observing or participating in the Legal system.  However, 
citizens will learn most of what they know about both the Legal and the Law 
through the media.  Michael Schudson’s argument that news must be understood as 
culture also applies to media coverage of legal disputes.31  Media is an essential 
staple of contemporary civic life, presenting both real and simulated representations 
of conflicts of law.  Under this model, citizens learn more about law from movies, 
television shows, and other forms of simulated mass media than from personal 
experience or formal education.  Yet, there is ample evidence that news reporting 
on legal issues is problematic.  Scholarship on media coverage of U.S. Supreme 
Court cases suggests that journalists fail to understand the significance or particular 
legal meaning of the language of an opinion.32
31
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An underlying assumption of this dissertation is that some measure of 
media analysis is necessary in order to effectively understand how legal 
information is transmitted and evaluated by citizens.  To make arguments about 
how Law operates rhetorically without taking into account any aspect of media’s 
role in that process is to ignore the realities of modern social life.
4. The Emerging Crisis in Legal Communication
The combination of a democratically-centered notion of Law and a 
professionalized Legal system will invariably leave many, if not most, citizens ill 
equipped to understand what is happening in their legal institutions.  A lack of 
understanding and input will lead to questions of the Legal system’s legitimacy.  
For some segments of the U.S. population, the perception may have already set in 
that the courts only serve dominant classes.  For many citizens, the courts represent 
a sort of judicial casino where wealthier or better connected citizens are generally 
given more power.  Jürgen Habermas has spelled out the trouble with a faltering 
legitimacy by public institutions.  That concern is reflected in Hans Hohmann’s 
underappreciated call for a renewed focus on everyday legal language, which is an 
important influence on this dissertation.
a. Legitimacy and the Rhetoric of the Modern Legal System
Legitimacy is the key to a successful legal order.  Law, as Jürgen Habermas 
explains, is “connected from the start with the authorization to coerce” which is 
justified only for the “prevention of a hindrance of freedom.”33  The less a legal 
Prospects." Judicature 75 (1991): 128-142 (quoting journalist Max Friedman as saying that "the 
Supreme Court is the worst reported ... institution in the American system of government").  Richard 
Davis reports that television media coverage of decision announcements is mostly guided by 
preprinted reaction statements distributed outside the Supreme Court by interest group advocates.  
Richard Davis, Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Press, 1994.
33
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Elements of Justice, pt. 1 of The Metaphysics of Morals. trans. John Ladd, New York: Hackett, 
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order is legitimate, or “at least is considered such,” the more other factors such as 
intimidation, circumstantial force, custom, or “sheer habit” are relied upon to 
reinforce the legal order.34  Legitimacy must be obtained on both the individual and 
societal level because a legal order’s claim to legitimacy “can be redeemed only 
through the socially integrative force of the ‘concurring and united free will of all’ 
free and equal citizens.”35  Habermas is certainly not the only scholar interested in 
legitimacy, but his description offers a fairly common understanding of 
legitimacy’s function as a citizen’s check against a political (or legal) order.
Courts require legitimacy in order to function effectively.  Legal 
commentator Neil MacCormick explains that “courts are not self-sustaining 
institutions endowed with legitimacy by their own say so, clothed with might by 
their own bodily vigor.” 36  Instead, courts are “institutions established (however 
informally or formally) by a wider community from which they derive their 
legitimacy and authority as determiners of controversies.”37  Agreeing with 
Habermas’ concern for the legitimacy of institutional discourse of the courts, 
MacCormick observes that “the forcefulness of the orders they issue depends in the 
first instance on acceptance of their authority by those to whom the orders are 
addressed, and in the second instance (relatively later in historical development) on 
acceptance of their authority by enforcement officials who do wield some degree 
(often a considerable degree) of collective might.”38  Legal discourse, without a 
basis in Law, erodes the order needed for effective social discourse to occur in the 
public sphere.  Alfred Phillips, in an effort to reconnect legal institutions to 
democratic government, argues for a bottom-up approach to the validation of law:  
Law produced by the political and adjudication processes in a 
democratic state should in some sense reflect public opinion insofar 
34
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that a citizen might be able to recognize the principles, norms, and 
rules of law as the basis of right and disinterested choices and 
judgments which he might have made reasonably for himself.39
There are difficulties in finding a place for a lay citizen to criticize the Law 
and the Legal.  First, legal discourse has become the language of trained 
professional attorneys, who develop their discursive expertise through advanced 
graduate study and years of specialized practice.  Although the United States leads 
the world in the production of attorneys, most Americans simply are unable to read 
and accurately interpret many legal rules and regulations for themselves.  Even if 
the average citizen could eavesdrop on legal discourse effectively, rule-making 
powers are distributed among thousands of legislatures, judges, agencies, executive 
officers, and committees on the federal, state, and local level.  
Even as public legal institutions become increasingly distanced from the 
citizens who must support them, non-public institutions continue to model private 
rules and regulations on the public institutional models.  Rosemary J. Coombe 
notes that legal systems produce more than just instruments and forums for societal 
problem solving, but they also generate the signs and symbols by which difference 
is given meaning.40  John Rawls intuitively notes a difference between the role of 
justice on the “basic structure” of society and the types of rules and regulations 
relied upon by private institutions like families, churches, labor unions and 
universities.41  These institutions are subject to Law, but not always regulated by 
the Legal system.  As an example, Rawls notes that “while churches can 
39
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excommunicate heretics, they cannot burn them.”42 The central concern is the 
production of “reason” for both public and private institutions.  Rawls differentiates 
between “public reason” and “non-public reason,” noting that whether we are 
acting as citizens or institutional members we all need some recognized way of 
reasoning that contains principles of inference, rules of evidence, and standards of 
truth and correctness.43 Why should a private institution be held to a higher 
standard of accountability to its private, presumably voluntary, members than a 
public legal institution to its citizens?44 Alternatively, if legal discourse 
overwhelms the ordinary citizen’s ability to understand issues of constitutional 
justice, how can individuals know whether the rules of private institutions are 
within the broader notions of justice?  How will churches come to know that 
burning sinners at the stake is not acceptable without resorting to legal institutions?
Legitimacy requires more than just civic obedience.  As Barry Friedman 
observes, “legal legitimacy asks whether the decisions of judges find support in 
existing sources and understandings of law,” while “social legitimacy asks if those 
same decisions are met with acceptance by a substantial part of the public in terms 
of the felt necessities of the time.”45  Friedman’s observation suggests that a legal 
ruling can be legitimate in the first instance by not departing from previous legal 
decisions, but fail the legitimacy test in the second instance by not reflecting the 
public’s current needs.  I would argue that the Law/Legal distinction accounts for 
both the social and legal legitimacy described by Friedman because it differentiates 
popular support for an abstract principle of law, which supports social legitimacy, 
42 Id. 11.
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from the precision with which a judicial tribunal resolved a conflict, a facet that 
reflects legal legitimacy.
b. Hohmann’s Call for a Renewed Focus on Legal Rhetoric.
I believe that rhetorical inquiry can make a difference.  In a review of the 
book Between Facts and Norms, in which Habermas calls for the 
“institutionalization of a legal public sphere that goes beyond the existing culture of 
experts and is sufficiently sensitive to make problematic leading cases the focus of 
public controversies,”46 Hans Hohmann builds a case for focusing on legal rhetoric 
as an exercise in civic engagement, arguing that Habermas’s structural analysis of 
the role of rhetoric in the democratic legal discourse ought to be combined with 
contemporary rhetorical studies that allow for a broader intercultural perspective on 
law.47  This dissertation is motivated in part by Hohmann’s call to action to return 
legal rhetoric back to common citizens.  Specifically, Hohmann calls for a 
synthesis of Habermas’s comprehensive approach with rhetorical studies.  
Hohmann notes that Habermas’s proceduralist paradigm requires him to rely 
heavily on procedural and mechanistic safeguards, but worries that the people who 
engage the safeguards might lack the appropriate rhetorical competence: “How can 
judicial decisions fruitfully be made the focus of public controversy if the public is 
unable to understand either the judges’ written opinions or the critiques of these 
opinions by experts?”48
Consensus in the public sphere is hardly agreement insofar as participants 
may continue to disagree about any particular argument in the abstract.  They only 
find consensus on the argumentative contest at hand.49  The law is meant to be a 
46 Hohmann, "Rhetoric in the Public Sphere and the Discourse of Law and Democracy," (1998).
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“way in which people can live together in spite of their differences.”50 James Boyd 
White describes the judicial opinion as a “continuing and collective process of 
conversation and judgment,” rather than an isolated exercise in power.”51  He notes 
that one judicial opinion becomes the material for arguments in a future case, 
which results in a continuous cycle of “opening and closure, argument and 
judgment.”52  Likewise, the consensus does not require the abandonment of legal 
discourse.  As Sanford Levinson notes, legal discourse can be formative: 
“Constitutional law provides a public vocabulary absolutely necessary to 
understanding the nature of political discourse within our society.”53
The very elements that make the Law so slippery in meaning also allow it to 
provide an agreeable basis for decision-making among parties seeking closure.  
Doxtader notes that consensus-seeking strategies can often use rhetorically 
ambiguous agreements that have no practical effect other than to demonstrate 
cooperation between parties.  In contrast, Walter Fisher described the failure of the 
efforts to avoid the American Civil War through the 1861 Compromise as a result 
of no room for deliberative rhetoric: “[i]n deliberative councils dialectical issues 
are resolved by a decisive vote of like-minded men, by avoiding or shifting the 
issues, or by disruption of the organization.”54 The procedural deliberations of 
Congress are one of the best practical examples of legal discourse occurring outside 
of a courtroom.  Fisher’s analysis is also a good example of the mechanical aspects 
of legal discourse overwhelming the capacity of citizens to avoid the Civil War.
The citizen’s concern is not that the Law is accurate and satisfactory, but 
that it remains open to change.  As Habermas explains, in order for a legal norm to 
be valid, the state must offer two basic guarantees simultaneously: “on the one 
50
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hand, the state ensures average compliance, compelled by sanctions if necessary; 
on the other hand, it guarantees the institutional preconditions for the legitimate 
genesis of the norm itself, so that it is always at least possible to comply out of 
respect for the law.55 The public can evaluate the “institutional preconditions” only 
if it commands some understanding of the rhetorical process by which legal 
opinions are created.  Accordingly, Hohmann raises awareness of the need to 
educate the general public in the ways of legal rhetoric.  He argues that what is 
required is a “well developed and ultimately teachable theoretical framework for 
the rhetorical criticism of judicial discourse.”56  Hohmann suggests that such a 
theory should contain elements of classical rhetoric, use Habermas’s notion of 
procedural legitimacy, and not shy away from discussing substantive values.  
Hohmann argues that legal jargon is not the greatest barrier to public 
deliberation of key legal issues, but rather the “dried-up and bleached-out nature of 
rationalistic academic discourse that is purged of explicit personal and affective 
elements and thus of any recognizable human context.”57  Nevertheless, jargon has 
the potential to exclude minority groups that lack the linguistic competence to 
participate in legal forums.  Surely this phenomenon occurs in a variety of non-
legal situations, but Habermas’s concerns here are paramount because of the central 
role of law in a discursive community.  The danger is that Americans will learn 
about their legal rights and obligations through a distorted social context, leaving 
them unprepared to make legal decisions on their own.  
No better example of the common citizen’s unerring belief in the evocative 
power of legal language exists than the standard “cease and desist” letter.  Such a 
55
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letter demonstrates the citizen’s “belief that lawyers’ language was the right 
medium, given the nature and gravity of his grievances.”58 What the reliance on the 
cease-and-desist letter does not teach the average citizen is how to resolve a 
conflict without the use of an overt threat whether litigation or criminal indictment.  
Law becomes a metaphor indistinguishable from power, losing the sense of 
communal consensus in that transformation. Phillips, in an effort to reconnect legal 
institutions to democratic government, argues for a bottom-up approach to the 
validation of law:  Law produced by the political and adjudication processes in a 
democratic state should in some sense reflect public opinion; a citizen must be able 
to recognize the principles, norms, and rules of law as the basis of right and 
disinterested choices and judgments which he might have made reasonably for 
himself.59  In a sense, the gap between democratic participation and judicial 
independence might be found at the intersection of law and rhetoric.  
Although the crisis of legal communication affects a variety of academic 
and professional fields, the most promising source of a resolution of this crisis is in 
the application of rhetorical principles.  First, the American model of speech 
communication has long been grounded in notions of civic duty.60  Learning to be 
an effective communicator allows one to become a more effective citizen.  The 
same notion applies to the subset of legal communication, given the practical 
importance of communication skills to the profession.  Second, rhetoric has an 
ancient and compelling relationship with legal studies.  The two disciplines share a 
common historical DNA.  A combination of classical and contemporary rhetorical 
theories should easily fit within the framework of legal practice, given the close 
proximity of both fields.  A rhetorically centered understanding of how citizens can 
actively and effectively participate in the legal rule-making process reinforces the 
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importance of civic engagement in all public affairs.  If citizens cannot have a 
critical conversation about the legal system soon, the laws that are produced from 
those systems will be largely irrelevant to the needs of most citizens.  
The solution to the increasing gap between legal discourse and civic 
understanding undoubtedly contains many elements.  However, we might reduce 
the general features of an effective solution to the following elements: first, a 
public that is better educated in legal rhetoric; second, a media that is more 
effective in reporting legal developments; and third, a legal system that is more 
responsive the foregoing needs of the public and the media.  In all of these 
elements, the ability of legal discourse to produce precise, appropriate, and flexible 
statements of law should be preserved.  In other words, a distinction must be made 
between the discourse of the legal system and the rhetoric of the broader social 
conception of law.
In English, law means rules and standards as well as the enveloping system 
that applies those rules and standards.  At first, this might seem unfortunate and 
leading to ambiguity.  After all, the French have le loi (rules and regulations) and le 
droit (the system of control).61  If one were to describe the law as a language, le loi 
would describe the text and le droit might be the system.  A similar trouble occurs 
when defining the term rhetoric, which could mean the particular way of talking 
(e.g., the use of rhetorical devices like metaphors and repetition) or an entire 
system of talk (e.g., the Rhetoric of the New Deal).  Although arguments some 
times erupt over the failure of modern rhetorical scholars to recall Classical 
rhetorical structures, rhetorical scholars have largely accepted that the notion of 
rhetoric has a plurality of meanings and definitions that all have something to do 
with symbol use.  
On an entirely practical level, a definition of legal rhetoric that includes 
both le loi and le droit holds one accountable to the law regardless of how difficult 
61
 Of course, the French also use le juste to describe the justness and the fairness of a proposition. 
A. Phillips, 164.
26
it may be to understand as a layperson.  Not as obvious is the corollary that the 
system itself is symbolic of the better efforts of the society that approves of it.  As 
an example,  John W. Halderman described two significant factors of the United 
Nations Charter: first, “the Charter, as originally written and adopted, was never 
anything more than the framework of a potential system;” and second, the Charter 
“nevertheless did, and still does, constitute such a potential framework.”62  For the 
U.N. Charter, or any system of law to function, Halderman argued that the concept 
must be “grounded in a basic frame of mind in which the [people’s] concerned 
desire to do justice as among themselves, have a common notion of what they mean 
by justice, and general agreement as to how to go about securing it.”63  The most 
effective “rule of law,” argued Halderman, is not the substantive content or the 
consistency with which the rules are applied.64  Instead, the decisive factor is the 
“nature of the effort made, and seen to be made, on the part of the competent 
authorities to achieve justice through the equal and dispassionate application of law 
and principle.”65  The goal of “rule of law” is the “development of the requisite 
degree of public confidence in the ‘system’ being sought after.”66  Thus, in 
critiquing the U.N. Charter, Halderman admits that the “particular form of a legal 
order envisioned at San Francisco proved unworkable … however, the principles 
themselves are more important than any question of form.  They are flexible, 
capable of being adapted to use in varying situations and thus of playing their 
essential role, in terms of political realities, in the development of a dynamic 
system capable of maintaining peace and security in an evolving world.”67
By acknowledging the capacity of legal rhetoric to reflect the democratic 
aspirations of a lay public as well as the systematic effort to interpret and enforce 
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those wishes, any study of legal rhetoric can be reduced to a dual faceted 
distinction.  Following Cherwitz and Hikins’ notion of rhetoric as the “use of 
language to describe reality” as a starting point, one might suggest that Law is the 
“use of language to describe justice.”68  This dissertation proposes a rhetorical 
understanding of Law as a pool of argumentative resources available to engage in 
descriptions of justice that are supported by a rough societal consensus.  McGee 
might describe the Law as an ideograph, or a short hand for an ideologically 
centered worldview, but this project would broaden that definition to allow Law to 
serve as a reservoir of other justice-related ideographs.  For example, the Law may 
enjoy a rough societal consensus supporting the principle that individuals facing 
societal punishment ought to be able to defend themselves.  There are plenty of 
variations as to how this principle might be used, but it clearly has a place in the 
pool of argumentative resources available when discussing a matter of justice.
In contrast, the Legal rules and regulations that are put into place by 
authoritative figures to enact the Law do not generally enjoy societal consensus.  In 
fact, the very nature of the discourse and the underlying system encourages Legal 
discourse to become specialized, elitist, and most importantly, efficient.  At the 
same time, the Legal must be responsive to the fact that the American style of legal 
conflict resolution often asks lay citizens to do their own legal analysis and make 
their own legal arguments.  Any citizen faced with the difficult decision to contest a 
traffic ticket is placed in this very dilemma.  Moreover, legal discourses are also 
generated by private institutions that simulate the legal discourse of the public legal 
system.  Credit card holders attempting to argue their way of out late payment 
penalties invariably find themselves at the mercy of one of these private legal 
discourses.  The general rules of public Law still apply to private legal discourses 
but, without a system that ensures that the Legal discourse reflects the rough 
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consensus of the Law, there is little to prevent a private or public rule-making 
institution from running roughshod over citizens.
The Law/Legal Distinction is strictly a rhetorical argument, not a legal one.  
Few citizens, outside of Hollywood screenplays, will ever win a legal ruling by 
appealing to general notions of fairness.  Those arguments might work with a jury, 
but a staggering array of legal arguments must be made long before citizens would 
ever get to that point.  The rub is that the distinction, although based on rhetorical 
perspectives, is not rhetorical in the pejorative sense.  Rather, the Law/Legal 
distinction can be substantive.  An argument about whether something is legal is 
grounded in axiology and applied perspectives.  In contrast, a lawful argument is 
about the world of possibilities.  The difference in rhetorical grounding can be 
illustrated by a trial court’s consideration of questions of fact and questions of law.  
A question of fact, in legal parlance, is usually left to a jury (or a judge acting as a 
jury in a bench trial) to determine.  However, a judge is free to base a decision 
about a question of law on imagined realities.  In many U.S. Supreme Court oral 
arguments, the justices question the attorneys about absurd hypotheticals in order to 
probe the limits of a question of law.  Geoffrey Samuel also critiques the 
assumption that knowledge of law can be contained in the knowledge of the rules.69
He argues effectively that such a rule-model epistemological assumption fails for 
lack of considering the construction of facts.  He argues that cases are not based on 
real facts, but “virtual” facts.  In fact, he argues, the object of legal science is the 
construction of legal model of facts.
As a consequence of this different rhetorical grounding, legal and lawful 
arguments are invoked by distinctive argumentative personas.  Legal woes are 
suffered by cognizable individuals who have suffered an injury capable of remedy.  
The scope of the issues is limited, theoretically, to the facts available in the private 
instance.  In the U.S. Supreme Court case of University of California Board of 
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Regents v. Bakke, the petitioner’s identity as a rejected white medical school 
applicant is crucial to the legal application of equal protection rules developed by 
the Court.70  In contrast, the lawful argument requires a broader argumentative 
personae because the issues are of public concern.  In Bakke, that same white 
petitioner must also invoke the larger argumentative personae of any political 
minority for his argument against “reverse discrimination” to have merit.  In the 
modern U.S. system, the large class action lawsuit offers an excellent laboratory for 
examining the differences between public and private disputes.  At one level, each 
class action litigant must demonstrate eventually that she or he has the standing to 
be a plaintiff.  However, the class of plaintiffs must also demonstrate why their 
individual claims should be taken up by the courts as one collective action.
However distinctive the lawful might be from the legal, the modern public 
is rarely provided with the opportunity to see the distinction.  The typical American 
usually only encounters the legal side of the justice system.  A citizen might receive 
a parking ticket, for example, as a consequence of parking too close to a fire 
hydrant.  The citizen can either pay the ticket or appeal the citation.  In order to 
appeal, the citizen must follow a set of court procedures that usually requires filing 
appropriate paperwork within the proper amount of time and appearing for a 
grievance hearing.  Purportedly, the average citizen would wade through all of 
these legal rules and procedures and finally encounter “the law” in the form of a 
judge.  Yet before the citizen-complainant can argue about the speciousness of the 
fire-hydrant law, she will have to rise when the judge enters the courtroom, wait to 
begin her argument, remember to address the judge with all of the proper 
formalities, and be prepared for the judge to interrupt her presentation with 
questions.  Imagine her frustration when the judge hands down his decision that 
expresses sympathy for her argument, but notes his powerlessness in overturning 
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traffic laws.  In order for her to get an opportunity to see a judge talk about the 
Law, rather than the Legal, she will have to appeal to a higher court.
In sum, the Law/Legal Distinction is worth paying attention to because Law 
and the Legal perform different rhetorical functions.  While some languages 
condense the two concepts into the word “Law,” rhetorical scholars would do well 
to keep the distinction in mind.  In the next section, the proposed methodology of 
this project will incorporate the Law/Legal Distinction into a media analysis, 
allowing scholars to ground the rhetorical perspective with a clear understanding of 
how citizens receive their law. 
E. Introducing the Methodology and Artifact
This project searched for answers to the following three questions in Gratz 
v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, a set of companion cases on affirmative
action handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003:
(1) The Legal System:  How is the legal system constituted in the text?
(2) The Law:  What principles at Law are in conflict in the text?
(3) The Media: What can citizens learn from media coverage of a text? 
While these questions are relevant for analyzing any item of legal text, these two 
particular Supreme Court decisions are appropriate artifacts of study for at least 
three reasons.  First, the topic of affirmative action has received enough media 
coverage to be familiar to most consumers.  In that sense, the general topic is more 
approachable than other recent court decisions.  Second, the nature of the dispute, 
whether a state is constitutionally justified in using racial classifications in higher 
education admissions, relies on a line of constitutional argument that is much easier 
to decipher by the average lay citizen than most legal analyses.  Finally, there is 
little need to make emerging scholars in legal rhetoric familiarize themselves with 
new areas of law for every article they review.  Indeed, rhetorical critics are also 
citizens.  A model of legal rhetorical criticism ought not require that critics become 
doctrinal experts in the area of law that a judicial decision inhabits.  
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U.S. Supreme Court discourse is representative of legal rhetoric in general.  
Indeed, the language employed by the Supreme Court is cited by thousands of 
lower courts and courts from other jurisdictions.  From a critical standpoint, the 
main benefit of a Supreme Court opinion is the number of authors involved in its 
ultimate form.  Any given decision is a product of input from dozens of attorneys, 
from the attorneys litigating the case, the various judges making rulings, and the 
judicial clerks assisting in the research and drafting of the opinion.  While the 
appellate practitioners may not reflect the typical legal discourse of the average 
courthouse, there are enough similarities to justify using Supreme Court cases as 
illustrative examples.
This study tracks the Law/Legal distinction by examining what arguments 
and rhetorical elements of the decisions are reported by three U.S. newspapers 
covering the Gratz and Grutter cases.  First, I assess the major legal discursive 
arguments in the case.  In a fully realized analysis, this stage would require the 
review of all majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions of the Court, as well as 
the briefs of the litigants and any “friends of the Court”—not to mention the 
massive record of litigation in the underlying cases.  For the sake of simplicity, this 
project limits its survey of the leading legal arguments to the majority, concurring, 
and dissenting opinions in these two cases. The first question can be answered by 
first comparing the results of my analysis in stage one (identifying the architectural 
and cultural variables) with the media reporting of those same variables.  The 
relative emphasis of the news reporting of each variable will help establish which 
arguments the public was intended to view as more or less important.  In addition, 
the correlation between media strategic framing in general and the coverage may be 
illuminating.  Thus, the “legal” analysis includes three aspects: first, a general 
tabulation of different arguments advanced by different opinion writers; second, an 
examination of some rhetorical features that emphasize the architecture of the 
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Legal system; and third, an examination of some rhetorical features that emphasize 
the culture of the Legal system.  
Second, I analyze the issues of Law, which involve addressing the 
underlying legal principles in conflict within the cases.  By evaluating the language 
of the majority opinion in two companion cases addressing the constitutionality of 
affirmative action programs in higher education, this study will identify the general 
principles such as the importance of diversity in education, the appropriateness of 
state-sponsored racial classifications, or what constitutes diversity.  Note that these 
terms reflect the Court’s constitutional lexicon for cases involving equal protection 
questions.  Therefore, the second question can be answered by comparing the 
results of my analysis in stage two (identifying the principles of Law in conflict) 
with the media reporting of those same conflicts.  Like the legal analysis stage, the 
media’s relative emphasis of the principles may be revealed through the placement 
of the references within the story.  In addition, the correlation between media issue 
framing in general and the coverage may be illuminating.
Most scholarship in legal rhetoric essentially stops at this point, preferring 
to describe the relationship between the Law and the Legal in a variety of 
methodologically sound ways.  While there are great lessons to be learned from 
essentially descriptive analyses of the interplay between legal rules and their 
underlying social or democratic justifications, this dissertation asks scholars to 
make a connection between the language of the law and legal systems with the 
citizens who tacitly or actively affirm the legitimacy of the legal order.  Most 
people learn about law from exposure to television and other media of popular 
culture, not from direct experience.71
The third question is answered through a compilation of data from all three 
stages.  Initially, the strategic framing analysis will suggest some lessons for 
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citizens. The final stage of this analysis tracks media coverage of the Court’s 
decisions.  Using a content analysis method derived from an unpublished pilot 
project, this study examines which arguments are being passed along to media 
consumers by newspapers at the national, regional, and local level and measure the 
general framing of the coverage.  Specifically, I track references to strategic, 
narrative, and issue framing.  In addition, I attempt to measure how many 
arguments and issues identified in the first two stages were actually reported by 
media.  Most importantly, the media coverage can reveal what the citizen’s role is 
in the conflict.  If there is a heavy emphasis on covering the stage one (Legal) 
aspects of the case, to the detriment of coverage of stage two (Law) issues, citizens 
understand that they have a limited role in evaluating the conflict.
The results of this analysis will also provide support for suggesting 
alternative approaches to covering legal conflicts.  If the data suggest that citizens 
are essentially removed from the conflict through media coverage, that data will 
provide some basis for an alternative mode of reporting that focuses on different 
variables more relevant to citizen’s needs in evaluating legal conflicts.
F. Conclusions and Preview of Remaining Chapters
To summarize, the central question of this study is how can rhetorical 
scholarship help citizens become better critics of the law?  The question is 
premised on Hans Hofmann’s call for more research on what keeps citizens from 
becoming effectively engaged with the legal process.  This study takes one modest 
step towards that goal by establishing a general framework for organizing 
scholarship in legal rhetoric and using the Law/Legal Distinction as the central 
facet of that organizational schema.  In addition, my objective is to demonstrate 
how media analysis can be incorporated into a regular part of a legal rhetorical 
analysis. 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation accomplish the following tasks:
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Chapter Two introduces readers to Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. 
Bollinger as the primary artifacts of this study and offers a general discussion of the 
legal, political, and cultural background of these cases.72  In particular, I briefly 
review the Court’s prior ruling in Bakke v. Regents of California, which was the 
Court’s last major ruling on affirmative action.  This chapter also contains a review 
of the major arguments forwarded by the opinion writers in Gratz and Grutter, 
which will subsequently be tracked in the media coverage analysis.
Chapters Three and Four deal respectively with the proposed analyses of 
the Legal system and the Law by first reviewing relevant research literature and 
then applying the analyses described in this chapter to the Gratz and Grutter 
opinions.  Chapter Three reviews the variables relating to legal architecture and 
culture and Chapter Four examines the principles in conflict, all of which will be 
tracked in the media coverage analysis.
Chapter Five describes the attitudinal variables (strategic, narrative, and 
issue framing) that are tracked in the media coverage analysis.
Finally, Chapter Six reports findings of the media coverage analysis that 
will incorporate elements from Chapters Three through Five.  This chapter also 
draws conclusions about whether the media coverage is distorted in favor of the 
Law or the Legal issues, what framing technique is predominant, and which 
arguments and rhetorical features of the cases are more likely to be transmitted to 
citizens.  In addition, Chapter Six contains recommendations on what 
improvements or adjustments might make media coverage of legal disputes more 
helpful to citizens taking a critical posture towards the Legal system.
Despite this introductory chapter’s critique of the exclusion of citizens from 
the legal system, the end goal of this process is not to simplify the legal process, 
72
 Note that in lieu of a single literature review, the appropriate references will be reviewed within 
each Chapter.
35
however laudable that goal might be.  Fuller’s comparison of the law to the weather 
is appropriate: 
For the man in the street or in the field the most common response 
to law is a gesture of helplessness and indifference … It may be said 
that through reactions to the law—like those toward the weather—
may be complex and subtle, but there is nothing about the notion of 
law itself that suggests such qualities.  Individual laws, to be sure, 
may be complicated and forbiddingly so, with their endless 
paragraphs, their “aforesaid’s” and “provided however’s” But about 
the notion of law itself there is no mystery.  Everybody knows what 
it is and why it exists.”73
The system for reporting on weather is necessarily complex and would not 
benefit from the regular intervention of amateurs.  However, the complexity of the 
Legal system should not prevent citizens from understanding the impact of its 
decisions.  Just as a farmer does not need a degree in meteorology in order to speak 
intelligently about the weather, citizens do not need a professional education in 
legal discourse and procedure to be effective critics of the law.  What is needed is 
some degree of transparency within the Legal system and some degree of 
accountability by the media for its news coverage and dramatic depictions of legal 
conflicts.  The methodological structure described in this study is one way to gauge 
the transparency of the Legal system and its coverage by the media.  More 
centrally, this notion of a Law/Legal Distinction can aid any critic, whether a 
rhetorical scholar or a lay citizen, in evaluating legal texts.
73
 Lon F. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968, 6.
36
Chapter II: Artifact
Legal anthropologist Stephane Palmié explains that a U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion is but one narrative that amounts to a “thinly spread icing on a thickly 
layered cake of stories.  Cutting into this heteroglossic cake is a modest 
archeological task.” 74 This dissertation relies on two simultaneously written and 
released U.S. Supreme Court decisions styled respectively, Gratz v. Bollinger75 and 
Grutter v. Bollinger,76 to draw broad conclusions about the rhetorical character of 
law and the relationship between law, legal systems, and citizenship.
A. Overview  
As Palmié suggests, the decisions only represent a small part of the entire 
legal dispute.  However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the two cases 
demonstrate the rhetorical distinctions to be found between Law, the Legal system, 
and the Media.  The cases revolved, respectively, around the University of 
Michigan undergraduate and law school admissions programs.  The two cases 
afforded the Court the opportunity to address whether and how state-funded 
educational institutions can use race-based classification programs like affirmative 
action to promote racial and ethnic diversity.  The legal basis for the decisions rests 
with the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
which guarantees equal protection of the law to all citizens.77  Handing down both 
decisions on June 23, 2003, the Court ultimately upheld the law school’s 
admissions program, but found the undergraduate system to be unconstitutional.  
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As with any study, the use of a limited data sample to make broad claims 
must be carefully justified.  This chapter will first discuss why U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions are generally appropriate artifacts for the study of legal rhetoric.  In the 
process, the basic structure of the court and the “rhetoric of its decisions” are 
reviewed. Second, because any rhetorical analysis of a legal text requires some 
basic familiarity with the underlying legal issues, this Chapter will expose the 
reader to the legal issues at play in Gratz and Grutter.  That review includes the 
basic jurisprudential background of racial classifications in American constitutional 
law as well as the specific issues discussed and arguments made by the Justices in 
the two cases.  
B. Using U.S. Supreme Court Decisions as Rhetorical Artifacts
If we understand “legal rhetoric” as “the use of language to describe 
reality,” then at some level we must justify using U.S. Supreme Court opinions as 
rhetorical artifacts that are representative of that language use.78  Generally, the 
Court’s rhetoric is unique within the legal system.  Most legal disputes do not go to 
trial, let alone reach an appellate court.  Indeed, most legal rhetoric is generated in 
non-litigative disputes that are well beyond the domain of a judiciary.  More to the 
point, scholars should be able to assess any legal text to gain insights into legal 
rhetoric.  As Levinson notes, every case, and every opinion in every case, studied 
in a law school classroom is an example of the on-the-wall “thinking like a 
lawyer.”79
However, Supreme Court opinions, along with sensationalistic or celebrity-
driven trials, tend to receive more media coverage than the aggregate of so-called 
normal legal disputes.80  Similarly, rhetorical scholars have shown much more 
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interest in Supreme Court opinions than legal texts generated by other rule-making 
institutions.  The answer to the question of why journalists and rhetorical scholars 
are interested in Supreme Court opinions is straightforward, Supreme Court 
opinions are viewed as more important and influential than the decisions of another 
rule-making institution, such as the state motor vehicle board, for example.  The 
rest of this section examines why the Court is considered to be so influential. 
1. Structure of the U.S. Supreme Court
First, a short description of the Supreme Court’s place in the U.S. judicial system 
may be helpful.  The Court is the highest court of the land for most federal issues, 
subject to the approval of Congress.  Indeed, Congress maintains the power to limit 
the reach of the Supreme Court’s decision-making authority through legislation.  
However, Congress has chosen to give the Supreme Court a vast amount of 
discretionary authority to issue writs of certiorari to cases it deems important 
enough to decide, managing its case load in the process.  The Court generally hears 
appeals from two sets of courts: the federal courts of appeal and the various state 
supreme courts.  The federal courts of appeals are divided topically and 
geographically into thirteen circuits.81  One basis for filing for a Supreme Court 
appeal is a disagreement among the circuit courts regarding the proper 
interpretation or application of a point of law.  Generally, most disagreements 
among the circuits are resolved once a majority of the circuits have adopted a 
particular interpretation of a law, although substantive difference between circuits 
can exist for decades.  The effect is that a federal district (trial) court in one district 
may be forced to apply a different legal standard than a federal district court in a 
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neighboring state.82  The Court’s various doctrines related to its review of state 
supreme court judgments are outside the scope of this project.
The diversity of state and federal trial and appellate courts raises the 
question of why the U.S. Supreme Court merits attention.  Most cases barely reach 
trial, let alone the U.S. Supreme Court. By using only the text of two companion 
Supreme Court cases to illustrate the distinction between what constitutes the Law 
in a rhetorical sense and what constitutes the Legal system, this dissertation is using 
an absurdly discrete data sample.  The modern U.S. Supreme Court only releases 
approximately seventy decisions a year, often with multiple opinions and dissents.  
Moreover, the scope of the federal judiciary produces thousands of written legal 
decisions every year.  A minimally representative sample of legal texts might also 
include the reported opinions of state trial and appellate courts as well.  Even with 
all of that text, we still have hardly touched the legislative and executive rules and 
regulations propagated by the federal and state governments.  A comprehensive 
discussion about legal rhetoric would invariably have to examine the law making 
systems of other countries and perhaps the hundreds of thousands of private rule-
making institutions.  Finally, there are millions of written and oral legal agreements 
between private parties in effect every day.  Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, in 
the grand scope of law, are paltry and inadequate as a representative sample of 
legal texts in general.83
There is some question of whether the discourse of the Supreme Court even 
reflects ordinary legal talk.  Even when legal disputes do reach trial, the types of 
82
 For example, the conflict between the Fifth Circuit and other federal circuits over whether states 
can justify racial classifications on the basis of increasing classroom diversity ultimately convinced 
the Court to address the two Michigan cases studied here.  Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 
(5th Cir. 1996) (finding no justification for race-based classifications in admissions program at the 
University of Texas School of Law); Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding race-based classifications permissible in the admissions program for the 
University of Washington Law School).
83
 Cass Sunstein questions whether Supreme Court opinions are more important on a practical level 
or a symbolic level.  Cass R. Sunstein, “Incommensurability and Valuation in Law,”  Michigan Law 
Review 92 (1994): 779-861.
40
legal communication present there only barely resemble the discourse of the 
Supreme Court.  The argumentative protocols at the trial level are simply different 
than the matters before any appellate court.  In most jurisdictions, appellate courts 
have a separate code of appellate procedure.  Like any court, the Supreme Court 
has its own set of written and unwritten rules regarding the appearance of attorneys, 
filing and briefing procedures, and even appropriate behavior during the hearing of 
a matter.  Few courtrooms are conducted with the sort of formality and attention to 
legal tradition that is commonplace in the Supreme Court.  Even most appellate 
court decisions are different than the rhetorical nature of the Supreme Court. 
Perhaps one might justify the attention to the Supreme Court by the public’s 
tendency to ascribe more importance to a Supreme Court decision than an equally 
final and binding state supreme court or federal appellate court decision.  However, 
the Supreme Court’s discourse is perhaps fundamentally different that other 
appellate courts, by virtue of its public nature.
Despite the relatively unique nature of the Court’s posture and discourse, 
the decisions of the Court remain effective examples of legal rhetoric for a variety 
of reasons.  First, the Court’s formality and traditions make it a model for other 
courts.  The influence of the Court’s language is routinely seen in constitutional 
law, when the Court’s phrasing of a rule is replicated by so-called lower courts, 
even when the rule is fundamentally altered in the process.  Second, the Court’s 
symbolic importance elevates the rhetorical value of its language beyond the sphere 
of legal discourse.  Hunsaker notes the profound rhetorical influence the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education had on subsequent social movements 
advocating for “equal rights” for women and homosexuals.84  While other courts 
have undoubtedly had a similar influence on public talk, the Supreme Court’s 
rhetoric is an excellent starting point for exploring this rich connection.  
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Another reason for focusing on the rhetoric of the Supreme Court is that 
most Supreme Court decisions are the product of dozens of legal authors.  The 
Michigan cases produced: seven majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions; 
over sixty minutes of oral arguments; twelve briefs filed in the Supreme Court by 
the litigants in these cases; over 135 additional briefs filed by “friends of the 
court”; and approximately thirty three additional written decisions of lower courts 
in this litigation; thousands of pages documenting relevant evidence admitted at 
various stages of the litigation.  A full accounting of the case would also require 
consideration of the hundreds of relevant federal and state court decisions 
generated since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and relevant law 
review articles and scholarly publications discussing the Fourteenth Amendment 
and racial preferences.  Even all of those sources would not include any 
consideration of how courts will apply the Michigan cases to related disputes in the 
future.  Without these other sources of authorship, a Supreme Court decision can be 
viewed as a synthesis of a fairly broad scope of divergent and engaged legal 
thinking on the matter, whether or not all of the viewpoints are not fully and fairly 
represented in the final opinion.  In contrast to a trial court, there is less of an 
opportunity for a single individual (whether it be a judge, attorney, or party) to 
change the nature of the language.85
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One impact of the multiple authors of Law is a sense by many jurists and 
legal scholars that courts are in a constant dialogue with the legislative and 
executive branches of the government.  In a close textual reading of McCulloch v. 
Maryland,86 legal rhetorical scholar James Boyd White expresses the notion that all 
judicial opinions are part of a conversation:
The most prominent feature of the judicial opinion is that it is not 
an isolated exercise of power but part of a continuing and 
collective process of conversation and judgment.  The conversation 
of which it is part is not a political conversation of the usual sort, 
proceeding as such conversations ordinarily do—by kind of 
jostling and compromise, focusing mainly on the problem of the 
immediate present—but a highly formal one, in which 
authoritative conclusions are reached after explicit argument.  
These decisions in their turn become the material of future 
arguments leading to future decisions, and so on in a continuing 
process of opening and closure, argument and judgment, of which 
no one can claim to foresee the end.87
Courts may also be engaged in a dialogue with the citizenry.  Some legal scholars 
suggest that American federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, makes 
decisions that closely mirror national norms.88  Public opinion researchers have 
detected a similar pattern with the modern Supreme Court.89  These observations 
are somewhat in contrast to the notion of the judiciary as an anti-democratic or 
86
 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (U.S. Supreme Court1819). 
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 James Boyd White, Acts of Hope. Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994, 640.
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 Robert A. Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy-
Maker,” Journal of Public Law 6 (1957): 279-95; Mark A. Graber, “The Non-Majoritarian 
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,” Studies in American Political Development 7 
(1993): 35-72, 36; Michael J. Klarman, “Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History,” 
California Law Review 92 (2001): 1721-1765, 1749-50.
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 Thomas Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court, Winchester, Mass: Unwin Hyman, 
1989 (noting that up to sixty six percent of Supreme Court opinions historically mirror public 
opinion polls); Thomas Marshall, “Policymaking and the Modern Court: When do Supreme Court 
Rulings Prevail?” Western Political Quarterly 42 (1989): 493-507.
43
counter-majoritarian branch of government.90 Nevertheless, if the judiciary does 
mirror public sentiment (or perhaps lead it), then it may be worthwhile to use a 
leading Court decision as a sort of cultural barometer.
This study is limited to the consideration of the Court’s two decisions in the 
Michigan cases.  A “decision” by the U.S. Supreme Court typically encompasses 
two or three types of competing opinions.  The majority opinion is the authoritative 
decision of the Court and consists of the majority of the voting justices.  That 
opinion is authored by a justice in the majority,91 but is subject to editorial 
commentary by the other justices on the Court.  In truth, almost every majority 
opinion is something of a collaborative writing project.  The second type of opinion 
typically found in the Court decision is the concurring  opinion.  When a justice in 
the majority wishes to concur in the judgment of the Court, but for different or 
more specific reasons than the majority, the result may be a concurring opinion.  
While concurring opinions carry no precedential weight, the reality is that in a 
close decision, the concurring opinion of a “swing vote” often becomes more 
important to legal practitioners than the majority opinion.  Third, when justices 
disagree with the judgment and analysis of the majority, they often write dissenting
opinions.  Again, the dissenting opinion carries no precedential value. However, the 
dissent can serve a number of important rhetorical purposes in future cases.  A 
fourth type of opinion emerges when a majority of the justices agree only on the 
proper result.  In such a case, the opinion with the most number of justices is 
referred to as a plurality opinion.  Plurality opinions have very limited precedential 
value, but can serve important rhetorical purposes.  In the ensuing analysis of 
90
 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982,  542; Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch. Binghamton, N.Y.: Vail-Ballou Press  
1962, 26.
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 Traditionally, the task of writing the majority opinion is assigned by the highest-ranking justice in 
the majority, which is either the Chief Justice or the longest serving justice.  The highest-ranking 
justice may assign the task to himself.  For example, Chief Justice Earl Warren took on the task of 
writing the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
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Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Bakke v. Regents is 
crucially important.
Finally, Supreme Court opinions are good artifacts for rhetorical inquiry 
because of their audiences, some of whom are intuitive and others whom might 
surprise casual observers of the Court.92  At a basic level, the Court is explaining its 
decision to the litigants in the case.  On a second level, the Court is explaining to 
the general public why the decision was just.  On a third level, the Court offers 
guidance to other courts on how to treat similar types of situations or applications 
of a particular law.  On a fourth level, the Court offers critical feedback to 
legislative and regulatory bodies creating law, and executive branches that are 
attempting to enforce laws.  On a fifth level, the Court offers commentary to future 
litigants on other methods of dealing with the legal dispute at issue.  On a sixth 
level, the Court speaks to legal scholars and historians interested in the subject 
matter of the dispute.  Finally, on a surprisingly intimate level, the Justices of the 
Court often speak to each other by offering praise or criticism.  Much like the 
synthetic authorship of a Supreme Court decision, the various audiences also lend 
considerable weight to the decision.
For a rhetorical scholar, a fully argued Supreme Court decision with a 
variety of opinions and audiences involved can be a lifetime’s data sample for 
research.  This study has two such decisions, both of which will be more 
thoroughly covered in the ensuing chapters.  For the purposes of this chapter, a 
brief overview of the legal issues and postures of Grutter and Gratz should be 
sufficient.  The next subsection describes the historical background for the Equal 
Protection Amendment arguments found in these cases.  The basic arguments 
various opinions of the two cases are briefly described in subsection 3.
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Racial Classifications
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The Michigan decisions primarily focus on the question of whether a state 
educational institution may use race as a factor in its admissions program.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires states to guarantee, 
among other matters, the “equal protection of the laws” to all persons.93  One of the 
Civil War Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended in large part to 
prevent states from treating recently freed slaves as second-class citizens.  
Congress had earlier passed the Ku Klux Klan Civil Rights Act, which offered 
some measure of civil rights protections, but the constitutionality of whether the 
federal government could force states to provide such protections came into 
question.  Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment only requires states, not the 
federal government, to provide such protections.
Not surprisingly, African-Americans found the Equal Protection Clause to 
be of little practical assistance in the struggle to overcome institutional racism. 
Equal protection was “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”94 The “old” 
Equal Protection jurisprudence emphasized legislative deference to the objectives 
of the state, leaving only the actual classifications open to analysis.  In Plessey v. 
Ferguson,95 the Court upheld the right of states to segregate railroad passengers by 
race, so long as the separate accommodations were essentially equal.  The outcome 
made perfect sense because both races were ostensibly being treated equally. 
However, the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence has grown more 
individualistic in nature, focusing only on the effects of state classifications on 
individual rights.96  The “separate but equal” policy was effectively retired by the 
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94 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (U.S. Supreme Court 1927). 
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Court in Brown v. Board of Education and in subsequent decisions.97  Decided in 
1954, Brown was the first opinion issued by the Warren Court and signaled a 
“new” equal protection doctrine98 that focuses on a state’s objectives in racial 
classifications.  The “new equal protection” standard mandated that any effort by a 
state to classify persons on the basis of race be held to “strict scrutiny.”  Under the 
strict scrutiny analysis, racial classifications could be constitutional if they were 
“narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest” of the government.  Well before 
Brown, the Court approved the use of racial classifications when “pressing public 
necessity” is shown, such as in the internment of Japanese-Americans during 
World War II.99  The Warren Court’s influence in Brown and in subsequent case 
law was to elevate strict scrutiny to such an exacting level that the analysis was 
arguably strict in theory and fatal in fact.100
Diagram 2.1: Old Equal Protection and New Equal Protection
97
 For a full accounting of the road to Brown, see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of 
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99 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (U.S. Supreme Court 1943); Korematsu v. United 
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100 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (U.S. Supreme Court 1995) (refuting 
notion that strict scrutiny analysis can never be satisfied).
Old Equal Protection
Race-based classifications 
permissible if:
1. Pressing public necessity, 
or
2. “separate but equal.”
New Equal Protection
(Strict Scrutiny)
Race-based classifications 
permissible if:
1. Narrowly Tailored
2. To further a compelling 
state interest, and
3. No discriminatory intent.
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Since Brown, the Court has generally treated racial classifications and racial 
discrimination with the same strict scrutiny test, even though a classification 
generally does not inherently treat members of one race differently from members 
of another race.  An example is the prohibition against interracial marriage, to 
which the Court has applied the strict scrutiny test.101  In the same vein, the Court 
has declared deliberate segregation in public schools to be inherently unequal in 
Brown v. Board of Education.102  In that sense, the Court’s approval of the “separate 
but equal doctrine” of Plessy v. Ferguson, may be seen as effectively repudiated.  
Nevertheless, the Court has never suggested that the mere existence of racially 
segregated schools, when unintentional, is a constitutional violation.  A finding of 
discriminatory intent is required.103  In most cases involving racial classifications, 
the most important element of a strict scrutiny review is the determination of 
whether a state had a discriminatory purpose in instituting the racial 
classification.104  Racial discrimination may be found in a variety of ways, including 
explicitly discriminatory regulations and “facially neutral” regulations that are 
unequally administered105 or have an impermissible legislative motive.106
Much in line with President Kennedy’s original use of the phrase 
“affirmative action,”107 in the context of intentional segregation in public schools, 
101 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1967).
102 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (U.S. Supreme Court 1954).
103 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (U.S. Supreme Court 1979).
104 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (U.S. Supreme Court 1976).
105 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (U.S. Supreme Court 1965) (literacy tests in voting)
106 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (U.S. Supreme Court 1960) (changing of city boundaries to 
eliminate almost every black voter).
107
 When Kennedy created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1961, he used the 
phrase to describe the requirement that projects receiving federal funds take "affirmative action" to 
ensure that employment decisions are free from racial discrimination.  See Executive Order No. 
10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961)
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the Court has placed an affirmative duty on school boards to eliminate intentional 
racial segregation.108  School boards may not perpetuate new systems that result in 
racial segregation, nor may they continue older systems, unless the board can show 
that the action serves important and legitimate ends.109  The same rules apply to 
public colleges and universities.110  Courts are empowered to use their equitable 
powers (based on fairness rather than regulation) to balance individual and 
collective interests while remedying the constitutionally offensive condition.111
With the question of access to public institutions seemingly secured, civil 
rights advocates began focusing on the problem of rectifying decades of 
segregation by pressing for admissions programs that used race as a basis for 
admission.  Educational institutions began working toward improving the racial 
makeup of various professional programs, such law and medical schools, which 
had traditionally lacked strong minority representation.  In the 1978 case of Bakke 
v. California Board of Regents, the Court addressed the practice of the California 
Board of Regents, which set aside 16 of 100 seats in the state university’s medical 
school for minority students.  The affirmative action program was challenged by 
Alan Bakee, an unsuccessful white applicant to the medical school, who argued 
that the school had no “compelling interest” in discriminating against white 
applicants.
In Bakke v. California Board of Regents, the Court was fractured by an 
unusual plurality opinion.  Four justices found a compelling state interest in 
remedying past racial discrimination and would have upheld the admissions 
108 Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (U.S. Supreme Court 1968).
109 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (U.S. Supreme Court 1979).
110 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
111 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1971); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (U.S. Supreme Court 1880) (blacks serving on grand 
juries). Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (denial of laundry licenses to only Chinese); 
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (U.S. Supreme Court 1954) (discrimination against Mexican-
Americans in jury service).
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policy.112  Four other justices refused to address the constitutional question, 
preferring to strike the program on statutory grounds.113 The ninth vote was held by 
Justice Powell, who wished to strike the program, but uphold California’s 
“substantive interest that legitimately [may] be served by a properly devised 
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic 
origin.”114 The substance of Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court, although joined 
by no other justice, became the basis by which educational institutions modeled 
their admissions policies through the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, because 
Justice Powell praised Harvard University’s admission program that viewed race as 
a “plus” among a range of factors, many schools sought to adopt a plus-factor 
admission program.
By the mid-1990s, several schools were facing legal challenges to the use of 
race in the admissions process.  In Hopwood v. Texas, the University of Texas 
School of Law was sued in a class action by four rejected applicants alleging that 
the school’s system of considering minority candidates separately from other 
applicants was unconstitutional.  Taken on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals twice, the Texas Law School unsuccessfully argued Justice Powell’s view 
that diversity served a compelling interest.  The Supreme Court denied the law 
school’s petition for a certorari of review and Texas Law School was forced to 
abandon any consideration of race in its application process.  The attorney general 
for the State of Texas interpreted the Hopwood decision as to prohibit any state 
consideration of race for admission purposes or scholarships in any state institution.  
The result was a complete overhaul of Texas state educational policies regarding 
race.  Other similar cases evolved in Washington State, Georgia, and New York, 
but no consensus was to be found among the circuit courts of appeals.
112 Bakke, 325.
113 Id. 408.
114 Id. 320.
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Finally, in 2003, the Court granted certorari to two companion cases 
involving the University of Michigan.  The first case, Gratz v. Bollinger, involved a 
class action claiming that the undergraduate admissions program unconstitutionally 
considered race.  The second case, Grutter v. Bollinger, involved a second class 
action that levied the same argument at the University’s law school.  The Court 
heard oral arguments on both cases and accepted amicus curie briefing from dozens 
of interested parties.  Ultimately, the Court found the undergraduate admissions 
program in Gratz to fail strict scrutiny.  However, in Grutter, the Court accepted 
the law school’s admissions program as constitutional. The decisions rendered in 
those cases are the basis for the analysis in the subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation.  The next section explains the specific legal issues in the Michigan 
cases and the various opinions that constitute the Court’s decision in these cases.
D. Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger
In Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court reviewed the use of 
racial preferences in the undergraduate and law admissions programs at the 
University of Michigan.  Noting important differences between the two admissions 
programs, the Court upheld the law school program, but declared the undergraduate 
program to be unconstitutional.  The decision was not unanimous, evoking fierce 
concurring or dissenting opinions from every Justice on the Court.  Even the 
majority opinion tempered its support for the law school’s use of racial preferences 
by suggesting that they would be unnecessary within 25 years.115 Between the two 
cases, there are two binding majority opinions, six suggestive concurring opinions, 
and five non-binding dissenting opinions.  Technically, only the majority opinions 
are law as the rest are considered dicta, or surplus reasoning.  However, given that 
both decisions were essentially five to four decisions, the reasoning of each Justice 
voting for a case is important.  
115 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will 
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
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As an overview, the two majority positions essentially affirm what has been 
long suggested as the Court’s position since its 1978 judgment in Regents of 
California v. Bakke:116 racial preferences in educational institutions are permissible, 
but quotas are not.117  First, Grutter establishes that a school may consider race as 
part of its admissions program, but only as one non-determinative factor in the 
admissions process.  This was the basic argument of Justice Lewis Powell, who 
was the “swing vote” for upholding the University of California’s affirmative 
action program in Bakke; however, Powell’s “plurality” opinion was not joined by 
any of the other Justices voting in favor of the affirmative action program.  Under a 
rule laid down by the Court in Marks v. United States,118 Powell’s opinion with 
respect to diversity was the controlling rationale for the judgment of the Court and 
therefore controlling precedent.  Although the application of the Marks rule has 
been controversial, Grutter endorsed Powell’s position that student body diversity 
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university 
admissions.119
Second, the Gratz majority affirmed Powell’s view that racial preferences 
should not be determinative factors in admissions processes.  The Michigan 
undergraduate admissions program gave points for certain applicant characteristics.  
Students with enough points were guaranteed offers of admission. Applicants of 
particular minority groups and recruited athletes were automatically awarded 20 
points.120  The primary position of the Court’s majority is that the undergraduate 
program failed for lack of “individualized consideration.”121  The Gratz majority 
was particularly displeased with the ratio of bonus points available for creative 
accomplishments or leadership (5) with the automatic allocation of 20 points for 
116
 438 U.S. 265 (U.S. Supreme Court 1978).
117 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.).  All references hereinafter to Bakke refer to 
Justice Powell’s opinion.
118
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119 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
120 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 256.
121 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274-5.
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membership in a particular ethnicity.  This position reflects the Justice Lewis’ 
concern that race only be used as a non-decisive factor that would function as “a 
‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file.”122  However Grutter and Gratz may have 
affirmed and extended Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Bakke, the balance of 
the majority opinions in the Michigan cases suggest much more is involved than 
deciding whether Bakke is good law.
1. The Gratz Opinions (Michigan undergraduate) 
In Gratz, the Court found Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program to 
be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  The majority opinion, concurring 
opinions, and dissenting opinions are briefly described here.
a.  Majority Opinion in Gratz
The majority opinion in Gratz was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
traditionally understood as an opponent to racial preferences in most settings, 
including education.  The first half of the opinion addresses whether one of the 
petitioners, Patrick Hamacher, lacked “standing” to sue the University because he 
did not attempt to enroll at UM as a transfer student.123  “Standing” describes the 
qualifications of an individual seeking to sue. Justice Stevens, a member of the 
minority in Gratz, raised the issue sua sponte (on his own accord).  The importance 
of the standing issue extended well beyond the equal protection law because of the 
multitudes of class-action suits in American law.  In the majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained that Hamacher’s contention that he was “able and 
ready” to apply as a transfer student was more than adequate to qualify him as a 
representative of the entire class of potential plaintiffs harmed by the University’s 
affirmative action program.124
The second half of the majority opinion details why the undergraduate 
admissions policies at the University of Michigan fail under the Court’s strict 
122 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
123 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260.
124 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 262.
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scrutiny standard of inquiry. Although the Grutter decision required the Court to 
agree that classroom diversity was a compelling interest, the Gratz majority was 
dissatisfied with Michigan’s efforts to craft a narrowly tailored classification.125
The majority opinion notes that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke emphasized the 
“importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all 
of the qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual’s 
ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education.”126 The Michigan 
undergraduate program fails in this regard because it automatically distributed 20 
points to every single applicant from an “underrepresented minority” group without 
engaging in the individualized evaluation described by Justice Powell.127  The 
majority rejected the suggestion that such an individualized analysis would be 
impossible, or at least unreasonable.  The fact that such an analysis is inefficient, 
according to the majority, is no excuse for ignoring constitutional mandates.128
Finally, the majority held that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
was also a violation of federal discrimination legislation.129
b. The Concurring Opinions in Gratz
The majority opinion was accompanied by three concurring opinions.  
Justice O’Connor, joined in part by Justice Breyer, emphasized that the primary 
flaw with the undergraduate admissions system was the lack of individualized 
attention given to all applicants through the mechanized undergraduate application 
process.130  What distinguishes her position from that of the majority (and perhaps 
offers an explanation why only Breyer joined her opinion) is that the University 
could have “fixed” the flaw in their case through better record development.131  If 
125 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269-70.
126 Gratz, 539 at 271.
127 Id.
128 Gratz, 539 at 274-5.
129 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275, note 23.
130 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 285-6 (O’Connor, concurring).
131 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279-80 (O’Connor, concurring) (noting the “apparent absence” of evidence on 
the record).
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the school had shown that it did give individualized attention to all students, even
when the 20 point boost was allocated to certain minority groups, then O’Connor 
seems to be willing to accept that system.
The second concurring opinion was authored by Justice Thomas.  Justice 
Thomas argues that state-sponsored racial discrimination, however well 
intentioned, ought never be allowed.132  He specifically emphasizes that the Court’s 
opinions in Gratz and Grutter combine to outlaw discrimination between groups 
that would contribute to a “critical mass.”133  In other words, Thomas would prevent 
Michigan from discriminating against Native Americans in order to ensure that 
African-Americans were “adequately” represented in the school’s critical mass.  
This interpretation is important because Thomas essentially outlines the case for 
members of one minority group to sue a school for granting preferences to other 
disadvantaged minorities groups within the critical mass.
Finally, Justice Breyer only joins the judgment of the Court.  Although he 
joins O’Connor’s concurring opinion, he also joins part of Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion in which she argues that a government might use racial 
classification when it distinguishes between policies of inclusion and exclusion.134
c. The Dissenting Opinions in Gratz
First, the Gratz dissenters focused on finding ways to limit the impact of the 
majority opinion.  Although not truly a dissent, Justice Breyer’s concurrence agrees 
so much with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that with a stronger record he clearly 
would have supported the University’s program as he did with the law school.135
Ginsburg’s argument is that the government can distinguish between racial 
classifications designed to include racial minorities, and those intended to exclude.  
That both Breyer and O’Connor are in some agreement with Ginsburg suggests that 
132 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (Thomas, concurring).
133 Id.
134 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281-2 (Breyer, concurring in part).
135 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 282 (Breyer, concurring in part).
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racial classifications designed for inclusive ends might find five or six votes in a 
future case.  Breyer’s interest in governmental intent in classification also suggests 
that he might be less willing to expand the Grutter holding to national security 
cases.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent offered three unique arguments.  First, Ginsburg 
notes the omnipresence of racism, particularly directed towards Hispanics and 
African-Americans, by using a variety of statistical evidence in her dissent.136
Ginsburg plainly intended to promote the notion that inclusion efforts by states 
ought to be evaluated differently than efforts to exclude.    Second, citing to her 
concurring opinion in Grutter, Ginsburg notes the presence of international human 
rights documents that support an inclusive/exclusive racial classification 
distinction.  Given the Court’s traditional reluctance to rest its decisions on 
international legal standards, Ginsburg’s insistence is noteworthy.  Third, Ginsburg 
expresses a preference for Michigan’s “accurately described, fully disclosed” 
program over the use of race-blind efforts to raise minority presences in the 
classroom, such as the ten percent rule plans or the use of indirect means to 
highlight race.137
A second important dissent is offered by Justice Stevens, who attacks the 
standing of both plaintiffs, but particularly questions Hamacher’s status as a 
transfer applicant.138  The claim is arguably intended to accomplish two goals.  
First, Stevens may have suspected that the conservative majority would have a hard 
time agreeing on a more lenient standard for a class action representative.  Even 
though the majority managed to hold together, the result may have been a more 
conciliatory opinion.  Second, Stevens also recognized that by forcing the majority 
136 Gratz, 530 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, dissenting).
137 Gratz, 530 U.S. at 303 (Ginsburg, dissenting).  Ginsburg argues that the ten percent plans 
propagate segregation by discouraging parents from moving out of low performing school districts. 
See footnote 10.  Ginsburg also expresses concern over whether admissions essays, letters of 
recommendations, or other aspects of the admissions policy might be used to highlight an 
applicant’s status as a minority.
138 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 284 (Stevens, dissenting).
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to expend energy addressing the standing issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist would 
probably be forced to leave other aspects of the analysis for concurring opinions 
written by other authors.  Although it may never be possible to prove that Stevens 
ever contemplated or intended this result, it may well explain why Stevens raised 
the issue sua sponte.
Justice Souter’s dissent offers one of the only point-by-point rebuttals of the 
majority position.  From the start, he criticizes the majority’s standing argument as 
“indulgent.”139  Next, he argues that Michigan’s undergraduate admissions 
“minority review” was not the insulated version found in Bakke, and finds the 
comparison inappropriate.140  Souter questions the offensiveness of the 20 point 
boost, given that there are plenty of other ways to earn 20 extra points, including 
athletic talent.141  Souter criticizes the majority for finding a 20 point boost to be 
suspicious, but not finding a 10 point boost to be equally suspicious.142  He also 
suggests that there is little difference between a numbered scale and a holistic 
review of a candidate, and that the majority is punishing the University for its 
candor.   
139 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 292 (Souter, dissenting).
140 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter, dissenting).
141 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 294 (Souter, dissenting).
142 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 296 (Souter, dissenting).
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Diagram 2.2: Arguments in Gratz
The sum of the Gratz dissenters’ efforts is that the majority opinion has 
been cordoned and criticized.  In future opinions, opinion writers wishing to rely on 
Gratz will have to deal with the critiques offered by the dissent.  On a second level, 
the dissenters made a show of numbers, suggesting that with a stronger record, the 
majority would have lost two votes.
2. The Grutter Opinions (Michigan Law School)
UM (Rehnquist)
1. Hamacher had standing.
2. Undergraduate not narrowly tailored because of no individualized analysis.
3. Also a violation of federal law.
UC-1 (O’Connor)
Undergraduate’s record was inadequate, 20 points could have been justified.
UC-2 (Thomas)
1. Race-based classifications should always be outlawed.
2. “Critical masses” are illegal if it advantages one minority group over another.
UC-3 (Breyer)
Sides with O’Connor’s reasoning, but also supports notion of state-sponsored 
racial classifications for the purpose of inclusion.
UD-1 (Ginsburg)
1. Omnipresence of racism.
2. International human rights documents support inclusive racial classifications.
3. Fully disclosed preferences are better than blind programs.
UD-2 (Stevens)
Standing is an issue.
UD-3 (Souter)
1. Majority’s standing argument is indulgent.
2. Michigan’s process not the same as Bakke.
3. Offensiveness of 20 point boost is overstated, given the athletic talent 20 point 
option.
4. If 20 points is offensive, then so is 10 points.
5. No difference between scale and holistic review of candidate except candor.
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In contrast to Gratz, the Court upheld the University of Michigan’s law 
school admissions program in Grutter.  The majority opinion, concurring opinion, 
and dissenting opinions in Grutter are reviewed here.
a. Majority Opinion in Grutter
The majority opinion in Grutter was authored by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor.  In recent years, Justice O’Connor has emerged as an important “swing 
vote” who often resolves deadlocks between the Court’s most conservative and 
more moderate members.  In writing for the Court, O’Connor explains that the law 
school’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a 
compelling interest in “obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body” is constitutionally permissible.143  The Court first accepts Justice 
Powell’s plurality opinion in Bakke as law, insofar as it views “student body 
diversity” as a compelling state interest.144  The majority notes that the analysis 
contains two aspects: first, a “compelling governmental interest” and second, a 
“narrow-tailoring requirement” which involves an individualized assessment, such 
that no one is treated solely on the basis of their race.145  The Court approves of the
law school’s program on both counts. 
First, the Court accepts the law school’s argument that student body 
diversity is important for the benefit of the students and the community that they 
will eventually serve.146  The majority suggests that education is a requirement for 
better citizenship.  In addition, the Court notes the importance of graduate law 
degrees in U.S. political and professional life.  The Court’s argument is premised 
not only on the individual benefit that a law degree can provide.  The Court also 
explains that “[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of 
143 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. 
144 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
145 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (“When race -based action is necessary to further a compelling 
governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.”).
146 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 -33.
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the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”147 The Court is extremely 
deferential to the University’s arguments about the importance of racial diversity, 
citing First Amendment freedoms accorded to educators.148
Second, the Court found that the law school admission program satisfied the 
“narrow-tailoring” prong of strict scrutiny analysis.  The Court’s analysis of the 
“critical mass” approach of the law school reflects its acceptance of Justice 
Powell’s preference for Harvard University’s traditional “plus-factor” system, in 
which race was a plus-factor, but not “determinative” of admission.149  The Court 
takes pains to reinforce Bakke’s underlying claim by noting that the law school 
admissions program is not a quota.150
However, the Grutter majority adds two important factors to the analysis.  
First, the majority requires that the University continuously evaluate whether such 
race-conscious systems are necessary through sunset provisions and tracking 
procedures.  Second, the majority suggests that because 25 years passed between 
Brown and Bakke, and 25 more years between Bakke and the Bollinger cases, the 
Court expects affirmative action to be unnecessary within 25 more years.
b. Concurring Opinion in Grutter
The only concurring opinion is generated by Justice Ginsburg, who 
questions the need for any twenty-five year limitations.  However, Ginsburg does 
cite international treaties to which the United States is a signatory as evidence of 
the importance of some “logical end point.”151  She notes that racial discrimination 
may involve different ethnic groups within the next twenty five years and the 
schools may have additional reasons to continue race-based classification schemes.
147 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
148 Grutter, 539  U.S. at 328.
149 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
150 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 -9.
151 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, concurring).
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Ginsburg’s sole footnote also offers an interesting interpretation of the 
majority opinion.  By noting that the case has survived strict scrutiny, Ginsburg 
suggests that the ruling does not require that all race-based classifications or 
interests besides “student body diversity” be subject to the same analysis.
c. Dissenting Opinions in Grutter
In contrast to the critical approach taken by the Gratz dissenters, the 
conservative Grutter dissenters coordinated their opinions to present an “embryonic 
majority opinion,” a term I use to describe a dissent that hopes to be fully adapted 
as a future majority opinion.  Each author tackles a different aspect of the case, but 
read together, the dissent presents a clear alternative to the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist begins the counter-argument by questioning 
whether the majority is changing the Court’s “strict scrutiny” analysis.  By 
suggesting that the majority has deviated or misapplied the traditional analysis 
because of its view that affirmative action is benign, Rehnquist challenges whether 
the majority has properly applied strict scrutiny.152  He dismisses the school’s 
“critical mass” objective as a “veil of racial balancing” and directs the main portion 
of his attack to an issue left undiscussed by the majority: whether the school can 
discriminate against one group in a critical mass in order to advantage another.  
Specifically, Rehnquist questions why lower percentages of Native Americans and 
Hispanics are accepted than African-Americans.153  Rehnquist also challenges the 
lack of a defined time limit and argues that the law school’s proposal permits racial 
preference “on a seemingly permanent basis.”154
Justice Kennedy continues the attack, through a statistical analysis of the 
law school’s percentage of offers to racial minorities, which have remained the 
152 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 -9 (Rehnquist, dissenting).
153 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381.  Rehnquist provides a detailed statistical critique  of the Law’s School’s 
admissions from pages 382 to 385, in making the argument that the admissions program is actually 
“a carefully managed program designed to ensure proportionate representation of applicants from 
selected minority groups.” Id. at 386.
154 Grutter. 539 U.S. at 387.
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same for four years.  He suggests that this fact is evidence that there was no 
individualized consideration of all applicants, which contravenes the 
“individualized assessment” prong of strict scrutiny analysis.155  Kennedy argues 
that as the calendar year progressed, admissions staff used daily class profile 
reports to ensure that proper racial balancing occurred.156  To Kennedy, the result is 
tantamount to a quota system.157  Kennedy also laments the Court’s willingness to 
pass over other models that would allow for increased classroom diversity.158
Next, Justice Scalia presents the case against the use of “racial diversity” as 
an educational benefit, suggesting that other places are more important and better 
equipped to create racially-sensitive citizens.159  Scalia takes issue with whether a 
state graduate educational institution should be able to employ race-based 
classifications to teach “generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship” and 
ponders why the general civil state work force should also be deprived of those 
lessons.160  Scalia also predicts future litigation on the subject matter.161  Scalia 
closes his dissent with a strong statement of his position: “The Constitution 
proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided 
education is no exception.”162
Finally, the balance of the counter-argument is presented by Justice
Thomas, who outlines his theory of “aesthetic” racism: “The Law School’s 
argument, as facile as it is, can only be understood in one way: Classroom 
aesthetics yields educational benefits, racially discriminatory admissions policies 
are required to achieve the right racial mix, and therefore the policies are required 
155 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, dissenting).
156 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 390 -2 (Kennedy, dissenting).
157 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, dissenting).
158 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 -5 (Kennedy, dissenting).  Although not specifically discussed, Kennedy 
was likely referring to percentage plans or lottery systems of selection.
159 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 -8 (Scalia, dissenting).
160 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, dissenting).
161 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, dissenting).
162 Id.
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to achieve the educational benefits.”163  Thomas suggests that the law school is not 
interested in admitting students who are otherwise too poor or uneducated to 
participate in elite higher education.164  Thomas argues that the Law School’s 
motivation in maintaining its status as an elite law school, from which very few 
graduates actually practice in Michigan, demonstrates the very lack of a true state 
interest.165  Thomas attacks the law school’s reliance on LSAT and other 
“objective” admissions data, noting the exclusionary history of those measures.166
Early in his dissent, Thomas suggests that the Court’s ruling approves only 
classroom diversity as a compelling state interest and outlaws all other bases.167  In 
addition, Thomas claims that the Court’s ruling requires the end of any affirmative 
action programs within 25 years.168  Although clearly an effort to reinterpret the 
majority’s opinion, Thomas’ argument is based on his belief that the Court’s 
deference to the school’s opinions will be limited in some fashion.169
Diagram 2.3: Arguments in Grutter
163 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, dissenting).
164 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 n.3 (Thomas, dissenting).
165 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 357 -8 (Thomas, dissenting).  Thomas also takes issue with the Court’s 
willingness to show deference to Michigan, but not to the “less fashionable” Virginia Military 
Institute’s opinions regarding all male schools.  Id. at 367.
166 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 35368 -70 (Thomas, dissenting).
167 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351 (Thomas, dissenting).
168 Id.
169 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, dissenting).
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Taken together, the dissenting opinions make two strong claims.  First, 
there is a 25-year limit expressed in the majority opinion.  Second, no university 
ought to be able to discriminate against one racial group to benefit another, 
especially if both are in the critical mass targets.  The minority opinions also 
suggest that no evidence exists of actual harm to Michigan, or could exist, when 
LM (O’Connor)
1.  Classroom diversity is a compelling state interest. (Bakke was right).
2.  Diversity promotes good citizenship.
3. Diversity promotes legitimacy in educational institutions among minorities.
4. Deference to school’s views on diversity, given first amendment. 
5. Program is narrowly-tailored because a critical mass is not a quota.
6. Some limit is necessary through monitoring and 25 year limit.  
LC (Ginsburg)
1. No logical end point for racism, so 25 year limit is aspirational.
2. Strict scrutiny might not apply to all race-based classifications.
LD-1 (Renhquist)
1. Majority is diluting strict scrutiny analysis by yielding to school’s expertise.
2. Program permits cross-minority group discrimination.
3. Lack of a time limit permits school to use racial preference on a permanent basis.
LD-2 (Kennedy)
1. Tantamount to a quota system because statistical analysis shows that percentage 
of offers to racial minorities is the same.
2. Other models would avoid race-based classifications and still promote minority 
enrollment.
LD-3 (Scalia)
1. Racial diversity is not an educational benefit central to a law school.
2. Suggests that State can expand compelling interest to other state functions.
3. Predicts future litigation over properly constituted critical masses.
LD-4 (Thomas)
1. Majority ruling has a 25 year limit.
2. Court’s deference to school will be limited eventually.
3. No state interest in law school’s desire to be elite.
4. Law school’s diversity is merely aesthetic.
5. Law school relies on racist assessments (LSATs) to maintain elite status.
6. Law school has no interest in getting economic diversity.
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racial classifications are abandoned (citing to recent experiences in Texas and 
California as examples).  The dissenters collectively argue that affirmative action 
harms racial minorities by lowering expectations from and for them, leading to a de 
facto system of racial classifications measured by “actual achievement” versus 
credentials.  Given O’Connor’s vote, this cumulative opinion would have 
prohibited any use of race-based classifications absent national security concerns.
E. Conclusion
One basic point about legal argumentation should be clear from the review 
of these two cases.  Supreme Court arguments can be connected across various 
opinions and even cases to form a larger position.  In these cases, it is important to 
read the Gratz majority (which included Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) in 
light with their dissents in Grutter.  The position of Gratz and Grutter in the larger 
jurisprudence of equal protection law has yet to be determined.  Much like Bakke 
and Brown, the holdings will only be understand as they are enforced by trial courts 
and interpreted by various appellate courts. 
The rest of this dissertation explores what citizens might have learned from 
that coverage.  The next chapter assesses the rhetorical features of the Legal 
system.  Chapter Four investigates the broader rhetorical notions of Law that are 
part of these cases.  Chapter Five reports on the media coverage of the arguments 
discussed in this Chapter, and the relevant variables explored in Chapters Three and 
Four.  Finally, Chapter Six discusses the impact and implications of the findings 
from this study.
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Chapter III: The Legal System
Legal scholar Adam Gearey suggests that to say anything about Law, one 
must make an explicit or implicit reference to rules or standards.170  It makes a
certain amount of sense to begin a discussion about the rhetorical dimensions of 
Law with an examination of the Legal system.  Citizens usually learn about 
principles of justice and fairness through their encounters with various legal 
systems, from the discipline of the home life to the media broadcast of a celebrity 
trial.  Rarely do citizens come to think about Law in the abstract.  Instead, most 
discussions about broad principles of justice and fairness are framed within the 
narratives of a particular legal episode, such as a criminal or civil case.
A. Overview
Using textual examples from Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, 
this Chapter demonstrates how a rhetorical analysis of the Legal system can be 
useful as both an independent study and part of the broader comprehensive 
framework for interdisciplinary studies in legal rhetoric.  As an independent study, 
this analysis provides insight into various rhetorical dimensions of the Gratz and 
Grutter cases.  As part of the broader framework espoused in this dissertation, 
those same dimensions reflect the informational media cues that citizens use to 
make critical assessments about the Law and their Legal system. 
The central question in this Chapter is: 
How is the Legal system constituted in legal text?  
In order to answer this question, I first provide an overview of how the Legal 
system operates to generate symbols and discourses that support its capacity to 
enforce Law.  Second, I examine the notion of legal architecture as one way to 
understand the rhetorical elements of the Legal system.  Next, I apply a similar 
analysis to the rhetorical concept of a legal culture.   Finally, I draw conclusions on 
170
 Adam Gearey, Law and Aesthetics, Portland, Or.: Hart, 2001, 1. (“To say anything meaningful 
about art one makes an explicit or implicit reference to rules and standards.”). 
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what future independent studies of Legal systems might explore within this 
framework.
B. The Operation of the Legal System
“Law” may be the pool of general principles of justice and fairness that 
citizens agree with in the abstract, but the Legal system is the arena in which those 
principles are put into action.  At its most basic level, the Legal system is a 
mechanism for resolving disputes between competing parties.  The Legal system 
relies on the average citizen’s acquiescence to the authority of officials and courts 
in order to provide this dispute resolution function.  Concurrently, the Legal system 
informs citizens about what just and proper resolutions of legal conflicts should 
look like.  Rhetorical scholar Carrie Crenshaw has observed that “law not only 
draws upon the reservoir of society’s symbolic constructions, it also legitimizes 
those constructions.”171  Crenshaw’s observation especially applies to the Legal 
system that often operates, to borrow a phrase from Sanford Levinson, as a 
linguistic system.172  Levinson was referring to the U.S. Constitution, but any legal 
system can provide a “common language” that “forms us just as much as we 
purport to form it.”173  In order to understand the particular relationship between 
citizens and their Law, it is helpful to first become familiar with the Legal system’s 
discursive functions. 
To preview, the Legal system consists of: written rules, regulations, and 
procedures; unwritten norms, protocols, and rituals; and elaborate vocabularies that 
are vague and precise, all at once.  In addition, various symbols of authority, from 
the judge’s robes to the seal of a notary public, create an aesthetic of authority that 
supports the Legal system’s continuing need for legitimacy.
171
 Carrie Crenshaw. “The ‘Protection’ of ‘Women’: a History of Legal Attitudes Toward Women’s 
Workplace Freedom.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 81 (1995): 63-82. 64.
172
 Levinson, Constitutional Faith, 191 (referring to the Constitution as a “linguistic system”). Of 
course, Levinson’s commentary is much more expansive, as he argues that the Constitution provides 
a “common language” which “forms us just as much as we purport to form it.”  Id.
173 Id.
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First, the Legal system most obviously traffics in written rules and 
regulations.  The presence of legal codes or written case decisions allows citizens 
to know their rights and responsibilities under the Law.  These written rules may be 
substantive in nature.  For example, a citizen’s constitutional right to protest the 
government is a written part of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  At 
other times, the rules may merely suggest a procedure to be followed.  In time, 
some procedural rights can become viewed as substantive rights.174
A good example in Gratz and Grutter of a written rule or regulation is the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states that 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.175
Additionally, the modern “strict scrutiny” test formulated by the Court in 
Korematsu and refined in Grutter is another example of a written rule or 
regulation.  Although derived from different texts (the Constitution versus 
Supreme Court precedents), both rules are primarily bound by their written form.  
As Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter demonstrates, any discussion 
about the “strict scrutiny” test must be grounded with citations to previous Court 
decisions or other persuasive texts about the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
In addition, the Legal system relies on normative behaviors captured in 
unwritten norms, rituals, and protocols.  Some rules are functional.  For example, 
normative behaviors that require the litigant to sit quietly and respectfully during 
an opposing counsel’s opening statement permit both sides to present their case.  
174
 For an example, see Dickerson v. United States, 310 U.S. 554 (2000) (holding that criminal 
defendant’s expectations of receiving a Miranda warning expand his or her rights to be informed of 
the right to seek legal counsel).
175
 U.S. Constitution, XIV Amendment.
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Other rules serve less obvious purposes.  A judge’s entry into a courtroom is 
usually a ridiculous exercise in watching attorneys fall over themselves to stand 
up.  However, taking that ritual along with many of the other normative behaviors 
reinforces the judge’s central role in providing order in a courtroom.
Perhaps the most interesting unwritten norm at play in the Gratz and 
Grutter decisions is the requirement that the Court’s decisions account for prior 
precedents.  Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas all target the Grutter majority 
for abandoning the traditional strict scrutiny test.  The Grutter majority agreed that 
classroom diversity could be a “compelling state interest” and was generally 
deferential to Michigan’s claim that classroom diversity would benefit the entire 
student body.  The dissenters each suggest that Michigan’s claim is a dishonest 
effort to mask race preferences.  By suggesting that Michigan is toying with the 
Court, the dissenters raise questions about the judgment of the majority.  
Finally, the Legal system is most famous for its elaborate discourses with 
vocabularies that are simultaneously vague and precise. “Once a law is 
promulgated, legal discourse comes into play.”176  In general, the lexicon of a 
professional legal discourse is highly complex.  Terms that have specific meanings 
in some jurisdictions may have radically different meanings in other jurisdictions.  
Attorneys have difficulty deciphering terms and phrases used in different 
jurisdictions.  Lay citizens struggle all the more.
Mastering the complex vocabulary is only part of the challenge for lay 
citizens.  When lawyers, judges, and legal commentators talk about the law, they 
routinely engage in a special form of reasoning and discourse that brands them as 
“lawyers” or “lawyerly.”177  For lay observers, this is an obvious reference to the 
176
 A. Phillips, 126.
177
 Wetlaufer (1990), 1545-46.
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speech mannerisms favored by lawyers.  These methods of speaking create another 
barrier for the lay citizen to understand legal discourse.178
  Indeed, “legal rhetoric” is often taken as a pejorative reference to the 
highly-mannered “legalese” used to obscure the Law or confuse otherwise law-
abiding citizens as to the legal impact of certain actions.  Even the judiciary 
occasionally utilizes strategic ambiguity.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s order to 
desegregate public elementary schools in Brown v. Board of Education required 
“all deliberate speed” rather than immediate compliance or a specified timetable.179
In time, the Grutter majority’s notion of a 25 year time frame might be the basis 
for a similar controversy.
These three levels of Legal discourse (written rules, unwritten norms, and 
vocabularies) are accompanied by an intricate web of symbolic performances by 
various individuals operating within the Legal system.  In a formulation discussed 
more fully in the next Chapter, French legal philosopher Paul Amselek suggests 
that a law has three structural elements: generic normative elements; constitutive 
elements; and behavioral elements.  The Legal system is particularly focused on 
matching the first and third elements.  From a normative standpoint, a judge is 
expected to sound and act authoritative in order to inspire confidence and 
cooperation from all involved parties.  The black robes are just an important as the 
raised dais from which many judges issue rulings.  The powerful certainty and 
confidence with which Supreme Court justices write their opinions is part of this 
normative requirement.180
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 “There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing.  One is its style.  The other is its 
content.”  Frank Rodell, “Goodbye to Law Reviews,” Virginia Law Review 23 (1936): 38-45, 38.  
Franz Kafka is often credited with the observation that a lawyer is a person who writes a ten 
thousand word document and calls it a “brief.”
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 Wetlaufer (1990), 1552.  Susan Keller makes a comparison between judges and transsexuals that 
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70
However, the judge’s performance must also direct the behavior expected 
under the Law.  The decisions must be understandable by citizens, or at least be 
capable of being interpreted by an attorney.  The decisions must also carry a 
directive element as well.  Justice O’Connor’s call for the 25 year time limit for the 
continued use of racial preferences by Michigan arguably serves that particular
function.
C. Legal Architecture and Legal Culture
Having demonstrated that one can look to written rules, unwritten norms, 
and vocabularies or performances in Gratz and Grutter for examples of legal text, 
the next step to understanding how the Legal system is constituted in a legal text is 
to look at the way the textual elements are used.  A review of research literature on 
legal textual analysis suggests that legal text serves to bolster one of two different 
aspects of the Legal system.  First, legal texts help describe the architecture of the 
Legal system.  Second, legal texts illuminate the culture of the Legal system.  
In this section, I introduce the concepts of legal architecture and legal culture. The 
architecture of the Legal system includes both its structural elements as well as the 
voice of the system’s creators.  The culture of the Legal system includes the 
internal cultural traits of the Legal system, but also the relationship between Legal 
culture and the rest of the civic world. I point to specific examples from Gratz and 
Grutter as examples of the variations of these concepts.
1. Legal Architecture
The first general classification for a legal rule or regulation might be as an 
architectural element.  For the purposes of this study, legal architecture refers to the 
structural, foundational, and ornamental features of a legal rule or regulation that 
suggest substance or physical appearance of the Legal system.  Louis Althusser 
comments that law, just like other social structures such as churches and families, 
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“hails” the individual “into existence by identifying one’s proper locus, identity, 
and approved forms of interaction.181  The mere existence of a given rule is part of 
the structure, just as is the willingness of otherwise disinterested parties to re-
enforce the structure.  Accordingly, the vast amount of legal rules are obeyed not 
because of a fear of legal institutional surveillance, but rather because other legal 
players are likely to object to deviations from the rules.  As Harold Garfinkle 
observes, having tacitly agreed to follow certain rules, we tend to “police” each 
other’s deviation from the rules.182  Horn-blowing in traffic is a simple example of 
this form of self-regulation.
Of course, the structure of the legal system is rather squarely focused on the 
breaking of rules.  Accordingly, legal architecture is not only concerned with what 
happens when the rules are being followed, but also operates on the assumption 
that the structural components of the system will, invariably, fail.  A great deal of 
the analysis of legal architecture is about anticipating deviations or perversions of a 
given procedure, protocol, or rule.  In many areas of law that rely heavily on 
voluntary compliance, the last and most important question is whether a rule can be 
fairly enforced.  The Legal is constituted not only by the language of structure, but 
also by the authoritative or persuasive voices that offer interpretations of the 
internal architecture.  Voice can be measured by typical rhetorical appeals to 
authority, but also in the various efforts to give a rule, protocol, or judicial tribunal 
human (and presumptively reasonable) characteristics.  Diagram 3.1 below lists 
some of the variables that might signal the presence of structure or voice as a subset 
of legal architecture.
Diagram 3.1: Variables Related to Legal Architecture
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Structure Voice
Locus on conflict within a schema
Notice of rank or position
Adherence to procedure or processes
Use of rules, regulations, or definitions
Naming of Authority
Use of Singular or Plural
Personification of Structure
As an example of structure, there is a battle between the justices in the 
Grutter and Gratz cases about whether an educational institution has a First 
Amendment interest in promoting diversity in the classroom.  Without the 
protections of the First Amendment, the decisions of a school to discriminate on the 
basis of race would have less authority.  As an example of voice, the majority and 
dissenting opinions will each employ voices to bolster or disrupt the authority of 
given parties.  For example, the majority might speak in the “we” even though four 
justices of the Court are in disagreement.  At the same time, the dissenters might 
directly refer to the author of the majority opinion by name in order to emphasize 
their separation.  Both of these concepts are explored in greater depth below.
a. Architecture and Structure
Structure is a critical part of American legal reasoning because it provides 
the basic framework for addressing many Constitutional issues.  Sanford  Levinson 
suggests that American law is predicated on the moral authority of popular will, 
rather than the notion of moral right.183  Once law becomes “stripped of any moral 
anchoring,” the American version is instead “the product of specific political 
institutions enjoying power under the Constitution.”184  Institutional authority is a 
key aspect of any court’s projection of authority.  Makau and Lawrence point to a 
line of critical inquiry into the Supreme Court’s invention of institutional strategies.  
Makau and Lawrence’s study of evolving judicial inventional strategies “assumes a 
close symbiotic link between politics, economics, and judicial reasoning.”185
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Structural analysis can reveal the political connections between the judicial 
branch and other political institutions or the public.  For example, Eric Doxtader’s 
application of  Jürgen Habermas’s theories of communicative action186 and 
constitutionalism187 to legal discourse is essentially a study of the structural 
relationships between governmental institutions and community, social, or ethnic 
organizations.188  Todd McDorman has examined the reaction of the African-
American community to the Dred Scott decision.189  Because his analysis focuses 
on the communicative acts of the community, he partially illuminates the structural 
relationship between disenfranchised communities and legal apparatus like the 
Court.  Other similar studies have examined the effects of a court ruling on the 
gay/lesbian/bisexual community190 and Holocaust survivors.191
Supreme Court justices  make exhaustive efforts to ground their opinions 
within the context of previous judicial opinions.  While there may be many ways to 
identify the structure of a legal opinion, the use of prior precedent is certainly 
important.  As legal historian Eileen M. O’Sullivan noted, “The use of prior 
decisions to explain or support a current decision, in effect folding them into the 
decisions, is a means of systematic self-reference.  This folding in process validated 
not only the current decision, but the prior one as well.”192  Ensuring that a present 
decision accords with prior case law suggests that the Court is offering a doctrinal 
argument, which as Jablonski notes, is generally characterized by a subordination 
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of individual personalities to doctrine, hierarchy, and tradition.193  Posner reports 
that the most cited judicial opinions tend to be free of footnotes and dissenting 
opinions.194
Given the central importance of precedent to legal structure, it makes sense 
why a Court wishing to appear as apolitical as possible would attempt to align its 
decisions with previous decisions (especially those regarded as correctly decided).  
Conversely, one of the most effective ways for a dissenting judge to lower the 
impact of a majority opinion is to challenge the majority’s adherence to structure 
(doctrinal law) and force the majority opinion author to include copious legal 
citations to validate his or her argument.  Citations serve important rhetorical 
functions, such as relaying basic information, demonstrating priority or 
disagreement, highlighting authority, or even merely celebratory (citing to another 
text to enhance one’s own credibility)195  At the same time, Posner argues that 
“[f]ootnotes in judicial opinions tend to confuse the reader, and a dissenting 
opinion undermines the majority opinion not only by indicating a lack of unanimity 
but also by expressing criticisms of the outcome that the majority would have 
preferred to pass over in silence.”196  One excellent example of the technique can be 
seen in Justice Stevens’ attack on the standing of Patrick Hamacher in Gratz.  
Rehnquist’s majority opinion began with a defense of the standing argument which 
may have blunted his efforts to use the Gratz majority as a rhetorical counterpoint 
to the Grutter majority ’s discussion about the merits of affirmative action.
In both Grutter and Gratz, one of the central issues is whether the majority 
opinions are consistent with the Court’s prior applications of the “strict scrutiny” 
test.  This variable is worth tracking in the media analysis because it is a strong 
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representation of the various efforts of the justices to frame their arguments within 
the doctrinal structure of the precedent.  In Grutter, the “strict scrutiny” test is 
discussed at great length in the majority opinion, which ultimately finds that the 
Law School passes the strict scrutiny.  It is no surprise that in writing for the 
majority, O’Connor emphasizes that the strict scrutiny test allows some race based 
classifications, “[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compelling 
governmental interest.”197  She closes her overview of strict scrutiny applications 
by noting that
[n]not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable 
and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully 
examining the important and the sincerity of the reasons advanced 
by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that 
particular context.198
In contrast, the majority opinion in Gratz, which found that the University’s 
undergraduate program failed the strict scrutiny test, emphasizes the strictness of 
the test.  Rehnquist suggests that in order to “withstand our strict scrutiny analysis,” 
the University must demonstrate that its program is narrowly tailored.199  Rehnquist 
suggests that the test is so strict because “racial classifications are simply too 
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and 
classification.”200
The dissenters in both cases attempted to cast the majority’s application of 
the strict scrutiny test as improvident.  In Rehnquist’s dissent of Grutter, he argues 
that “[b]efore the Court’s decision today, we consistently applied the same strict 
scrutiny analysis regardless of the government’s purported reasons for using race 
and regardless of the setting in which race was used” and suggests that “[a]lthough 
197 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
198 Id.
199 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
200 Id.
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the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that 
review is unprecendented in its deference.”201  Likewise, Ginsburg’s dissent of 
Gratz cites affirmative action critic Stephen Carter to emphasize the futility of 
Rehnquist’s efforts to remove context from strict scrutiny analysis:
To say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil 
rights have been mostly about freedom from racial oppression is to 
trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered under 
racism.  To pretend … that the issue presented in [Bakke] was the 
same as the issue in [Brown] is to pretend that history never 
happened and that the present doesn’t exist.202
Because of the importance that American legal jurisprudence places on 
adherence to previous precedents, this study tracks media coverage of the fidelity 
of the “strict scrutiny” analysis as an indicator of structure within the legal 
architecture. 
b. Architecture and Voice
The architecture of the Legal system is more than just linguistic or rational 
engineering.  The very creation of a Legal system is an expression.  Therefore, a 
second important variable for measuring the Legal is voice.  As Alexy observes, if 
laws are to be handed down in the name of the people, the law-giver should not be 
“indifferent to the beliefs of those in whose name judgment is handed down.”203
The voice or voices that a judicial opinion adopts reflects the relationship between 
the architecture of the Legal system and the citizens within that system.  Indeed, 
when a judge is dissenting, he or she is not speaking with the voice of full 
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authority.204 Wetlaufer details some of the specific rhetorical conventions of 
American legal discourse, particularly as related to the courtroom performances of 
trial attorneys.205  Specifically, the attorney suppresses his personal voice in the 
language of authority and objective tones of “reason”, “science,” and “logic.”206
Trial attorneys will present texts as having one singular meaning.  When relating 
narratives for a persuasive purpose, attorneys obscure their roles as authors, 
preferring to present the moral of the story as a “simple revelation of objective 
truth.” 207  Wetlaufer argues that, while attorneys often transcend these rhetorical 
conventions, they must nevertheless find ways of addressing these conventions.208
Aside from simply cataloging the particular rhetorical quirks of lawyers, the 
project of understanding legal rhetoric as discourse is important given the public 
role that legal rhetoric plays in resolving public controversies through the judicial 
system. Elkins argues that law is certainly not the only language suitable for 
expression of public concern for public goods.  All too often, legal discourse and 
legal institutions are used for “public discourse in ways that fail to recognize the 
limits of law as a disciplined way of talking about public life and public goods.”209
Law does, however, constitute a “developed (and developing) public language, 
widely shared, although never so widely as we might assume.”210
Voice is a crucial variable in the study of social movements because courts 
are often viewed as “speaking” on a matter.  For example, seminal court decisions 
such as Brown v. Board of Education are often critically studied as part of a larger 
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social movement.211  Carrie Crenshaw has used judicial decisions in the areas of 
reproductive choice and desegregation to illustrate the legal system’s responses to 
social calls for greater institutional sensitivity to these issues.212  Part of the 
relevance of legal rhetoric to social revolutions is the manner in which an argument 
is developed and introduced into the public sphere.  Judicial opinions can play a 
relevant role in the pre-genesis, inception, rhetorical crises, or consummation phase 
of a social movement.213  Indeed, individual court cases can be understood as 
providing a public space for marginalized voices speaking on issues such as 
homosexual/transsexual rights,214 feminist and/or women’s issues,215 and race.216
Hunsaker’s analysis of Brown is particularly illustrative of how the study of legal 
relationships in one social movement (racial desegregation) can carry over to other 
social movements (gay rights).217
One of the roles of rhetorical scholars and historians is to identify the 
various voices that come to bear on a judicial decision.  One means by which 
voices can be measured is to track citations to prior decisions or extra-legal 
publications like law review articles or other scholarly reports.  For example, the 
influence of social science experts is apparent in Brown v. Board of Education.  In 
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this study, voice can be measured by looking at the Grutter majority’s deference to 
the University’s assessment that diversity will yield educational benefits.  In 
Grutter, the majority bolstered its finding that classroom diversity is a compelling 
state interest by noting a traditional deference to educational institutions on matters 
of academic expertise.218  This deference is based on First Amendment principles 
of education autonomy discussed by Powell in his Bakke plurality opinion: “The 
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body.”
The question of whether the voice of the University should carry weight is 
not only an important part of the substantive legal analysis, but also representative 
of the proper voice of the judiciary.  On most matters, the judiciary will defer to 
populist voices like a legislature or public referendum.  Appellate courts routinely
defer to the expertise of expert witnesses or the factual assessments of lower court 
trial judges.  However, in areas involving fundamental rights, the Supreme Court 
has traditionally freed itself of such obligations to deference.219  Nevertheless, in the 
Korematsu case, the Court gave great deference to the military’s claim that 
discrimination against Japanese-Americans served national security interests. Prior 
to Grutter, the Court had only shown similar deference to prison officials justifying 
the use of racial segregation to address race-riot conditions in prisons.  Whether 
education experts should be given the same amount of deference is ultimately a 
question about whether or not such voices merit deference within the architecture 
of the Legal system.  Accordingly, references to the Court’s deference to 
educational experts are an appropriate variable to assist in the tracking of legal 
architecture.
Diagram 3.3: Summary of Legal Architecture Variables in Grutter and Gratz
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Structure Voice
Grutter majority’ s adherence to the 
“strict scrutiny” test for state-based 
racial classifications
University of Michigan faculty 
as proponents of classroom 
diversity
2. Legal Culture
The second broad classification scheme for legal rules or regulations 
embraces the notion of a legal culture.  Culture refers to the living elements that 
give life to the Legal system.  Legal institutions and actors “derive their 
perspectives” from cultural settings, even as they attempt to locate themselves in a 
“mythical space separate from the space of any particular social locale.”220  Culture 
also can refer to the relationship that the actors in the Legal system have with 
society operating in their own subcultures.221
Two general variables can be helpful in assessing legal culture.  First, 
rhetorical scholars have long recognized the relationship between time and rhetoric.  
Any legal system must carefully account for the invocation of a temporal-bound 
notion such as tradition, so as to ensure that some laws are respected and others are 
viewed as anachronistic.  By tracking other rhetorical constructions of time, 
observant scholars may be able to monitor some aspects of the culture that 
envelopes the Legal.  
A second important variable useful in tracking the culture of the Legal 
system is the use of metaphors.  To be sure, metaphoric analysis is so indeterminate 
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as to be useless in many regards.  However, a careful analysis of particular 
metaphors used within the context of a particular legal argument can offer insight 
to the underlying cultural assumptions of the Legal system.222  In addition, because 
metaphors are often the most colorful and memorable aspect of an otherwise dry 
legal opinion, they might be one of the few elements of judicial discourse that 
actually reaches the public.
Diagram 3.4: Variables Related to Legal Culture
Time Metaphor
Call to tradition
Using Dates as arguments
Duration of ruling
References to modernity or antiquity
Naming of eras, epochs, or period
Use of similes or metaphors
Parallel case law citations
Extended hypothetical 
analogies
Description of judicial authors
Diagram 3.4 above includes some of the variables that might indicate time 
or metaphor use as an indicator of Legal culture.  As an example of time, the 
Grutter and Gratz opinions battle over whether a limited period of time should be 
part of any approved affirmative action scheme.  Accordingly, both majority and 
minority authors will put forward various versions of when an acceptable end point 
might occur.  Struggles over time also occur when opinion writers attempt to 
dismiss certain lines of cases by categorizing them in a different time period.  For 
example, equal protection clause cases prior to the 1950s are distinguished from the 
“New Equal Protection” era cases in an effort to avoid their results.
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Examples of metaphors are very easy to find because, as James Boyd White 
has noted, legal reasoning is essentially metaphorical reasoning.223  Anytime the 
Court is comparing one set of facts to a decision in another case, some level of 
metaphorical analyses is being employed.  One very specific example of 
metaphoric language is the use of extended hypothetical analogies.  Law students in 
the United States are primarily tested through essay examinations using 
hypothetical situations that can absurdly test a rule’s limits.  It is a common feature 
of legal discourse to use such hypotheticals in the course of regular legal argument.  
Accordingly, there is usually an abundance of such hypotheticals available to 
review.  Given their colorful nature, such hypotheticals are often irresistible to 
media writers.
a. Intracultural Analysis
Cultural scholarship covers the spectrum of research that deals with the 
cultural location and characteristics of a given legal text.  Rhetorical scholars have 
been investigating the cultural foundations of legal texts through a variety of 
methods.  Broadly speaking, the projects can be organized in relation to the critic’s 
position with the legal text, allowing for a spectrum that ranges from intracultural 
perspectives to intercultural positions.  This section discusses the intracultural 
references to time within the Michigan decisions.  The next section explains the 
Court’s use of military academy metaphors as an intercultural variable.
A good example of an intracultural rhetorical scholar is Clarke Rountree, 
who has called for rhetorical scholars to gain a more sophisticated understanding of 
the technical operations of courts.224 Part of that process requires that rhetorical 
scholars become better educated about law and specific characteristics of the legal 
decision-making process.  Rountree is not the first rhetorical scholar to sound this 
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sort of call to arms.225  Rountree’s primary interest is in understanding how the 
judicial culture affects its decision-making process.  He prefers a close textual 
analysis that emphasizes the cultural position of the judge within the context of the 
judge’s historical setting, but also the particular cultural rules under which the 
judge operates.  Rountree also believes that when rhetorical scholars demonstrate a 
mastery of the legal jargon and technical problems of jurisprudence, rhetorical 
scholars are more likely to be read seriously by lawyers.  In that sense, Rountree 
urges scholars to deeply immerse themselves in legal language and culture to write 
better, more informed analyses.
One of the enduring contradictions of the American legal system is the 
conflicting promise for swift justice and slow deliberation.  At one level, victims of 
crimes or legal transgressions are promised that the Legal system will punish, 
rectify, or resolve conflicts with exceeding speed.  At the same time, legal 
decisions are expected to be thorough and mindful of wider effects on other cases.  
Accordingly, there is a constant intracultural tension within the Legal system when
units of time are discussed.  In almost every conflict, the Court is faced with the 
question of acting quickly to resolve the suffering of a victim versus acting 
resolutely in order to fully address the entire legal conflict and perhaps anticipate 
future issues.
In Grutter, the Court’s majority agreed that race -based classifications were 
properly used by the school.  However, at the end of the majority opinion, 
O’Connor notes that the majority took the University at its word that it would “like 
nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula” and would end its 
race-based admissions program as soon as “practicable.”226  O’Connor then offers 
the following calculation as a suggested timeline:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of 
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of 
225
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public higher education.  Since that time, the number of minority 
applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased.  
We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will 
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.227
The dissenters seized on the 25 year term and describe it as a “possible 25-
year limitations;”228 a “pronouncement that race-conscious admissions programs 
will be unnecessary 25 years from now;”229 or a “holding that racial discrimination 
in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”230  Ginsburg’s 
concurring opinion approaches the 25 year term only as a suggestion, noting that 
“[f]rom today’s vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the 
next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal 
opportunity will make it safe to  sunset affirmative action.”231
Tracking the media’s notation of the 25 year limit offers an opportunity to 
discover how much of the Court’s intracultural conflicts are highlighted for the 
media-consuming citizen.  Paired with the attitudinal orientations described in the 
beginning of the Media chapter, this analysis may also reveal whether journalists 
framed the issue as political wrangling between Justices or as a sincere issue to be 
resolved.
b. Intercultural Analysis
On the other side of the culture spectrum is intercultural scholarship that 
emphasizes the cultural location of law.  These lines of research understand law as 
a particular culture that often requires translation from a somewhat objectivist 
position to be fully understood.  Headlining this category is the instructive work by 
Marouf Hasian and his collaborators that emphasizes understanding Law as a 
227 Id. (citations omitted).
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“rhetorical culture.”232  However, work in the Law and Literature and Critical Legal 
Studies movements also qualify as intercultural legal rhetorical criticism.  
Marouf Hasian has consistently demonstrated a commitment to the 
rhetorical culture of law as part of a “critical legal rhetoric” that liberates legal 
argumentation from the hegemonic argumentative norms imposed by the legal 
culture.233  In his more recent scholarship, Hasian has put critical legal rhetorical 
criticism to use in looking at a variety of legal texts, from court cases to 
revolutionary legal arguments.234  The diversity of legal texts studied by Hasian is 
instructive, in that interested scholars need not study only U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions or mass mediated criminal trials with celebrity defendants.  Hasian et. al 
note a set of characteristics of American legal culture: 
Law is bounded by public culture; 
Law is polysemic; 
Law is hegemonic; 
Law is vulnerable to social changes; and
Law is usually not fair.235
Although “Law” is Hasian’s word, he seems to be referring to the U.S. legal system 
in many respects.  Like an intraculturalist, Hasian takes care to understand the 
importance of “speaking like a lawyer.”236 In law schools, there is a similar interest 
in understanding how the culture of law impacts the practice of law.237  However, 
Hasian is more interested in understanding how “Law” is perceived outside of the 
circle of trained attorneys.
The Law and Literature movement is another example of scholars looking 
at how Law is communicated outside of the Legal system.  In general, the 
232 Hasian, Condit et al. (1996).
233 Hasian (1994); Hasian and Croasmun (1996); Hasian (1997); Hasian, Condit et al. (1997); 
Hasian (1998); Hasian (2000); Hasian (2000).
234
  Hasian (1997b, 2000a, 2000b, 2003).
235
  Hasian, Condit et al. (1996), 335-37.
236 Id. 323, 339.
237
 Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1994; Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer. Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993; 
Stephen D. Smith, "Believing Like a Lawyer." Boston College Law Review (1999) 40: 1041-1137.
86
movement might be said to contain three different strands: the humanists, the 
hermeneutics, and the storytellers.238 According to Baron, the humanists are 
interested in how exposure to literature opens up the perspectives of lawyers and 
jurists.239 The hermeneutic “law-and-lits” want lawyers reading literary theory to 
better understand the business of textual interpretation.240 Finally, the storytellers 
are interested in evaluating narratives in legal circles for their social, evidentiary, 
and/or epistemological value.241 What Baron means by epistemological values is 
hard to tell, but her citations to Eskridge and Scheppele suggest that she 
understands epistemology as more subjective than perspectivist-based.242 Baron 
concludes that all strands of law and literature, as well as other forms of 
interdisciplinary legal studies (e.g., law and history, law and society, law and 
economics) treat law as a “bounded entity, an independent domain” that can be 
fertilized through cross-disciplinary studies.243
For James Boyd White, one of the clearest voices in the Law and Literature 
movement, the “rue value of a text” is based in the community of the audience 
where “the author offers his reader a place to stand, a place from which he can 
observe and judge the characters and events of the world he creates, indeed the 
world itself.”244 White observes that “[w]hat is most deeply distinctive about law [is 
reducible] to two main features: the separation of powers and the obligation to 
explain (and explain in a certain way).”245  This second notion of an obligation to 
explain seems to require and justify the law’s historical dance with rhetoric.  The 
interplay between the speaker’s obligation and the culture within which he becomes
subject to the law is a consistent part of White’s work, particularly when the subject 
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matter relates to constitutional analysis.  He explains that the U.S. Constitution is a 
rhetorical constitution in that “it constitutes a rhetorical community, working by 
rhetorical processes that it has established but can no longer control.  It establishes 
a new conversation on a permanent basis.”246
The Legal system is not only a constructed set of processes and procedures; 
it also represents a living institution with its own internal culture and cultural 
references with other life systems.  Eric Doxtader notes that institutions have a 
“kind of double character” by “enacting a shared identity through necessarily 
exclusive norms of representations.”247  “Institutional arguments are interactions 
that define the scope of institutional decision making and explain why particular 
actions are justified in light of the public’s interest.248  Doxtader points out two 
reasons to critique institutional argument: first, institutional argumentation “sheds 
light on how institutions understand their self-acknowledged obligation to the 
public;” and second, “critical readings of institutional argument show how 
institutions mediate diverse public interests and the need for systematic stability.”249
These two justifications align closely with both cultural aspects of the Legal 
system.  At one level, cultural criticism must be turned inwards towards the Court’s 
intracultural understanding of its role and functions.  At another level, the Court’s 
need to balance its internal culture with the needs of the external public justifies an 
intercultural critique.
The variable used in this study for tracking cultural references in the Legal 
system is metaphor.  James Boyd White has noted that all legal reasoning is 
essentially analogical reasoning because the application of law to facts invariably 
involves the comparison of two different things.250  In addition, judicial opinions are 
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usually written to be guideposts for future situations.  Courts have the “capacity to 
use each judicial opinion not simply to resolve a controversy, but also to 
communicate continually with audiences beyond those litigants actually before the 
court.”251  As Levinson notes, tradition is not found “floating in the air” but is 
“presumably manifested in such central cultural documents as the Declaration of 
Independence and the Gettysburg Address, as well as, more controversially, Martin 
Luther King’s “I have a Dream” speech.252
Legal metaphors sit at the intersection between legal culture and the 
cultures of the general public and thus are appropriate indicators of intercultural 
connections.  Even as cultural norms change within the Legal system and the 
general public, metaphors can suggest links between a culture’s past practices and 
present attitudes.  As an example, modern litigation derives much of its technical 
terminology from its medieval roots of trial by combat or trial by ordeal.  The 
physical practices of combat and torture were fully accepted by the legal 
institutions of the day.253  Even as the modern jury trial has left behind older 
notions of tests by sword or burning, there remains the underlying notion that truth 
is tested by undergoing an ordeal.  The modern metaphor may not involve loss of 
blood, but usually involves loss of money or reputation.  Trial remains an ordeal, 
but with different pressure points.
For this study, one of the more interesting examples of metaphorical 
reasoning is the invocation of military academies.  The Grutter majority, in 
upholding the Law School’s use of race-based classifications, noted an amicus 
curie brief filed by various retired military and civilian defense leaders supporting 
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affirmative action.254  The majority quotes the brief’s claim that “the military 
cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse 
unless the service academies and the [Reserved Officer Training Corps] used 
limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies.”255  The majority then 
postulates that it takes “only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our 
country’s other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and 
selective.”256  The majority uses the military’s leadership needs as a metaphor for 
the general needs of civic leadership (which the Court establishes earlier is left to 
lawyers).  Recall that the Korematsu  holding already permits racial classifications 
if national security so demands.  Arguably, the military schools could simply rely 
on that justification for recruiting minority officers, rather than appeal for a general 
state interest in classroom diversity.
None of the Grutter dissenters address the majority’s use of the military 
academies as a metaphor for societal leadership.  However, Thomas does use a 
different military school analogy.  He notes that the Court refused to permit the 
Virginia Military Institute, a state-sponsored military school, to exclude women 
from its student body.257  Thomas’ dissent notes that the VMI decision, which 
presumably offered a lower standard of review, afforded the school no deference to 
its claims that an all-male education was an adequate state interest.258  Thomas uses 
the Court’s lack of deference to suggest that it favors elite law schools: 
“Apparently, where the status qou being defended is that of the elite 
establishment—here the Law School—rather than a less fashionable Southern 
military institution, the Court will defer without serious inquiry and without regard 
to the applicable legal standard.”259
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Diagram 3.5: Summary of Legal Culture Variables in Grutter and Gratz
Time Metaphor
25 year limit for use of race-based 
classifications at University
Military schools as an analogy 
for the use of race or gender 
classifications
D. Conclusion
A citizen reading the text of the Gratz and Grutter cases would learn more 
than just the arguments discussed in the previous chapter.  The text of these cases 
also reveals something about the architecture of the Legal system, particularly 
related to its structure and voice.  It may not be particularly surprising that the 
structure of the decisions are balanced on interpreting the structure of Bakke.  
However, the Court’s struggle over whether to allow academics the sort of 
deference that military leaders received in the Japanese-American internment cases 
might surprise many Americans.  Similarly, citizens looking at the case through the 
prism of cultural might be surprised at the Court’s internal struggle over the 25 year 
time “limit” and puzzled by the various Justice’s use of the military school analogy.  
Whatever the citizen might decide about the ultimate wisdom of the Court’s 
decisions, he or she would be hard pressed not to be engaged by the decision.
Before proceeding to a discussion about the rhetorical notion of Law in the 
next chapter, it is worth noting one of the limitations of the Legal system concept.  
Whether using the architectural or the cultural model, there is an assumption that 
the Legal system has some sort of permanent status.  However, there are plenty of 
cases in which a particular judicial tribunal is established for a limited period of 
review.  Most war crimes tribunals are examples of these limited term 
arrangements.  In those scenarios, the Legal system may be more mechanical in 
nature.  Nevertheless, the rules, protocols and languages of even a temporary Legal 
system are important influences on the rhetoric produced at trial.   Indeed, future 
scholarship might demonstrate that the sharp lessons of a singular tribunal like the 
91
Nuremburg Trials may resonate more in the public consciousness than the over-
exposed criminal court trial model that currently populates news and entertainment 
media programming.
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Chapter IV:  The Law
One of the emergent challenges of a global economic order is the mediation 
between different legal traditions, specifically Eastern and Western notions of law.  
Korean legal scholar Hahm Pyong-Choon notes that because European languages 
use the word law to refer to not only the rights of the individual, but justice as well, 
it becomes inconceivable to imagine justice without law.260  The very threat of 
lawsuit ensures justice.  In contrast, Professor Hahm argues that the Korean legal 
tradition, like many Asian cultures, aspires to a perfect harmony under which law 
and lawsuits are eventually unnecessary.261  Korea’s issues with the imposition of 
Western legal standards are hardly new.  Foreign legal codes and customs are 
constantly being imposed on cultures.  The troubles in Korea are a reminder that 
legal systems are ultimately fueled by a more fundamental notion of Law.  Citizens 
can import their legal systems, but they must develop their own notion of Law for 
those systems to be effective.
A. Overview
This Chapter explores the notion of “Law” as a pool of generally accepted 
principles of justice or fairness.  In doing so, this Chapter answers the question: 
How citizens learn about Law from legal texts? 
Using examples from Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger,  I briefly 
describe some of the characteristics of the rhetorical notion of Law propounded 
here.  Next, I describe the sorts of “principles of justice” that are central to a 
rhetorical definition of Law.  Then, I explain the importance of understanding the 
points at which these principles come into conflict.  Finally, I offer some basic 
conclusions on what this formulation of Law might mean for future studies in legal 
rhetoric.  
260
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B. Characteristics of a Rhetorical Notion of Law
Note that we have left the term “legal rhetoric” alone.  Under the 
framework established by this study, there is no real need to talk about a “legal 
rhetoric” because the term is vacuous.  If we must, “legal rhetoric” can be defined 
as the “use of language to describe” the Law, under Cherwitz & Hikins’ 
definition.262  The only refinement is the substitution of “the Law” for “reality.”  
The substitution of Law for reality is fair, because the move recognizes that Law 
operates on a series of presumptions about rules.  It is helpful to note that “reality” 
as used in this construction amounts to an objectively tested and validated 
knowledge claim.263  Just as scientists elevate certain hypotheses that survive close 
scrutiny, lawyers value presumed legal holdings for having survived the close 
scrutiny of repetitive advocacy.264  Law thus becomes a “reality symptomatically 
reflected” by a consensus, rather than a rule created by unanimity.265
As the focus of this Chapter, the working definition of Law for the purposes 
of this study is the set of principles of justice or fairness supported by a rough 
societal consensus.  I do not pretend that this is the only or most obvious definition 
to emerge from various approaches to legal rhetorical scholarship.  However, this 
definition has two important positive characteristics.  First, it is grounded in James 
Boyd White’s definition of Law as the pool of available arguments and narratives 
that are commonly thought of as legal.  Professor White is an important figure in 
the area of Law and Literature and his influence is palpable when reviewing 
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contemporary law and literature studies.  Second, the definition reflects some of the 
broader characteristics about Law as a rhetorical notion discussed by scholars other 
than White, including some who rarely reference the notion of rhetoric at all.  In 
this section, I will review some of the broader characteristics of legal rhetoric that 
tend to support the definition of Law offered in this study.
1. Law has Ideologically Imposed Boundaries.
The study of Law is the study of artificially imposed boundaries, which 
makes developing a general theory of law difficult.  Richard Posner suggests that 
legal scholars know little about the general theory of law.266  I argue that no general 
theory of law exists because of the discipline’s habit of specialization.  To get to 
know a general theory of law, a scholar would need an enormous amount of time to 
simply read through the various legal jurisdictions, theories of jurisprudence, and 
the historical documents that suggest the growth of law.  As Cohen notes, the 
problem with studying the “growth of law” is that the “lawyer must embrace a field 
of literature, history and science within his studies, which will make the duties of 
the lawyer and student extremely difficult, and involve much more time and labor 
than now it is thought profitable to expend in order to be a lawyer.”267
Leaving a “general theory” of law behind, there is a similar problem trying 
to develop a singular definition of Law.  Intercultural legal scholar Surya Prakash 
Sinha presents a helpful categorization of varying approaches to defining Law 
based on different theories of jurisprudence.268  Her categories include: 
Divine/Prophetic Law; ancient269 and modern270 Natural Law Theory; Legal 
Idealism271; Legal Positivism272; Historical Theories of Law273; sociological and 
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psychological legal theories274; Legal Realism theories275; Phenomenology276; and 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS).277  Sinha concludes that no singular definition of Law 
exists because “law is not the principle of social organization everywhere on this 
earth” and law is more influenced by ideology than philosophically grounded 
analyses.278
In an analysis of interdisciplinary approaches to studying law, Jane Baron 
concludes that all forms of interdisciplinary legal studies treat Law as a “bounded 
entity, an independent domain” that can fertilized through cross-disciplinary 
studies.279  This, of course, is the hallmark of a rhetorical view of Law being a 
discrete constitutive entity.  In a greater sense, by acting as if there existed a body 
of legal principles called “the Law,” lawyers have brought into existence something 
akin to Law.280  The boundaries are real, but only material because of their 
rhetorical construction.
Despite the astonishing number of communicatively-grounded or influenced 
philosophical approaches to legal criticism, the methodologies might boil down to 
the same basic elements.  The French existentialist philosopher Paul Amselek 
argues in the phenomological tradition that law can be reduced to the three essential 
elements of the eidos (structure of the law): 
i) generic normative elements of law; 
ii) constitutive elements that give ethical weight to the command of 
the law; and 
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iii) the behavior elements of law that directs human behavior.281
Put one way, Amselek might be calling the essential elements of law rhetorical.  
Law is less a body of knowledge or an area of scholarship, but a field of agreeable 
playing ground.  Like the agreed boundaries of a baseball game, Law is the ever-
changing array of rules, regulations, rhetorical forms and styles, and specialized 
vocabularies that may be conscripted by “legal” advocates to affect changes in the 
rule of law.  As Legal Realist Jerome Frank suggested, the distinction between Law 
and rules is that “[r]ules, whether stated by judges or others, whether in statutes, 
opinions or text-books by learned authors, are not the Law, but are only some 
among many of the sources to which judges go in making the law of the cases tried 
before them.”282
If there are boundaries to Law, whether we understand them through 
interdisciplinary investigation or other methodological approaches, the boundaries 
“exist” because of the willingness of citizens to recognize them as limitations.  For 
example, in the Gratz and Grutter oral arguments, the plaintiffs attempted to argue 
that the U.S. Constitution proscribes any form of state-sponsored racial 
classification.  Justice O’Connor quickly dismissed that notion.  The argument was 
not taken seriously because the Court recognized that the American ideological 
experience supports the use of some racial-classifications by the state.  Examples of 
appropriate race consideration involve public health concerns related to ethnically 
restricted genetic makeup and the segregation of prisoners by race during near-riot 
conditions. Accordingly, the boundaries of equal protection law were informed by 
this ideological orientation.
2. There is a Distinction Between Legalistic and Lawful Behavior.
281
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A second characteristic that informs our definition of Law is the distinction 
between what is legalistic and what is lawful.283 Having already relegated all talk 
about systems, rules, or procedures to the definition of the Legal System, there are 
relatively few discussions about what Law might mean, separate and apart from the 
Legal system.  Our evidence is that the word “legalistic” is a curse, whereas the 
word “lawful” is a eulogy.  
James Boyd White’s analysis of Law as text offers some understanding 
about the differences.  White wishes to introduce legal thinkers to “a world in 
which language is always bounded by the inexpressible; in which language is 
uncertain, always remade; in which we are always making and remaking our own 
characters and our communities.”284  By studying literature, lawyers can learn about 
“law’s gaps, rhetoric, and moral stances.”285  White grounds the inquiry into the 
relationship between Law and Rhetoric by treating Law as a branch of Rhetoric, 
rather than a system of rules.286  His notion of rhetoric is not as a “failed science or 
as the ignoble art of persuasion” but as the “central art by which community and 
culture are established, maintained, and transformed.”287 White sees Law and 
Rhetoric both sharing the ultimate end of justice.288
As previously mentioned, White applies a variation of Aristotle’s definition 
of rhetoric in describing law as “the particular set of resources made available by a 
culture for speech and argument on those occasions, and by those speakers, we 
think as legal.”289  Thus, laws, rules, statutes, and judicial opinions are alongside 
maxims, proverbs, expressions of conventional wisdom as useful tools for the 
opportunistic lawyer.  While lawyers may generally agree on which tools are 
283
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relevant, there is never a perfect agreement.290  While the components of legal 
argument are perhaps objectively discoverable through an “empirical process, their 
reformulation and use [is] an inventive or creative one.”291
A moment of criticism is appropriate at this point.  White’s treatment of 
Law as a text, although insightful and useful, fails to distinguish between the 
systematic elements of the U.S. legal system and the broader notion of the 
principles of justice or fairness that are at the heart of a given conflict.  This study 
argues that Law is limited to the latter principles and exists quite independently of 
any given Legal system.  
What separates talk about Law from the normal discussions about legal 
rules and procedures?  Legal scholar Stephen D. Smith notes that legal discourse, 
what we understand to be the talk of the Legal system, has two characteristics: first, 
the citation of authoritative or binding precedent to decide cases; and second, the 
techniques by which lawyers “invoke, interpret, avoid, or extend enacted law.”292
Clearly, these are not the discussions of citizens about which principles of justice 
should constitute the Law.  At the same time, Smith’s broader description of the 
legal discourse is as a “jurisprudence of faith.”  The rhetorical notion of Law is thus 
defined in part by the underlying values or beliefs that motivate the use of legal 
discourse.  Similarly, Neil MacCormick explains how the artificiality of legal rule 
is a reflection of its underlying purpose: “Perhaps disappointingly for grand 
theorists, [legal logic] is really relatively simple and straightforward.  The simple 
but often criticized formula ‘F + R = C’, or Rule plus Facts yields Conclusion’ is 
the essential truth.”293  MacCormick’s point is that rules are constructed in 
relationship to a pre-established value system coupled with predicted outcome.  In 
290 Id. 689-90.
291 Id. 690.
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that sense, “these rules exist as relatively concrete formulations of more abstract 
principles.”294
Turning towards Gratz and Grutter, we can look to the last two chapters of 
this study to discover the arguments or interesting rhetorical features of the 
decisions.  The central arguments in the cases started with the strict scrutiny test.  
Michigan won the argument that classroom diversity is a compelling state interest, 
but the Court’s decision was primarily based on deference to the educators, 
military, and business leaders who stressed the need for adequate minority 
representation in leadership roles.  The legalistic result was that educators are given 
great deference when they conclude that race-based classifications are necessary to 
effect a positive learning environment for all students.  However, Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter plainly emphasized the social benefits of 
minority leadership, not the importance of deference to educators under the First 
Amendment.
The primary weakness of White’s conceptual theory of law is his reliance 
on public texts.  As the example from Grutter just demonstrated, the actual legal 
text may only suggest what principles are at stake.  The text of a Supreme Court 
opinion is only one of many texts that can aid in interpretation. While the public 
nature of the Court’s opinions make them publicly accessible texts, there are other 
texts worth exploring. White is privileging democratic forms of legal disputes that 
encourage open public dialogue.  Principles of justice and fairness have existed and 
been addressed (however adequately) in all forms of government, even those with 
little regard for open discussions.  There is little reason to base a definition of Law 
on a democratically-oriented system of government.  On a related concern, White’s 
approach essentially suggests that Law requires conflict in order for courts to rule 
294 Id.  (“That is, at least, their aspirational character.”).
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legitimately.295  However, this premise is perhaps not so obvious or acceptable if 
courts could speak authoritatively in the absence of a root conflict.  White explains 
further that:
Law is the constitution of a world by the distribution of authority 
within it.  It is a way of creating a rhetorical community over time.  
It is this discourse, working in the social context of its own 
creation, this language in the fullest sense of the term, that is the 
law.  It makes use members of a common world.
Once Law is understood as a set of principles of justice generally accepted as 
legitimate by a community or society, there is no reason to require conflict.  As the 
Korean example at the beginning of this Chapter demonstrates, Western societies 
may have an unwarranted zeal for using dispute resolution to warrant justice or 
fairness.
3. Principles of Justice and Fairness are Never Wrong.
A third characteristic of a rhetorical notion of Law is that the underlying 
principles of justice or fairness are never wrong.  The question is not whether a 
principle is logical, moral, or correct.  Rather the analysis is whether the principle is 
accepted in its broadest sense by a rough consensus of people.  As an example, 
consider some of the closing lines in Justice Thomas’ dissent in Grutter:
For the immediate future, however, the majority has placed its 
imprimatur on a practice that can only weaken the principle of 
equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the 
Equal Protection Clause.  "Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."296
Thomas’ invocation of Justice Harlan’s famous language from his own 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson is a good example because most Americans would 
agree that race should not matter.  As a principle of justice, it stands even though it
is not the law of the land.  Justice Thomas has been no support of affirmative 
295 See White (1984), 264-65 (noting the centrality of conflict as a prerequisite to judicial 
deliberation).  
296
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action, but he would likely agree that there are some limited events when the use of 
a racial classification by a state is appropriate.  Why cite Harlan if he does not 
agree, as a matter of law, that the Constitution should be color-blind?  The short 
answer is that Thomas is seeking to frame affirmative action as an poorly 
considered exception to the broader rule of colorblindness.
The more complicated answer is that Thomas wants to make the majority’s 
ruling unacceptable as a matter of Law.  German political philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas has argued that the legitimacy of any court’s decision rests on the 
intertwining of the public’s expectation of legitimacy with the factually-grounded 
process of making and enforcing law.297  The resulting pronouncement is described 
by Habermas as “Janus-faced” to citizens, leaving it up to them to decide between 
two possible approaches to law:
Either they can consider legal norms merely as commands, in the 
sense of factual constraints on their personal scope of action, and 
take a strategic approach to the calculable consequences of 
possible rule violations; or they can take a performative attitude in 
which they view norms as valid precepts and comply “out of 
respect for the law.298
In a Supreme Court decision, the majority and dissenting authors compete for the 
citizen’s orientation for strategic or performative-based obedience.  The members 
of the majority, whether in the majority opinion or in a concurrence, are doctrinally 
incapable of expositing on the “negotiation” of obedience to a given rule.  
Conversely, the dissenter can argue for a strategic approach that gives agency to the 
individual.  The majority can only make Law that is enforceable and acceptable299
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and there is little if any room for the individual decision-making in that 
pronouncement.300
In Habermas’ view, majority opinions are therefore different only because 
they are treated differently.301  Doctrinal argument and personal arguments are thus 
substantively similar, if not identical, but rhetorically distinguishable because they 
serve different rhetorical functions.  Dissents may not be the institutionally favored 
argument, but they are the equals of majority arguments and concurrences in 
deliberative democratic discourse and at times a necessary part of the process of 
social integration.302  In fact, the presence of dissent is proof that “Law is not a 
narcissistically self-enclosed system” or that the mere legality of a law offers it 
legitimacy.303
This distinction between lawful and legalistic arguments demands further 
development.  One immediate concern is that the treatment of arguments inside of 
the Legal system influences how individuals treat an argument as a matter of Law.   
Habermas’ reliance on systematic legitimacy ignores the facts that one recognized 
right comes at the expense of another in the legal system.  Paraphrasing Fuller, 
legal systems cannot be fitted plastically to new situations as they arise; they must 
extend over readily understood areas even at some sacrifice of aptness in individual 
300
 This is one reason why I suspect that judges in the majority, whether writing for the Court or a 
separate concurrence, almost never used the first person personal tense.
301
  Habermas, Facts and Norms, 462 (“The paradoxical achievement of law thus consists in the fact 
that it reduces the conflict potential of unleashed individual liberties through norms that can coerce 
only so long as they are recognized as legitimate on the fragile basis on unleashed communicative 
liberties.”) (emphasis added).
302 Id. (“Social integration thereby takes on a peculiarly reflexive shape: by meeting its need for 
legitimation with the help of the productive force of communication, law takes advantage of a 
permanent risk of dissensus to spur on legally institutionalized public discourses.”).
303 Id. 461.  Similar concerns have been raised by other critically-minded scholars. Eileen M. 
O’Sullivan, “Legal Argument as a Non-linear Process.” In Law and History (eds. Andrew Lewis 
and M. Lobban) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Geoffrey D. Klinger, "Law as 
Communicative Praxis: Toward a Rhetorical Jurisprudence." Argumentation and Advocacy (1994) 
30: 236-47; John Louis Lucaites, "Between Rhetoric and 'the Law': Power Legitimacy and Social 
Change." Quarterly Journal of Speech (1990) 76: 435-49; Ramie McKerrow, "Critical Rhetoric: 
Theory and Praxis." Communication Monographs (1989) 56: 91-111.
103
cases.
304
  Like language, the revelation of one legal relationship is at the cost of 
another.  When a symbolically significant deed becomes ritualized, it also becomes 
a requirement.  For example, the reading of Miranda rights is ritualistic and not 
specifically required by many jurisdictions.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that because society has adopted the notion that one’s rights must be read to 
him or her, Miranda rights are law.305 Whereas Miranda rights were once a legal 
right, they are now apparently elevated to a lawful claim.
4. Principles of Justice and Fairness are Culturally Bound.
Justice Thomas’ dissent accuses the majority of abandoning the severity of 
the strict scrutiny test because of an admiration for the elite status of the law 
school.  He contrasts the Court’s disregard for the Virginia Military Institute’s 
claim that its single-sex status was necessary to maintain its classroom 
environment, concluding that the majority must have viewed Southern military 
schools as “unfashionable.”306  Although Thomas’ claim suggests that judicial 
decisions should be above cultural trends, there is something of a counterargument 
when one looks at the rhetorical notion of Law.  I argue that where the Legal 
system might have some cultural aspects to its internal operation or external 
relationship with citizens, the Law is entirely a culturally-bound concept.
Marouf Hasian Jr., a critical rhetorical scholar interested in liberating legal 
argumentation from the hegemonic argumentative norms imposed by the legal 
culture,307 has argued with the assistance of some colleagues for the notion of Law 
as a rhetorical culture.308 Hasian is closely aligned with White’s liberal acceptance 
of non-legal texts as artifacts of legal rhetoric.  Hasian also uses a concept of Law 
that incorporates elements of the Legal system concept advocated here.  For 
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Hasian, the concept of law as a rhetorical culture is intended to be a middle ground 
in the debate between legal “professionalists” and advocates of the critical legal 
studies movement (CLS).  According to Hasian, legal professionalists believe that 
legal reasoning trains attorneys to ignore their instinctive emotional and social 
needs to balance long-term legal rights and duties.309  In contrast, CLS advocates 
portray that “rule of law” as a dominant ideology that “represents a narrow and 
exclusive range of sociopolitical and economic interests.”310  Taking a transcendent 
middle position, Hasian argues that “law is neither a rationally constructed 
discourse nor simply a dominant ideology, but rather an active and protean 
component of a hegemonically crafted rhetorical culture.”311  Law as culture offers 
an intriguing explanation for how principles of justice and fairness might evolve in 
step with societal norms.312
Gerald Wetlaufer specifically argues that American legal discourse can 
trace its cultural roots to one of three distinctive historical “communities” that are 
linked to particular periods of time and styles of jurisprudence.313  In approaching 
legal discourse, Wetlaufer urges critics to first locate the cultural moorings of the 
legal author’s discourse “system.”314  By identifying the cultural “position” of a 
legal discourse, the rhetorical criticism of law points to the possibility of a more 
complete cultural criticism of law, which evaluates not just the rhetorical personae 
lawyers adopt, but the legal institutions, legal decisions, an legal forms that shape 
character and identity in our society.315
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Justice Thomas’ complaint about the “trendy” Court reveals the peculiar 
dynamic between Law and culture.  Thomas shows concern for the Court’s 
apparent willingness to interpret the requirements of the Constitution in line with 
contemporary societal needs.  Take the principle of justice that every applicant to 
Michigan should be reviewed on his or her individual merits.  What counts as an 
individual merit certainly evolves with time.  Community service, for example, is a 
culturally bound concept.  What does not evolve is the notion that any individual 
consideration should be sincere.  For Michigan’s undergraduate admissions 
program, the granting of a large number of points to an applicant for being a 
minority ran afoul of that notion, a sin that was not culturally bound.  Thomas’ 
complaint is not measured by the Court’s willingness to explore new critieria for 
what counts as a “compelling state interest” but rather his concern that the Court is 
too willing to accept the apparent sincerity of the academic advocates of the 
“critical mass” theory while they doubted less-fashionable supporters of VMI’s all 
male education programs.
Hasian’s perspective of law as culture is limited on two levels.  First, 
Hasian merely understands the particular legal system of the United States when he 
grounds his analysis in culture.  For example, in the article that first advocates the 
law as rhetorical culture position, Hasian and his coauthors take care to understand 
the importance of “speaking like a lawyer” as a key to understanding Law’s 
cultural positioning.316  However, this perspective confuses the culture of the legal 
system with the longevity of a set of argumentative tools.  Lawyers have been 
studying rhetoric for over two thousand years317  and not so much has changed: 
“The perplexing truth, at once startling and yet vaguely reassuring, is that lawyers 
and judges today talk and argue and justify in pretty much the same curious ways 
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that they have used for generations.”318  The question to ask is what is staying the 
same: the rhetorical notion of Law grounded in a rhetoric or the specific legal 
arguments?
How can abstract principles of justice, stripped from the context of the 
conflicts that gave rise to them in courts, be effectively understood or articulated by 
citizens?  Baron’s view, one which ought to be appealing to rhetorical theorists for 
many reasons, is that “the definition of the field of ‘law,’ like that of any other 
field, will to some degree reflect or be a product of what we, as a culture, want law 
to be and do.”319  Fortunately, rhetorical scholarship has provided critics with a tool 
to diagnosis the aspirational qualities of a particular text.
Rhetoric scholar Michael Calvin McGee has articulated the concept of an 
“ideograph” as a condensed form of ideology that is a “high-order abstraction 
representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined 
normative goal.” 320  Examples of ideographs include: “law,” “liberty,” “tyranny,” 
“trial by jury,” “rule of law,” “property,” “religion,” “right of privacy,” or “freedom 
of speech.”321  The key to understanding ideographs is that different participants 
have differing understandings of the same ideograph, 322 but are still able to engage 
in discourse on the subject.323  In discourse, the interaction of speakers with 
different understandings of the same ideograph can create a “dynamic tension” that 
allows the pursuit of individual rights in a pluralistic world.324  When looking for 
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principles of justice, the starting point should be those ideographs like equality, due 
process, and fairness.  In locating points of conflict, one looks to the location at 
which one advocates that one ideograph becomes distinguishable for another.  That 
is the site of conflict.  For example, Lucaites & Condit might suggest that violence 
is the point of conflict for the ideograph of “equality” as respectively understood by 
Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr.
C. What Principles at Law are in Conflict in Gratz and Grutter?
We have posited that the rhetorical definition of Law is a “rough 
consensus” opinion regarding a pool of various arguments available and useful for 
resolving conflicts over justice.  The Law itself encompasses the moral, technical, 
or scientific claims that are supported in law.  As an example, the claim that lie 
detector test results are always valid does not enjoy the support of a rough 
consensus.  On the other hand, a statement made against one’s interest is viewed to 
be more trustworthy.  The individual logic of the two arguments is much less 
important than the underlying basis for the argument.  The lie detector example 
emphasizes the reliability of science, a notion that has not yet gained wide 
consensus from Americans.  The statement against interest, in contrast, is based on 
the widely accepted premise that people generally do not intend to harm themselves 
by telling falsehoods.
In this project, the statements of Law worth examining provide the 
underlying moral, technical, or scientific basis for the claims of the majority 
opinions.  The claims will relate to the roles of educational institutions, the 
problematic nature of racism, and the duty of state governments to use race-based 
classifications to combat the effects of hundreds of years of racial segregation.  
Recalling that the Law is the reservoir for arguments that have some rough social 
Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhetorics in the Martyred Black Vision,” Communication 
Monographs 57 (1990): 5-24.
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consensus, we might identify the specific arguments in Law by noting appeals to 
standards or norms accepted by society.
In general, however, identifying the Law is a rhetorical analysis and any of 
the diverse tools of rhetorical inquiry can be relied upon.  For the purposes of this 
project, Chaim Perelman’s theory of informal argumentation can be applied to the 
Gratz and Grutter opinions.  Perelman, like many mid -twentieth century American 
and Swedish judges, adopted a realist perspective towards formal legal argument.  
In this view, formal legal claims are supported by essential appeals to socially 
accepted norms.  In Grutter and in Gratz, the Court’s majority opinion writers 
explicitly identified the underlying social concerns that support or work against 
racial classifications.  As illustrated below in Diagram 4.1, there are two salient 
elements of analysis: first, the principles of justice or fairness that underlie the legal 
rule in conflict; and second, the points of conflict which locate the specific 
instances and places in which two or more principles are in conflict.
Diagram 4.1: Indicia of Principles and Points of Conflict 
Principles Points of Conflict
Generalized statement of justice Conflicting fact patterns
References to civic authority Clash between rule and 
principle
One begins this level of analysis by identifying the two or more general 
principles of Law in conflict.  In some cases, the principles are explicitly stated.  In 
other cases, particularly those in a long line of similar disputes, the reference to the 
principles is buried under legal citation.  When statements are not explicitly stated, 
it may be helpful to return to the Legal analysis and identify the underlying issues 
supporting the use of various architectural and cultural features of the Legal 
discourse.  Metaphors are a particularly good source for clues as to the underlying 
legal conflict.
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In Grutter and Gratz, the major principles are stated in a fairly straight-
forward fashion, as the following three examples demonstrate.  First, the justices 
struggle over whether all state-sponsored racial classifications should be subject to 
the highest level of scrutiny.  Second, the justices debate whether some of the 
plaintiffs are truly representative of the class of students affected by the affirmative 
action program.  Third, there is a crucial debate about whether the First 
Amendment affords educational institutions leeway in declaring that classroom 
diversity is a compelling state interest.  It is important to note that each of these 
conflicts involves two competing basic notions about justice and not just the proper 
application of laws to facts.
After identifying the principles in conflict, the next aspect of this stage of 
the analysis is to identify which conflicts were resolved by the Court’s decision and 
how those conflicts were resolved.  In addition, one must identify which conflicts 
were avoided by the Court and, to the extent possible, attempt to identify whether 
the Court was still making a statement about the relative merit of the argument.  As 
an example, the Court might subordinate an argument about one constitutional 
provision to another, indicating the superiority of the prefered provision.
Alexy warns that lawyers cannot dispense wisdom and justice in a 
senseless, unjust world.325  However, McGee’s ideographs are helpful means of 
identifying which principles of justice are “at play” in any given legal text.  
Turning toward the Grutter and Gratz cases, we can find a fairly discrete set of 
principles of justice by focusing on the ideographic language.  The prevailing 
ideographs were “equality of access” and “individual consideration.”  Whether 
these ideographs have any bearing on a case involving applicants to elite 
educational institutions that receive thousands of applications each year is beyond 
the scope of this study.  However, the Court managed to address the conflict 
325
 Alexy, 295 (“This presupposes a rational and just social order.”).
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between those ideograph-centered principles of justice and offer a resolution to the 
underlying legal dispute.
First, the Grutter majority expl ains that this “case requires [the Court] to 
decide whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University 
of Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful.”326  The specific question the 
Grutter majority answers is whether “diversity is a compelling interest that can 
justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to 
public universities.”327  However, the broader issue is clearly about equality of 
access.  The Grutter majority’s description of the case law be gins with the Equal 
Protection Clause and notes that “We are a ‘free people whose institutions are 
founded upon the doctrine of equality.’”328  Any education benefit gained from 
student body diversity is viewed through the framework of equality:  “Effective 
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our 
Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”329  The 
majority’s emphasis on civic leadership is also keyed to the notion of equality of 
access: “in order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”330
In contrast, the Gratz majority’s opening description of the question is 
much more specific: “We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether ‘the 
University of Michigan’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of  1964, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”331  Because the compelling 
interest prong had been satisfied under Grutter’s analysis, the Gratz majority 
326 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312.
327 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322.
328 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
329 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
330 Id.
331 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249 (some citations omitted).
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focused on whether the undergraduate admissions program was narrowly tailored.  
Accordingly, the Gratz majority focused on the need for individualized assessment 
by noting that Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion “emphasized the important of 
considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities 
that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual’s ability to 
contribute to the unique setting of higher education.332  The Gratz majority then 
holds that the undergraduate program’s rule granting 20 points for race as not 
providing such “individualized consideration” other than a verification of minority 
status.333
Taken together, the two broad principles of justice offered by the Court are:
1.  Equality of access to higher education is important, especially in order 
to cultivate leaders for an ethnically diverse society.  Classroom diversity is a 
compelling state interest, largely because of the relationship between education and 
the development of social leaders.
2.  Equality demands true individual consideration.  Granting students of 
certain racial or ethnic backgrounds enough points to guarantee admission is not 
true individual consideration, even if borderline candidates are given a second 
individual review.
Recalling that the second aspect of this analysis calls for locating points of 
conflict, the ideographs of equality and individual consideration seem to begin 
unraveling at two keys locations in the legal text.  
1.  Where should the opinion of educational administrators 
be ranked in relation to the opinions of individual applicants?  The 
Court ultimately gave as much deference to the education 
administrators’ belief in the importance of classroom diversity as 
to the military leaders in Korematsu.  
332 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271.
333 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-2.
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2. At what point in the evaluation process may schools
treat applicants as a class?  The Court ultimately concluded that 
some points awarded for race/ethnicity were acceptable, but not so 
many points such that racial minorities were assured on 
admissions.
The “breaking” of the ideographs of equality and individual consideration thus 
occurs at those two theoretical points where deference to educational administrators 
and the formation of the class are at odds.  More accurately, when Gratz, Grutter, 
and Hamacher were not included in the University’s respective law school and 
undergraduate classes, the freedom of Michigan’s faculty to compose the optimal 
classroom makeup came into question.
E. Conclusion
This Chapter has explained and demonstrated the importance of revealing 
the principles of justice that are in conflict “underneath” a legal dispute.  Legal 
scholars may dismiss the exercise as mere “issue spotting.”  However, there is an 
important difference between identifying generic lines of arguments that are 
suggested by the particular facts of a case, which is the law school approach to 
issue spotting, and the more delicate task of understanding what principles are at 
play.  Were law students to spend more time thinking about these broader issues, 
their legal training would be undoubtedly more meaningful.
Nevertheless, this Chapter’s discussion about Law as a set of principles of 
justice is not just helpful for rhetorical scholars.  A broader question is whether the 
public had the opportunity to learn about how the Court resolved these issues.  The 
media coverage detailed in the next Chapter will include an analysis of whether 
these principles or points of conflicts were identified.  
The importance of understanding how individual citizens view Law cannot 
be overstated.  As  Cohen notes, “Law, as designating a rule of action prevailing in 
a given community, could have no divine origin in any sense superhuman or 
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preternatural.  It resulted from the impact of human beings … to the existence of 
which human beings were a sine qua non.”334  As discussed in this Chapter, the 
leading rhetorical conceptions of Law tend to understate the importance of the 
relationship between individuals and their conception of Law.  Much like the Legal 
system’s need for legitimacy, the Law requires some sense of universal consensus, 
no matter how rough that consensus might be.
The difference between a citizenry that feels connected with the Law and a 
citizenry overwhelmed by the Legal system is treacherous.  Lon Fuller describes 
the dangerous consequences:
To the thoughtful and sensitive citizen the law can present itself in a 
bewildering array of moods.  It can appear as the highest 
achievement of civilization, liberating for creative use human 
resources otherwise dedicated to destruction.  … A shift in mood 
and all this bright glitter surrounding the law can collapse into dust.  
Law then becomes man’s badge of infamy, his confession of 
ineradicable perfidy.335
The beginning of this Chapter discussed the trouble Korean political leadership 
encountered when they discovered that the implementation of Western-style law 
invariably required universal obedience to the law.  Under the traditional Korean 
mindset, only the criminals were subject to the law.  Professor Hahm noted that in 
order for Korean citizens to enjoy the full protections of the legal system, a 
decision to follow and support the notion of Law is paramount.  This is an excellent 
example of how an individual sense of communion with the principles of justice 
that support the Legal system is paramount.
Before one dismisses the Korean experiences as a necessary consequence of 
the wholesale import of a foreign legal code, consider that American constitutional 
law has experienced a massive overhaul in the last fifty years.  As one of the great 
critics of the Warren Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, Lino 
334
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Graglia articulates a distinction between the Law and the Legal that is similar to 
that argued here.  He recognizes that the “true meaning” of a case such as Brown 
requires the discovery of its basic principles, which are usually conflicting and at 
the heart of the underlying conflict.  Thus, the meaning of any case is not waiting to 
be discovered “like a vein of gold,” but must be “supplied by later decision 
makers.”336  Only when a court’s decision is based on a principle whose validity 
and applicability “few will openly or persuasively challenge” will that decision be 
“adequately justified.”337  Graglia’s theoretical basis for challenging post-Brown 
efforts to legitimate racial busing decrees spells out the basic premise of the 
Law/Legal distinction.  The Law is the principles that we might universally agree 
with and the Legal is, in part, the line of cases that interpret the principles in 
relation to new facts and arguments.
The next chapter reports on the findings of the media content analysis of the 
variables discussed up to this point.  Although this Chapter has not intended to 
offer the authoritative unified approach to studying and understanding the 
rhetorical notion of law, future studies should be able to use this discussion as a 
template for guiding more streamlined research approaches in the area.
336
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Chapter V: The Law, the Legal, and the Media
In this Chapter I argue that a theoretical framework for understanding legal 
rhetoric must necessarily include mass media.  Talking about any modern legal 
system without accounting for the media is essentially ignoring the only apparatus 
in which the legal system is presented to citizens.338 Legal scholar Richard Ericson 
suggests that, for all practical purposes, the distinction between the Legal system 
and news media is fairly slight.339  The Legal system demonstrates its legitimacy to 
most citizens through media coverage.  In turn, media’s legitimacy relies on 
media’s access to authoritative sources within the legal and political system.  As 
institutions, both media and the Legal system have similar values, such as 
orderliness and public interest.  Whatever differences that do exist may only be a 
matter of degree.    
A. Overview
For the purposes of this Chapter I focus on the news media coverage of 
Gratz and Grutter i n order to describe how media interacts with the other aspects of 
the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation.  Like Chapters Three and 
Four, this analysis is intended to stand alone as an independent study.  The primary
research question is:
What can citizens learn through individual or mass media exposure 
to legal texts?  
This question requires a twofold response.  First, what specific lessons can be 
learned by citizens from Gratz and Grutter?  Second, what general lessons could be 
learned by citizens from mediated legal texts?  Taken together, these questions help 
338
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guide our initial understanding of media’s role in the relationship between Law, the 
Legal system, and citizens.
Accordingly, this Chapter first argues for legal rhetorical scholarship to 
include media analyses in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the rhetorical functions of various legal texts.  Second, I provide an example of one 
such analysis, using newspaper coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s affirmative 
action decisions in Gratz and Grutter.  After offering a description of the media 
content analysis used here, four main themes are presented as “lessons” in response 
to the subpart questions posed above.  The final section of this Chapter suggests 
prospective hypotheses for future studies in media coverage of legal conflicts.
B. Media and the Citizen, the Law and the Legal System 
Most people learn about Law from exposure to television and other media 
of popular culture, not from direct experience. “Legal ways of seeing the world—of 
classifying people and their relations and experiences, of distributing authority, of 
giving voice—become featured in news discourse and thus a part of popular culture 
and common sense.”340  Yet, as Alfred Phillips argues, media coverage of a legal 
conflict goes both directions: “The media’s intermediate position between the trial 
and the public … not only [relays] the trial proceedings to the public but also 
[impacts] on the trial and ... [produces] an element of distortion.”341  At the same 
time media coverage can affect the Legal system, at least on a broad operational 
level.  Legal media critic Antoine Garapon suggests that the “way in which the 
newspapers report on legal business in fact implies the expectancy of a democratic 
process which is much more direct and which is intended to force the institution to 
modernize its methods.”342 Hence, the substance and the tenor of the media 
340
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coverage are essential to understanding how and what Americans learn about the 
Court’s decision.  
A rhetorical criticism of a legal decision that does not account for media 
coverage may not be inherently flawed, but such a criticism is lamentably limited.  
It is one thing to understand how a judge arrives at a legal decision, it is another to 
understand how that decision is understood by citizens.  Citizens are not 
disinterested observers, although that role is often forced upon them by institutional 
actors concerned about whether citizens “want” to learn about the legal system.  In 
most cases, any citizen capable of understanding the rules of a televised athletic 
contest can understand legal rules.  Any citizen has the capacity to weigh his or her 
sense of fairness and justice against the decision of any judicial tribunal.  The only 
question is whether the media coverage gives citizens sufficient information to 
make that determination.
Second, the legal system is irrevocably a political system.  Although court 
decisions like Gratz and Grutter are often framed as personal struggles, the issues 
almost always relate to larger political issues.  If scholars are prepared to scrutinize 
media coverage of political campaigns, there is no discernable reason to ignore 
trends in judicial rulings that resemble campaigns.  Justice Ginsburg’s call for U.S. 
courts to cite international and comparative law is as much a political campaign as 
the latest presidential effort to reform Medicare or Social Security.
Just as political media ignore certain candidates in an election, legal 
reporting can ignore important voices and arguments.  A rich body of research has 
demonstrated there are norms to general news reporting and more specialized forms 
of news reporting, such as foreign affairs reporting.343  There is no reason to think 
343
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that legal reporting does not also have its own norms that highlight some voices 
and obscure others.  Scholars should be interested in knowing which voices and 
arguments are obscured by legal reporting.  Although the New York Times and the 
Washington Post provided lengthy excerpts from the Supreme Court’s rulings in 
Gratz and Grutter, the news coverage, and not the media excerpts, is how  the vast 
majority of citizens are going to learn about the arguments used by the Court to 
justify the outcome.  In a pair of cases like Gratz and Grutter, the length of the 
various opinions require that the news media coverage reduce or eliminate some 
arguments.  The norms of news reporting, which often emphasize developing a 
narrative, can conversely overemphasize some arguments.  The result in Gratz and 
Grutter is that newspapers focused on the opinions of Justice O’Connor and Justice 
Thomas, while largely ignoring the standing arguments raised by Justice Stevens 
and Justice Souter.  Although characterized as “technical arguments,” the debate 
about standing should have been fairly interesting to the reading public.  After all, 
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the essence of the debate was whether the plaintiffs were legally entitled to even 
file suit?
A third reason that legal rhetorical scholarship should include media 
analysis stems from the news media’s capacity to provide attitudinal orientation 
towards news topics.  Joseph Capella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson have argued 
persuasively that modern news media injects a dangerous level of cynicism in 
political reporting.344  The danger of cynical reporting is that cynical citizens 
become disempowered and unable to participate in the political process.  There is 
little reason to believe that legal subjects, some of which often are plainly political, 
are immune from this effect.  In fact, the deeply felt authority of a weighty judicial 
ruling might even increase the citizen’s feelings of powerlessness.
The effect of a citizenry with deeply cynical attitudes toward the judiciary 
and other elements of the Legal system could be catastrophic.  Recalling the 
importance of public legitimacy serves in allowing the Legal system to operate 
with suasory force, the rise of a cynical attitude reflects a deterioration of the 
effectiveness of the entire Legal system.  As Gearey explains, “Law may 
communicate in the logic of legal arguments, but it is also reliant on the image.”345
In that sense, Law is a “kind of a confidence trick, a way of making society appear 
… [but] if one is not aware that legal concepts are reified and abstracted, they 
appear to have some kind of foundational substance, a kind of autonomy or 
independent being.”  The law is more than a house of cards; as Gearey notes “[i]f 
the law was merely an elaborate trick, it would collapse if its subjects simply 
stopped believing.  [There must be] more to law’s hold over the social world, and 
hence another aspect to the operation of the image.”346
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The rise of cynicism also counteracts Legendre’s notion of Law as  
“dogmatic communication” involving the transmission of a vital social myth.347
When citizens develop unrelenting cynical attitudes about their legal institutions, 
the Law is unable to perform this myth-affirming function.  Drawing from 
Augustine’s description of the liturgical order as a structure of love, Legrende 
concludes that the subject of an institution must fall in love with the institution.348
Perhaps Americans have already fallen out of love with their legal systems.  
Without some basic civic respect for legal institutions, it is difficult to see how 
citizens could transmit social narratives about justice and fairness to subsequent 
generations.
Finally, rhetorical scholars should be interested in understanding how media 
represents the U.S. legal system to the rest of the world.  Garapon warns that “legal 
ways of seeing the world—of classifying people and their relations and 
experiences, of distributing authority, of giving voice—become featured in news 
discourse and thus a part of popular culture and common sense.”349 Jan Broekman 
notes that a successful legal system must “proclaim its being different from related 
discourses and social structures in order to function, to be coercive, to develop 
conflict-solving procedures, to reinforce and legitimate legal decisions and to have 
its teleology socially accepted.”350  So understood, the decisions of the U.S. legal 
system are presented through international media to other countries as a logical 
consequence of a conflict resolution process.  The representations of legal norms 
passed along through the media become exemplars of model behavior, especially 
for the private law forums that often imitate public law.351  This perspective is 
particularly important to keep in mind when considering how developing nations 
347
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might model the notion of “rule of law” based on media representations of U.S. 
legal institutions.
U.S. citizens are not the only citizens that can learn from the U.S. legal 
system.  Given the influence of the American legal system on other societies, 
citizens from a vast number of countries are learning from the U.S. legal system.  If 
Americans use the law to “represent ourselves, our social organizations, and our 
aspirations,”352 what happens when cynicism infiltrates those rhetorical 
constructions?  Garapon worries about the international influence when “young 
people in France are more familiar with United States law” and all of its cynical 
underpinnings353 than their native French Law and legal customs.  What messages 
are being sent to other democratic societies about the reliability of the Legal 
system?
C. Description of Content Analysis Methodology
The conclusions presented in this Chapter are based on my analysis of 
newspaper coverage of Gratz and Grutter.  By looking at media coverage of the 
entire litigation history of the two cases, certain patterns or “lessons” emerge.  
Although I borrow from the language of social science, this is not intended to be a 
statistically-valid analysis.  Instead, the lessons learned from Gratz and Grutter 
offer support for possible research questions or hypotheses in future studies.  In 
short, this is a descriptive exercise intended to engage conceptual thinking about 
media coverage of the Legal system.
In this section, I describe the “sample” of newspapers that provided my 
dataset. Then I describe the two broad categories of “variables” that I tracked in 
this study.  First, I look at arguments, which include not only the arguments offered 
by the various Justices detailed in Chapter Two, but also the Legal and Law 
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dimensions discussed in Chapters Three and Four.  Second, I look at attitudes 
through an analysis of media framing strategy.
1. Description of Sample
A total of 58 newspaper stories published between October 15, 1997 to June 
27, 2003 formed the basic sample for this study.  Most of the stories came from the 
New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Detroit Free Press.  As described 
later in this Chapter, coverage from the Detroit News was added.  The New York 
Times and the Washington Post are both leading “national” newspapers with 
international readerships.  The Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News are 
regarded as “regional” newspapers largely because of their focus on regional and 
state issues confronting Michigan.  Of course, these categorizations are largely 
simplifications that only speak to the limits of this study and not the 
professionalism or influence of any of these newspapers.
The stories were unusual in many respects.  The stories ranged in length 
from five to sixteen paragraphs, which is longer than usual for newspaper 
reporting.  In many cases, multiple authors worked collaboratively on the stories, 
also somewhat less common in newspaper reporting.  Finally, most of the stories 
were written in anticipation of a litigation event such as a hearing or decision, 
rather than reporting on the event after the fact.  Even the stories reporting on the 
Supreme Court’s final decisions were largely crafted weeks before the opinions 
were handed down.  In most other respects, the newspaper reporting was quite 
similar to typical reporting.  All of the stories attempted to place a “lead” paragraph 
that summarized the news of the case.  Various experts and participants in the cases 
were quoted directly.  Most of the background for the stories appeared in the final 
paragraphs.  
One of the primary purposes of this study has been to trace what the 
newspaper stories taught newspaper-reading citizens about the specific Gratz and 
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Grutter cases, the Legal system in general, and the American notion of Law.  Thus, 
I developed coding schemes that reflected each of these dimensions. All of the 
codes are more explicitly described in subsequent sections of this Chapter.  The 
first set of codes related to my analysis of the actual arguments used by the various 
Justices in Gratz and Grutter found in Chapter II.  The second set of codes derives 
from the architectural and cultural features of the Legal system discussed in 
Chapter III.  The third set of codes derives from my discussion of Law in Chapter 
IV.  Finally, a fourth set of codes were used to track media framing strategies, 
discussed in greater depth later in this Chapter.  
The coding process was relatively simple.  This author acted as the sole 
coder.  Each article was reviewed three times: first, the articles were screened for 
relevance; second, the opening, middle, and ending paragraphs of each article were
reviewed under each code set; third; the coding assignments were reviewed for 
consistency.  Absolutely no claim to statistical validity is represented here.  Instead, 
this review is merely a descriptive exercise of the patterns of media coverage 
present in Gratz and Grutter. As with any rhetorical criticism, different patterns 
reveal themselves to different critics.
2. General Trends
Newspaper reporting, like any news media, is influenced by norms or 
routines of coverage.  Legal reporting, particularly of U.S. Supreme Court cases, is 
especially likely to follow a familiar pattern of coverage.  As to be expected, the 
peak of the media coverage of Gratz and Grutter occurred on June 4, 2003 when 
the Supreme Court handed down its opinions.  All of the newspapers in my sample 
also included “preview” stories in the days leading up to the decisions, as well as 
coverage of the oral arguments earlier in the spring.
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Interestingly, the next most significant event was the actual filing of the 
Gratz lawsuit.  All of the remaining stories covered significant354 courtroom 
appearances such as the initial filing of the lawsuit, the University’s answer,355
efforts by interested parties to intervene in the case, trial, renderings of the 
decisions of various justices, filing of appeals and granting of a writ of certorari, 
filing of appeal briefs, oral arguments, and the Supreme Court’s decision.  Much 
like any other newspaper reporting subject matter, legal reporting is largely event-
driven. 
One difference appeared that may relate to the regional or national focus of 
the newspaper.  The Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News covered the cases 
with the same set of reporters throughout the history of the litigation.  In contrast,
the New York Times or Washington Post tended to rely on Associated Press or other 
wire services for early stories and then turned towards their own legal reporting 
staff for the Supreme Court coverage.  Given the vast electronic research resources 
available to the reporting staff of the Times or the Post, this different approach in 
staffing may have had no effect.  However, as discussed later, there appeared to be 
a tendency by the national papers to ignore connections between the later events of 
the litigation and some of the disputants’ early arguments.
A final interesting feature of the news coverage of this particular legal 
conflict involved editorial and non-hard news stories.  Many of the editorials and 
political columns that were ultimately removed from the study sample tended to 
review the basic set of facts in the case when discussing the issue of race in 
America.  Several of these columns inspired letters to the editor printed in the days 
following publication.  In addition, several references to Gratz or Grutter occurred 
354
 Plainly, the newspapers tended to cover what was perceived as a significant event and ignored 
the case in the meanwhile.  In 1998, for example, no newspaper in the sample had a significant story 
on the Gratz lawsuit largely because the litigants were in the evidence-gathering stage. 
355
 An “answer” or “response” is the Defendant’s reply to a lawsuit.  In federal court, defendants are 
expected to respond to each claim of a plaintiff’s lawsuit, which often makes for an interesting 
pleading.
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in stories covering cultural anniversaries like Martin Luther King Day or the 
anniversary of the Brown v. Board of Education ruling.  Finally, profiles of 
individual Justices, such as Justice Scalia, Justice O’Connor, or Justice Thomas 
evoked references to these cases.  Because of a variety of methodological concerns, 
these various editorials and stories were not included in the sample.356
3. Coding Arguments
As indicated, this study tracked three basic sets of coding variables.  The 
first broad set of variables tracked were “arguments.” For the purposes of this 
analysis, arguments refer to the substantive claims raised by the Justices in the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Gratz and Grutter.  Diagram 2.3 
details the 22 separate arguments tracked in this study.  In preparing this list, I used 
the Court’s own syllabi357 for each case as a starting point and then included the 
counterarguments offered by various judicial authors.  During the coding process at 
this stage, I focused on whether the basic arguments were raised, without regard to 
the accuracy, fairness, or source of the argument.   
The point of tracking arguments is to determine how much citizens were 
exposed to the various legal issues in the cases.  I was more interested in what 
newspaper-reading citizens could learn over the lifespan of the two cases than what 
the specific news reported on June 4, 2003, the day the Court handed down its 
decisions.  Although results will be discussed in full later, it is interesting to note 
that citizens reading newspapers were exposed to the issues and major arguments
raised by the Supreme Court justices long before the actual decisions were handed 
356
 The primary reason for excluding these writings was the lack of confidence in the completeness 
of the sample.  Although the Lexis-Nexis database is comprehensive, not all newspapers insert 
letters to the editor or syndicated columns.  For example, former President Gerald Ford wrote a 
column supporting the University of Michigan for the New York Times on August 8, 1997.  
Although a search revealed the letters to the editor reacting to the column, the actual column itself 
was not in the sample.  The list of stories included in this study were cross-referenced with indexes 
of archived stories from each newspaper.
357
 The “syllabus” is the Court’s official summary of the case, found at the beginning of a published 
opinion.  Although not binding law, it is good evidence of the Court’s perception of its own 
argument.
126
down.  Although some of the more important arguments, such as standing, tended 
to be obscured, the news coverage of these cases was generally comprehensive.  
4. Coding the Legal and the Law
The second and third sets of codes relate to the rhetorical concepts about the 
Legal and the Law discussed in Chapters II and III. Specially, these variables 
include both the Legal architectural or cultural variables and the principles-in-
conflict that form the underlying notions of Law.  The point of including the Legal 
variables is to better understand what architectural or cultural variables are used to 
contextualize the arguments reported.  The inclusion of the principles of Law in 
conflict is also important to understand how citizens learn about the context of the 
disputes and how it might relate to them.  These specific variables were
summarized in Chapters III and IV. 
In tracking all of these variables, I confess a liberal interpretative 
framework.  For example, in tracking “structure” (one of the architectural 
variables) I allowed any reference to precedent to count.  In evaluating the 
“principles of justice and fairness” variable, I counted fairly generic statements 
from the litigants or their spokespersons.  In future projects, more refined and 
conservative measurements may suggest different results, but the more opened-
ended approach was appropriate for the descriptive focus of this  study.
5. Coding Media Attitudinal Frames
In addition to the actual arguments and rhetorical elements reported by 
media, the tenor of media coverage may be enormously influential.  Therefore, I 
attempted to understand the general degree of cynical media coverage for these 
particular cases.  Because I am working under the assumption that citizens learn 
about legal processes and the broader notion of Law through media news or 
entertainment, it is important to understand the level of cynicism in that media 
coverage.  Of course, this study is further limited to news media, and specifically, 
newspapers.
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The notion that Americans learn about law through media accords with the 
perception that most Americans learn about their politics through media.  
Americans have fewer personal experiences with politics and are increasingly 
reliant on mass-mediated formats such as television. Capella and Jamieson suggest 
that a variety of complex factors can influence whether audiences actually learn 
anything from political news coverage, including: educational level, audience 
motivation, intensity of media coverage of topic, audience’s prior knowledge of 
topic, the reliability of news sources, and the manner in which the story is 
framed.358  Media coverage of political campaigns tends to utilize one of three 
types of frames: the strategic frame focuses on the gamesmanship between various 
players in the contest; the narrative frame focuses on the personal experiences of 
some of the participants; and the issue frame focuses on the underlying substantive 
bases for conflicts.  Note that strategic and issue framing might also be narratives, 
but are otherwise mutually exclusive. 
Capella and Jamieson draw two conclusions about the effects of strategic 
framing on audience learning.  First, regardless of whether framing is issue-
oriented or strategic, all political news enhances learning of related political 
information.359  Because all news coverage provides some prior information, 
audience members who are later exposed to the same or similar topic are better able 
to recall both substantive and strategic information.  Second, strategic framing (in 
broadcast mode) enhances audience recall of strategic information, while issue 
framing (in any mode) enhances recall of substantive information.360  There is little 
reason to think that framing has a different effect when the subject matter is a legal 
rather than political dispute.
In an unpublished pilot study of media coverage of the Hopwood
controversy, I tested a set of coding protocols based on Capella and Jamieson’s 
358
 Capella and Jamieson, 114.
359 Id. 137.
360 Id. 138.
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research methodology.  After collecting 219 media stories in the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, and the Dallas Morning News that referenced Hopwood from 
1992-2002, each article was examined for evidence of issue, strategic, or narrative 
framing in its headline (primary), first few paragraphs (secondary), and final 
paragraphs (tertiary).361  While the focus of this analysis is on strategic framing, the 
presence of issue and narrative framing is an important indicator of the 
pervasiveness of strategic frames, and thus well worth documenting.  The division 
of issue and strategic frames follows the examples provided by Capella and 
Jamieson.  Narrative frames, as viewed within this study, involve discussions about 
the cases that invoke the human stories surrounding the case.  
The pilot study protocols were adapted for use in this dissertation.  First, 
this study included media stories from the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
the Detroit News, and the Detroit Free Press (the closest regional newspapers to
the University’s main campus in Ann Arbor, Michigan).  I later added the Detroit 
News when the comprehensiveness of its coverage of the cases became apparent.  
Second, the date range of this study runs from 1997 to 2003, which covers the 
general scope of the Michigan disputes.  The Hopwood case involved a longer time 
period and was a touchstone in several political debates.362  Third, this study 
focused on the body of the news stories and ignored the headlines.363  Rather than 
reference the headline as the primary level, I split each story into three parts and 
361
 As an example of the coding scheme, the Washington Post reported on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
denial of the final appeal in the case by noting: 1) that the Supreme Court Justices rejected the State 
of Texas’s appeal (strategic: focus on the individual deliberation, ignoring other reasons for the 
Court’s declining to look at the case), 2) the effects of the denial on affirmative action programs in 
non-educational areas of law (issue: developing the broader context of the Court’s denial of appeal), 
and 3) the impact of the decision on Cheryl Hopwood, the name sake plaintiff (narrative: focusing 
on Hopwood’s personal story as providing deeper meaning to the case).
362
 As of this writing, Gratz continues as a class action for students rejected under the undergraduate 
admissions protocols.  Attorneys for the plaintiffs are also pursuing the collection of their legal fees.
363
 The decision to ignore headlines reflects that fact that individual newspapers craft their own 
headlines.  As a consequence, a reader of a New York Times affiliate paper might read the same 
article as a Times reader, but under a locally-drafted headline.  Consequentially, it is difficult to 
make even the most general descriptive claims about the rhetoric of headlines.
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ignored headlines.  As a practical matter, the three level analysis was of no 
consequence in this study.
One limitation of this study is that I have no way to estimate how much 
citizens learn about the Law and their Legal systems through direct personal 
experience rather than media.  Some subsets of the population will have more 
direct, personal experience with different legal processes.  For example, few 
Americans will ever be audited by the Internal Revenue Service or be a defendant 
in a criminal case.  A relatively larger number of Americans will likely know 
someone who has experienced either event.  However, thanks to news and 
entertainment media, most American citizens are generally familiar with both types 
of legal proceedings.364  Affirmative action, as a hot political issue, may be 
unrepresentative of the sorts of issues that citizens follow.  Nevertheless, for the
purposes of this study, the limitation does not minimize the lessons learned.
C. Four Lessons Learned from Gratz and Grutter
In asking what citizens can learn from media coverage of legal disputes and 
Gratz and Grutter in particular, there are four “lessons” that emerge from the 
findings of this media analysis.  Each lesson is described both in terms of the 
specific information obtained about the Gratz and Grutter cases and also more 
generally about the Legal system, Law, and the citizen’s relationship with both.  
1.  Accuracy and Distortion in Reporting on Arguments
The first lesson learned from news coverage of Gratz and Grutter is that ,
while the diligent newspaper-reading citizen may be exposed to most of the 
arguments in a given case, she or he is likely to have a distorted view of the final 
outcome of a legal dispute.  Generally speaking, in Gratz and Grutter, read ers were 
364
 As media coverage likely privileges and identifies with the experiences of its target demographic, 
it is likely to report more on legal experiences common to upper middle class media consumers.  In 
that sense, IRS audits are probably over-covered.  Stories on criminal matters, particularly involving 
violence, are also likely over-reported, but solely for entertainment purposes and not audience 
identification.
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exposed to all of the major arguments advanced by the various justices in their 
Supreme Court opinions.  However, media coverage failed to report on the impact 
of two major arguments: the standing of one of the Gratz plaintiffs and the impact 
of affirmative action in the armed forces and business.  As a result, readers were 
left with a distorted and simplistic understanding of why race-based classifications 
remain constitutionally permissible in higher education.
I found that the news coverage generally addressed all of the arguments that 
were ultimately expressed in the Court’s various opinions in Gratz and Grutter. 
Nevertheless, the coverage tended to gravitate to a set of arguments.  Of the 449 
references to arguments in the litigation, the five arguments most frequently cited 
by newspaper accounts are listed in Diagram 5.1.
Diagram 5.1:  Most-cited Arguments in Media Coverage
Argument Number of References
Classroom diversity is a compelling state 
interest (affirming Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke). [Majority]
44
Diversity promotes legitimacy through 
the development of minority leaders in 
society.  [Majority]
33
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions 
system is tantamount to a quota or set-
aside practice. [Dissenting]
30
Race-based classifications should be 
outlawed. [Dissenting]
24
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions 
system is not narrowly tailored because 
of the 20 point differential given to 
minority status. [Majority]
23
Overall, the reporting tended to emphasize arguments ultimately adopted by 
the opponents of Michigan’s use of race-based classifications.  Three of the top ten 
arguments were reflected in Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion affirming the 
Law School’s use of racial classifications.  There is nothing particularly surprising 
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about the reporting of arguments found to be persuasive by the Court.  One might 
expect that the winners receive the spoils of media coverage.  What is interesting is 
the emphasis on reporting dissenting arguments.  The remaining seven arguments 
came from Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Rehnquist, all dissenters.  In 
fact, the newspapers reported more dissenting arguments than ultimately successful 
arguments of the majority.365 This coverage may simply be the consequence of 
dramatically-oriented news media reporting on a narrowly-decided case.
There are several other explanations for this tendency to cite arguments that 
were not ultimately adopted by the Court.  First, the lawsuits were initiated by 
opponents of affirmative action who therefore had the opportunity to frame the 
issue in the press from the beginning.  Indeed, the New York Times received an 
advance copy of the original lawsuit against Michigan’s undergraduate system and 
exclusive access to the plaintiffs and their attorneys at the Center for Individual 
Rights.   Second, the arguments against affirmative action were largely arguments 
against the status quo, which perhaps generates more media scrutiny than 
arguments supporting the use of race-based classifications in higher education 
admissions.  Although the University organized a public relations campaign, the 
plaintiffs in both lawsuits were supported by the Center for Individual Rights, a 
well organized public advocacy law firm with experience in previous affirmative 
action lawsuits.366
Finally, the “dissenting” arguments may have received more attention 
because they were more complicated.  Although the plaintiffs attempted to argue 
that the Constitution prohibits the use of race-based classifications across the board, 
365
 197 references were to arguments adopted by the supporters of race-based classifications.  252 
references were to arguments against affirmative action efforts.
366
 Journalist Greg Stohr reported in his book on the two cases that the Center for Individual Rights 
experienced extreme financial difficulties throughout the litigation. Greg Stohr, A Black and White 
Case: How Affirmative Action  Survived its Greatest Legal Challenge, Bloomberg: New York, 
2004, 133.  In contrast to CIR’s $4 million in expenses, Michigan spent at least $8 million on legal 
fees, not counting discounted or pro bono work done by alumni from the Law School.  Id. 256.  It 
appears that the University of Michigan’s alumni network and large legal defense budget overcame 
an experiential advantage owned by CIR.
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the Court has always been willing to entertain justifications for such 
classifications.367  Unable to argue for a complete end to race-based classifications, 
the plaintiffs were left to argue against the sea of amicus curie arguments from 
corporate leaders, retired military generals and admirals, and educational experts 
who supported the use of race-based classifications.
It is also important to examine which arguments received relatively little 
play in the newspapers. Diagram 5.2 details five of the arguments that received 
minimal attention.  The standing argument advanced by Justices Stevens and 
Souter is one such argument; especially in light of the fact that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist used half of the majority opinion in Gratz in order to rebut the argument.  
One argument advanced by Justice Ginsburg received absolutely no mention in the 
press, perhaps for understandable reasons.368
Diagram 5.2:  Least-cited Arguments in Media Coverage
Argument Number of References
Justice Ginsburg’s observation that 
international human rights documents 
support the use of inclusive racial 
classifications. [Concurring]
1
Justice O’Connor’s contention that the 
Michigan undergraduate case could be 
justified with a stronger record.
[Concurring]
2
Justice Breyer’s argument that state-
sponsored racial classifications can be 
justified for the purposes of inclusion 
more easily than exclusion. [Concurring]
3
367
 During oral arguments at the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor quickly shut down the plaintiffs’ 
attempt to argue for colorblindness.  Id. 266-67.
368
 Justice Ginsburg’s claim in her concurrence to Grutter that the Court’s decision did not require 
strict-scrutiny to apply to all race-based classifications was not reflected in a single newspaper 
report.  Ginsburg’s claim is likely intended to preserve the argument that some race-based 
classifications are subject to lower levels of scrutiny, for example, in cases of “benign” 
discrimination.  On the whole, the point is obscure and underdeveloped.  It is understandable that 
reporters ignored the argument.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concern that 
the lack of a time limit may make 
affirmative action permanent. [Dissent]
3
The standing arguments offered by 
Justices Stevens and Souter. [Dissent]
6
Readers were exposed to a distorted emphasis on dissenting arguments over 
arguments that explained the positions of the Justices in the majority.  However, 
there were other types of subtle distortion.  One example is the different 
perspectives offered by the regional versus the national newspapers.  There is every 
indication that the Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News provided more 
comprehensive and balanced coverage of the cases than the national newspapers.  
Both Detroit newspapers covered Michigan’s initial arguments that the 
undergraduate plaintiffs lacked standing because of their failure to sign onto the 
University’s wait list.  Both plaintiffs had claimed that the tone of the University’s 
rejection letter led them to believe that the wait list would have been a waste of 
time.  However, Michigan was able to show that both plaintiffs would have been 
admitted had they signed onto the wait list.  Although the argument skirts the 
constitutionality of the admissions program, it was hotly contested in the early 
stages of the Gratz trial.
The Supreme Court correspondents from the New York Times and the 
Washington Post never reported on this early clash, which clearly foreshadows the 
standing argument advanced by Justice Stevens.  Even though the two standing 
arguments are distinguishable from each other, there was an important opportunity 
for citizens to reflect on whether the plaintiffs were even qualified to raise the 
constitutional infirmity arguments.  The underlying lesson is that when reporters 
are assigned to the Supreme Court, they tend to report on the Supreme Court rather 
than the cases before it.  When a reporter is assigned to follow a particular case, as 
was the case for the two Detroit newspapers, that specific case becomes the main 
Diagram 5.2, cont.
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focus.  This potential dynamic raises questions about whether the public is best 
served by legal specialists, well trained general reporters, or a combination of both.
In sum, the first lesson of Gratz and Grutter is that the types and degrees of 
distortion in media coverage of legal cases maybe significant and thus should be 
studied more closely by scholars.  Focusing on these distortions not only helps us 
better understand what information and perspectives the average citizen gains from 
media exposure, but also the context in which citizens consider the arguments for 
and against various decisions.  In addition, a careful understanding of how media 
outlets can contribute to these distortions is the first step to any critical analysis of 
media coverage of legal disputes. 
2. Reporting on the Legal System
The second lesson pertains to the reporting of the Legal system.  
Specifically, what lessons did the average citizen learn about the Legal system from 
the media coverage of Gratz and Grutter? The answer is complex and perhaps 
somewhat contradictory.  As described in Chapter III, I chose to track four 
variables that reflected architectural and cultural features of the Legal system: 
structure, voice, time, and metaphor.  These variables give an indication of how the 
Legal system was represented to citizens in the press.  In terms of represented 
architectural features, the media coverage was indeed fairly comprehensive: both 
structure and voice were highlighted.  However, the media coverage seemed to 
underemphasize the cultural variables of time and metaphor.  As discussed below, 
when citizens are unable to connect on a cultural level with their legal system, the 
dangerous notion of a legal system floating unanchored to its society is a 
possibility.
Simply, the media coverage of Gratz and Grutter seems to have emphasized 
the architectural features of the Legal system at the expense of its cultural 
dimensions.  Specifically, the coverage contained an overwhelming number of 
references to structure and voice, which are architectural references that tend to 
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reinforce the vision of the Legal system as an orderly and authoritative 
construction.  First, references to legal structure were present in 41 of 58 stories.  
Examples of these sorts of references included discussions of the strict scrutiny test, 
the Court’s previous ruling in Bakke, and the mechanics of the appeal process.  
Given that Legal systematic discourse is usually about structures and power 
relationships between various governmental units, it is no surprise that structure is a 
primary rhetorical characteristic of the coverage.  
The second variable reflecting legal architecture was voice.  For the 
purposes of this study, “voice” reflected the faculty of the University of Michigan 
as proponents of classroom diversity.  Found in 31 of the 58 stories, this variable 
underscores the successful argument of the University that some deference ought to 
be granted to universities to determine what steps are necessary to construct a 
diverse educational atmosphere.  In tracking this variable, I included references to 
scholarly studies supporting the importance of diversity to the learning 
environment as well as testimonials from Michigan faculty.  Like the first 
architectural variable, this result is also somewhat expected, given the centrality of 
the diversity benefit studies to the University’s successful case.  Most of these 
references were a result of coverage of President Lee Bollinger, the named 
defendant in the Gratz and Grutter a nd the leading spokesperson for the University 
on the cases.369
In contrast to the relative abundance of references to the architectural 
features of the Legal system, media coverage tended to deemphasize the cultural 
aspects of the system.  “Emphasis” is a relative term that is difficult to measure.  
However, a general pattern is evident in the newspaper coverage in the two cultural 
references tracked in this study.  First, by failing to note a major internal 
disagreement about the significance of the 25 year limit, newspaper stories
369
 Although Bollinger was dismissed from the case in his individual capacity and left the University 
of Michigan for the presidency of Columbia University, the Supreme Court continued to use his 
name to reference the cases. 
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obscured what may be a major disagreement in the future of the case.  Second, the 
newspaper coverage also missed the disjointed metaphor strategies used by the 
Justices of the Court to connect with their broader audiences.  This general lack of 
attention to the cultural dimensions of the Legal system presents a distorted view of 
the Court’s decision making process and may be cause for worry.
Recalling that the Time variable reflected the Court’s intracultural 
understanding of its tolerance for the use of race-based classifications, it is 
surprising that only 17 of the 58 stories reference any aspect of the 25 year time 
limit discussed in Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion.  One explanation for this 
result is the number of stories included in the sample that preceded the actual 
decisions by the Court.  However, there were many reasons to anticipate that the 
Court would struggle with a time limit for any permissible use of race-based 
classifications into the future.   
Initially, both plaintiffs and the defendants noted that 25 years had passed 
between Brown (1954) and Bakke (1979).  Second, the notion of a defined end 
point for the race-based classifications was a central point of discussion in both 
trials as well as the appellate arguments in Grutter.  Even in the stories reviewed 
after the Court’s decision, the accounting of the 25 year time limit was reported 
either as a fact or an aspirational goal.  The contradictory views of the various 
Justices on what that time period might mean was largely ignored.  This lack of 
attention to a particularly obvious point of disagreement among the Justices 
suggests a lack of appreciation by media for the Court’s intracultural struggle over 
the proper meaning of its own invocation of a time limit.  As a consequence, 
readers are less likely to understand the Court’s ongoing internal struggles with its 
capacity to issue definitive decisions that offer certainty to citizens and universities.
The second cultural variable tracked in this study was the metaphoric
references to military schools.  The Court’s opinions used military schools as a 
metaphor to communicate two different concepts.  First, the Court noted that 
military academies used affirmative action programs to ensure a high minority 
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representation in the officer ranks of the armed forces.  Second, Justice Thomas 
notes that the Court’s lack of tolerance for all male military schools like the 
Virginia Military Institute reflected a judicial bias for the politically-correct 
education theories espoused by Michigan.  Surprisingly, the news coverage of the 
cases only used military school or military references in 14 of 58 stories.  The lack 
of attention to these metaphors is significant because both voting blocs relied on 
these metaphors to communicate with a broader audience outside of the legal 
sphere.  The supporters of classroom diversity appealed to the national security 
interests of the public.  In contrast, Justice Thomas appealed to the public’s sense 
that the Supreme Court should be both consistent and unbiased.
If the lesson that news media favors architectural features over cultural 
features is true—an assertion that merits further testing—there may be good reason 
to question whether the public is adequately informed by press coverage of legal 
disputes.  Cultural context is an important aspect of whether a particular legal 
ruling reflects the society that supports the legal system.  Without an understanding 
of how that particular legal system interacts with societal cultural norms, citizens 
are left unable to assess the validity or the wisdom of the legal decision.
3. Principles of Justice and Fairness in a Vacuum
In addition to the troubling lack of cultural context in legal reporting, the 
third lesson concerns the lack of an ethical context.  By ethical, I mean the terms by 
which we resolve grounded philosophical conflicts that are part and parcel of the 
legal system.  In Chapter IV, I discussed the notion of Law as pool of principles of 
justice supported by a rough consensus of the public.  When principles of justice 
come in conflict with one another, these points of conflict generate legal conflicts 
that require resolution by the Legal system.  I selected references from Gratz and 
Grutter that generally reflect these two underlying rhetorical components of the 
decisions.  The prevailing lesson described here is that, when news media fail to 
explain the points of conflict, citizens are left with a discussion about “principles of 
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justice” that are quite meaningless precisely because of the lack of an ethical 
context.
Recall first that this study tracked the following two principles of justice: 
“equality of access” and the right to individual consideration.370  Overall, the 
principles of justice and points of conflict were well covered.  Newspaper-reading 
citizens should have been able to identify the principles of justice in conflict in 
these cases and identify specific areas in which the conflicts gave rise.  In ten of 58 
articles, no principles were referenced at all.  In 38 articles, equality of access was 
referenced.  In 39 articles, the right to individual consideration was referenced.  In 
32 articles, both principles were highlighted.
However, principles of justice exist in a vacuum until they come into
conflict within one another.  These conflicts provide the ethical context by which 
the principles of justice might be evaluated.  Thus, it is helpful to track the points of 
conflict at which principles of justice collide.  In this study, the “question of 
deference” to education (or state) officials was one point of conflict.  A second 
point of conflict was when individuals (such as applicants to a college) may be 
treated as a class versus as an individual.  The decisions of the Court clearly 
indicated that some degree of deference should be accorded to Michigan’s faculty 
in pursuing classroom diversity, but that students cannot be treated as a class when 
a racial identity is ultimately determinative of admission into the school.  
News coverage of the cases revealed some sensitivity to points of conflict. 
Eleven of the 58 articles failed to note either point of conflict.  The question of 
deference was discussed in 24 articles, while the question of treating students as a 
class was referenced in 35 articles.  Both points of conflict were discussed in only 
370
 Determining whether or not an article reflected a consideration of these principles is a subjective 
task.  Whenever possible, philosophical expressions offered by various sources for the articles 
served as the basis for indicating that a principle was referenced.  At other times, the statement of 
particular implications of the Court’s decision was a basis.  For example, discussions about a 
particular outcome on future minority enrollment at Michigan raised the principle of equality of 
access.  In contrast, statements about the unfairness of being judged on the color of one’s skin was 
marked as reference to the right to individual consideration.
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22 of the articles, despite their clear relevance within the legal dispute.  Although 
citizens should have understood that issues of equality and individual treatment 
were at issue, the news coverage generally failed to explain why questions of 
equality and individual consideration were in conflict.
An example of the troubling lack of an ethical context involves the 
predicted impact of the rulings.  Although the Center for Individual Rights was 
clearly pushing for a wholesale ruling that all race-based classifications were 
unconstitutional, the majority of the Court clearly was not interested in that sort of 
outcome.  Nevertheless, the news coverage tended to suggest that all forms of 
affirmative action were at risk.  While technically true, if only because of the 
Court’s penchant for surprise rulings, that overly dramatic positioning distorts the 
narrowness of the issue while, ironically, allowing successive litigants to argue that 
the Court’s decision was actually broader.  This same pattern occurred in the wake 
of Brown v. Board of Education, which was topically limited to the desegregation 
of elementary school students in public schools.  Successive cases used Brown as a 
basis for desegregating all types of public institutions, many of which had nothing 
to do with elementary education.  To some degree, the media coverage of Brown
assist those successive litigants in arguing that Brown’s holdings extended well 
beyond the context of elementary school education.
In covering Gratz and Grutter, the newspaper reporters’ failure to provide a 
context for the state’s right to use race-based classifications in higher education 
admissions distorts the Court’s fairly-narrowly written decisions.  Reminding 
readers of the basic points of conflict may not seem like cutting-edge journalism.  
Nevertheless, citizens need to understand why conflicts between various principles 
of justice exist before they can evaluate the Court’s ultimate decision.  The 
consequence of news coverage that reports on abstract principles of justice, while 
ignoring the underlying points of conflict, is a confused public capable of over-
reading the Court’s decision as a rejection of individual consideration.
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4. Deferential Coverage Lacking a Healthy Dose of Cynicism
The fourth lesson derived from media coverage of Gratz and Grutter is that 
citizens might be less skeptical about legal disputes than we normally assume.  
Recalling that Capella and Jamieson argued that media framing of a news event can 
influence readers’ attitudes, the results of this study suggest that legal reporting is 
framed quite differently than political campaign reporting.  The result might be a 
less cynical audience that lacks the capacity to critically assess the operation of the 
Legal system.
As described earlier in this Chapter, heavy use of strategic frames,371 which 
emphasize the tactical and political purposes of actors, can lead to cynical attitudes 
about politics.  Issue-framing372 tends to avoid focus on the gamesmanship of 
political campaigns, focusing instead on the substantive issues in dispute.  While 
there is no evidence that a focus on issue framing improves citizen’s overall 
371
 The following excerpts are examples of strategic framing:
Robert Sedler, a Wayne State University law professor and expert in affirmative action, said the 
decision is a victory for U-M.  "This is a big defeat for CIR [Center for Individual Rights], and it's a 
big win for affirmative action," he said. "Even if U-M's policy was unconstitutional before, it's 
constitutional now." (Detroit Free Press, Dec. 14, 2000)
The two cases [Gratz and Grutter] were expected to go to trial this fall, but several activist groups 
recently succeeded in claiming "intervenor" status. Their intervention amounts to a statement that 
they don't trust U-M to fight as hard as it might to protect preferences. They are now entitled to an 
evidence-gathering process that could postpone the trials for up to a year. (Detroit Free Press, 
August 2, 1999)
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 The following excerpts are examples of issue framing:
For a black student who applies to the University of Michigan, a 3.0 high school grade point average 
is worth the same as a comparable white applicant's 3.5.  This demonstrable minority bonus is 
emerging as a central issue in a legal challenge to the principle that whites and minorities should be 
treated differently because society values diversity. (Chicago Tribune, Dec. 11, 1997)
In the main opinion of the decision upholding the system for law school admissions at Michigan, 
O'Connor wrote, "When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling government interest, 
such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection . . . "
She said that was true provided there is a compelling state interest in the goal of the affirmative 
action plan and that the system used is tailored narrowly and considers race as one among a variety 
of factors. She said the law school system met those standards, and the court could not second-guess 
the university's position that a "critical mass" of minority students was an important element in 
providing students full preparation for legal careers.  (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 24, 2003)
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understanding of the political process, there is a marked reduction in cynical 
attitudes. 
A surprising result of this study is that, unlike political reporting, strategic 
framing was not a predominant part of the news coverage frames.  The 
predominant framing orientation used by news media in covering the Gratz and 
Grutter cases was issue framing.  Over 75 percent of the 168 total frames were 
issue-oriented.  The only deviations to this pattern occurred early in coverage of the 
Gratz suit.  This overall pattern is surprising, given that a pilot study on media 
coverage of Hopwood revealed a more strategic framing orientation.  
Upon closer reflection, the prevalence of issue-orientated framing may not 
be an aberrant result, but a reflection of legal reporting norms.  Strategic framing is 
likely to be present when the controversy is understood as a competition for 
political gain.  The Michigan cases clearly did not fall along any traditionally 
defined political lines.  President Bush’s intervention in the case is instructive.  
Although he claimed publicly that he opposed affirmative action, the actual amicus 
curie brief filed by the Department of Justice was more concerned with arguing that 
Michigan did not avail itself of alternative approaches.373  In addition, the 
arguments of military generals and corporate chief executive officers also obscured 
traditional ideological divisions.
The early presence of strategic references in 1997 is also explained by 
another fact.  The Gratz and Grutter plaintiffs were recruited when a conservative 
Michigan state representative sent out a public call for white students denied 
admission by the University.374  Although referenced in the initial coverage of the 
lawsuits, the recruitment of the plaintiffs was largely left uncommented upon in 
stories of the later appellate decisions.  This example, along with the failure to 
373
 Stohr, 241-43.
374 Id.  45-47.  Stohr notes that the CIR was especially pleased that two of the three final plaintiffs 
were women, capable of countering the image of “angry white men.”  Id.  49.
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cover the standing argument and the 25 year time limit argument, suggests that the 
lack of strategic framing is not because of a paucity of topics.
A final reason for reduced strategic framing may be explained by the 
bolstered credibility of the Center for Individual Rights (“CIR”), the Washington, 
D.C. public interest law firm that financed the plaintiff’s cases.  In Hopwood and in 
other earlier efforts, CIR was an unknown political commodity.  At the time, the 
group’s efforts to argue that one of the nation’s leading public law schools was 
applying unconstitutional admission standards was greeted with a sense of 
skepticism.  With the success in Hopwood, CIR’s claims that affirmative action is 
unconstitutional gained some degree of credibility, leading to more issue-orientated 
framing.
Another finding that is related to media attitudinal framing involves the 
timing of the coverage.375  Specifically, newspapers tended to focus only on the 
cases when significant legal actions (like the filing of the lawsuit or an appeal) or a 
court action occurred.  Initially, this study only tracked three newspapers: the New 
York Times, the Washington Post, and the Detroit Free Press.  The initial review of 
articles from this sample revealed some gaps in coverage.  For example, only the 
Free Press offered daily coverage of the trials in Gratz and Grutter.  The larger 
newspapers only reported on the results.  In an effort to capture a broader range of 
articles, additional sources were added. The Detroit News, another local paper, had 
fairly comprehensive coverage.
Arguably, one of the distinctions between traditional political reporting and 
legal reporting is volume.  Political campaigns actively seek to generate “news” 
through staged media events.  In contrast, a legal dispute typically makes news 
during the progress of a case.  The distinction may simply be that legal reporters 
are less cynical about their subjects because they have not fully exhausted them.  It 
375
 Mikhail A. Alexseev and W. Lance Bennett. "For Whom the Gates Open: News Reporting and 
Governmental Source Patterns in the United States." Political Communication (1995) 12: 395-412.
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is worth pondering whether additional intensive legal reporting would result in 
overly strategic reporting.
A final finding worth noting here relates to the prevalence of narrative 
frames used within the Gratz and Grutter coverage.  Narratives are an important 
story-telling tool for journalists, especially when the subject matter of a story is 
abstract or complicated.  In this study, narrative frames were used largely to 
personify individual participants in the cases and to present the complexity of the 
various issues involved in the case.  
As the following example from the Detroit News demonstrates, a relatively 
brief narrative can highlight issues of class, gender, and urbanity that are part of the 
affirmative action debate:
From her 47th floor office at the Jenner & Block law firm, Lisa 
Scruggs can see over the city -- its skyscrapers, crawling traffic and 
the sailboats on Lake Michigan.  It's from this office -- and the clout 
that comes with working at a prestigious firm -- that the 32-year-old 
lawyer is influencing the Midwest's urban center below, from 
protecting jail inmates to mentoring middle school girls.
Just ask Allyce Seales, a bright 17-year-old junior with a goal of 
becoming a forensic scientist, but who would rather listen to hip-hop 
than think about her last year of high school. Scruggs is her mentor.  
"I know she's going to convince me to come back. She always 
does," Seales said between classes at the all- girls charter school that 
Scruggs co-founded three years ago.  
Scruggs, an African-American and 1998 graduate of the 
selective University of Chicago law school, says she wouldn't be a 
successful trial lawyer -- and role model to hundreds of young 
school girls -- if not for affirmative action policies now under 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court.376
Each of the plaintiffs, aided by a coordinated public relations campaign, received 
similar narrative profiles that elevate the dramatic quality of their case.  
376 Detroit News, June 16, 2003.
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Most of the concerns raised in this study have related to context.  Readers 
lack a sense of the cultural, ethical, or strategic context in which the legal disputes 
are grounded.  In the absence of such contexts, readers may be tempted to draw too 
much from the isolated narratives meant only as illustrations.  There is no reason to 
believe that every minority law school applicants will be as successful or civic 
conscious as Lisa Scruggs.  Likewise, the plaintiffs’ arguments should not be any 
stronger based on their scholastic success because the underlying issue is about 
what standards the State of Michigan might use in creating an undergraduate or law 
school class.  Narratives certainly have a place in all forms of reporting, but not as 
a substitute for important contextual points.
D. Conclusions about Potential Future Hypotheses
In this Chapter, I have argued that rhetorical scholars ought to include a 
media analysis as part of a broader understanding of the relationship between 
citizens, their Legal system, and the Law.  An analysis of media coverage 
surrounding the Gratz and Grutter litigation reveals a general problem with 
context:  some arguments are overemphasized; some cultural aspects of the Legal 
system are relatively unexplored; and the basic principles of justice in conflict are 
discussed in a vacuum without regard to the context of the clash.  We have also 
discovered that despite the strong political and ideological overtones of the 
underlying issues, the media coverage is not nearly as strategically-framed as 
typical political stories.  The consequence in sum of all of these findings is that 
citizens are getting a distorted view of the judicial proceedings in Gratz and Grutter
and therefore may not be able to weigh that outcome in any deliberative fashion.
The Legal system of the United States is almost completely reliant on the 
cooperation of its citizens in order to be effective.  If there are possible media 
trends that impact the willingness of individual citizens to continue to be 
cooperative, the very essence of the American legal order is threatened.  Americans 
have tended to support their judicial institutions, even when the prevailing 
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jurisprudence does not necessarily meet their individual self interest.377  Without 
paying close attention to the type of media and popular influences that impact the 
public citizen’s perception of the Legal system, the loss of legitimacy, if that 
outcome does happen, may be very difficult from which to recover.
A closer examination of the Legal system and media might yet bear out 
Ericson’s claim that the two systems are nearly interchangeable.  If judicial 
elections become more prevalent, there may be little reason to assume that the 
Legal system and the Media will not be an intertwined as the rest of the political 
world.378   Media is likely a permanent part of the Law’s relationship with the 
individual citizen.  Further research into legal rhetoric demands some attention be 
paid to media coverage, 379 if we expect to achieve a full understanding of the 
communicative force of any legal system and the role of the citizen in determining 
what should count as Law. 
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 Jaros, Dean and Robert Roper. "The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth Diffuse Support, Specific 
Support, and Legitimacy." American Politics Quarterly (1980) 8: 85-105.
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 Judicial elections and judicial confirmation hearings are arguably becoming indistinctive from 
each other.  Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese. Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences 
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Klux Klan were revealed.  Martin Carcasson and James A. Aune, "Klansman on the Court: Justice 
Hugo Black's 1937 Radio Address." Quarterly Journal of Speech (2003) 89: 154-70.
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Chapter VI:  Conclusion
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose,
Speaking clearly and most severely,
Law is as I’ve told you before,
Law is as you know I suppose,
Law is but let me explain it once more,
Law is The Law.380
W.H Auden’s notion of Law maybe somewhat profane but it does suggest 
that the Law escapes easy definition.  Is Law too complicated for average citizens 
to understand?  The central question posed by this dissertation has been, given the 
complexity of the modern Legal system, can citizens be expected to be effective 
critics of their society’s notion of Law?  If so, what role can rhetorical scholarship 
play in the effort?  Following Hanns Hohmann’s call for new approaches to 
scholarship in legal rhetoric that are grounded in civic awareness,381 I have argued 
that our rhetorical notion of Law has at least three dimensions (the Legal, the Law, 
and the Media) that combine to inform citizens about legal texts and principles of 
justice.  Through an examination of Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, we 
learned that citizens may be receiving some highly distorted and incomplete 
information.
In this final chapter I discuss the broader implications of the findings of the 
analysis found in Chapters Three, Four, and Five.  These three chapters contained 
independent analyses of the following questions:
(1) The Legal System:  How is the legal system constituted in the text?
(2) The Law:  What principles of Law are in conflict in the text?
(3) The Media: What can citizens learn from media coverage of a text? 
Each of the following sections will note limitations to this study, offer suggestions 
for practical implementation of the findings, and speculate about future research.
380
 W.H. Auden, Collected Poems, London: Faber, 1976, 208.
381
 Hohmann (1998).
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A. The Legal System: How is the Legal System Constituted in the 
Text?
Chapter Three described the Legal system as a forum of legal dispute 
resolution that contains both architectural and cultural dimensions.  These two 
dimensions reveal the fact that a legal system is both a matter of thoughtful design 
as well as a living space.  It is too easy to forget that the Legal system is “lived in” 
by various judges, advocates, and even participants just as much as any other social 
forum.
I specifically noted that the architecture of the Court’s decisions in Gratz 
and Grutter was highlighted by references to the variables of structure and voice.  
Structure was represented by the notion of judicial precedent, particularly in 
regards to Regents v. Bakke, the Court’s last major decision on affirmative action in 
higher education.  Voice was represented by the Court’s deference to the First 
Amendment right of educators to determine how best to assemble a diverse 
classroom.  Both of these architectural features suggest that a rhetorical design is 
present in the Court’s decisions, understanding an appreciation for orderliness, 
predictability, and restraint.
The architectural implications of the Gratz and Grutter rulings were 
undoubtedly on the justices’ collective conscience.  However, the difference may 
have been something grounded in the cultural context of the case.  Nearly a year 
after Gratz and Grutter were decided, Justice John Paul St evens gave a remarkable 
speech in which he offered his explanation for the Court’s decisions.  Referring to 
his personal notes of the conference in which Gratz and Grutter were debated, 
Stevens suggested that the military and CEO amicus briefs may have pulled the 
day. Stevens recalled thinking that nine justices would be hard pressed to ignore the 
“accumulated wisdom of the country’s [military and business] leaders.”382
382
 The speech is remarkable largely because the deliberations of the Court are usually kept 
confidential.  At conferences, only the justices are permitted to enter the conference room.  The 
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Stevens’ comments strongly indicate that the Court’s decisions also reflected a 
broad spectrum of cultural considerations, ranging from the Court’s internal culture 
to the broader cultural relationship between the Court and society.  This conclusion 
would run contrary to the notion of a Court far removed from public or societal 
influence.
The intracultural variable for this study was the discussion over the meaning 
of Justice O’Connor’s 25 year limit.  Whether viewed as an absolute ruling or an 
aspiration goal reveals much about the various attitudes of the Justices to the 
Court’s proper role.  If viewed as an absolute rule, the 25 year limit becomes a 
judicial invention or policy implementation.  On the other hand, a permissive 
standard suggests a Court that reacts to prevalent social norms.  Only time will tell 
which intracultural description best suits the Court, but arguably either description 
grants justices some degree of freedom to be “activist.”  The absolute rule is the 
Court’s rather arbitrary implementation of a standard whereas the permissive 
standard shows a Court willing to bend to current social attitudes.
On the intercultural side of the cultural spectrum, the Gratz and Grutter 
cases highlighted the use of the military school metaphor.  The military school 
metaphor represents an attempt by both sides of the debate to offer a transcendent 
analogy to outside audiences.  The use by Thomas and Scalia harkens back to the 
Court’s earlier decision regarding the Virginia Military Institute.  Social 
conservatives wishing to preserve state-funded same sex education likely found 
that decision to be upsetting.  The majority aimed for a different conservative 
audience, however, in raising national security issues by noting the importance of 
race-classifications to a diverse officer corps.  The success of the majority’s 
approach might offer an interesting interpretation of modern conservatism.
newest justice handles tasks like answering the door and relaying messages from outsiders.  For 
details of Stevens’ speech, see Stohr, 288.
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The media analysis in this study suggested that the cultural dimensions of 
the cases were underplayed by the newspaper reports.  In hindsight, perhaps the 
cultural contexts of legal disputes, incorporating both the intracultural and 
intercultural dynamics of the Legal system, are more important than the 
architectural features, such as structured reasoning or precedential authority, 
features so often associated with legal reasoning.  One suspects that the cultural 
context gives judges the rhetorical space to act as legal thinkers.  As Justice 
Stevens’ observations on the Court’s conference for Gratz and Grutter suggests, 
the intervention of the military and business leaders made it difficult for the justices 
to simply apply legal doctrine without considering the practical implications of the 
ruling.  Whether this same dynamic applies in other cases remains to be seen.
1. Limitations of the Legal System as a Rhetorical Conception
Two limitations weigh on both the theoretical conception of the Legal 
system propounded in this study as well as the application of that model to the 
Michigan cases.  First, this study is primarily about the U.S. legal system.  Despite 
my efforts to take as universal a view as possible, there are plainly some cultural 
differences between various legal systems that may have an impact on the way 
citizens interact with their judicial tribunals. Even within the U.S. legal system, 
there are significantly different experiences for individuals, depending on the 
particular conflict, the disputants, and the forum.
A second limitation with the notion of the Legal system presented in this 
dissertation is the assumed relationship between the average citizen and the Legal 
system.  This dissertation assumes that individuals learn about their Legal system 
through either direct contact or through mass media.  This assumption 
deemphasizes the many other ways in which cultural knowledge can be 
transmitted, even in a mass media information age.  For example, mass media may 
portray prisons in a generally homogenized manner.  However, a citizen living 
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within an African-American culture may learn of other portrayals of prison life 
through various cultural networks within an African-American community. We 
also do not understand how citizens deal with conflicting cultural knowledge about 
legal rules.
Finally, the emergence of private adjudication forums such as arbitration or 
private courts demonstrates the application of aspects of a Legal system to a 
situation that may not reflect a communal understanding of Law.  In that case, these 
private Legal systems may not reveal the same sorts of historical, architectural, or 
cultural dimensions as public-oriented Legal systems. Nevertheless, the increasing 
presence of these private legal forums may still affect individual perceptions of the 
“public” legal system.
2. Implications for Future Rhetorical Studies on the Legal System
We hardly need to recommend more analysis of the legal system.  Lawyers 
already produce thousands of well informed analyses every year.  However, 
traditional legal doctrine tends to focus on legal architecture.  What may be missing 
is a focus on the cultural spectrum and, in particular, the “indicia” of culture.  By 
“indicia” I mean the cultural references used by judicial authors intended to convey 
a particular relationship between the legal doctrine at hand and a daily existence.  
In Gratz and Grutter, the use of the military school metaphor was revealing 
because it suggested two separate perspectives on the broader cultural relevance.  
In that respect, all Legal systems are grounded by an internal set of cultural 
indicators that may or may not impede the truth seeking and deliberation functions 
of the judiciary.  When legal texts are read without cultural context, then they are in 
danger of being distorted.  It seems especially nonsensical to treat cultural 
references as trivial, merely illustrative, or colorful when the judicial authors 
obviously intended the references to carry some sort of meaning.
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A full understanding of the cultural context of a Legal system will require 
greater collaboration between rhetorical scholars and legal scholars, practicing 
attorneys and other legal professionals, or other participants in the Legal system.  
As an example, Clarke Rountree has repeatedly implored rhetorical scholars to 
familiarize themselves with distinctive elements of judicial rhetoric.  Rountree’s 
calls are to be heeded if rhetoric scholarship is to effectively critique abusive or 
ineffective rhetorical techniques used by judges.  However, similar attention must 
be directed towards some of the other participants—such as criminal defendants, 
expert witnesses, jury consultants, and legal advocates—in the Legal system in 
order to provide a full accounting of the cultural dimensions of the system. 
Two lines of future research are recommended.  First, rhetorical scholars 
should make a concentrated effort to look for generic elements in the structural 
legal analysis produced by legal professionals.  More than merely producing a 
catalogue of legal argumentative forms, this effort would attempt to offer a model 
for criticizing the architecture of a legal opinion.  Ideally, such a critical model 
would not require the critic to be an expert in the legal subject matter in order to 
assess the strength of the judicial opinion.  A good first step in this effort would be 
to catalogue generic elements of various types of legal texts, from judicial opinions 
to cease and desist letters.  Rhetorical scholars need not be legal experts to assess 
generic elements of a case.383
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The second line of research attends to the cultural dimensions of Legal 
systems.  Rhetorical scholars should utilize a diversity of qualitative analytical 
techniques to better understand the culture of the American courtroom and the 
cultural connections between popular culture and the internal culture of the legal 
world.  Ethnographic studies of courtrooms, law firms, judicial chambers, and other 
sites of legal text might reveal more information about the intracultural dimensions 
of the Legal system.  Additionally, examinations of popular culture references to 
the Legal system may shed light on the intercultural connections.  The intercultural 
analysis might even include direct studies of individual citizens expressing their 
understanding and criticism of their Legal systems.  Much of this research already 
exists in some form in anthropological or cultural legal studies.  The challenge for 
communication scholars is to understand those findings within the standpoint of a 
communicative context.
B.  The Law:  What Principles at Law are in Conflict in the Text?
The rhetorical parallels between legal and religious discourse are not 
surprising given the explanation in Chapter One of the Church’s key role in 
preserving Roman legal codes.  It is tempting when developing a rhetorically-based 
notion of Law to equate Law with Divinity or Sovereignty and the Constitution as a 
form of Holy Scripture.  However, while modern U.S. citizens do show a religious 
zeal for the broad concept of constitutional principles, there remains a sense that 
U.S. citizens are quite comfortable with discrete constitutional violations geared 
towards principles of justice or fairness.  Gratz and Grutter are essentially cases 
about when the State of Michigan can violate the constitutional right to equal 
protection.  The Fourteenth Amendment can be violated, but only for the right 
Court: Progressivism, Ethics, and 'Social Justics' in the 1916 'Trial' of Louis D. Brandeis." Rhetoric 
& Public Affairs (1999) 2: 83-106; The Character of Justice: Rhetoric, Law, and Politics in the 
Supreme Court Confirmation Process. Lansing, Mich.: Michgan State University Press, 2004.
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reasons.  For the time being, affirmative action in education for the sake of 
classroom diversity appears to be among the right reasons.
If Law is more than the Constitution, what is it?  This study proposes that 
Law represents a discrete rhetorical pool of principles of justice and fairness that 
are approved by a rough societal consensus.  The Constitution contains several
principles of justice and fairness that are clearly within the Law.  However, there 
are extra-constitutional principles of justice, such as those expressed by the 
majority in Grutter, which  can trump constitutional provisions under certain 
circumstances.  The key to making an effective rhetorical critique of the Law is to 
identify both the principles of justice at play and the points of conflict between 
multiple principles embedded in the legal dispute.
In Gratz and Grutter, the principles in conflict concerned the clash between 
the individual consideration that any college applicant expects and the equality of 
access to higher education.  For the average citizen, these points of conflict are 
more than merely informative detail.  Instead, the points of conflict provide the 
context necessary to understand how the Court can preserve the use of race-
classifications in some cases and not in others.  To suggest that the Michigan cases 
were about affirmative action in higher education (a description that emphasizes the 
location of the conflict) is just as overly simplistic as to suggest that the cases 
reflect general concerns about principles of justice.  Both the principles and the 
points of conflict must be considered together to create a meaningful context.384
384
 Rhetorical scholars have recently been interested in John Quincy Adam’s Amistad speech in 
which he successfully argued for the freedom of two dozen African slaves.  Part of their combined 
excellence is the emphasis on the specific legal points of conflict that made the case so remarkable, 
yet not historically out of step with the jurisprudence of the day.  Sean Patrick O’Rourke, 
Cultivating the ‘Higher Law’ in American Jurisprudence: John Quincy Adams, Neo-Classical 
Rhetoric and the ‘Amistad’ Case, Southern Communication Journal (1994) 60: 33-43; Jerald L. 
Banninga, John Quincy Adams on the Right of a Slave to Petition Congress,” Southern Speech 
Communication Journal (1972) 38: 151-163;  A. Cheree Carlson, John Quincy Adams’ ‘Amistad 
Address’: Eloquence in a Generic Hybrid,”Western Journal of Speech Communication (1985) 
49:14-26; Marouf Hasian Jr. & A. Cheree Carlson, Revisionism and Collective Memory: The 
Struggle for Meaning in the ‘Amistad’ Affair,” Communication Monographs (2000) 67: 42-62.
154
For example, Justice Thomas’ dissent offers a meaningful case study of 
how principles in conflict elevate Gratz and Grutter above a basic constitutional 
argument.  Even though Justice Thomas was on the losing end of the constitutional 
argument, he still managed to argue effectively that Americans should eventually
remove the classroom diversity justification from the pool of arguments that are 
lawful.  His dissent evokes logical and personal appeals about the wisdom of 
permitting racial discrimination merely to provide a “balanced” classroom.  His 
arguments reflect the conclusion that Law may be more expansive a concept than 
the various legal systems used to resolve conflicts, but there is still a gap between 
the agreement of the public on a basic principle of justice and the decision of an 
individual to comply with any particular aspect of a legal system.  
Despite my earlier criticism of using religion as a metaphor for Law, there 
is at least one potential model for rhetorical legal criticism that incorporates 
religious metaphors.  Sanford Levinson offers as a metaphor a “catholic” and 
“protestant” position on constitutional doctrine.385 Levinson is not describing 
Catholic or Protestant beliefs but rather uses some broad theological 
generalizations as metaphors for two distinct models to constitutional 
interpretation.  The protestant believes that the source of doctrine is the 
constitutional text itself and the text can be properly interpreted by individuals.  In 
contrast, the catholic view is that the source of doctrine is the text of the 
Constitution plus unwritten tradition which is ultimately dispensed by the Supreme 
Court.  Levinson suggests that one might be a protestant on doctrinal issues but a 
catholic on interpretation issues.386  Although only proposed as a metaphor, 
Levinson’s construction may yet suggest a broader connection between the rhetoric 
of religion and the rhetoric of law.  In particular, parallel analyses of authority in 
religious and legal texts, perhaps applying some of the same media variables used 
385
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in this study, might reveal important differences and similarities between the talk of 
judges and ministers.
1. Limitations of Law as a Rhetorical Conception
Of the three stages of the analysis presented in this dissertation, the analysis 
of the Law is the least developed.  As a rhetorical notion, Law is perhaps inherently 
difficult to define with any precision.  Additional refinement is necessary to fully
develop the concept of Law as both a rhetorical theory as well as a jurisprudential 
theory.    The central limitation is in the use of legal discourse as a general 
rhetorical expression.  Jack Balkin has argued that the development of new 
technologies in legal research will reinforce what he sees as the common law’s 
“fondness for conceiving, categorizing, and imagining law in terms of topics.”387
With what appears to be a rapidly expanding production of legal texts (and topics), 
legal rhetorical scholars have plenty of artifacts to research.  But Balkin also warns 
that, in performing rhetorical criticism of law, scholars should be careful to note 
their own topical or heuristic-driven limitations.388  When applying non-legal 
paradigms, such as rhetorical theory, to legal language, or vice versa, Balkin notes 
that “we subtly change the nature of legal argument and legal analysis.”389  Because 
this study is a rhetorical criticism at heart, Balkin’s concerns carry less weight.  
However, in future studies that emphasize more quantitative approaches to studying 
legal language, the danger of distorting meaning cannot be overstated.
A more technical limitation of this particular study is the emphasis on two 
companion cases.  Principles of justice develop over time.  Therefore, it may be 
rather unhelpful to use two contemporaneous Supreme Court texts, such as Gratz 
and Grutter, to make broad claims about such principles.  Conversely, a 
387
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longitudinal study may obscure some of the cultural touchstones that are important 
to this analysis as well.  Thus, a fully developed study might need to incorporate 
both situated understandings about principles of justice and historically grounded 
notions of justice.  Tracking a limited line of cases might offer a compromise 
between these two approaches.
2.  Implications for Future Studies on the Rhetorical Notion of Law
There are two practical implications for future research on the rhetorical 
notion of law.  First, legal scholars may conclude that a different emphasis in legal 
education on case analysis might be necessary.  One of the earliest skills taught in 
an American law school is the art of “briefing” a case, or providing a brief succinct 
description.  Briefing tends to emphasize “holdings” and determinative facts over 
broader themes.  As part of their training in briefing, law students might be 
encouraged to identify some of the principles at play in a given case and to locate 
the points of conflict.390  The effort to reflect on some of the underlying 
philosophical aspects of a case might encourage legal professionals to view the case 
as more than an argumentative tool, but rather as a broader reflection of the 
prevailing issues in a particular matter.
Second, communication scholars interested in legal disputes must 
conversely become more familiar with existing legal research on rhetoric and 
communication issues.  I have already suggested that the rhetorical notion of Law 
described here needs to be more adequately cross-evaluated against leading 
jurisprudential theories of Law.  The professed personal relationship between 
individual citizens and Law remains unexplored in this study.  More questions 
should be asked about how individuals view the Law and their relationship with the 
Law and the Legal system.  Finally, the notion of Law as a projected ideal in mass 
390
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media demands further scrutiny.  Because news media and fictional entertainment 
often adhere to fairly predictable generic patterns, it is reasonable to think that 
certain tropes of Law and justice are consistently replicated for the average media 
consumer.391  A comparison between the Court’s notions of Law and that which is
expressed in various media forms would be useful.  A similar consideration of Law 
as a topic of discussion by specific cultural communities is also warranted.
C.  The Media: What can Citizens Learn from Media Coverage of a 
Text?
When discussing theories of legal and social legitimacy, both 
communication and legal scholars often make the mistake of not analyzing the 
means by which a citizen receives news of a legal decision.  As an example, 
evaluating the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, Theodore Prosise 
and Craig Smith argued in a 2001 article in Rhetoric and Public Affairs that the 
Court’s violation of the “boundaries of the legitimate linguistic possibilities” had 
lead to a damaging of the ethos of the Court and the judiciary in general, and the 
Bush presidency.  Their study, which evaluated the professed rationales offered by 
the per curiam, concurring, and dissenting opinions of the Court, concludes that,
because of the Court’s “inability to reach a consensus on a matter of such national
import, the Court appeared craven and may have irreparably damaged its 
391
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credibility.”392  Regardless of how one feels about the result in Bush v. Gore, 
Prosise and Smith’s conclusion makes the crucial mistake of assuming that citizens 
read the Court’s decisions in the same way as interested scholars, rather than 
through the filter of media and personal discussions.  
When talking about the Court’s public legitimacy, one must ask what the 
public learned from the decision.  Although the authors cite a public opinion poll 
from the day of the Court’s rendering of its final decision, there is no effort to 
examine how citizens came to understand the Court’s ruling.  Their identification 
of the rhetorical contradictions within and between the various opinions and 
previous judicial writings is thus presented out of context.  Until an analysis of the 
public’s “reception” of the Court’s ruling can be better understood, Prosise and 
Smith’s analysis only really touches on the internal legal discourse of the Court 
(and the broader American legal system, up to a point).  What citizens really know 
about the case is unknown, as is their ability to evaluate the decision in light of the 
broader principles of justice embedded in their rhetorical conception of Law.
Largely because of my frustration with studies similar to Prosise and Smith, 
the final part of this study focused on the media coverage of the Court’s decisions 
in Gratz and Grutter.  The main point of the analysis was to urge rhetorical 
scholars to consider the impact that media plays in disseminating important 
information about judicial texts.  Not surprisingly, the media covered some 
arguments more intensely than others.  The media also tended to focus on 
architectural issues within the Legal system and principles of justice in the Law.  
What was missing was the relative cultural indicia for both the Legal system and 
the Law.  Although the military academies’ use of race-classifications was very 
important to the Court’s decisions, the media tended to underplay that argument, 
often favoring Justice Thomas’ intensely personal dissent in Grutter.
392
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An important finding of this study was the heavy reliance on issue framing 
by the news media.  Because issue framing tends to emphasize substantive matters 
in a given political conflict, this approach would seem to be an encouraging sign 
that judicial reporting is not nearly as cynically-oriented as political campaign 
reporting.  However beneficial the emphasis on issue-framing might be, there may 
be a problem when a judicial decision on a plainly political issue offers no strategic 
framing to speak of.  When the judiciary’s political activities are treated with more 
deference than the activities of other political actors, citizens are presented with an 
imbalanced, and possibly distorted, understanding of the issue and the court’s 
actions.  
The results of this study may simply be evidence that news media do not 
equate judicial decisions with political events.  Nevertheless, Gratz and Grutter 
certainly represented an important political issue.  A more complete answer may be 
that reporters are like most citizens, being relatively unwilling to question the 
legitimacy of the Court’s rulings.  Given the damage that strategic framing can do 
to an institution or its members, journalists may feel some trepidation applying that 
frame to a venerated institution like the Supreme Court.393  Perhaps this aberration 
should be welcomed by scholars that are concerned by the lack of civic 
engagement, suppressed in some part by excessively cynical attitudes towards 
politics.  At the same time, a little cynicism towards the judiciary might be in order 
from time to time.
The increase in the production of legal texts is not only a challenge for 
rhetorical legal scholars.  The speed and volume of the production of legal texts 
challenges the capacity of the average citizen to monitor the work of the Legal 
system.  As Balkin describes, with each legal text comes a proliferation of “legal 
393
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truth and legal reality” that directs how people live their lives, shapes their 
imaginations, and potentially smothers competing “truths or realities.”394  I have 
described these truths in Chapter IV as the principles of justice or fairness that 
comprise the Law (as abstracted).  Balkin’s concern is that citizens are likely to 
allow legal discourse to structure moral behavior, much like computer software 
structures one’s use of computer technology: “Law is at its most powerful when it 
is most cultural, when it is most invisible.”395  Yet my assumption is that U.S. 
citizens would not like their legal system to become so embedded into their culture 
and everyday life that the “legal perspective” becomes the common perspective.
In order for any legal system not to become completely “invisible,” citizens 
will rely on media coverage of legal disputes.  To that end, news media are 
presently unprepared to report fairly and fully on legal disputes.  Fortunately, the 
problems are surmountable.  First, media organizations need to be proactive in 
legal reporting.  This study has made apparent a trend in reporting on legal cases 
only when “significant” litigation events occur.  Media need not wait for the 
pageantry of a courtroom appearance to inform the public about the issues in the 
case.  As Bob Woodward and Carl Berstein’s reporting in Watergate aptly 
demonstrated, reporters are fully capable of newsgathering in the absence of public 
hearings.  In fact, much of the importance of a story is often lost by the time a 
hearing comes to pass.  For example, the New York Times “scooped” the story 
about the initial filing of the undergraduate lawsuit because the Center for 
Individual Rights offered an exclusive.  However, reporters need not have waited 
for the entirely predictable lawsuit.396  They could have noted that CIR’s public 
394
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recruitment of potential plaintiffs or Michigan’s quiet revamping of its admission 
system and hiring of an elite Washington, D.C. law firm.397
1. Limitations Related to the Study of Law and Media
The media analysis in this study is limited in a number of methodological 
ways.  First, my project has been descriptive, with no pretense of offering 
statistically-rigorous generalizations.  Second, the focus on a limited sample of 
newspapers and news magazines cannot completely account for the means by 
which most Americans receive their legal news.  Third, the reporting on this case 
dovetails with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the Hopwood case; 
hence, a full accounting of the media news coverage from that reporting would 
provide a more complete picture of what was being reported about affirmative 
action in higher education over the decade prior to the Michigan decisions.
A second limitation of this study is its exclusive focus on news media with 
no attention paid to popular entertainment media.398  The prevalence of movies and
television shows with legal related storylines, as well as law-specific programming, 
indicates that perhaps most of the cultural information received by citizens does not 
come from reporting on Supreme Court decisions.  Moreover, as noted previously, 
there is a general lack of attention to the interpersonal network of community 
members that often pass along information about the Legal system.  These last two 
sources of information are not captured in this study.  Nevertheless, I believe that 
397 Id. 39, 48-50.  Gratz, Grutter, and Hamacher were selected from over 200 applicants after a 
multi-stage screening process.  Stohr reports that CIR was unable to sue the University’s medical 
school for lack of an appropriate candidate.  Id. 49.
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Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.  Likewise, 
nontraditional media forms may have a significant impact on citizen’s perceptions of the Law and 
Legal system.  Jack M. McLeod, "The Impact of Traditional and Nontraditional Media Forms in the 
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the same basic tropes and rhetorical pressures that inform newspaper reporting are 
also at the heart of other news and fictional narratives.
A third limitation that pervades the entire study is a lack of appreciation for 
the popular viewpoint of Law and justice.  It is difficult to assess how “popular” 
notions of justice differ from the notions found in legal opinions; it is difficult to 
view the official version as authoritative.  The consequence, according to Garapon 
is that “authority no longer embodies real social relationships but cultural 
mythologies about those relationships.”399 Law becomes in popular culture “a 
‘normal’ part of public conversation in the media, to be represented as well as 
obeyed and resisted,” arguably without regard to the wisdom of such obedience or 
adherence. Rather than understanding the Legal system as a regulation of their 
behavior, people experience the law “as a form of knowledge they use to visualize 
themselves, their experiences and their place in the authoritative structure of 
society.”400  The failure to appreciate this fourth dimension (the popular law, 
perhaps) limits the full reach of this three-pronged approach to understanding legal 
rhetoric.  
2. Implications for Future Rhetorical Studies in Law and Media
As one communication scholar has suggested: “the best antidote for a 
sophistic rhetor is a sophisticated rhetoree, and we had best get at the business of 
providing such an antidote.”401  Can news media provide an “antidote” to the 
distance between legal texts and the average citizen?  I argue that news media can 
399
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provide citizens with the tools and information necessary to make critical 
evaluations of legal texts and particularly judicial decisions.  Garapon similarly 
argues that news about law constitutes justice as the fulfillment of institutional 
needs and thereby helps legitimate the legal institution.402
The main problem with legal reporting is that citizens must relearn various 
features of the Legal system for every story.  For example, any discussion about 
race-classifications requires some discussion about the strict scrutiny test.  These 
reminders are helpful, but a waste of resources for the legal reporter.  Instead, news 
media should strive for a model of legal reporting that provides updates on 
emerging decisions, but also features that contextualize the case, the legal standards 
at play, and some of the participants’ strategic motives.  In short, news reporting 
should evolve into a format that can inform citizens without becoming bogged 
down in the small nuances of legal procedures.  If readers of Sports Illustrated can 
understand a story about baseball without fully understanding the concept of a balk 
or a pitcher’s E.R.A., then surely citizens can learn about Supreme Court decisions 
(or other legal events) without needing a course in civil procedure.  Reporting the 
architectural elements of the Legal system or merely the principles of justice fails 
to provide the readers with the necessary cultural context for understanding the 
broader issues.
In many respects, news magazines and some Supreme Court correspondents 
have already demonstrated the capacity to write about Law without writing only 
about the Legal system.  However, this effort should be coming from local and 
regional newspapers reporting on local and regional legal decisions.  The Supreme 
Court’s opinions, while obviously important, represent only the smallest sliver of 
legal decisions produced in the United States.  Citizens should be able to connect 
402
 Garapon, 204
164
on an individual basis with the Law at play in every case, regardless of whether the 
matter is before the Supreme Court or the local justice of the peace.
D.  Conclusion
This examination of what constitutes Legal rhetoric began as a response to 
Hohmann’s call for an approach to legal rhetoric liberated from the trappings of the 
“dried-up and bleached-out nature of rationalistic academic discourse that is purged 
of explicit personal and affective elements and thus of any recognizable human 
context.”403  In recognizing and developing the rhetorical distinctions between the 
Law and the Legal system, this study is but the first step towards developing a body 
of scholarship on legal rhetoric that begins with a set of common assumptions.  The 
challenge is to ensure that future scholarship on legal rhetoric does not fall prey to 
the pull of inaccessible language and jargon that already riddles legal discourse.
Another challenge facing scholars interested in legal rhetoric is the 
enormous energy required to fully evaluate legal texts, place them within their 
proper cultural and ethical contexts, and evaluate the average citizen’s capacity to 
receive and understand the Legal system.  This study references only a handful of 
the many scholarly efforts at understanding the phenomenon of legal rhetoric in the 
modern world.  If any progress is to be made, scholars must begin the process of 
creating a set of interdisciplinary common notions.  The Law/Legal distinction 
offers one such method of facilitating a common discussion among scholars using 
vastly different methodologies and artifacts.  As Jack Balkin has noted, the Law is 
a difficult partner for interdisciplinary scholars, precisely because it is, at heart, 
more of a profession than an intellectual discipline.404  The next textbook for legal 
403 Id.
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communication will require careful thought so as not to ignore any of the many 
interesting strands that help comprise the study of legal rhetoric.405
However legal rhetorical scholarship evolves, Legal systems need the 
cooperation of citizens in order to be successful.  Citizens need information and 
perspective from media in order to assess whether the Legal system’s resolution of 
legal conflicts is ultimately satisfactory.  Manuchehr Sanadjian provides an 
example in Iran of how an uninformed citizenry can unintentionally derail any 
efforts at systematic community justice.406  Sanadadjian witnessed a public 
flogging of three village men for violating national Islamic laws against gambling, 
which was legal under village customs.  The Islamic officials picked official 
witnesses and attempted to keep the rest of the villagers at a respectful distance.  
The criminals took their punishments with passivity and subversive silence, in 
contrast to the display of pain and anguish expected by the Islamic court.  As a 
second beating was ordered, the crowd of villagers erupted in jubilant applause for 
the criminals’ show of strength.  Confused, the justice officers quieted the crowd 
with threats of punishment.  The silent witnessing of a punishment expected by the 
Islamic court was a foreign concept to the villagers, who had no idea how to 
behave at such a public spectacle.  Instead of a demonstration of justice, the court’s 
actions seemed arbitrary and mean-spirited.
The clash between culture, legal rhetoric, and the Legal system described in 
this example is not terribly removed from American courtrooms filled with 
405
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uninformed or unimpressed parties.  This dissertation began with a discussion 
about what the ancient rhetoricians Corax and Tisias might think about modern 
legal discourse.  They might be most shocked by the willingness of citizens to 
tolerate a Legal system they can neither understand nor explain.  W.H Auden’s 
poetic depiction of the paradox of legal authority is more than mere cynicism. A 
rhetorical conception of “the Law,” supported largely by the public’s general 
acceptance of principles of justice, exists separate and apart from the Legal system 
of rules.  The architecture or culture of the Legal system gives rule-makers like 
Auden’s windbag of a jurist the capacity to resolve conflicts between principles of 
justice. “The Law is the Law,” but only to a certain point.  Sooner or later, the Law 
either becomes something revered and protected by citizens or it becomes a 
nuisance.
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OPINIONBY: REHNQUIST [*249] 
OPINION:  [**2417]   [*249]  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 
Court.
 [***HR1A]  [1A]  [***HR2A]  [2A] 
We granted certiorari in this case to decide 
whether "the University of Michigan's use of 
racial preferences in  [*250]  undergraduate 
admissions violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 
2000d [42 USCS §  2000d]), or 42 USC §  
1981 [42 USCS §  1981]." Brief  [*251]  for 
Petitioners i.  Because we find that the 
manner in which the University considers the 
race of applicants in its undergraduate 
admissions guidelines violates these 
constitutional and statutory provisions, we 
reverse that portion of the District Court's 
decision upholding the guidelines.
I
A
Petitioners Jennifer Gratz and Patrick 
Hamacher both applied for admission to the 
University of Michigan's (University) 
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts 
(LSA) as residents of the State of Michigan.  
Both petitioners are Caucasian.  Gratz, who 
applied for admission for the fall of 1995, 
was notified in January of that year that a 
final decision regarding her admission had 
been delayed until April.  This delay was 
based upon the University's determination 
that, although Gratz was "'well qualified,'" 
she was "'less competitive than the students 
who had been admitted on first review.'" 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 109a.  Gratz was 
notified in April that the LSA was unable to 
offer her admission.  She enrolled in the 
University of Michigan at Dearborn, from 
which she graduated in the spring of 1999.
Hamacher applied for admission to the LSA 
for the fall of 1997.  A final decision as to his 
application was also postponed because, 
though his "'academic credentials [were] in 
the qualified range, they [were] not at the 
level needed for first review admission.'" 
Ibid. Hamacher's application was 
subsequently denied in  [***270]  April 
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1997, and he enrolled at Michigan State 
University. n1
n1 Although Hamacher indicated 
that he "intended to apply to transfer 
if the [LSA's] discriminatory 
admissions system [is] eliminated," 
he has since graduated from Michigan 
State University.  App. 34.
 [*252]  In October 1997, Gratz and 
Hamacher filed a lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan [**2418]  against the University of 
Michigan, the LSA, n2 James Duderstadt, 
and Lee Bollinger. n3 Petitioners' complaint 
was a class-action suit alleging "violations 
and threatened violations of the rights of the 
plaintiffs and the class they represent to equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . ., and for racial discrimination 
in violation of 42 USC § §  1981, 1983, and 
2000d et seq. [42 USCS § §  1981, 1983, and 
2000d et seq.]" App. 33.  Petitioners sought, 
inter alia, compensatory and punitive 
damages for past violations, declaratory relief 
finding that respondents violated petitioners' 
"rights to nondiscriminatory treatment," an 
injunction prohibiting respondents from 
"continuing to discriminate on the basis of 
race in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," and an order requiring the 
LSA to offer Hamacher admission as a 
transfer student. n4 Id., at 40. 
n2 The University of Michigan 
Board of Regents was subsequently 
named as the proper defendant in 
place of the University and the LSA. 
See id., at 17.
n3 Duderstadt was the president 
of the University during the time that 
Gratz's application was under 
consideration.  He has been sued in 
his individual capacity.  Bollinger 
was the president of the University 
when Hamacher applied for 
admission.  He was originally sued in 
both his individual and official 
capacities, but he is no longer the 
president of the University.  Id., at 35.
n4 A group of African-American and 
Latino students who applied for, or 
intended to apply for, admission to 
the University, as well as the Citizens 
for Affirmative Action's Preservation, 
a nonprofit organization in Michigan, 
sought to intervene pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.  
See App. 13-14.  The District Court 
originally denied this request, see id.,
at 14-15, but the Sixth Circuit 
reversed that decision.  See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (1999).
The District Court granted petitioners' 
motion for class certification after 
determining that a class action was 
appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(2).  The certified class 
consisted of "those individuals who applied 
for and were not granted admission to the 
College of  [*253]  Literature, Science and 
the Arts of the University of Michigan for all 
academic years from 1995 forward and who 
are members of those racial or ethnic groups, 
including Caucasian, that defendants treated 
less favorably on the basis of race in 
considering their application for admission." 
App. 70-71.  And Hamacher, whose claim 
the District Court found to challenge a 
"'practice of racial discrimination pervasively 
applied on a classwide basis,'" was 
designated as the class representative.  Id., at 
67, 70.  The court also granted petitioners' 
motion to bifurcate the proceedings into a 
liability and damages phase.  Id., at 71.  The 
liability phase was to determine "whether 
[respondents'] use of race as a factor in 
admissions decisions violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution." Id., at 70. 
n5
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n5 The District Court decided 
also to consider petitioners' request 
for injunctive and declaratory relief 
during the liability phase of the 
proceedings.  App. 71.
 [***271]  B
The University has changed its admissions 
guidelines a number of times during the 
period relevant to this litigation, and we 
summarize the most significant of these 
changes briefly.  The University's Office of 
Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) oversees 
the LSA admissions process. n6 In order to 
promote consistency in the review of the 
large number of applications received, the 
OUA uses written guidelines for each 
academic year.  Admissions counselors make 
admissions decisions in accordance with 
these guidelines. 
n6 Our description is taken, in 
large part, from the "Joint Proposed 
Summary of Undisputed Facts 
Regarding Admissions Process" filed 
by the parties in the District Court.  
App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a-117a.
OUA considers a number of factors in 
making admissions decisions, including high 
school grades, standardized test scores, high 
school quality, curriculum [**2419]  
strength, geography, alumni relationships, 
and leadership.  OUA also considers race.  
During all periods relevant to this litigation, 
the University  [*254]  has considered 
African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans to be "underrepresented 
minorities," and it is undisputed that the 
University admits "virtually every qualified . 
. . applicant" from these groups.  App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 111a.
During 1995 and 1996, OUA counselors 
evaluated applications according to grade 
point average combined with what were 
referred to as the "SCUGA" factors.  These 
factors included the quality of an applicant's 
high school (S), the strength of an applicant's 
high school curriculum (C), an applicant's 
unusual circumstances (U), an applicant's 
geographical residence (G), and an 
applicant's alumni relationships (A).  After 
these scores were combined to produce an 
applicant's "GPA 2" score, the reviewing 
admissions counselors referenced a set of 
"Guidelines" tables, which listed GPA 2 
ranges on the vertical axis, and American 
College Test/Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(ACT/SAT) scores on the horizontal axis.  
Each table was divided into cells that 
included one or more courses of action to be 
taken, including admit, reject, delay for 
additional information, or postpone for 
reconsideration.
In both years, applicants with the same GPA 
2 score and ACT/SAT score were subject to 
different admissions outcomes based upon 
their racial or ethnic status. n7 For example, 
as a Caucasian in-state applicant, Gratz's 
GPA 2 score and ACT score placed her 
within a cell calling for a postponed decision 
on her application.  An in-state or out-of-state 
minority applicant with Gratz's scores would 
have fallen within a cell calling for 
admission. 
n7 In 1995, counselors used four 
such tables for different groups of 
applicants: (1) in-state, nonminority 
applicants; (2) out-of-state, 
nonminority applicants; (3) in-state, 
minority applicants; and (4) out-of-
state, minority applicants.  In 1996, 
only two tables were used, one for in-
state applicants and one for out-of-
state applicants.  But each cell on 
these two tables contained separate 
courses of action for minority 
applicants and nonminority applicants 
whose GPA 2 scores and ACT/SAT 
scores placed them in that cell.
 [*255]  In 1997, the University modified 
its admissions procedure.  Specifically, the 
formula for calculating an applicant's GPA 2 
score was restructured to include additional 
point values under the "U" category in the 
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SCUGA factors.  Under this new system, 
applicants could receive points  [***272]  for 
underrepresented minority status, 
socioeconomic disadvantage, or attendance at 
a high school with a predominantly 
underrepresented minority population, or 
underrepresentation in the unit to which the 
student was applying (for example, men who 
sought to pursue a career in nursing).  Under 
the 1997 procedures, Hamacher's GPA 2 
score and ACT score placed him in a cell on 
the in-state applicant table calling for 
postponement of a final admissions decision.  
An underrepresented minority applicant 
placed in the same cell would generally have 
been admitted.
Beginning with the 1998 academic year, the 
OUA dispensed with the Guidelines tables 
and the SCUGA point system in favor of a 
"selection index," on which an applicant 
could score a maximum of 150 points.  This 
index was divided linearly into ranges 
generally calling for admissions dispositions 
as follows: 100-150 (admit); 95-99 (admit or 
postpone); 90-94 (postpone or admit); 75-89 
(delay or postpone); 74 and below (delay or 
reject).
Each application received points based on 
high school grade point average, standardized 
test scores, academic quality of an applicant's 
high school, strength or weakness of high 
school curriculum, in-state residency, alumni 
relationship, personal essay, and personal 
achievement or leadership.  Of particular 
significance here, under a "miscellaneous" 
category, an applicant was entitled to 20 
points based upon his or her membership in 
an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority 
group.  The University explained that the 
[**2420]  "'development of the selection 
index for admissions in 1998 changed only 
the mechanics, not the substance of how race 
and ethnicity were considered in 
admissions.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a.
 [*256]  In all application years from 1995 to 
1998, the guidelines provided that qualified 
applicants from underrepresented minority 
groups be admitted as soon as possible in 
light of the University's belief that such 
applicants were more likely to enroll if 
promptly notified of their admission.  Also 
from 1995 through 1998, the University 
carefully managed its rolling admissions 
system to permit consideration of certain 
applications submitted later in the academic 
year through the use of "protected seats." 
Specific groups--including athletes,  foreign 
students, ROTC candidates, and 
underrepresented minorities--were "protected 
categories" eligible for these seats. A 
committee called the Enrollment Working 
Group (EWG) projected how many 
applicants from each of these protected 
categories the University was likely to 
receive after a given date and then paced 
admissions decisions to permit full 
consideration of expected applications from 
these groups.  If this space was not filled by 
qualified candidates from the designated 
groups toward the end of the admissions 
season, it was then used to admit qualified 
candidates remaining in the applicant pool, 
including those on the waiting list.
During 1999 and 2000, the OUA used the 
selection index, under which every applicant 
from an underrepresented racial or ethnic 
minority group was awarded 20 points.  
Starting in 1999, however, the University 
established an Admissions Review 
Committee (ARC), to provide an additional 
level of consideration for some applications.  
Under the new system, counselors may, in 
their  [***273]  discretion, "flag" an 
application for the ARC to review after 
determining that the applicant (1) is 
academically prepared to succeed at the 
University, n8 (2) has achieved a minimum 
selection index score, and (3) possesses a 
quality or characteristic important to the 
University's composition  [*257]  of its 
freshman class, such as high class rank, 
unique life experiences, challenges, 
circumstances, interests or talents, 
socioeconomic disadvantage, and 
underrepresented race, ethnicity, or 
geography.  After reviewing "flagged" 
applications, the ARC determines whether to 
admit, defer, or deny each applicant. 
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n8 LSA applicants who are 
Michigan residents must accumulate 
80 points from the selection index 
criteria to be flagged, while out-of-
state applicants need to accumulate 75 
points to be eligible for such 
consideration.  See App. 257.
C
 [***HR3A]  [3A] The parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment with respect 
to liability.  Petitioners asserted that the 
LSA's use of race as a factor in admissions 
violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 78 Stat 252, 42 USC §  2000d [42 
USCS §  2000d], and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Respondents relied on Justice Powell's 
opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 
2733 (1978), to respond to petitioners' 
arguments.  As discussed in greater detail in 
the Court's opinion in Grutter v Bollinger, 
post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325, 
Justice Powell, in Bakke, expressed the view 
that the consideration of race as a factor in 
admissions might in some cases serve a 
compelling government interest.  See 438 US 
265, 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  
Respondents contended that the LSA has just 
such an interest in the educational benefits 
that result from having a racially and 
ethnically diverse student body and that its
program is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.  Respondent-intervenors asserted 
that the LSA had a compelling interest in 
remedying the University's past and current 
discrimination against minorities. n9  
[***HR3B]  [3B]
 n9 The District Court considered 
and rejected respondent-intervenors' 
arguments in a supplemental opinion 
and order.  See 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 
(ED Mich. 2001).  The court 
explained that respondent-intervenors 
"failed to present any evidence that 
the discrimination alleged by them, or 
the continuing effects of such 
discrimination, was the real 
justification for the LSA's race-
conscious admissions programs."  Id., 
at 795.  We agree, and to the extent 
respondent-intervenors reassert this 
justification, a justification the 
University has never asserted 
throughout the course of this 
litigation, we affirm the District 
Court's disposition of the issue.
 [**2421]   [*258]  The District Court 
began its analysis by reviewing this Court's 
decision in Bakke. See 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 
817 (ED Mich. 2001).  Although the court 
acknowledged that no decision from this 
Court since Bakke has explicitly accepted the 
diversity rationale discussed by Justice 
Powell, see 122 F. Supp. 2d, at 820-821, it 
also concluded that this Court had not, in the 
years since Bakke, ruled out such a 
justification for the use of race.  122 F. Supp. 
2d, at 820-821.  The District Court concluded 
that respondents and their amici curiae had 
presented "solid evidence" that a racially and 
ethnically diverse student body produces 
significant educational benefits such that 
achieving such a student body constitutes a 
compelling governmental interest.  See id., at 
822-824. 
The court next considered whether the LSA's 
admissions guidelines were narrowly tailored 
to achieve  [***274]  that interest.  See id., at 
824.  Again relying on Justice Powell's 
opinion in Bakke, the District Court 
determined that the admissions program the 
LSA began using in 1999 is a narrowly 
tailored means of achieving the University's 
interest in the educational benefits that flow 
from a racially and ethnically diverse student 
body. See 122 F. Supp. 2d, at 827.  The court 
emphasized that the LSA's current program 
does not utilize rigid quotas or seek to admit 
a predetermined number of minority students.  
See ibid. The award of 20 points for 
membership in an underrepresented minority 
group, in the District Court's view, was not 
the functional equivalent of a quota because 
minority candidates were not insulated from 
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review by virtue of those points.  See id., at 
828.  Likewise, the court rejected the 
assertion that the LSA's program operates 
like the two-track system Justice Powell 
found objectionable in Bakke on the grounds 
that LSA applicants are not competing for 
different groups of seats. See 122 F. Supp. 
2d, at 828-829.  The court also dismissed 
petitioners' assertion that the LSA's current 
system is nothing more than a means by 
which to achieve racial balancing.  See id., at 
831.  The court explained that the LSA does 
not seek to  [*259]  achieve a certain 
proportion of minority students, let alone a 
proportion that represents the community.  
See ibid.
The District Court found the admissions 
guidelines the LSA used from 1995 through 
1998 to be more problematic.  In the court's 
view, the University's prior practice of 
"protecting" or "reserving" seats for 
underrepresented minority applicants 
effectively kept nonprotected applicants from 
competing for those slots.  See id., at 832.  
This system, the court concluded, operated as 
the functional equivalent of a quota and ran 
afoul of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.
n10 See 122 F. Supp. 2d, at 832. 
n10 The District Court 
determined that respondents Bollinger 
and Duderstadt, who were sued in 
their individual capacities under Rev 
Stat §  1979, 42 USC §  1983 [42 
USCS §  1983], were entitled to 
summary judgment based on the 
doctrine of qualified immunity.  See 
122 F. Supp. 2d, at 833-834.  
Petitioners have not asked this Court 
to review this aspect of the District 
Court's decision.  The District Court 
denied the Board of Regents' motion 
for summary judgment with respect to 
petitioners' Title VI claim on 
Eleventh Amendment immunity 
grounds.  See id., at 834-836.  
Respondents have not asked this 
Court to review this aspect of the 
District Court's decision.
Based on these findings, the court 
granted petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the LSA's 
admissions programs in existence from 1995 
through 1998, and respondents' motion with 
respect to the LSA's admissions programs for 
1999 and 2000.  See id., at 833.  
Accordingly,  [**2422]  the District Court 
denied petitioners' request for injunctive 
relief. See id., at 814.
The District Court issued an order consistent 
with its rulings and certified two questions 
for interlocutory appeal to the Sixth Circuit 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §  1292(b) [28 USCS §  
1292(b)].  Both parties appealed aspects of 
the District Court's rulings, and the Court of 
Appeals heard the case en banc on the same 
day as Grutter v Bollinger. The Sixth Circuit 
later issued an opinion in Grutter, upholding 
the admissions program used by the 
University of Michigan Law School, and the 
petitioner in that case sought a writ of 
certiorari from this Court.  Petitioners asked 
this Court to grant certiorari in this case as  
[*260]  well, despite the  [***275]  fact that 
the Court of Appeals had not yet rendered a 
judgment, so that this Court could address the 
constitutionality of the consideration of race 
in university admissions in a wider range of 
circumstances.  We did so.  See  537 US 
1044, 537 U.S. 1043, 154 L. Ed. 2d 514, 123 
S. Ct. 617 (2002).
II
 [***HR4A]  [4A] As they have throughout 
the course of this litigation, petitioners 
contend that the University's consideration of 
race in its undergraduate admissions 
decisions violates §  1 of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, n11 
Title VI, n12 and 42 USC §  1981 [42 USCS 
§  1981]. n13 We consider first whether 
petitioners have standing to seek declaratory 
and injunctive relief, and, finding that they 
do, we next consider the merits of their 
claims. 
n11 The Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment 
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explains that  "no State shall . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."
n12 Title VI provides that  "no person 
in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." 42 USC §  
2000d [42 USCS §  2000d].
n13 Section 1981(a) provides 
that:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of 
the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to 
make and enforce contracts, . . . and 
to the full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security 
of persons and property as is enjoyed 
by white citizens."
A
Although no party has raised the issue, 
Justice Stevens argues that petitioners lack 
Article III standing to seek injunctive relief 
with respect to the University's use of race in 
undergraduate admissions.  He first contends 
that because Hamacher did not "actually 
apply for admission as a transfer student[,] 
his claim of future injury is at best 
'conjectural or hypothetical' rather than 'real 
and immediate.'" Post, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 291 
(dissenting opinion).  But whether Hamacher 
"actually applied" for admission as a transfer 
student is not  [*261]  determinative of his 
ability to seek injunctive relief in this case.  If 
Hamacher had submitted a transfer 
application and been rejected, he would still 
need to allege an intent to apply again in 
order to seek prospective relief.  If Justice 
Stevens means that because Hamacher did 
not apply to transfer, he must never really
have intended to do so, that conclusion 
directly conflicts with the finding of fact 
entered by the District Court that Hamacher 
"intends to transfer to the University of 
Michigan when defendants cease the use of 
race as an admission preference." App. 67. 
n14
n14 This finding is further 
corroborated by Hamacher's request
that the District Court "require the 
LSA College to offer [him] admission 
as a transfer student." App. 40.
 [***HR5]  [5]  It is well established that 
intent may be relevant to standing in an 
Equal Protection challenge.  In Clements v. 
Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 73 L. Ed. 2d 508, 102 
S. Ct. 2836 (1982), for example, we 
considered a challenge to a provision of the 
Texas Constitution requiring the immediate 
resignation of certain state officeholders upon 
their announcement of candidacy for another 
office.  We concluded that the [**2423]  
plaintiff officeholders had Article III standing 
because they had alleged that they would  
have announced their candidacy for other 
offices were it not for the "automatic  
[***276]  resignation" provision they were 
challenging. Id., at 962, 73 L Ed 2d 508, 102 
S Ct 2836; accord, Turner v. Fouche, 396 
U.S. 346, 361-362, n. 23, 24 L. Ed. 2d 567, 
90 S. Ct. 532 (1970) (plaintiff who did not 
own property had standing to challenge 
property ownership requirement for 
membership on school board even though 
there was no evidence that plaintiff had 
applied and been rejected); Quinn v. Millsap,
491 U.S. 95, 103, n. 8, 105 L. Ed. 2d 74, 109 
S. Ct. 2324 (1989) (plaintiffs who did not 
own property had standing to challenge 
property ownership requirement for 
membership on government board even 
though they lacked standing to challenge the 
requirement "as applied").  Likewise, in 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. 
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 124 L. Ed. 2d 586, 113 S. Ct. 2297 
(1993), we considered whether an association 
challenging an ordinance that gave 
preferential treatment to certain  [*262]  
minority-owned businesses in the award of 
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city contracts needed to show that one of its 
members would have received a contract 
absent the ordinance in order to establish 
standing.  In finding that no such showing 
was necessary, we explained that  "the 'injury 
in fact' in an equal protection case of this 
variety is the denial of equal treatment 
resulting from the imposition of the barrier, 
not the ultimate inability to obtain the 
benefit.  . . .  And in the context of a 
challenge to a set-aside program, the 'injury 
in fact' is the inability to compete on an equal 
footing in the bidding process, not the loss of 
contract."  Id., at 666, 124 L Ed 2d 586, 113 
S Ct 2297.  We concluded that in the face of 
such a barrier, "to establish standing, a party 
challenging a set-aside program like 
Jacksonville's need only demonstrate that it is 
able and ready to bid on contracts and that a 
discriminatory policy prevents it from doing 
so on an equal basis." Ibid.
 [***HR4B]  [4B] In bringing his equal 
protection challenge against the University's 
use of race in undergraduate admissions, 
Hamacher alleged that the University had 
denied him the opportunity to compete for 
admission on an equal basis.  When 
Hamacher applied to the University as a 
freshman applicant, he was denied admission 
even though an underrepresented minority 
applicant with his qualifications would have 
been admitted.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 
115a.  After being denied admission, 
Hamacher demonstrated that he was "able 
and ready" to apply as a transfer student 
should the University cease to use race in 
undergraduate admissions.  He therefore has 
standing to seek prospective relief with 
respect to the University's continued use of 
race in undergraduate admissions.
 [***HR6A]  [6A] Justice Stevens raises a 
second argument as to standing.  He contends 
that the University's use of race in 
undergraduate transfer admissions differs 
from its use of race in undergraduate 
freshman admissions, and that therefore 
Hamacher lacks standing to represent absent 
class members challenging the latter.  Post, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 291 (dissenting opinion).   
[*263]  As an initial matter, there is a 
question whether the relevance of this 
variation, if any, is a matter of Article III 
standing at all or whether it goes to the 
propriety of class certification pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).  The 
parties have not briefed the question of 
standing versus adequacy, however, and we  
[***277]  need not resolve the question 
today: Regardless of whether the requirement 
is deemed one of adequacy or standing, it is 
clearly satisfied in this case. n15
n15 Although we do not resolve 
here whether such an inquiry in this 
case is appropriately addressed under 
the rubric of standing or adequacy, we 
note that there is tension in our prior 
cases in this regard.  See, e.g., Burns, 
Standing and Mootness in Class 
Actions: A Search for Consistency, 
22 U. C. D. L. Rev. 1239, 1240-1241 
(1989); General Telephone Co. of 
Southwest v. Falcon , 457 U.S. 147, 
149, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740, 102 S. Ct. 
2364 (1982) (Mexican-American 
plaintiff alleging that he was passed 
over for a promotion because of race 
was not an adequate representative to 
"maintain a class action on behalf of 
Mexican-American applicants" who 
were not hired by the same 
employer); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 
U.S. 991, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 
2777 (1982) (class representatives 
who had been transferred to lower 
levels of medical care lacked standing 
to challenge transfers to higher levels 
of care).
 [**2424]  From the time petitioners 
filed their original complaint through their 
brief on the merits in this Court, they have 
consistently challenged the University's use 
of race in undergraduate admissions and its 
asserted justification of promoting 
"diversity." See, e.g., App. 38; Brief for 
Petitioners 13.  Consistent with this 
challenge, petitioners requested injunctive 
relief prohibiting respondent "from 
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continuing to discriminate on the basis of 
race." App. 40.  They sought to certify a class 
consisting of all individuals who were not 
members of an underrepresented minority 
group who either had applied for admission 
to the LSA and been rejected or who 
intended to apply for admission to the LSA, 
for all academic years from 1995 forward.  
Id., at 35-36.  The District Court determined 
that the proposed class satisfied the 
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, including the requirements of 
numerosity, commonality, and typicality.  
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a); App. 70.  The 
court further concluded that Hamacher was 
an adequate representative  [*264]  for the 
class in the pursuit of compensatory and 
injunctive relief for purposes of Rule 
23(a)(4), see App. 61-69, and found "the 
record utterly devoid of the presence of . . . 
antagonism between the interests of . . . 
Hamacher, and the members of the class 
which [he] seeks to represent," id., at 61.  
Finally, the District Court concluded that 
petitioners' claim was appropriate for class 
treatment because the University's "'practice 
of racial discrimination pervasively applied 
on a classwide basis.'" Id., at 67.  The court 
certified the class pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and designated 
Hamacher as the class representative.  App. 
70.
Justice Stevens cites Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 
U.S. 991, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777 
(1982), in arguing that the District Court 
erred.  Post, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 293.  In Blum, 
we considered a class action suit brought by 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  The named 
representatives in Blum challenged decisions 
by the State's Medicaid Utilization Review 
Committee (URC) to transfer them to lower 
levels of care without, in their view, 
sufficient procedural safeguards.  After a 
class was certified, the plaintiffs obtained an 
order expanding class certification to include 
challenges to URC decisions to transfer 
patients to higher levels of care as well.  The 
defendants argued that the named 
representatives could not represent absent 
class members challenging transfers to higher 
levels of care because they had not been 
threatened with such transfers.  We  [***278]  
agreed.  We noted that "nothing in the record 
. . . suggests that any of the individual 
respondents have been either transferred to 
more intensive care or threatened with such 
transfers." 457 US, at 1001, 73 L Ed 2d 534, 
102 S Ct 2777.  And we found that transfers 
to lower levels of care involved a number of 
fundamentally different concerns than did 
transfers to higher ones.  Id., at 1001-1002, 
73 L Ed 2d 534, 102 S Ct 2777 (noting, for 
example, that transfers to lower levels of care 
implicated beneficiaries' property interests 
given the concomitant decrease in Medicaid 
benefits, while transfers to higher levels of 
care did not).
 [***HR6B]  [6B]  [***HR7A]  [7A]  [*265]  
In the present case, the University's use of 
race in undergraduate transfer admissions 
does not implicate a significantly different set 
[**2425]  of concerns than does its use of 
race in undergraduate freshman admissions.  
Respondents challenged Hamacher's standing 
at the certification stage, but never did so on 
the grounds that the University's use of race 
in undergraduate transfer admissions 
involves a different set of concerns than does 
its use of race in freshman admissions.  
Respondents' failure to allege any such 
difference is simply consistent with the fact 
that no such difference exists.  Each year the 
OUA produces a document entitled 
"COLLEGE OF LITERATURE SCIENCE 
AND THE ARTS GUIDELINES FOR ALL 
TERMS," which sets forth guidelines for all 
individuals seeking admission to the LSA, 
including freshman applicants, transfer 
applicants, international student applicants, 
and the like.  See, e.g., 2 App. in No. 01-1333 
etc. (CA6), pp 507-542.  The guidelines used 
to evaluate transfer applicants specifically 
cross-reference factors and qualifications 
considered in assessing freshman applicants.  
In fact, the criteria used to determine whether 
a transfer applicant will contribute to the 
University's stated goal of diversity are 
identical to that used to evaluate freshman 
applicants.  For example, in 1997, when the 
class was certified and the District Court 
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found that Hamacher had standing to 
represent the class, the transfer guidelines 
contained a separate section entitled 
"CONTRIBUTION TO A DIVERSE 
STUDENT BODY." 2 id., at 531.  This 
section explained that any transfer applicant 
who could "contribute to a diverse student 
body " should "generally be admitted" even 
with substantially lower qualifications than
those required of other transfer applicants.  
Ibid. (emphasis added).  To determine 
whether a transfer applicant was capable of 
"contributing to a diverse student body," 
admissions counselors were instructed to 
determine whether that transfer applicant met 
the "criteria as defined in Section IV of the 
'U' category of [the] SCUGA" factors used to 
assess  [*266]  freshman applicants.  Ibid.
Section IV of the "U" category, entitled 
"Contribution to a Diverse Class," explained 
that "the University is committed to a rich 
educational experience for its students.  A 
diverse, as opposed to a homogenous, student 
population enhances the educational 
experience for all students.  To insure a 
diverse class, significant weight will be given 
in the admissions process to indicators of 
students contribution to a diverse class." 1 
id., at 432.  These indicators, used in 
evaluating freshman and transfer applicants 
alike, list being a member of an 
underrepresented minority group as 
establishing an applicant's contribution to  
[***279]  diversity. See 3 id., at 1133-1134, 
1153-1154.  Indeed, the only difference 
between the University's use of race in 
considering freshman and transfer applicants 
is that all underrepresented minority 
freshman applicants receive 20 points and 
"virtually" all who are minimally qualified 
are admitted, while "generally" all minimally 
qualified minority transfer applicants are 
admitted outright.  While this difference 
might be relevant to a narrow tailoring 
analysis, it clearly has no effect on 
petitioners' standing to challenge the 
University's use of race in undergraduate 
admissions and its assertion that diversity is a 
compelling state interest that justifies its 
consideration of the race of its undergraduate 
applicants. n16 [***HR7B]  [7B]
n16 Because the University's 
guidelines concededly use race in 
evaluating both freshman and transfer 
applications, and because petitioners 
have challenged any use of race by 
the University in undergraduate 
admissions, the transfer admissions 
policy is very much before this Court.  
Although petitioners did not raise a 
narrow tailoring challenge to the 
transfer policy, as counsel for 
petitioners repeatedly explained, the 
transfer policy is before this Court in 
that petitioners challenged any use of 
race by the University to promote 
diversity, including through the 
transfer policy.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4 
("The [transfer] policy is essentially 
the same with respect to the 
consideration of race"); id., at 5 ("The 
transfer policy considers race"); id., at 
6 (same); id., at 7 ("The transfer 
policy and the [freshman] admissions 
policy are fundamentally the same in 
the respect that they both consider 
race in the admissions process in a 
way that is discriminatory"); id., at 7-
8 ("The University considers race for 
a purpose to achieve a diversity that 
we believe is not compelling, and if 
that is struck down as a rationale, then 
the [result] would be [the] same with 
respect to the transfer policy as with 
respect to the [freshman] admissions 
policy, Your Honor").
 [***HR6C]  [6C]  [**2426]   [*267]  
Particularly instructive here is our statement 
in General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740, 102 
S. Ct. 2364 (1982), that "if [defendant-
employer] used a biased testing procedure to 
evaluate both applicants for employment and 
incumbent employees, a class action on 
behalf of every applicant or employee who 
might have been prejudiced by the test 
clearly would satisfy the . . . requirements of 
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Rule 23(a)."  Id., at 159, n. 15, 72 L Ed 2d 
740, 102 S Ct 2364 (emphasis added).  Here, 
the District Court found that the sole 
rationale the University had provided for any 
of its race-based preferences in 
undergraduate admissions was the interest in 
"the educational benefits that result from 
having a diverse student body." App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 8a.  And petitioners argue that an 
interest in "diversity" is not a compelling 
state interest that is ever capable of justifying 
the use of race in undergraduate admissions.  
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners 11-13.  In sum, 
the same set of concerns is implicated by the 
University's use of race in evaluating all 
undergraduate admissions applications under 
the guidelines. n17 We therefore agree with 
the District Court's  [*268]  carefully 
considered  [***280]  decision to certify this 
class-action challenge to the University's 
consideration of race in undergraduate 
admissions.  See App. 67 ("'It is a singular 
policy . . . applied on a classwide basis'"); cf. 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 469, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351, 98 S. Ct. 2454 
(1978) ("The class determination generally 
involves considerations that are enmeshed in 
the factual and legal issues comprising the 
plaintiff's cause of action" (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Indeed, class action 
treatment was particularly important in this 
case because "the claims of the individual 
students run the risk of becoming moot" and 
the "the class action vehicle . . . provides a 
mechanism for ensuring that a justiciable 
claim is before the Court." App. 69.  Thus, 
we think it clear that Hamacher's personal 
stake, in view of both his past injury and the 
potential injury he faced at the time of 
certification, demonstrates that he may 
maintain this class-action challenge to the 
University's use of race in undergraduate 
admissions. 
n17 Indeed, as the litigation 
history of this case demonstrates, "the 
class-action device saved the 
resources of both the courts and the 
parties by permitting an issue 
potentially affecting every [class 
member] to be litigated in an 
economical fashion."  Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701, 61 L. 
Ed. 2d 176, 99 S. Ct. 2545 (1979).  
This case was therefore quite unlike 
General Telephone Co. of Southwest 
v. Falcon , 457 U.S. 147, 72 L. Ed. 2d 
740, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982), in which 
we found that the named 
representative, who had been passed 
over for a promotion, was not an 
adequate representative for absent 
class members who were never hired 
in the first instance.  As we explained, 
the plaintiff's "evidentiary approaches 
to the individual and class claims 
were entirely different.  He attempted 
to sustain his individual claim by 
proving intentional discrimination.  
He tried to prove the class claims 
through statistical evidence of 
disparate impact.  . . .  It is clear that 
the maintenance of respondent's 
action as a class action did not 
advance 'the efficiency and economy 
of litigation which is a principal 
purpose of the procedure.'"  Id., at 
159, 72 L Ed 2d 740, 102 S Ct 2364 
(quoting American Pipe & Constr. 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553, 38 L. 
Ed. 2d 713, 94 S. Ct. 756 (1974)).
B
 [***HR1B]  [1B] Petitioners argue, first and 
foremost, that the University's use of race in 
undergraduate admissions violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they 
contend that this Court has only sanctioned 
the use of racial classifications to remedy 
identified discrimination, a justification on 
which respondents have never relied.  Brief 
for Petitioners 15-16.  Petitioners further 
argue that "diversity as a basis for employing 
racial preferences is simply too open-ended, 
ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a 
compelling interest capable of supporting 
narrowly-tailored means." Id., at 17-18, 40-
41.  But for the reasons set forth today in 
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Grutter v Bollinger, post, at 156 L Ed 2d 
304, 123 S Ct 2325, the Court [**2427]  has
rejected these arguments of petitioners. 
 [*269]  Petitioners alternatively argue that 
even if the University's interest in diversity 
can constitute a compelling state interest, the 
District Court erroneously concluded that the 
University's use of race in its current 
freshman admissions policy is narrowly 
tailored to achieve such an interest.  
Petitioners argue that the guidelines the 
University began using in 1999 do not 
"remotely resemble the kind of consideration 
of race and ethnicity that Justice Powell 
endorsed in Bakke." Brief for Petitioners 18.  
Respondents reply that the University's 
current admissions program is narrowly 
tailored and avoids the problems of the 
Medical School of the University of 
California at Davis program (U. C. Davis) 
rejected by Justice Powell. n18 They claim 
that their program "hews  [***281]  closely" 
to both the admissions program described by 
Justice Powell as well as the Harvard College 
admissions program that he endorsed.  Brief 
for Respondents 32.  Specifically, 
respondents contend that the LSA's policy 
provides the individualized consideration that 
"Justice Powell considered a hallmark of a 
constitutionally appropriate admissions 
program." Id., at 35.  For the reasons set out 
below, we do not agree. 
n18 U. C. Davis set aside 16 of 
the 100 seats available in its first year 
medical school program for 
"economically and/or educationally 
disadvantaged" applicants who were 
also members of designated "minority 
groups" as defined by the university.  
"To the extent that there existed a 
pool of at least minimally qualified 
minority applicants to fill the 16 
special admissions seats, white 
applicants could compete only for 84 
seats in the entering class, rather than 
the 100 open to minority applicants."  
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 274, 289, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 
98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978) (principal 
opinion).  Justice Powell found that 
the program employed an 
impermissible two-track system that 
"disregarded . . . individual rights as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  Id., at 315, 57 L Ed 2d 
750, 98 S Ct 2733.  He reached this 
conclusion even though the university 
argued that "the reservation of a 
specified number of seats in each 
class for individuals from the 
preferred ethnic groups" was "the 
only effective means of serving the 
interest of diversity." Ibid. Justice 
Powell concluded that such 
arguments misunderstood the very 
nature of the diversity he found to be 
compelling.  See ibid.
 [***HR8A]  [8A]   [*270]  It is by now 
well established that "all racial classifications 
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause 
must be strictly scrutinized."  Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
224, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 
(1995).  This "'standard of review . . . is not 
dependent on the race of those burdened or 
benefited by a particular classification.'" Ibid.
(quoting Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 494, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. Ct. 
706 (1989) (plurality opinion)).  Thus, "any 
person, of whatever race, has the right to 
demand that any governmental actor subject 
to the Constitution justify any racial 
classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest of 
judicial scrutiny."  Adarand, 515 U.S., at 
224, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097. 
 [***HR1C]  [1C]  [***HR8B]  [8B]  To 
withstand our strict scrutiny analysis, 
respondents must demonstrate that the 
University's use of race in its current 
admission program employs "narrowly 
tailored measures that further compelling 
governmental interests."  Id., at 227, 132 L 
Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097.  Because "racial 
classifications are simply too pernicious to 
permit any but the most exact connection 
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between justification and classification," 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537, 65 
L. Ed. 2d 902, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), our review of 
whether such requirements have been met 
must entail "'a most searching examination.'"  
Adarand, supra, at 223, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 
115 S Ct 2097 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 273, 90 L. Ed. 2d 
260, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) (plurality 
opinion of Powell, J.)).  We find that the 
University's policy, which automatically 
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the 
points needed to guarantee admission, to 
every single "underrepresented minority" 
applicant solely because of race, is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in 
educational diversity [**2428]  that 
respondents claim justifies their program. 
In Bakke, Justice Powell reiterated that 
"preferring members of any one group for no 
reason other than race or ethnic origin is 
discrimination for its own sake." 438 US at 
307, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  He then 
explained, however, that in his view it would 
be permissible for a university to employ an 
admissions program in which "race or ethnic 
background may be  [*271]  deemed a 'plus' 
in a particular applicant's file."  Id., at 317, 57 
L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct  2733. He explained 
that such a program might allow for "the file 
of a particular black applicant [to] be 
examined for his potential contribution to 
diversity without the factor of race being 
decisive when compared, for example,  
[***282]  with that of an applicant identified 
as an Italian-American if the latter is thought 
to exhibit qualities more likely to promote 
beneficial educational pluralism." Ibid. Such 
a system, in Justice Powell's view, would be 
"flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements of diversity in light of the particular 
qualifications of each applicant." Ibid.
 [***HR1D]  [1D] Justice Powell's opinion in 
Bakke emphasized the importance of 
considering each particular applicant as an 
individual, assessing all of the qualities that 
individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating 
that individual's ability to contribute to the 
unique setting of higher education.  The 
admissions program Justice Powell 
described, however, did not contemplate that 
any single characteristic automatically 
ensured a specific and identifiable 
contribution to a university's diversity. See 
id., at 315, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  
See also  Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547, 618, 111 L. Ed. 2d 445, 110 S. 
Ct. 2997 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that the FCC's policy, which 
"embodied the related notions that a 
particular applicant, by virtue of race or 
ethnicity alone, is more valued than other 
applicants because [the applicant is] 'likely to 
provide [a] distinct perspective,'" 
impermissibly value[d] individuals" based on 
a presumption that "persons think in a 
manner associated with their race").  Instead, 
under the approach Justice Powell described, 
each characteristic of a particular applicant 
was to be considered in assessing the 
applicant's entire application.
The current LSA policy does not provide 
such individualized consideration.  The 
LSA's policy automatically distributes 20 
points to every single applicant from an 
"underrepresented minority" group, as 
defined by the University.  The only 
consideration that accompanies this 
distribution of  [*272]  points is a factual 
review of an application to determine 
whether an individual is a member of one of 
these minority groups.  Moreover, unlike 
Justice Powell's example, where the race of a 
"particular black applicant" could be 
considered without being decisive, see Bakke, 
438 U.S., at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 
2733, the LSA's automatic distribution of 20 
points has the effect of making "the factor of 
race . . . decisive" for virtually every 
minimally qualified underrepresented 
minority applicant.  Ibid. n19
n19 Justice Souter recognizes 
that the LSA's use of race is decisive 
in practice, but he attempts to avoid 
that fact through unsupported 
speculation about the self-selection of 
minorities in the applicant pool.  See 
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Post, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 297-298 
(dissenting opinion).
Also instructive in our consideration of 
the LSA's system is the example provided in 
the description of the Harvard College 
Admissions Program, which Justice Powell 
both discussed in, and attached to, his 
opinion in Bakke. The example was included 
to "illustrate the kind of significance attached 
to race" under the Harvard College program.  
Id., at 324, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  It 
provided as follows: 
"The Admissions Committee, 
with only a few places left to fill, 
might find itself forced to choose 
between A, the child of a successful 
black physician in an academic 
community with promise of superior 
academic performance, and B, a black 
who grew up in an inner-city ghetto 
of semi-literate parents whose 
academic [**2429]  achievement was  
[***283]  lower but who had 
demonstrated energy and leadership 
as well as an apparently abiding 
interest in black power.  If a good 
number of black students much like A 
but few like B had already been 
admitted, the Committee might prefer 
B; and vice versa.  If C, a white 
student with extraordinary artistic 
talent, were also seeking one of the 
remaining places, his unique quality 
might give him an edge over both A 
and B.  Thus, the critical criteria are 
often individual qualities or 
experience not dependent  [*273]
upon race but sometimes associated 
with it." Ibid. (emphasis added).
This example further demonstrates the 
problematic nature of the LSA's admissions 
system.  Even if student C's "extraordinary 
artistic talent" rivaled that of Monet or 
Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, 
five points under the LSA's system.  See 
App. 234-235.  At the same time, every 
single underrepresented minority applicant, 
including students A and B, would 
automatically receive 20 points for 
submitting an application.  Clearly, the LSA's 
system does not offer applicants the 
individualized selection process described in 
Harvard's example.  Instead of considering 
how the differing backgrounds, experiences, 
and characteristics of students A, B, and C 
might benefit the University, admissions 
counselors reviewing LSA applications 
would simply award both A and B 20 points 
because their applications indicate that they 
are African-American, and student C would 
receive up to 5 points for his "extraordinary 
talent." n20
n20 Justice Souter is therefore 
wrong when he contends that 
"applicants to the undergraduate 
college are [not] denied 
individualized consideration." Post, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 297.  As Justice 
O'Connor explains in her 
concurrence, the LSA's program 
"ensures that the diversity 
contributions of applicants cannot be 
individually assessed." Post, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 287.
Respondents emphasize the fact that the 
LSA has created the possibility of an 
applicant's file being flagged for 
individualized consideration by the ARC.  
We think that the flagging program only 
emphasizes the flaws of the University's 
system as a whole when compared to that 
described by Justice Powell.  Again, students 
A, B, and C illustrate the point.  First, student 
A would never be flagged. This is because, as 
the University has conceded, the effect of 
automatically awarding 20 points is that 
virtually every qualified underrepresented 
minority applicant is admitted.  Student A, an 
applicant "with promise of superior academic 
performance," would certainly fit this 
description.  Thus, the result of the automatic 
distribution of 20 points is that the University  
[*274]  would never consider student A's 
individual background, experiences, and 
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characteristics to assess his individual 
"potential contribution to diversity," Bakke, 
supra, at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  
Instead, every applicant like student A would 
simply be admitted.
It is possible that students B and C would be 
flagged and considered as individuals.  This 
assumes that student B was not already 
admitted because of the automatic 20-point 
distribution, and that student C could muster 
at least 70 additional points.  But the fact that 
the "review committee can look at the 
applications individually and ignore the 
points," once an application is flagged, Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 42, is of little comfort under our 
strict scrutiny analysis.  The record does not  
[***284]  reveal precisely how many 
applications are flagged for this 
individualized consideration, but it is 
undisputed that such consideration is the 
exception and not the rule in the operation of 
the LSA's admissions program.  See App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 117a ("The ARC reviews only a 
portion of all of the applications.  The bulk of 
admissions decisions are executed based on 
selection index score parameters set by the 
EWG"). n21  [**2430]  Additionally, this 
individualized review is only provided after
admissions counselors automatically 
distribute the University's version of a "plus" 
that makes race a decisive factor for virtually 
every minimally qualified underrepresented 
minority applicant. 
n21 Justice Souter is mistaken in 
his assertion that the Court "takes it 
upon itself to apply a newly 
formulated legal standard to an 
undeveloped record." Post, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 298, n 3.  He ignores the 
fact that the respondents have told us 
all that is necessary to decide this 
case.  As explained above, 
respondents concede that only a 
portion of the applications are 
reviewed by the ARC and that the 
"bulk of admissions decisions" are 
based on the point system.  It should 
be readily apparent that the 
availability of this review, which 
comes after the automatic distribution 
of points, is far more limited than the 
individualized review given to the 
"large middle group of applicants" 
discussed by Justice Powell and 
described by the Harvard plan in 
Bakke. 438 U.S., at 316, 57 L Ed 2d 
750, 98 S Ct 2733 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
 [*275]  Respondents contend that "the 
volume of applications and the presentation 
of applicant information make it impractical 
for [LSA] to use the . . . admissions system" 
upheld by the Court today in Grutter. Brief 
for Respondents 6, n 8.  But the fact that the 
implementation of a program capable of 
providing individualized consideration might 
present administrative challenges does not 
render constitutional an otherwise 
problematic system.  See  J. A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S., at 508, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 
706 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 690, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 93 S. Ct. 
1764 (1973) (plurality opinion of Brennan, 
J.) (rejecting "'administrative convenience'" 
as a determinant of constitutionality in the 
face of a suspect classification)).  Nothing in 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke signaled 
that a university may employ whatever 
means it desires to achieve the stated goal of 
diversity without regard to the limits imposed 
by our strict scrutiny analysis. 
 [***HR1E]  [1E]  [***HR2B]  [2B] We 
conclude, therefore, that because the 
University's use of race in its current 
freshman admissions policy is not narrowly 
tailored to achieve respondents' asserted 
compelling interest in diversity, the 
admissions policy violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. n22 We further find that the 
admissions policy also violates  [***285] 
Title VI and  [*276]  42 USC §  1981 [42 
USCS §  1981]. n23 Accordingly, we reverse 
[**2431]  that portion of the District Court's 
decision granting respondents summary 
judgment with respect to liability and remand 
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the case for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
n22 Justice Ginsburg in her 
dissent observes that "one can 
reasonably anticipate . . . that colleges 
and universities will seek to maintain 
their minority enrollment . . . whether 
or not they can do so in full candor 
through adoption of affirmative action 
plans of the kind here at issue." Post, 
at 156 L Ed 2d, at 303.  She goes on 
to say that "if honesty is the best 
policy, surely Michigan's accurately 
described, fully disclosed College 
affirmative action program is 
preferable to achieving similar 
numbers through winks, nods, and 
disguises." Post, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
303.  These observations are 
remarkable for two reasons.  First, 
they suggest that universities--to 
whose academic judgment we are told 
in Grutter v Bollinger, post,  at 156 L 
Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325, we should 
defer--will pursue their affirmative-
action programs whether or not they 
violate the United States Constitution.  
Second, they recommend that these 
violations should be dealt with, not by 
requiring the universities to obey the 
Constitution, but by changing the 
Constitution so that it conforms to the 
conduct of the universities.
  [***HR2C]  [2C]
 n23 We have explained that 
discrimination that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment committed by an 
institution that accepts federal funds 
also constitutes a violation of Title 
VI.  See Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 
U.S. 275, 281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 517, 121 
S. Ct. 1511 (2001); United States v. 
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732, n. 7, 120 
L. Ed. 2d 575, 112 S. Ct. 2727 
(1992); Alexander v. Choate , 469 
U.S. 287, 293, 83 L. Ed. 2d 661, 105 
S. Ct. 712 (1985).  Likewise, with 
respect to §  1981, we have explained 
that the provision was "meant, by its 
broad terms, to proscribe 
discrimination in the making or 
enforcement of contracts against, or 
in favor of, any race."  McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 
273, 295-296, 49 L. Ed. 2d 493, 96 S. 
Ct. 2574 (1976).  Furthermore, we 
have explained that a contract for 
educational services is a "contract" 
for purposes of §  1981.  See Runyon 
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172, 49 L. 
Ed. 2d 415, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).  
Finally, purposeful discrimination 
that violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
will also violate §  1981.  See General 
Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-390, 
73 L. Ed. 2d 835, 102 S. Ct. 3141 
(1982).
It is so ordered.
CONCURBY: O'CONNOR; THOMAS; 
BREYER
CONCUR: Justice O'Connor, concurring. *
* Justice Breyer joins this 
opinion, except for the last sentence.
I
Unlike the law school admissions policy the 
Court upholds today in Grutter v Bollinger , 
post, 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325, the 
procedures employed by the University of 
Michigan's (University) Office of 
Undergraduate Admissions do not provide 
for a meaningful individualized review of 
applicants.  Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. 
Ct. 2733 (1978) (principal opinion of Powell, 
J.).  The law school considers the various 
diversity qualifications of each applicant, 
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including race, on a case-by-case basis.  See 
Grutter v Bollinger, post, at 156 L Ed 2d 
304, 123 S Ct 2325.  By contrast, the Office 
of Undergraduate Admissions relies on the 
selection index to assign every
underrepresented minority applicant the 
same, automatic 20-point bonus without 
consideration of the particular background, 
experiences, or  [*277]  qualities of each 
individual applicant.  Cf. ante, at 156 L Ed 
2d, at 282, 283.  And this mechanized 
selection index score, by and large, 
automatically determines the admissions 
decision for each applicant.  The selection 
index thus precludes admissions counselors 
from conducting the type of individualized 
consideration the Court's opinion in Grutter, 
post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325, 
requires: consideration of each applicant's 
individualized qualifications, including the 
contribution each individual's race or ethnic 
identity will make to the diversity of the 
student body, taking into account diversity 
within and among all racial and ethnic 
groups.  Cf. ante, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S 
Ct 2325 (citing Bakke, supra, at 324, 57 L Ed 
2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733)). 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
District Court held that the admissions policy 
the University instituted in 1999 and 
continues to use today passed constitutional 
muster.  See 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 827 (ED 
Mich. 2001).  In their  [***286]  proposed 
summary of undisputed facts, the parties 
jointly stipulated to the admission policy's 
mechanics.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a-118a.  
When the university receives an application 
for admission to its incoming class, an 
admissions counselor turns to a Selection 
Index Worksheet to calculate the applicant's 
selection index score out of 150 maximum 
possible points--a procedure the University 
began using in 1998.  App. 256.  Applicants 
with a score of over 100 are automatically 
admitted; applicants with scores of 95 to 99 
are categorized as "admit or postpone"; 
applicants with 90-94 points are postponed or 
admitted; applicants with 75-89 points are 
delayed or postponed; and applicants with 74 
points or fewer are delayed or rejected.  The 
Office of Undergraduate Admissions extends 
offers of admission on a rolling basis and acts 
upon the applications it has received through 
periodic "mass actions." App. 256.
In calculating an applicant's selection index 
score, counselors assign numerical values to 
a broad range of academic factors, as well as 
to other variables the University considers 
important to assembling a diverse student 
body, including race.  Up to 110 points can 
be assigned for academic performance,  
[*278]  and up to 40 points can be assigned 
for the other, nonacademic factors.  Michigan 
residents, for example, receive 10 points, and 
children of alumni receive 4.  Counselors 
may assign an outstanding essay up to 3 
points and may award up to 5 points for an 
applicant's personal achievement, leadership, 
or public service.  Most importantly for this 
case, an applicant automatically receives a 20 
point bonus if he or she possesses any one of 
the following "miscellaneous" factors: 
membership [**2432]  in an 
underrepresented minority group; attendance
at a predominantly minority or disadvantaged 
high school; or recruitment for athletics.
In 1999, the University added another layer 
of review to its admissions process.  After an 
admissions counselor has tabulated an 
applicant's selection index score, he or she 
may "flag" an application for further 
consideration by an Admissions Review 
Committee, which is composed of members 
of the Office of Undergraduate Admissions 
and the Office of the Provost.  App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 117a.  The review committee meets 
periodically to discuss the files of "flagged" 
applicants not already admitted based on the 
selection index parameters.  App. 275.  After 
discussing each flagged application, the 
committee decides whether to admit, defer, 
or deny the applicant.  Ibid.
Counselors  [*279]  may flag an applicant for 
review by the committee if he or she is 
academically prepared, has a selection index 
score of at least 75 (for non-Michigan 
residents) or 80 (for Michigan residents), and 
possesses one of several qualities valued by 
the University.  These qualities include "high 
class rank, unique life experiences, 
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challenges, circumstances, interests or 
talents, socioeconomic disadvantage, and 
under-represented race, ethnicity, or 
geography." App. to Pet. for Cert. 117a.  
Counselors also have the discretion to flag an 
application if, notwithstanding a high 
selection index score, something in the 
applicant's file suggests that the applicant 
may not be suitable for admission.  App. 274. 
Finally, in "rare circumstances," an 
admissions counselor may flag an applicant 
with a selection index score  [***287]  below 
the designated levels if the counselor has 
reason to believe from reading the entire file 
that the score does not reflect the applicant's 
true promise.  Ibid.
II
Although the Office of Undergraduate 
Admissions does assign 20 points to some 
"soft" variables other than race, the points 
available for other diversity contributions, 
such as leadership and service, personal 
achievement, and geographic diversity, are 
capped at much lower levels.  Even the most 
outstanding national high school leader could 
never receive more than five points for his or 
her accomplishments--a mere quarter of the 
points automatically assigned to an 
underrepresented minority solely based on 
the fact of his or her race.  Of course, as 
Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, a 
university need not "necessarily accord" all 
diversity factors "the same weight," 438 US 
at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733, and the 
"weight attributed to a particular quality may 
vary from year to year depending on the 'mix' 
both of the student body and the applicants 
for the incoming class," id., at 317-318, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  But the selection 
index, by setting up automatic, predetermined 
point allocations for the soft variables, 
ensures that the diversity contributions of 
applicants cannot be individually assessed.  
This policy stands in sharp contrast to the law 
school's admissions plan, which enables 
admissions officers to make nuanced 
judgments with respect to the contributions 
each applicant is likely to make to the 
diversity of the incoming class.  See Grutter
v Bollinger, post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S 
Ct 2325 ("The Law School's race-conscious 
admissions program adequately ensures that 
all factors that may contribute to student 
body diversity are meaningfully considered 
alongside race in admissions decisions").
The only potential source of individualized 
consideration appears to be the Admissions 
Review Committee.  The evidence in the 
record, however, reveals very little about 
how  [*280]  the review committee actually 
functions.  And what evidence there is 
indicates that the committee is a kind of 
afterthought, rather than an integral 
component of a system of individualized 
review.  As the Court points out, it is 
undisputed that the "'[committee] reviews 
only a portion of all the applications.  The 
bulk [**2433]  of admissions decisions are 
executed based on selection index score 
parameters set by the [Enrollment Working 
Group].'" Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 
2325 (quoting App. to Pet for Cert. 117a).  
Review by the committee thus represents a 
necessarily limited exception to the Office of 
Undergraduate Admissions' general reliance 
on the selection index.  Indeed, the record 
does not reveal how many applications 
admissions counselors send to the review 
committee each year, and the University has 
not pointed to evidence demonstrating that a 
meaningful percentage of applicants receives 
this level of discretionary review.  In 
addition, eligibility for consideration by the 
committee is itself based on automatic cut-off 
levels determined with reference to selection 
index scores. And there is no evidence of 
how the decisions are actually made--what 
type of individualized consideration is or is 
not used.  Given these circumstances, the 
addition of the Admissions Review 
Committee to the admissions  [***288]  
process cannot offset the apparent absence of 
individualized consideration from the Office 
of Undergraduate Admissions' general 
practices.
For these reasons, the record before us does 
not support the conclusion that the University 
of Michigan's admissions program for its 
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts--
to the extent that it considers race--provides 
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the necessary individualized consideration.  
The University, of course, remains free to 
modify its system so that it does so.  Cf. 
Grutter v Bollinger, post, 156 L Ed 2d 304, 
123 S Ct 2325.  But the current system, as I 
understand it, is a nonindividualized,  
mechanical one.  As a result, I join the 
Court's opinion reversing the decision of the 
District Court. 
 [*281]  Justice Thomas, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion because I 
believe it correctly applies our precedents, 
including today's decision in Grutter v 
Bollinger, post, 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 
2325.  For similar reasons to those given in 
my separate opinion in that case, see post,
156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325 (opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
however, I would hold that a State's use of 
racial discrimination in higher education 
admissions is categorically prohibited by the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
I make only one further observation.  The 
University of Michigan's College of 
Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) 
admissions policy that the Court today 
invalidates does not suffer from the 
additional constitutional defect of allowing 
racial "discrimination among [the] groups" 
included within its definition of 
underrepresented minorities, Grutter, post, at 
156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325 (opinion of 
the Court); post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S 
Ct 2325 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), because it awards all 
underrepresented minorities the same racial 
preference.  The LSA policy falls, however, 
because it does not sufficiently allow for the 
consideration of nonracial distinctions among 
underrepresented minority applicants.  Under 
today's decisions, a university may not 
racially discriminate between the groups 
constituting the critical mass.  See ibid.; 
Grutter, post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 
2325 (opinion of the Court) (stating that such 
"racial balancing . . . is patently 
unconstitutional").  An admissions policy, 
however, must allow for consideration of 
these nonracial distinctions among applicants 
on both sides of the single permitted racial 
classification. See ante, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 
123 S Ct 2325 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). 
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court 
though I do not join its opinion.  I join Justice 
O'Connor's opinion except insofar as it joins 
that of the Court.  I join Part I of Justice 
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, but I do not 
dissent from the  [*282]  Court's reversal of 
the District Court's [**2434]  decision.  I 
agree with Justice Ginsburg that, in 
implementing the Constitution's equality 
instruction, government decisionmakers may 
properly distinguish between policies of 
inclusion and exclusion, post, at 156 L Ed 2d,  
[***289]  at 301, for the former are more 
likely to prove consistent with the basic 
constitutional obligation that the law respect 
each individual equally, see U. S. Const., 
Amdt. 14.  
DISSENTBY: STEVENS; SOUTER; 
GINSBURG
DISSENT: Justice Stevens, with whom 
Justice Souter joins, dissenting.
Petitioners seek forward-looking relief 
enjoining the University of Michigan from 
continuing to use its current race-conscious 
freshman admissions policy.  Yet unlike the 
plaintiff in Grutter v Bollinger, post , p 156 L 
Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325, n1 the petitioners 
in this case had already enrolled at other 
schools before they filed their class-action 
complaint in this case.  Neither petitioner was 
in the process of reapplying to Michigan 
through the freshman admissions process at 
the time this suit was filed, and neither has 
done so since.  There is a total absence of 
evidence that either petitioner would receive 
any benefit from the prospective relief sought 
by their lawyer.  While some unidentified 
members of the class may very well have 
standing to seek prospective relief, it is clear 
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that neither petitioner does.  Our precedents 
therefore require dismissal of the action. 
n1 In challenging the use of race 
in admissions at Michigan's law 
school, Barbara Grutter alleged in her 
complaint that she "has not attended 
any other law school" and that she 
"still desires to attend the Law School 
and become a lawyer." App. in No. 
02-241, p 30.
I
Petitioner Jennifer Gratz applied in 1994 for 
admission to the University of Michigan's 
(University) College of Literature, Science, 
and the Arts (LSA) as an undergraduate for 
the 1995-1996 freshman class.  After the 
University delayed action on her application 
and then placed her name on an extended 
waiting list, Gratz decided to attend the 
University of Michigan at Dearborn instead; 
she graduated in 1999.   [*283]  Petitioner 
Patrick Hamacher applied for admission to 
LSA as an undergraduate for the 1997-1998 
freshman class.  After the University 
postponed decision on his application and 
then placed his name on an extended waiting 
list, he attended Michigan  State University, 
graduating in 2001.  In the complaint that 
petitioners filed on October 14, 1997, 
Hamacher alleged that "he intends to apply to 
transfer [to the University of Michigan] if the 
discriminatory admissions system described 
herein is eliminated." App. 34.
At the class certification stage, petitioners 
sought to have Hamacher represent a class 
pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2). n2 See App. 71, n 3.  In response, 
Michigan contended that "Hamacher lacks 
standing to represent a class seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief." Id., at 63.  
Michigan submitted that Hamacher suffered 
"'no threat of imminent future injury'" given 
that he had already enrolled at another 
undergraduate institution. n3 Id., at 64.  The 
District Court rejected Michigan's contention, 
concluding that  [***290]  Hamacher had 
standing to seek injunctive relief because the 
complaint alleged that he intended to apply to 
Michigan as a transfer student.  See id., at 67 
("To the extent that plaintiff Hamacher 
reapplies to the University of Michigan, he 
will again face the same 'harm' in that race 
will continue to be a factor in admissions").  
[**2435]  The District Court, accordingly, 
certified Hamacher as the sole class 
representative and limited the claims of the 
class to injunctive and declaratory relief.  See 
id., at 70-71. 
n2 Petitioners did not seek to 
have Gratz represent the class 
pursuant to Federal Rule Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(2).  See App. 71, n 3.
n3 In arguing that Hamacher lacked 
standing, Michigan also asserted that 
Hamacher "would need to achieve a 
3.0 grade point average to attempt to 
transfer to the University of 
Michigan." Id., at 64, n 2.  The 
District Court rejected this argument, 
concluding that "Hamacher's present 
grades are not a factor to be 
considered at this time." Id., at 67.
In subsequent proceedings, the District 
Court held that the 1995-1998 admissions 
system, which was in effect when both 
petitioners' applications were denied, was 
unlawful but  [*284]  that Michigan's new 
1999-2000 admissions system was lawful.  
When petitioners sought certiorari from this 
Court, Michigan did not cross-petition for 
review of the District Court's judgment 
concerning the admissions policies that 
Michigan had in place when Gratz and 
Hamacher applied for admission in 1994 and 
1996 respectively.  See Brief for Respondents 
5, n 7.  Accordingly, we have before us only 
that portion of the District Court's judgment 
that upheld Michigan's new freshman 
admissions policy.
II
Both Hamacher and Gratz, of course, have 
standing to seek damages as compensation 
for the alleged wrongful denial of their 
respective applications under Michigan's old 
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freshman admissions system.  However, like 
the plaintiff in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660 
(1983), who had standing to recover damages 
caused by "chokeholds" administered by the 
police in the past but had no standing to seek 
injunctive relief preventing future 
chokeholds, petitioners' past injuries do not 
give them standing to obtain injunctive relief 
to protect third parties from similar harms.  
See id., at 102 ("Past exposure to illegal 
conduct does not in itself show a present case 
or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . 
if unaccompanied by any continuing, present 
adverse effects" (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488, 495-496, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674, 94 
S. Ct. 669 (1974))) .  To seek forward-
looking, injunctive relief, petitioners must 
show that they face an imminent threat of 
future injury.  See Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-211, 132 L. 
Ed. 2d 158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).  This 
they cannot do given that when this suit was 
filed, neither faced an impending threat of 
future injury based on Michigan's new 
freshman admissions policy. n4
n4 In responding to questions 
about petitioners' standing at oral 
argument, petitioners' counsel alluded 
to the fact that Michigan might 
continually change the details of its 
admissions policy.  See Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 9.  The change in Michigan's 
freshman admissions policy, however, 
is not the reason why petitioners 
cannot establish standing to seek 
prospective relief.  Rather, the reason 
they lack standing to seek forward-
looking relief is that when this suit 
was filed, neither faced a "real and 
immediate threat" of future injury 
under Michigan's freshman 
admissions policy given that they had 
both already enrolled at other 
institutions.  Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210, 132 
L. Ed. 2d 158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) 
(quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 105, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. 
Ct. 1660 (1983)).  Their decision to 
obtain a college education elsewhere 
distinguishes this case from Allan 
Bakke's single-minded pursuit of a 
medical education from the 
University of California at Davis.  See 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 
2733 (1978); cf. DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 40 L. Ed. 2d 
164, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974) (per 
curiam).
 [*285]  Even though there is not a 
scintilla of evidence that the freshman 
admissions  [***291]  program now being 
administered by respondents will ever have 
any impact on either Hamacher or Gratz, 
petitioners nonetheless argue that Hamacher 
has a personal stake in this suit because at the 
time the complaint was filed, Hamacher 
intended to apply to transfer to Michigan 
once certain admission policy changes 
occurred. n5 See App. 34; see also Tr. of 
Oral [**2436]  Arg. 4-5.  Petitioners' attempt 
to base Hamacher's standing in this suit on a 
hypothetical transfer application fails for 
several reasons.  First, there is no evidence 
that Hamacher ever actually applied for 
admission as a transfer student at Michigan.  
His claim of future injury is at best 
"conjectural or hypothetical" rather than "real 
and immediate."  O'Shea v. Littleton , 414 
U.S., at 494, 38 L Ed 2d 674, 94 S Ct 669  
[*286]  (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 
U.S. 555, 560, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. Ct. 
2130 (1992). 
n5 Hamacher clearly can no 
longer claim an intent to transfer into 
Michigan's undergraduate program 
given that he graduated from college 
in 2001.  However, this fact alone is 
not necessarily fatal to the instant 
class action because we have 
recognized that, if a named class 
representative has standing at the time 
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a suit is initiated, class actions may 
proceed in some instances following 
mootness of the named class 
representative's claim.  See, e.g.,
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, 42 
L. Ed. 2d 532, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975) 
(holding that the requisite Article III 
"case or controversy" may exist 
"between a named defendant and a 
member of the class represented by 
the named plaintiff, even though the 
claim of the named plaintiff has 
become moot"); Franks v. Bowman 
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 47 L. Ed. 
2d 444, 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).  The 
problem in this case is that neither 
Gratz nor Hamacher had standing to 
assert a forward-looking, injunctive 
claim in federal court at the time this 
suit was initiated.
Second, as petitioners' counsel conceded 
at oral argument, the transfer policy is not 
before this Court and was not addressed by 
the District Court.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5 
(admitting that "the transfer admissions 
policy itself is not before you--the Court").  
Unlike the University's freshman policy, 
which is detailed at great length in the Joint 
Appendix filed with this Court, the specifics 
of the transfer policy are conspicuously 
missing from the Joint Appendix filed with 
this Court.  Furthermore, the transfer policy 
is not discussed anywhere in the parties' 
briefs.  Nor is it ever even referenced in the 
District Court's Dec. 13, 2000, opinion that 
upheld Michigan's new freshman admissions 
policy and struck down Michigan's old 
policy.  Nonetheless, evidence filed with the 
District Court by Michigan demonstrates that 
the criteria used to evaluate transfer 
applications at Michigan differ significantly 
from the criteria used to evaluate freshman 
undergraduate applications.  Of special 
significance, Michigan's 2000 freshman 
admissions policy, for example, provides for 
20 points to be added to the selection index 
scores of minority applicants.  See ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 282.  In contrast, Michigan 
does not use points in its transfer policy; 
some applicants, including minority and 
socioeconomically disadvantaged applicants, 
"will generally be admitted" if they possess 
certain qualifications, including a 2.5 
undergraduate grade point average (GPA), 
sophomore standing, and a 3.0 high school 
GPA.  10 Record 16 (Exh. C).  Because of 
these differences, Hamacher cannot base his 
right to complain about the freshman
admissions policy on his hypothetical injury 
under a wholly separate transfer policy.  For 
"if the right to complain of one
administrative deficiency automatically 
conferred  [***292]  the right to complain of 
all administrative deficiencies, any citizen 
aggrieved in one respect could bring the 
whole structure of state administration before 
the courts for review."  Lewis v. Casey, 518 
U.S. 343, 358-359, n. 6, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606, 
116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996)  [*287]  (emphasis in 
original); see also Blum v. Yaretsky , 457 U.S. 
991, 999, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777 
(1982) ("[A] plaintiff who has been subject to 
injurious conduct of one kind [does not] 
possess by virtue of that injury the necessary 
stake in litigating conduct of another kind, 
although similar"). n6
n6 Under the majority's view of 
standing, there would be no end to 
Hamacher's ability to challenge any 
use of race by the University in a 
variety of programs.  For if 
Hamacher's right to complain about 
the transfer policy gives him standing 
to challenge the freshman policy, 
presumably his ability to complain 
about the transfer policy likewise 
would enable him to challenge 
Michigan's law school admissions 
policy, as well as any other race-
based admissions policy used by 
Michigan.
Third, the differences between the 
freshman and the transfer admissions policies 
make it extremely unlikely, at best, that an 
injunction requiring respondents to modify 
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the freshman admissions program would 
have any impact on Michigan's transfer 
policy.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. 3315 
(1984) [**2437]  ("Relief from the injury 
must be 'likely' to follow from a favorable 
decision"); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. 
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222, 41 L. Ed. 
2d 706, 94 S. Ct. 2925 (1974) ("The discrete 
factual context within which the concrete 
injury occurred or is threatened insures the 
framing of relief no broader than required by 
the precise facts to which the court's ruling 
would be applied").  This is especially true in 
light of petitioners' unequivocal disavowal of 
any request for equitable relief that would 
totally preclude the use of race in the 
processing of all admissions applications.  
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15.
The majority asserts that petitioners "have 
challenged any use of race by the University 
in undergraduate admissions"--freshman and 
transfer alike.  Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 279, n 
16 (emphasis in original).  Yet when 
questioned at oral argument about whether 
petitioners' challenge would impact both 
private and public universities, petitioners' 
counsel stated: "Your Honor, I want to be 
clear about what it is that we're arguing for 
here today.  We are not suggesting an 
absolute  [*288]  rule forbidding any use of 
race under any circumstances. What we are 
arguing is that the interest asserted here by 
the University, this amorphous, ill-defined, 
unlimited interest in diversity is not a 
compelling interest." Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 
(emphasis added).  In addition, when asked 
whether petitioners took the position that the 
only permissible use of race is as a remedy 
for past discrimination, petitioners' lawyer 
stated: "I would not go that far . . . .  There 
may be other reasons.  I think they would 
have to be extraordinary and rare.  . . ." Id., at 
15.  Consistent with these statements, 
petitioners' briefs filed with this Court attack 
the University's asserted interest in 
"diversity" but acknowledge that race could 
be considered for remedial reasons.  See, e.g., 
Brief for Petitioners 16-17.
Because Michigan's transfer policy was not 
challenged by petitioners and is not before 
this Court, see supra,  [***293]  at 156 L Ed 
2d, at 291, we do not know whether 
Michigan would defend its transfer policy on 
diversity grounds, or whether it might try to 
justify its transfer policy on other grounds, 
such as a remedial interest.  Petitioners' 
counsel was therefore incorrect in asserting at 
oral argument that if the University's asserted 
interest in "diversity" were to be "struck 
down as a rationale, then the law would be 
[the] same with respect to the transfer policy 
as with respect to the original [freshman 
admissions] policy." Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8.  
And the majority is likewise mistaken in 
assuming that "the University's use of race in 
undergraduate transfer admissions does not 
implicate a significantly different set of 
concerns than does its use of race in 
undergraduate freshman admissions." Ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 278.  Because the transfer 
policy has never been the subject of this suit, 
we simply do not know (1) whether Michigan 
would defend its transfer policy on 
"diversity" grounds or some other grounds, or 
(2) how the absence of a point system in the 
transfer policy might impact a narrow 
tailoring analysis of that policy.
 [*289]  At bottom, petitioners' interest in 
obtaining an injunction for the benefit of 
younger third parties is comparable to that of 
the unemancipated minor who had no 
standing to litigate on behalf of older women 
in H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 406-407, 
67 L. Ed. 2d 388, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981), or 
that of the Medicaid patients transferred to 
less intensive care who had no standing to 
litigate on behalf of patients objecting to 
transfers to more intensive care facilities in 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S., at 1001, 73 L Ed 
2d 534, 102 S Ct 2777.  To have standing, it 
is elementary that the petitioners' own 
interests must be implicated.  Because neither 
petitioner has a personal stake in this suit for 
prospective relief, neither has standing. 
III
It is true that the petitioners' complaint was 
filed as a class action and that Hamacher 
[**2438]  has been certified as the 
representative of a class, some of whose 
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members may well have standing to 
challenge the LSA freshman admissions 
program that is presently in effect.  But the 
fact that "a suit may be a class action . . . 
adds nothing to the question of standing, for 
even named plaintiffs who represent a class 
'must allege and show that they personally 
have been injured, not that injury has been 
suffered by other, unidentified members of 
the class to which they belong and which 
they purport to represent.'"  Simon v. Eastern 
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 
26, 40, n. 20, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 
1917 (1976) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 502, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 
2197 (1975)); see also 1 A. Conte & H. 
Newberg, Class Actions §  2:5 (4th ed. 2002) 
("One cannot acquire individual standing by 
virtue of bringing a class action"). n7 Thus, 
in Blum, we squarely held that the interests of 
members of the class could not satisfy the 
requirement that the class representatives 
have a personal interest in obtaining the 
particular equitable relief being sought.  The 
class in [*290]  Blum included  [***294]  
patients who wanted a hearing before being 
transferred to facilities where they would 
receive more intensive care.  The class 
representatives, however, were in the 
category of patients threatened with a transfer 
to less intensive care facilities.  In explaining 
why the named class representatives could 
not base their standing to sue on the injury 
suffered by other members of the class, we 
stated: 
n7 Of course, the injury to 
Hamacher would give him standing to 
claim damages for past harm on 
behalf of class members, but he was 
certified as the class representative for 
the limited purpose of seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief.
"Respondents suggest that 
members of the class they represent 
have been transferred to higher levels 
of care as a result of [utilization 
review committee] decisions.  
Respondents, however, 'must allege 
and show that they personally have 
been injured, not that injury has been 
suffered by other, unidentified 
members of the class to which they 
belong and which they purport to 
represent.'  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 502 [45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 
2197] (1975).  Unless these 
individuals 'can thus demonstrate the 
requisite case or controversy between 
themselves personally and 
[petitioners], "none may seek relief on 
behalf of himself or any other 
member of the class."  O'Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 [38 L. 
Ed. 2d 674, 94 S. Ct. 669] (1974).' 
Ibid."  457 U.S., at 1001, n. 13, 73 L 
Ed 2d 534, 102 S Ct 2777.
Much like the class representatives in 
Blum, Hamacher--the sole class 
representative in this case--cannot meet 
Article III's threshold personal-stake 
requirement.  While unidentified members of 
the class he represents may well have 
standing to challenge Michigan's current 
freshman admissions policy, Hamacher 
cannot base his standing to sue on injuries 
suffered by other members of the class.
IV
As this case comes to us, our precedents 
leave us no alternative but to dismiss the writ 
for lack of jurisdiction.  Neither petitioner 
has a personal stake in the outcome of the 
case, and neither has standing to seek 
prospective relief on behalf of unidentified 
class members who may or may not  [*291]  
have standing to litigate on behalf of 
themselves.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg
joins as to Part II, dissenting.
I agree with Justice Stevens that Patrick 
Hamacher has no standing to seek 
declaratory or injunctive relief against a 
freshman admissions policy that will never 
cause him any harm.  I write separately to 
note that even the Court's new gloss on the 
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law of standing should not permit it to reach 
the issue it decides today.  And because a 
majority of the Court has chosen to address 
the merits, I also add a word to say that even 
if the merits were reachable,  [**2439]  I 
would dissent from the Court's judgment.
I
The Court's finding of Article III standing 
rests on two propositions: first, that both the 
University of Michigan's undergraduate 
college's transfer policy and its freshman 
admissions policy seek to achieve student 
body diversity through the "use of race," 
ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 275-280, and second, 
that Hamacher has standing to challenge the 
transfer policy on the grounds that diversity 
can never be a "compelling state interest" 
justifying the use of race in any admissions 
decision, freshman or transfer, ante,  
[***295]  at 156 L Ed 2d, at 279.  The Court 
concludes that, because Hamacher's 
argument, if successful, would seal the fate of 
both policies, his standing to challenge the 
transfer policy also allows him to attack the 
freshman admissions policy.  Ante, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 279, n 16 ("Petitioners challenged 
any use of race by the University to promote 
diversity, including through the transfer 
policy"); ibid. ("'The University considers 
race for a purpose to achieve a diversity that 
we believe is not compelling, and if that is 
struck down as a rationale, then the [result] 
would be [the] same with respect to the 
transfer policy as with respect to the 
[freshman] admissions policy, Your Honor'" 
(quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8)).  I agree with 
Justice Stevens's critique  [*292]  that the 
Court thus ignores the basic principle of 
Article III standing that a plaintiff cannot 
challenge a government program that does 
not apply to him.  See ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, 
at 292-292, and n 6 (dissenting opinion). n1
n1 The Court's holding arguably 
exposes a weakness in the rule of 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 73 L. 
Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982), 
that Article III standing may not be 
satisfied by the unnamed members of 
a duly certified class.  But no party 
has invited us to reconsider Blum, and 
I follow Justice Stevens in 
approaching the case on the 
assumption that Blum is settled law.
But even on the Court's indulgent 
standing theory, the decision should not go 
beyond a recognition that diversity can serve 
as a compelling state interest justifying race-
conscious decisions in education.  Ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 280 (citing Grutter v 
Bollinger, post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 
2325).  Since, as the Court says, "petitioners 
did not raise a narrow tailoring challenge to 
the transfer policy," ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
279, n 16, our decision in Grutter is fatal to 
Hamacher's sole attack upon the transfer 
policy, which is the only policy before this 
Court that he claims aggrieved him.  
Hamacher's challenge to that policy having 
failed, his standing is presumably spent.  The 
further question whether the freshman 
admissions plan is narrowly tailored to 
achieving student body diversity remains 
legally irrelevant to Hamacher and should 
await a plaintiff who is actually hurt by it. n2
n2 For that matter, as the Court 
suggests, narrow tailoring challenges 
against the two policies could well 
have different outcomes.  Ante, at 156 
L Ed 2d, at 279.  The record on the 
decisionmaking process for transfer 
applicants is understandably thin, 
given that petitioners never raised a 
narrow tailoring challenge against it.  
Most importantly, however, the 
transfer policy does not use a points-
based "selection index" to evaluate 
transfer applicants, but rather 
considers race as one of many factors 
in making the general determination 
whether the applicant would make a 
"'contribution to a diverse student 
body.'" Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 278 
(quoting 2 App. in No. 01-1333 etc. 
(CA6), p 531 (capitalization 
omitted)).  This limited glimpse into 
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the transfer policy at least permits the 
inference that the University engages 
in a "holistic review" of transfer 
applications consistent with the 
program upheld today in Grutter v 
Bollinger, post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 
123 S Ct 2325.
 [*293]  II
The cases now contain two pointers toward 
the line between the valid and the 
unconstitutional in race-conscious admissions 
schemes.  Grutter reaffirms the permissibility 
of individualized consideration of race to 
achieve a diversity of students, at least where 
race is not assigned a preordained value in all 
cases.  On the other hand, Justice Powell's 
opinion in [**2440]   Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. [***296]  Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 
2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), rules out a 
racial quota or set-aside, in which race is the 
sole fact of eligibility for certain places in a 
class.  Although the freshman admissions 
system here is subject to argument on the 
merits, I think it is closer to what Grutter
approves than to what Bakke condemns, and 
should not be held unconstitutional on the 
current record.
The record does not describe a system with a 
quota like the one struck down in Bakke, 
which "insulated" all nonminority candidates 
from competition from certain seats.  Bakke, 
supra, at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 
(opinion of Powell, J.); see also Richmond v. 
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496, 102 L. 
Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (stating that Bakke invalidated "a 
plan that completely eliminated 
nonminorities from consideration for a 
specified percentage of opportunities").  The 
Bakke plan "focused solely on ethnic 
diversity" and effectively told nonminority 
applicants that "no matter how strong their 
qualifications, quantitative and 
extracurricular, including their own potential 
for contribution to educational diversity, they 
are never afforded the chance to compete 
with applicants from the preferred groups for 
the [set-aside] special admissions seats."  
Bakke, supra, at 315, 319, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 
98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(emphasis in original).
The plan here, in contrast, lets all applicants 
compete for all places and values an 
applicant's offering for any place not only on 
grounds of race, but on grades, test scores, 
strength of high school, quality of course of 
study, residence, alumni relationships, 
leadership, personal character, 
socioeconomic  [*294]  disadvantage, athletic 
ability, and quality of a personal essay.  Ante, 
at 156 L Ed 2d, at 272.  A nonminority 
applicant who scores highly in these other 
categories can readily garner a selection 
index exceeding that of a minority applicant 
who gets the 20-point bonus.  Cf. Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty.,
480 U.S. 616, 638, 94 L. Ed. 2d 615, 107 S. 
Ct. 1442 (1987) (upholding a program in 
which gender "was but one of numerous 
factors [taken] into account in arriving at [a] 
decision" because "no persons are 
automatically excluded from consideration; 
all are able to have their qualifications 
weighed against those of other applicants" 
(emphasis deleted)). 
Subject to one qualification to be taken up 
below, this scheme of considering, through 
the selection index system, all of the 
characteristics that the college thinks relevant 
to student diversity for every one of the 
student places to be filled fits Justice Powell's 
description of a constitutionally acceptable 
program: one that considers "all pertinent 
elements of diversity in light of the particular 
qualifications of each applicant" and places 
each element "on the same footing for 
consideration, although not necessarily 
according them the same weight."  Bakke, 
supra, at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  
In the Court's own words, "each 
characteristic of a particular applicant [is] 
considered in assessing the applicant's entire 
application." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 282.  
An unsuccessful nonminority applicant 
cannot complain that he was rejected "simply 
because he was not the right color"; an 
applicant who is rejected because "his 
combined qualifications . . . did not outweigh 
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those of the  [***297]  other applicant" has 
been given an opportunity to compete with 
all other applicants.  Bakke, supra, at 318, 57 
L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of 
Powell, J.).
The one qualification to this description of 
the admissions process is that membership in 
an underrepresented minority is given a 
weight of 20 points on the 150-point scale.  
On the face of things, however, this 
assignment of specific points does not set 
race apart from all other weighted 
considerations.  Nonminority students may 
receive 20 points for athletic ability, 
socioeconomic disadvantage, attendance at a 
socioeconomically  [*295]  disadvantaged or 
predominantly minority high school, or at the 
Provost's discretion; they may also receive 10 
points for being residents of Michigan,  
[**2441]  6 for residence in an 
underrepresented Michigan county, 5 for 
leadership and service, and so on.
The Court nonetheless finds fault with a 
scheme that "automatically" distributes 20 
points to minority applicants because "the 
only consideration that accompanies this 
distribution of points is a factual review of an 
application to determine whether an 
individual is a member of one of these 
minority groups."  Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
282.  The objection goes to the use of points 
to quantify and compare characteristics, or to 
the number of points awarded due to race, but 
on either reading the objection is mistaken. 
The very nature of a college's permissible 
practice of awarding value to racial diversity 
means that race must be considered in a way 
that increases some applicants' chances for 
admission.  Since college admission is not 
left entirely to inarticulate intuition, it is hard 
to see what is inappropriate in assigning 
some stated value to a relevant characteristic, 
whether it be reasoning ability, writing style, 
running speed, or minority race.  Justice 
Powell's plus factors necessarily are assigned 
some values.  The college simply does by a 
numbered scale what the law school 
accomplishes in its "holistic review," Grutter, 
post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325; the 
distinction does not imply that applicants to 
the undergraduate college are denied 
individualized consideration or a fair chance 
to compete on the basis of all the various 
merits their applications may disclose. 
Nor is it possible to say that the 20 points 
convert race into a decisive factor 
comparable to reserving minority places as in
Bakke. Of course we can conceive of a point 
system in which the "plus" factor given to 
minority applicants would be so extreme as 
to guarantee every minority applicant a 
higher rank than every nonminority applicant 
in the university's admissions system, see 438 
U.S., at 319, n. 53, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 
2733 (opinion of Powell, J.).  But petitioners 
do not have a convincing argument  [*296]  
that the freshman admissions system operates 
this way.  The present record obviously 
shows that nonminority applicants may 
achieve higher selection point totals than 
minority applicants owing to characteristics 
other than race, and the fact that the 
university admits "virtually every qualified 
under-represented minority applicant," App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 111a, may reflect nothing 
more than the likelihood that very few 
qualified minority applicants apply, Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger et al. 39, as well as 
the possibility that self-selection  [***298]  
results in a strong minority applicant pool.  It 
suffices for me, as it did for the District 
Court, that there are no Bakke-like set-asides 
and that consideration of an applicant's whole 
spectrum of ability is no more ruled out by 
giving 20 points for race than by giving the 
same points for athletic ability or 
socioeconomic disadvantage. 
Any argument that the "tailoring" amounts to 
a set-aside, then, boils down to the claim that 
a plus factor of 20 points makes some 
observers suspicious, where a factor of 10 
points might not.  But suspicion does not 
carry petitioners' ultimate burden of 
persuasion in this constitutional challenge, 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 
287-288, 90 L. Ed. 2d 260, 106 S. Ct. 1842 
(1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.), and it 
surely does not warrant condemning the 
college's admissions scheme on this record.  
Because the District Court (correctly, in my 
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view) did not believe that the specific point 
assignment was constitutionally troubling, it 
made only limited and general findings on 
other characteristics of the university's 
admissions practice, such as the conduct of 
individualized review by the Admissions 
Review Committee.  122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 
829-830 (ED Mich 2000).  As the Court 
indicates, we know very little about the 
actual role of the review committee.  Ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 283-284 ("The record does 
not reveal precisely how many applications 
are flagged for this individualized [**2442]  
consideration [by the committee]");  see also 
ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 287 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("The evidence in the record . . . 
reveals very little about how the review 
committee actually functions").  The point 
system cannot operate as a de facto set-aside 
if the  [*297]  greater admissions process, 
including review by the committee, results in 
individualized review sufficient to meet the 
Court's standards.  Since the record is quiet, 
if not silent, on the case-by-case work of the 
committee, the Court would be on more 
defensible ground by vacating and remanding 
for evidence about the committee's specific 
determinations. n3
n3 The Court surmises that the 
committee does not contribute 
meaningfully to the University's 
individualized review of applications.  
Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 283-284.  
The Court should not take it upon 
itself to apply a newly-formulated 
legal standard to an undeveloped 
record.  Given the District Court's 
statement that the committee may 
examine "any number of applicants, 
including applicants other than under-
represented minority applicants," 122 
F. Supp. 2d 811, 830 (ED Mich 
2000), it is quite possible that further 
factual development would reveal the 
committee to be a "source of 
individualized consideration" 
sufficient to satisfy the Court's rule, 
ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 287 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  
Determination of that issue in the first 
instance is a job for the District Court, 
not for this Court on a record that is 
admittedly lacking.
Without knowing more about how the 
Admissions Review Committee actually 
functions, it seems especially unfair to treat 
the candor of the admissions plan as an 
Achilles' heel.  In contrast to the college's 
forthrightness in saying just what plus factor 
it gives for membership in an 
underrepresented minority, it is worth 
considering the character of one alternative 
thrown up as preferable, because supposedly 
not based on race.  Drawing on admissions 
systems used at public universities in 
California, Florida, and Texas, the  [***299]  
United States contends that Michigan could 
get student diversity in satisfaction of its 
compelling interest by guaranteeing 
admission to a fixed percentage of the top 
students from each high school in Michigan.  
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18; 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in 
Grutter v Bollinger, O. T. 2002, No. 02-241, 
pp 13-17.
While there is nothing unconstitutional about 
such a practice, it nonetheless suffers from a 
serious disadvantage. n4 It  [*298]  is the 
disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation.  The 
"percentage plans" are just as race conscious 
as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they 
get their racially diverse results without 
saying directly what they are doing or why 
they are doing it.  In contrast, Michigan states 
its purpose directly and, if this were a 
doubtful case for me, I would be tempted to 
give Michigan an extra point of its own for 
its frankness.  Equal protection cannot 
become an exercise in which the winners are 
the ones who hide the ball. 
n4 Of course it might be pointless 
in the State of Michigan, where 
minorities are a much smaller fraction 
of the population than in California, 
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Florida, or Texas.  Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger et al. 48-49.
III
If this plan were challenged by a plaintiff 
with proper standing under Article III, I 
would affirm the judgment of the District 
Court granting summary judgment to the 
college.  As it is, I would vacate the judgment 
for lack of jurisdiction, and I respectfully 
dissent.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter
joins, dissenting. *
* Justice Breyer joins Part I of 
this opinion.
I
Educational institutions, the Court 
acknowledges, are not barred from any and 
all consideration of race when making 
admissions decisions.  Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, 
at 280; see Grutter v Bollinger, post, at 156 L 
Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325.  But the Court 
once again maintains that the same standard 
of review controls judicial inspection of all 
official race classifications. Ante, at 156 L Ed 
2d, at 281 (quoting [**2443]   Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
224, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 
(1995); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 494, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. Ct. 
706 (1989) (plurality opinion)).  This 
insistence on "consistency," Adarand, 515 
U.S., at 224, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 
2097, would be fitting were our Nation free 
of the vestiges of rank discrimination long 
reinforced by law, see id., at 274-276, and n 
8,132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting).  But we are not far distant 
from an overtly discriminatory past, and the 
effects of centuries of law-sanctioned 
inequality remain painfully evident in our 
communities and schools.
 [*299]  In the wake "of a system of racial 
caste only recently ended," id., at 273, at 273, 
132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097  (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting), large disparities  [***300]  
endure.  Unemployment, n1 poverty, n2 and 
access to health care n3 vary 
disproportionately by race.  Neighborhoods 
and schools remain racially divided. n4 
African-American and Hispanic children are 
all too often educated in poverty-stricken 
[*300]  and underperforming institutions. n5 
Adult African-Americans and Hispanics 
generally earn less than whites with 
equivalent levels of education. n6 Equally 
credentialed job applicants receive different 
receptions depending on their race. n7 
Irrational prejudice is still encountered in real 
estate [**2444]  markets n8 and consumer 
transactions. n9 [***301]  "Bias both  [*301]  
conscious and unconscious, reflecting 
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, 
keeps up barriers that must come down if 
equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are 
ever genuinely to become this country's law 
and practice."  Id., at 274, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 
115 S Ct 2097 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see 
generally Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: 
Intergroup Relations After Affirmative 
Action, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 1251, 1276-1291 
(1998). 
n1 See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United 
States: 2002, p 368 (2002) (Table 
562) (hereinafter Statistical Abstract) 
(unemployment rate among whites 
was 3.7% in 1999, 3.5% in 2000, and 
4.2% in 2001; during those years, the 
unemployment rate among African-
Americans was 8.0%, 7.6%, and 
8.7%, respectively; among Hispanics, 
6.4%, 5.7%, and 6.6%).
n2 See, e.g., U. S. Dept of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census, 
Poverty in the United States: 2000, p 
291 (2001) (Table A) (In 2000, 7.5% 
of non-Hispanic whites, 22.1% of 
African-Americans, 10.8% of Asian-
Americans, and 21.2% of Hispanics 
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were living in poverty); S. Staveteig 
& A. Wigton, Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities: Key Findings from the 
National Survey of America's 
Families 1 (Urban Institute Report B-
5, 2000) ("Blacks, Hispanics, and 
Native Americans . . . each have 
poverty rates almost twice as high as 
Asians and almost three times as high 
as whites.").
n3 See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census, Health 
Insurance Coverage: 2000, p 391 
(2001) (Table A) (In 2000, 9.7% of 
non-Hispanic whites were without 
health insurance, as compared to 
18.5% of African-Americans, 18.0% 
of Asian-Americans, and 32.0% of 
Hispanics.); Waidmann & Rajan, 
Race and Ethnic Disparities in Health 
Care Access and Utilization: An 
Examination of State Variation, 57 
Med. Care Res. and Rev. 55, 56 
(2000) ("On average, Latinos and 
African Americans have both worse 
health and worse access to effective 
health care than do non-Hispanic 
whites . . . .").
n4 See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census, Racial 
and Ethnic Residential Segregation in 
the United States: 1980-2000 (2002) 
(documenting residential 
segregation); E. Frankenberg, C. Lee, 
& G. Orfield, A Multiracial Society 
with Segregated Schools: Are We 
Losing the Dream?  4 (Jan. 2003), 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.
edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingth
eDream.pdf (all Internet materials as 
visited June 2, 2003, and available in 
Clerk of Court's case file), ("Whites 
are the most segregated group in the 
nation's public schools; they attend 
schools, on average, where eighty 
percent of the student body is 
white."); id., at 28 ("Almost three-
fourths of black and Latino students 
attend schools that are predominantly 
minority . . . .  More than one in six 
black children attend a school that is 
99-100% minority . . . .  One in nine 
Latino students attend virtually all 
minority schools.").
n5 See, e.g., Ryan, Schools, 
Race, and Money, 109 Yale L. J. 249, 
273-274 (1999) ("Urban public 
schools are attended primarily by 
African-American and Hispanic 
students"; students who attend such 
schools are disproportionately poor, 
score poorly on standardized tests, 
and are far more likely to drop out 
than students who attend nonurban 
schools.).
n6 See, e.g., Statistical Abstract 140 
(Table 211).
n7 See, e.g., Holzer, Career 
Advancement Prospects and 
Strategies for Low-Wage Minority 
Workers, in Low-Wage Workers in 
the New Economy 228 (R. Kazis & 
M. Miller eds. 2001) ("In studies that 
have sent matched pairs of minority 
and white applicants with apparently 
equal credentials to apply for jobs, 
whites routinely get more interviews 
and job offers than either black or 
Hispanic applicants."); M. Bertrand & 
S. Mullainathan, Are Emily and 
Brendan More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal?: A Field 
Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination (Nov. 18, 2002), 
http://gsb.uchicago.edu/pdf/bertrand.p
df; Mincy, The Urban Institute Audit 
Studies: Their Research and Policy 
Context, in Clear and Convincing 
Evidence: Measurement of 
Discrimination in America 165-186 
(M. Fix & R. Struyk eds. 1993).
n8 See, e.g., M. Turner et al., 
Discrimination in Metropolitan 
Housing Markets: National Results 
from Phase I HDS 2000, pp i, iii 
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(Nov. 2002), 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf (paired testing 
in which "two individuals--one 
minority and the other white--pose as 
otherwise identical homeseekers, and 
visit real estate or rental agents to 
inquire about the availability of 
advertised housing units" revealed 
that "discrimination still persists in 
both rental and sales markets of large 
metropolitan areas nationwide"); M. 
Turner & F. Skidmore, Mortgage 
Lending Discrimination: A Review of 
Existing Evidence 2 (1999) (existing 
research evidence shows that minority 
homebuyers in the United States "face 
discrimination from mortgage lending 
institutions.").
n9 See, e.g., Ayres, Further Evidence 
of Discrimination in New Car 
Negotiations and Estimates of its 
Cause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 109, 109-110 
(1995) (study in which 38 testers 
negotiated the purchase of more than
400 automobiles confirmed earlier 
finding "that dealers systematically 
offer lower prices to white males than 
to other tester types").
The Constitution instructs all who act for 
the government that they may not "deny to 
any person . . . the equal protection of the 
laws." Amdt. 14, §  1.  In implementing this 
equality instruction, as I see it, government 
decisionmakers may properly distinguish 
between policies of exclusion and inclusion.  
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 
267, 316, 90 L. Ed. 2d 260, 106 S. Ct. 1842 
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Actions 
designed to burden groups long denied full 
citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked 
with measures taken to hasten the day when 
entrenched discrimination and its after effects 
have been extirpated.  See Carter, When 
Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale L. J. 
420, 433-434 (1988) ("To say that two 
centuries of struggle for the most basic of 
civil rights have been mostly about freedom 
from racial categorization rather than 
freedom from racial oppression is to trivialize 
the lives and deaths of those who have 
suffered under racism.  To pretend . . . that 
the issue presented in [Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke,  438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 
750, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978) was the same as 
the issue in [Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 686 
(1954) is to pretend that history never 
happened and that the present doesn't exist."). 
Our jurisprudence ranks race a "suspect" 
category, "not because [race] is inevitably an 
impermissible classification, but because it is 
one which usually, to our national shame, has 
been drawn for the purpose of maintaining 
racial inequality."  Norwalk Core v. Norwalk 
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-
932 (CA2 1968) (footnote omitted).  But 
where race is considered "for the purpose of 
achieving equality," id., at 932, no automatic 
proscription is in order.   [*302]  For, as 
insightfully explained, "the Constitution is 
both color blind and color conscious.  To 
avoid conflict with the equal protection 
clause, a classification that denies a benefit, 
causes harm, or imposes a burden must not 
be based on race.  In that sense, the 
Constitution is color blind.  But the 
Constitution is color conscious to prevent 
discrimination being perpetuated and to undo 
the effects of past discrimination."  United 
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 372 
F.2d 836, 876 (CA5 1966) (Wisdom, J.); see 
Wechsler, The Nationalization Of Civil 
Liberties And Civil Rights, Supp to 12 Tex. 
Q. 10, 23 [**2445]  (1968) (Brown may be 
seen as disallowing racial classifications that 
"impl[y] an invidious assessment" while 
allowing such classifications  [***302]  when 
"not invidious in implication" but advanced 
to "correct inequalities").  Contemporary 
human rights documents draw just this line; 
they distinguish between policies of 
oppression and measures designed to 
accelerate de facto equality.  See Grutter, 
post, at 156 L Ed 2d 304, 123 S Ct 2325 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing the United 
Nations-initiated Conventions on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
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Discrimination and on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women). 
The mere assertion of a laudable 
governmental purpose, of course, should not 
immunize a race-conscious measure from 
careful judicial inspection.  See Jefferson 
County, 372 F.2d at 876 ("The criterion is the 
relevancy of color to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.").  Close review is 
needed "to ferret out classifications in reality 
malign, but masquerading as benign," 
Adarand, 515 U.S., at 275, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 
115 S Ct 2097 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and 
to "ensure that preferences are not so large as 
to trammel unduly upon the opportunities of 
others or interfere too harshly with legitimate 
expectations of persons in once-preferred 
groups," id., at 276, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S 
Ct 2097. 
II
Examining in this light the admissions policy 
employed by the University of Michigan's 
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts 
(College), and for the reasons well stated by  
[*303]  Justice Souter, I see no constitutional 
infirmity.  See ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 295-
299 (dissenting opinion).  Like other top-
ranking institutions, the College has many 
more applicants for admission than it can 
accommodate in an entering class.  App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 108a.  Every applicant admitted 
under the current plan, petitioners do not here 
dispute, is qualified to attend the College.  
Id., at 111a.  The racial and ethnic groups to 
which the College accords special 
consideration (African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and Native-Americans) 
historically have been relegated to inferior 
status by law and social practice; their 
members continue to experience class-based 
discrimination to this day, see supra, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 299-301.  There is no suggestion 
that the College adopted its current policy in 
order to limit or decrease enrollment by any 
particular racial or ethnic group, and no seats 
are reserved on the basis of race.  See Brief 
for Respondents 10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42 
(in the range between 75 and 100 points, the 
review committee may look at applications 
individually and ignore the points).  Nor has 
there been any demonstration that the 
College's program unduly constricts 
admissions opportunities for students who do 
not receive special consideration based on 
race.  Cf. Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke
and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective 
Admissions, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1049 
(2002) ("In any admissions process where 
applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and 
where white applicants greatly outnumber 
minority applicants, substantial preferences 
for minority applicants will not significantly 
diminish the odds of admission facing white 
applicants."). n10
n10 The United States points to 
the "percentage plans" used in 
California, Florida, and Texas as one 
example of a "race-neutral 
alternative" that would permit the 
College to enroll meaningful numbers 
of minority students.  Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 14; see 
Commission on Civil Rights, Beyond 
Percentage Plans: The Challenge of 
Equal Opportunity in Higher 
Education 1 (Nov. 2002), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/percent2/p
ercent2.pdf (percentage plans 
guarantee admission to state 
universities for a fixed percentage of 
the top students from high schools in 
the State).  Calling such 10 or 20% 
plans "race-neutral" seems to me
disingenuous, for they 
"unquestionably were adopted with 
the specific purpose of increasing 
representation of African-Americans 
and Hispanics in the public higher 
education system." Brief for 
Respondents 44; see C. Horn & S. 
Flores, Percent Plans in College 
Admissions: A Comparative Analysis 
of Three States' Experiences 14-19 
(2003), 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.
edu/research/affirmativeaction/tristate 
.pdf.  Percentage plans depend for 
their effectiveness on continued racial 
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segregation at the secondary school 
level: They can ensure significant 
minority enrollment in universities 
only if the majority-minority high 
school population is large enough to 
guarantee that, in many schools, most 
of the students in the top 10 or 20% 
are minorities.  Moreover, because 
such plans link college admission to a 
single criterion--high school class 
rank--they create perverse incentives.  
They encourage parents to keep their 
children in low-performing 
segregated schools, and discourage 
students from taking challenging 
classes that might lower their grade 
point averages.  See Selingo, What 
States Aren't Saying About the 'X-
Percent Solution,' Chronicle of 
Higher Education, June 2, 2000, p 
A31.  And even if percentage plans 
could boost the sheer numbers of 
minority enrollees at the 
undergraduate level, they do not 
touch enrollment in graduate and 
professional schools.
 [***303]   [**2446]   [*304]  The stain 
of generations of racial oppression is still 
visible in our society, see Krieger, 86 Calif. 
L. Rev., at 1253, and the determination to 
hasten its removal remains vital.  One can 
reasonably anticipate, therefore, that colleges 
and universities will seek to maintain their 
minority enrollment--and the networks and 
opportunities thereby opened to minority 
graduates--whether or not they can do so in 
full candor through adoption of affirmative 
action plans of the kind here at issue.  
Without recourse to such plans, institutions 
of higher education may resort to 
camouflage.  For example, schools may 
encourage applicants to write of their cultural 
traditions in the essays they submit, or to 
indicate whether English is their second 
language.  Seeking to improve their chances 
for admission, applicants may highlight the 
minority group associations to which they 
belong, or the Hispanic surnames of their 
mothers or grandparents.  In turn, teachers' 
recommendations may emphasize who a 
student is as much as what he or she has 
accomplished.  See, e.g., Steinberg, Using 
Synonyms for Race, College Strives for 
Diversity,  [*305]  N. Y. Times, Dec. 8, 
2002, section 1, p 1, col. 3 (describing 
admissions process at Rice University); cf. 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-
15 (suggesting institutions could consider, 
inter alia, "a history of overcoming 
disadvantage," "reputation and location of 
high school," and "individual outlook as 
reflected by essays").  If honesty is the best 
policy, surely Michigan's accurately 
described, fully disclosed College affirmative 
action program is preferable to achieving 
similar numbers through winks, nods, and 
disguises. n11
n11 Contrary to the Court's 
contention, I do not suggest 
"changing the Constitution so that it 
conforms to the conduct of the 
universities." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
284, n 22.  In my view, the 
Constitution, properly interpreted, 
permits government officials to 
respond openly to the continuing 
importance of race.  See supra, at 156 
L Ed 2d, at 301-302.  Among 
constitutionally permissible options, 
those that candidly disclose their 
consideration of race seem to me 
preferable to those that conceal it.
* * *
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.
219
Appendix Two: Grutter v. Bollinger
*
*
*
BARBARA GRUTTER, 
Petitioner v. LEE 
BOLLINGER et al.
No. 02-241 
SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 
539 U.S. 306; 123 S. Ct. 
2325; 156 L. Ed. 2d 304; 
2003 U.S. LEXIS 4800; 71 
U.S.L.W. 4498; 91 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
1761; 84 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
(CCH) P41,415; 2003 Cal. 
Daily Op. Service 5378; 16 
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 367
April 1, 2003, Argued  
June 23, 2003, Decided
JUDGES: O'Connor, J., delivered the 
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Thomas, J. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring 
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J., filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., 
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which SCALIA, J., joined as to Parts I-VII. 
Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., 
joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.
OPINIONBY: O'CONNOR [*311]  
OPINION:  [**2331]  Justice O'Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
 [***HR1A]  [1A]  [***HR2A]  [2A] 
This case requires us to decide whether the 
use of race as a factor in student admissions 
by the University of Michigan Law School 
(Law School) is unlawful.
 [*312]  I
A
The Law School ranks among the Nation's 
top law schools.  It receives more than 3,500 
applications each year for a class  [*313]  of 
around 350 students.  Seeking to "admit a 
group of students who individually and 
collectively are among the most capable," the 
Law School looks for individuals with 
"substantial  [*314]  promise for success in 
law school" and "a strong likelihood of 
succeeding in the practice of law and 
contributing in diverse ways to the well-
being of others." App. 110.  More broadly, 
the Law School seeks "a mix of students with 
varying backgrounds and experiences who 
will respect and learn from each other." Ibid.
In 1992, the dean of the Law School charged 
a faculty committee with crafting a written 
admissions policy to implement these goals.  
In particular, the Law School sought to 
ensure that its efforts to achieve student body 
diversity complied with this Court's most 
recent ruling on the use of race in university 
admissions.  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. 
Ct. 2733 (1978).   [*315]  Upon the 
unanimous adoption of the committee's 
report by the Law School faculty, it became 
the Law School's official admissions policy.
The hallmark of that policy is its focus on 
academic ability coupled with a flexible
assessment of applicants' talents, experiences, 
and potential "to contribute to the learning of 
those around them." App. 111.  The policy 
requires admissions officials to evaluate each 
applicant based on all the information 
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available in the file, including a personal 
statement, letters of recommendation,  
[**2332]  and an essay describing the ways 
in which the applicant will contribute to the 
life and diversity of the  [***324]  Law 
School. Id., at 83-84, 114-121.  In reviewing 
an applicant's file, admissions officials must 
consider the applicant's undergraduate grade 
point average (GPA) and Law School 
Admissions Test (LSAT) score because they 
are important (if imperfect) predictors of 
academic success in law school. Id., at 112.  
The policy stresses that "no applicant should 
be admitted unless we expect that applicant 
to do well enough to graduate with no serious 
academic problems." Id., at 111.
The policy makes clear, however, that even 
the highest possible score does not guarantee 
admission to the Law School. Id., at 113.  
Nor does a low score automatically 
disqualify an applicant.  Ibid. Rather, the 
policy requires admissions officials to look 
beyond grades and test scores to other criteria 
that are important to the Law School's 
educational objectives.  Id., at 114.  So-called 
"'soft' variables" such as "the enthusiasm of 
recommenders, the quality of the 
undergraduate institution, the quality of the 
applicant's essay, and the areas and difficulty 
of undergraduate course selection" are all 
brought to bear in assessing an "applicant's 
likely contributions to the intellectual and 
social life of the institution." Ibid.
The policy aspires to "achieve that diversity 
which has the potential to enrich everyone's 
education and thus make a law school class 
stronger than the sum of its parts." Id., at 118.   
[*316]  The policy does not restrict the types 
of diversity contributions eligible for 
"substantial weight" in the admissions 
process, but instead recognizes "many 
possible bases for diversity admissions." Id., 
at 118, 120.  The policy does, however, 
reaffirm the Law School's longstanding 
commitment to "one particular type of 
diversity," that is, "racial and ethnic diversity 
with special reference to the inclusion of 
students from groups which have been 
historically discriminated against, like 
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native 
Americans, who without this commitment 
might not be represented in our student body 
in meaningful numbers." Id., at 120.  By 
enrolling a "'critical mass' of 
[underrepresented] minority students," the 
Law School seeks to "ensure their ability to 
make unique contributions to the character of 
the Law School." Id., at 120-121.
The policy does not define diversity "solely 
in terms of racial and ethnic status." Id., at 
121.  Nor is the policy "insensitive to the 
competition among all students for admission 
to the Law School." Ibid. Rather, the policy 
seeks to guide admissions officers in 
"producing classes both diverse and 
academically outstanding, classes made up of 
students who promise to continue the 
tradition of outstanding contribution by 
Michigan Graduates to the legal profession." 
Ibid.
B
 [***HR3]  [3] Petitioner Barbara Grutter is a 
white Michigan resident who applied to the 
Law School in 1996 with a 3.8 grade point 
average and 161 LSAT score. The Law 
School initially placed petitioner on a waiting 
list, but subsequently rejected her application.  
In December 1997, petitioner filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan against the Law School, 
the Regents of the University of Michigan, 
Lee Bollinger (Dean of the Law School from 
1987 to 1994, and President of the University 
of  [***325]  Michigan from 1996 to 2002), 
Jeffrey Lehman (Dean of the Law School), 
and Dennis Shields (Director of Admissions 
at the Law School from 1991  [*317]  until 
1998).  Petitioner alleged that respondents 
discriminated against her on the basis of race 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 
Stat 252, 42 USC §  2000d [42 USCS §  
2000d]; and Rev Stat §  1977, as amended, 
42 USC §  1981 [42 USCS §  1981].
Petitioner further alleged that her application 
was rejected because the Law School uses 
race as a "predominant" factor,  [**2333]  
giving applicants who belong to certain 
minority groups "a significantly greater 
chance of admission than students with 
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similar credentials from disfavored racial 
groups." App. 33-34.  Petitioner also alleged 
that respondents "had no compelling interest 
to justify their use of race in the admissions 
process." Id., at 34.  Petitioner requested 
compensatory and punitive damages, an 
order requiring the Law School to offer her 
admission, and an injunction prohibiting the 
Law School from continuing to discriminate 
on the basis of race.  Id., at 36.  Petitioner
clearly has standing to bring this lawsuit.  
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. 
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 666, 124 L. Ed. 2d 586, 113 S. Ct. 
2297 (1993) . 
The District Court granted petitioner's motion 
for class certification and for bifurcation of 
the trial into liability and damages phases.  
The class was defined as "'all persons who 
(A) applied for and were not granted 
admission to the University of Michigan Law 
School for the academic years since (and 
including) 1995 until the time that judgment 
is entered herein; and (B) were members of 
those racial or ethnic groups, including 
Caucasian, that Defendants treated less 
favorably in considering their applications for 
admission to the Law School.'" App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 191a-192a.
The District Court heard oral argument on the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment 
on December 22, 2000.  Taking the motions 
under advisement, the District Court 
indicated that it would decide as a matter of 
law whether the Law School's asserted 
interest in obtaining the educational benefits 
that flow from a diverse student body was 
compelling.   [*318]  The District Court also 
indicated that it would conduct a bench trial 
on the extent to which race was a factor in 
the Law School's admissions decisions, and 
whether the Law School's consideration of 
race in admissions decisions constituted a 
race-based double standard.
During the 15-day bench trial, the parties 
introduced extensive evidence concerning the 
Law School's use of race in the admissions 
process.  Dennis Shields, Director of 
Admissions when petitioner applied to the 
Law School, testified that he did not direct 
his staff to admit a particular percentage or 
number of minority students, but rather to 
consider an applicant's race along with all 
other factors.  Id., at 206a.  Shields testified 
that at the height of the admissions season, he 
would frequently consult the so-called "daily 
reports" that kept track of the racial and 
ethnic composition of the class (along with 
other information such as residency status 
and gender).  Id., at 207a.  This was done, 
Shields testified, to ensure that a critical mass 
of underrepresented minority students would 
be reached so as to realize the educational  
[***326]  benefits of a diverse student body.
Ibid. Shields stressed, however, that he did 
not seek to admit any particular number or 
percentage of underrepresented minority 
students.  Ibid.
Erica Munzel, who succeeded Shields as 
Director of Admissions, testified that 
"'critical mass'" means "'meaningful 
numbers'" or "'meaningful representation,  '" 
which she understood to mean a number that 
encourages underrepresented minority 
students to participate in the classroom and 
not feel isolated.  Id., at 208a-209a.  Munzel 
stated there is no number, percentage, or 
range of numbers or percentages that 
constitute critical mass. Id., at 209a.  Munzel 
also asserted that she must consider the race 
of applicants because a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students could not 
be enrolled if admissions decisions were 
based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and 
LSAT scores. Ibid.
The current Dean of the Law School, Jeffrey 
Lehman, also testified.  Like the other Law 
School witnesses, Lehman did  [*319]  not 
quantify critical mass in terms of numbers or 
percentages.  Id., at 211a.  He indicated that 
critical mass means numbers [**2334]  such 
that underrepresented minority students do 
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for 
their race.  Ibid. When asked about the extent 
to which race is considered in admissions, 
Lehman testified that it varies from one 
applicant to another.  Ibid. In some cases, 
according to Lehman's testimony, an 
applicant's race may play no role, while in 
others it may be a "'determinative'" factor.  
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Ibid.
The District Court heard extensive testimony 
from Professor Richard Lempert, who 
chaired the faculty committee that drafted the 
1992 policy.  Lempert emphasized that the 
Law School seeks students with diverse 
interests and backgrounds to enhance 
classroom discussion and the educational 
experience both inside and outside the 
classroom.  Id., at 213a.  When asked about 
the policy's "'commitment to racial and ethnic 
diversity with special reference to the 
inclusion of students from groups which have 
been historically discriminated against,'" 
Lempert explained that this language did not 
purport to remedy past discrimination, but 
rather to include students who may bring to 
the Law School a perspective different from 
that of members of groups which have not 
been the victims of such discrimination.  Ibid.
Lempert acknowledged that other groups, 
such as Asians and Jews, have experienced 
discrimination, but explained they were not 
mentioned in the policy because individuals 
who are members of those groups were 
already being admitted to the Law School in
significant numbers.  Ibid.
Kent Syverud was the final witness to testify 
about the Law School's use of race in 
admissions decisions.  Syverud was a 
professor at the Law School when the 1992 
admissions policy was adopted and is now 
Dean of Vanderbilt Law School. In addition 
to his testimony at trial, Syverud submitted 
several expert reports on the educational 
benefits of diversity. Syverud's testimony 
indicated that when a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students is 
present,  [*320]  racial stereotypes lose their 
force because nonminority students learn 
there is no "'minority viewpoint'" but rather a 
variety of viewpoints among minority 
students.  Id., at 215a.
 [***327]  In an attempt to quantify the 
extent to which the Law School actually 
considers race in making admissions 
decisions, the parties introduced voluminous 
evidence at trial.  Relying on data obtained 
from the Law School, petitioner's expert, Dr. 
Kinley Larntz, generated and analyzed 
"admissions grids" for the years in question 
(1995-2000).  These grids show the number 
of applicants and the number of admittees for 
all combinations of GPAs and LSAT scores. 
Dr. Larntz made "'cell-by-cell'" comparisons 
between applicants of different races to 
determine whether a statistically significant 
relationship existed between race and 
admission rates.  He concluded that 
membership in certain minority groups "'is an 
extremely strong factor in the decision for 
acceptance,'" and that applicants from these 
minority groups "'are given an extremely 
large allowance for admission'" as compared 
to applicants who are members of nonfavored 
groups.  Id., at 218a-220a.  Dr. Larntz 
conceded, however, that race is not the 
predominant factor in the Law School's 
admissions calculus.  12 Tr. 11-13 (Feb. 10, 
2001).
Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the Law School's 
expert, focused on the predicted effect of 
eliminating race as a factor in the Law 
School's admission process.  In Dr. 
Raudenbush's view, a race-blind admissions 
system would have a "'very dramatic,'" 
negative effect on underrepresented minority 
admissions.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 223a.  He 
testified that in 2000, 35 percent of 
underrepresented minority applicants were 
admitted.  Ibid. Dr. Raudenbush predicted 
that if race were not considered, only 10 
percent of those applicants would have been 
admitted.  Ibid. Under this scenario, 
underrepresented minority students would 
have comprised 4 percent of the entering 
class in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 
14.5 percent.  Ibid.
 [**2335]   [*321]  In the end, the District 
Court concluded that the Law School's use of 
race as a factor in admissions decisions was 
unlawful.  Applying strict scrutiny, the 
District Court determined that the Law 
School's asserted interest in assembling a 
diverse student body was not compelling 
because "the attainment of a racially diverse 
class . . . was not recognized as such by 
Bakke and is not a remedy for past 
discrimination." Id., at 246a.  The District 
Court went on to hold that even if diversity 
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were compelling, the Law School had not 
narrowly tailored its use of race to further 
that interest.  The District Court granted 
petitioner's request for declaratory relief and 
enjoined the Law School from using race as a 
factor in its admissions decisions.  The Court 
of Appeals entered a stay of the injunction 
pending appeal.
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the District Court's judgment and 
vacated the injunction.  The Court of Appeals 
first held that Justice Powell's opinion in 
Bakke was binding precedent establishing 
diversity as a compelling state interest. 
According to the Court of Appeals, Justice 
Powell's opinion with respect to diversity 
comprised the controlling rationale for the 
judgment of this Court under the analysis set 
forth in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977).  
The Court of Appeals also held that the Law 
School's use of race was narrowly tailored 
because race was merely a "potential 'plus' 
factor" and because the Law School's 
program was "virtually identical"  [***328]  
to the Harvard admissions program described 
approvingly by Justice Powell and appended 
to his Bakke opinion.  288 F.3d 732, 746, 749 
(CA6 2002). 
Four dissenting judges would have held the 
Law School's use of race unconstitutional.  
Three of the dissenters, rejecting the 
majority's Marks analysis, examined the Law 
School's interest in student body diversity on 
the merits and concluded it was not 
compelling.  The fourth dissenter, writing 
separately, found it unnecessary to decide 
whether diversity was a compelling interest 
because, like the other dissenters,  [*322]  he 
believed that the Law School's use of race 
was not narrowly tailored to further that 
interest.
 [***HR4A]  [4A] We granted certiorari, 537 
U.S. 1043, 537 U.S. 1043, 154 L. Ed. 2d 514, 
123 S. Ct. 617 (2002), to resolve the 
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals 
on a question of national importance: 
Whether diversity is a compelling interest 
that can justify the narrowly tailored use of 
race in selecting applicants for admission to 
public universities.  Compare Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (CA5 1996) (Hopwood I) 
(holding that diversity is not a compelling 
state interest), with Smith v. University of 
Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (CA9 
2000) (holding that it is). 
II
A
We last addressed the use of race in public 
higher education over 25 years ago.  In the 
landmark Bakke case, we reviewed a racial 
set-aside program that reserved 16 out of 100 
seats in a medical school class for members 
of certain minority groups.  438 U.S. 265, 57 
L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).  The 
decision produced six separate opinions, 
none of which commanded a majority of the 
Court.  Four Justices would have upheld the 
program against all attack on the ground that 
the government can use race to "remedy 
disadvantages cast on minorities by past 
racial prejudice."  Id., at 325, 57 L Ed 2d 
750, 98 S Ct 2733 (joint opinion of Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting 
in part).  Four other Justices avoided the 
constitutional question altogether and struck 
down the program on statutory grounds.  Id., 
at 408, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 
(opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C. 
J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring 
in judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Powell provided a fifth vote not only 
for invalidating the set-aside program, but 
[**2336]  also for reversing the state court's 
injunction against any use of race 
whatsoever.  The only holding for the Court 
in Bakke was that a "State has a substantial 
interest that legitimately may be served by a 
properly devised admissions program 
involving  [*323]  the competitive 
consideration of race and ethnic origin."  Id., 
at 320, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  Thus, 
we reversed that part of the lower court's 
judgment that enjoined the university "from 
any consideration of the race of any 
applicant." Ibid.
Since this Court's splintered decision in 
Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion announcing 
the judgment of the Court has served as the 
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touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-
conscious admissions policies.  Public and 
private universities across the Nation have 
modeled their own admissions programs on 
Justice Powell's views on permissible race-
conscious  [***329]  policies.  See, e.g., 
Brief for Judith Areen et al. as Amici Curiae
12-13 (law school admissions programs 
employ "methods designed from and based 
on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke"); Brief 
for Amherst College et al. as Amici Curiae 27 
("After Bakke, each of the amici (and 
undoubtedly other selective colleges and 
universities as well) reviewed their 
admissions procedures in light of Justice 
Powell's opinion . . . and set sail 
accordingly").  We therefore discuss Justice 
Powell's opinion in some detail.
Justice Powell began by stating that "the 
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean 
one thing when applied to one individual and 
something else when applied to a person of 
another color.  If both are not accorded the 
same protection, then it is not equal."  Bakke, 
438 U.S., at 289- 290, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S 
Ct 2733. In Justice Powell's view, when 
governmental decisions "touch upon an 
individual's race or ethnic background, he is 
entitled to a judicial determination that the 
burden he is asked to bear on that basis is 
precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest."  Id., at 299, 57 L Ed 
2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  Under this exacting 
standard, only one of the interests asserted by 
the university survived Justice Powell's 
scrutiny.
First, Justice Powell rejected an interest in 
"'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally 
disfavored minorities in medical schools and 
in the medical profession'" as an unlawful 
interest in racial balancing.  Id., at 306-307, 
57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  Second, 
Justice Powell rejected an interest in 
remedying societal discrimination  [*324]  
because such measures would risk placing 
unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties 
"who bear no responsibility for whatever 
harm the beneficiaries of the special 
admissions program are thought to have 
suffered."  Id., at 310, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S 
Ct 2733.  Third, Justice Powell rejected an 
interest in "increasing the number of 
physicians who will practice in communities 
currently underserved," concluding that even 
if such an interest could be compelling in 
some circumstances the program under 
review was not "geared to promote that 
goal."  Id., at 306, 310, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S 
Ct 2733. 
Justice Powell approved the university's use 
of race to further only one interest: "the 
attainment of a diverse student body."  Id., at 
311, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  With the 
important proviso that "constitutional 
limitations protecting individual rights may 
not be disregarded," Justice Powell grounded 
his analysis in the academic freedom that 
"long has been viewed as a special concern of 
the First Amendment."  Id., at 312, 314, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  Justice Powell 
emphasized that nothing less than the 
"'nation's future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure' to the ideas and 
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of 
many peoples."  Id., at 313, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 
98 S Ct 2733 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 
589, 603, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629, 87 S. Ct. 675 
(1967)).  In seeking the "right to select those 
students who will contribute the most to the 
'robust exchange of ideas,'" a university seeks 
"to achieve a goal that is of paramount 
importance in the fulfillment of its mission." 
438 US, at 313, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 
2733.  Both "tradition and experience lend 
support  [***330]  to [**2337]  the view that 
the contribution of diversity is substantial." 
Ibid.
Justice Powell was, however, careful to 
emphasize that in his view race "is only one 
element in a range of factors a university 
properly may consider in attaining the goal of 
a heterogeneous student body."  Id., at 314, 
57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  For Justice 
Powell, "it is not an interest in simple ethnic 
diversity, in which a specified percentage of 
the student body is in effect guaranteed to be 
members of selected ethnic groups," that  
[*325]  can justify the use of race.  Id., at 
315, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  Rather, 
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"the diversity that furthers a compelling state 
interest encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element." Ibid.
In the wake of our fractured decision in 
Bakke, courts have struggled to discern 
whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale, 
set forth in part of the opinion joined by no 
other Justice, is nonetheless binding 
precedent under Marks. In that case, we 
explained that "when a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on 
the narrowest grounds." 430 US, at 193, 51 L 
Ed 2d 260, 97 S Ct 990 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  As the 
divergent opinions of the lower courts 
demonstrate, however, "this test is more 
easily stated than applied to the various 
opinions supporting the result in [Bakke]."  
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-
746, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745, 114 S. Ct. 1921 
(1994) .  Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Board of 
Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 
(CA11 2001) (Justice Powell's diversity 
rationale was not the holding of the Court); 
Hopwood v. Texas , 236 F.3d 256, 274-275 
(CA5 2000) (Hopwood II) (same); Hopwood 
I, 78 F.3d 932 (same), with Smith v. 
University of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 
1199 (Justice Powell's opinion, including the 
diversity rationale, is controlling under 
Marks). 
 [***HR4B]  [4B] We do not find it 
necessary to decide whether Justice Powell's 
opinion is binding under Marks. It does not 
seem "useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to 
the utmost logical possibility when it has so 
obviously baffled and divided the lower 
courts that have considered it."  Nichols v. 
United States, supra, at 745-746, 128 L Ed 
2d 745, 114 S Ct 1921.  More important, for 
the reasons set out below, today we endorse 
Justice Powell's view that student body 
diversity is a compelling state interest that 
can justify the use of race in university 
admissions. 
 [*326]  B
 [***HR5]  [5]  [***HR6]  [6] The Equal 
Protection Clause provides that no State shall 
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.  " U.S. Const., 
Amdt. 14, §  2.  Because the Fourteenth 
Amendment "protects persons, not groups," 
all "governmental action based on race--a 
group classification long recognized as in 
most circumstances irrelevant and therefore 
prohibited--should be subjected to detailed 
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal
right to equal protection of the laws has not 
been infringed."  Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena,  515 U.S. 200, 227, 132 L. Ed. 2d 
158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (emphasis in 
original; internal  [***331]  quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  We are a "free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality."  Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 
(1967) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  It follows from that principle that 
"government may treat people differently 
because of their race only for the most 
compelling reasons."  Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S., at 227, 132 L Ed 2d
158, 115 S Ct 2097. 
We have held that all racial classifications 
imposed by government "must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."  
IbidIbid. This means that such classifications 
are constitutional only if they are narrowly 
tailored to further compelling [**2338]  
governmental interests.  "Absent searching 
judicial inquiry into the justification for such 
race-based measures," we have no way to 
determine what "classifications are 'benign' 
or 'remedial' and what classifications are in 
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of 
racial inferiority or simple racial politics."  
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
493, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. Ct. 706 
(1989) (plurality opinion).  We apply strict 
scrutiny to all racial classifications to
"'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by 
assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal 
important enough to warrant use of a highly 
suspect tool." Ibid.
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Strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact."  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, supra, at 237, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S 
Ct 2097 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Although all governmental  
[*327]  uses of race are subject to strict 
scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it.  As we 
have explained, "whenever the government 
treats any person unequally because of his or 
her race, that person has suffered an injury 
that falls squarely within the language and 
spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal 
protection."  515 U.S., at 229-230, 132 L Ed 
2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097.  But that observation 
"says nothing about the ultimate validity of 
any particular law; that determination is the 
job of the court applying strict scrutiny."  Id., 
at 230, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097.  
When race-based action is necessary to 
further a compelling governmental interest, 
such action does not violate the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection so long as the 
narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.
 [***HR7]  [7] Context matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action 
under the Equal Protection Clause.  See 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-
344, 5 L. Ed. 2d 110, 81 S. Ct. 125 (1960) 
(admonishing that, "in dealing with claims 
under broad provisions of the Constitution, 
which derive content by an interpretive 
process of inclusion and exclusion, it is 
imperative that generalizations, based on and 
qualified by the concrete situations that gave 
rise to them, must not be applied out of 
context in disregard of variant controlling 
facts").  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v 
Pena, we made clear that strict scrutiny must 
take "'relevant differences' into account.  " 
515 US, at 228, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 
2097.  Indeed, as we explained, that is its 
"fundamental purpose." Ibid. Not every 
decision influenced by race is equally 
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed 
to provide a framework for carefully 
examining the importance and the sincerity 
of the reasons advanced by the governmental  
[***332]  decisionmaker for the use of race 
in that particular context.
III
A
 [***HR8A]  [8A] With these principles in 
mind, we turn to the question whether the 
Law School's use of race is justified by a 
compelling state interest. Before this Court, 
as they have  [*328]  throughout this 
litigation, respondents assert only one 
justification for their use of race in the 
admissions process: obtaining "the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body." Brief for Respondents 
Bollinger et al. i.  In other words, the Law 
School asks us to recognize, in the context of 
higher education, a compelling state interest 
in student body diversity.
 [***HR1B]  [1B]  [***HR4C]  [4C]  
[***HR8B]  [8B] We first wish to dispel the 
notion that the Law School's argument has 
been foreclosed, either expressly or 
implicitly, by our affirmative-action cases 
decided since Bakke. It is true that some 
language in those opinions might be read to 
suggest that remedying past discrimination is 
the only permissible justification for race-
based governmental action.  See, e.g.,
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493, 
102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 706 (plurality 
opinion) (stating that unless classifications 
based on race are "strictly reserved for 
remedial settings, they may in fact promote 
notions of racial inferiority and lead to a 
politics of [**2339]  racial hostility").  But
we have never held that the only 
governmental use of race that can survive 
strict scrutiny is remedying past 
discrimination.  Nor, since Bakke, have we 
directly addressed the use of race in the 
context of public higher education. Today, 
we hold that the Law School has a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse 
student body.
 [***HR8C]  [8C] The Law School's 
educational judgment that such diversity is 
essential to its educational mission is one to 
which we defer.  The Law School's 
assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield 
educational benefits is substantiated by 
respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of 
the interest asserted by the Law School is no 
less strict for taking into account complex 
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educational judgments in an area that lies 
primarily within the expertise of the 
university.  Our holding today is in keeping 
with our tradition of giving a degree of 
deference to a university's academic 
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed 
limits.  See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. 
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 88 L. Ed. 2d 523, 
106 S. Ct. 507 (1985); Board of Curators of 
Univ. of Mo.  [*329]  v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 
78, 96, n. 6, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124, 98 S. Ct. 948 
(1978); Bakke, 438 U.S., at 319, n. 53, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733  [*330]  (opinion of 
Powell, J.). 
 [***HR8D]  [8D]  [***HR9]  [9] We have 
long recognized that, given the important 
purpose of public education and the 
expansive freedoms of speech and thought 
associated with the university environment, 
universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.  See, e.g., Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195, 97 L. Ed. 216, 
73 S. Ct. 215 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U.S. 234, 250, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311, 77 S. Ct. 
1203 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 487, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 81 S. Ct. 247 
(1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of 
Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U.S., at 603, 17 L 
Ed 2d 629, 87 S Ct 675.  In announcing the 
principle of student body diversity as a 
compelling state interest, Justice Powell  
[***333]  invoked our cases recognizing a 
constitutional dimension, grounded in the 
First Amendment, of educational autonomy: 
"The freedom of a university to make its own 
judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body."  Bakke, supra, 
at 312, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  From 
this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by 
claiming "the right to select those students 
who will contribute the most to the 'robust 
exchange of ideas,'" a university "seeks to 
achieve a goal that is of paramount 
importance in the fulfillment of its mission." 
438 US, at 313, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 
2733 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents 
of Univ. of State of N. Y., supra, at 603, 17 L 
Ed 2d 629, 87 S Ct 675).  Our conclusion that 
the Law School has a compelling interest in a 
diverse student body is informed by our view 
that attaining a diverse student body is at the 
heart of the Law School's proper institutional 
mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a 
university is "presumed" absent "a showing 
to the contrary."  438 U.S., at 318-319, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733. 
 [***HR8E]  [8E]  [***HR10]  [10] As part 
of its goal of "assembling a class that is both 
exceptionally academically qualified and 
broadly diverse, " the Law School seeks to 
"enroll a 'critical mass' of minority students." 
Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 13.  
The Law School's interest is not simply "to 
assure within its student body some specified 
percentage of a particular group merely 
because of its race or ethnic origin."  Bakke, 
438 U.S., at 307, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 
2733 (opinion of Powell, J.).  That would 
amount to outright racial balancing, which is 
patently unconstitutional.  Ibid.; Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494, 118 L. Ed. 2d 108, 
112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) ("Racial balance is 
not to be achieved for its own sake"); 
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S., at 
507, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 706.  Rather, 
the Law School's concept of critical mass is 
defined by reference to the educational 
benefits that diversity is designed to produce.
 [***HR8F]  [8F] These benefits are 
substantial.  As the District Court 
emphasized, the Law School's admissions 
policy promotes "cross-racial understanding," 
helps to [**2340]  break down racial 
stereotypes, and "enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races." App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 246a.  These benefits are 
"important and laudable," because 
"classroom discussion is livelier, more 
spirited,  and simply more enlightening and 
interesting" when the students have "the 
greatest possible variety of backgrounds." Id.,
at 246a, 244a.
The Law School's claim of a compelling 
interest is further bolstered by its amici, who 
point to the educational benefits that flow 
from student body diversity. In addition to 
the expert studies and reports entered into 
evidence at trial, numerous studies show that 
student body diversity promotes learning 
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outcomes, and "better prepares students for 
an increasingly diverse workforce and 
society, and better prepares them as 
professionals." Brief for American 
Educational Research Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae 3; see, e.g., W. Bowen & D. 
Bok, The Shape of the River (1998); 
Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the 
Impact of Affirmative Action (G. Orfield & 
M. Kurlaender eds. 2001); Compelling 
Interest: Examining the Evidence on Racial 
Dynamics in Colleges and Universities (M. 
Chang, D. Witt, J. Jones, & K. Hakuta eds. 
2003).
These benefits are not theoretical  [***334]  
but real, as major American businesses have 
made clear that the skills needed in today's 
increasingly global marketplace can only be 
developed through exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and 
viewpoints.  Brief for 3M et al. as Amici 
Curiae 5;  [*331]  Brief for General Motors 
Corp. as Amicus Curiae 3-4.  What is more, 
high-ranking retired officers and civilian 
leaders of the United States military assert 
that, "based on [their] decades of 
experience," a "highly qualified, racially 
diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the 
military's ability to fulfill its principle 
mission to provide national security." Brief 
for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici 
Curiae 27.  The primary sources for the 
Nation's officer corps are the service 
academies and the Reserve Officers Training 
Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students 
already admitted to participating colleges and 
universities.  Id., at 5.  At present, "the 
military cannot achieve an officer corps that 
is both highly qualified and racially diverse 
unless the service academies and the ROTC 
used limited race-conscious recruiting and 
admissions policies." Ibid. (emphasis in 
original).  To fulfill its mission, the military 
"must be selective in admissions for training 
and education for the officer corps, and it 
must train and educate a highly qualified, 
racially diverse officer corps in a racially 
diverse setting." Id., at 29 (emphasis in 
original).  We agree that "it requires only a 
small step from this analysis to conclude that 
our country's other most selective institutions 
must remain both diverse and selective." Ibid.
We have repeatedly acknowledged the 
overriding importance of preparing students 
for work and citizenship, describing 
education as pivotal to "sustaining our 
political and cultural heritage" with a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of 
society.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 72 
L. Ed. 2d 786, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).  This 
Court has long recognized that "education . . . 
is the very foundation of good citizenship."  
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 
493, 98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).  For 
this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institutions of 
higher education must be accessible to all 
individuals regardless of race or ethnicity. 
The United States, as amicus curiae, affirms 
that "ensuring that public institutions are 
open and available to all segments of 
American  [*332]  society, including people 
of all races and ethnicities, represents a 
paramount government objective." Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 13.  And, 
"nowhere is the importance of such openness 
more acute than in the context of higher 
education." Ibid. Effective participation by 
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the 
civic life of our Nation is [**2341]  essential 
if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to 
be realized.
Moreover, universities, and in particular, law 
schools, represent the training ground for a 
large number of our Nation's leaders.  Sweatt
v. Painter , 339 U.S. 629, 634, 94 L. Ed. 
1114, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950) (describing law 
school as a "proving ground for legal 
learning and practice").  Individuals with law 
degrees occupy roughly half the state 
governorships, more than half the seats in the 
United States Senate, and more than a third 
of the seats in the United States House of 
Representatives.  See Brief for Association of 
American  [***335]  Law Schools as Amicus 
Curiae 5-6.  The pattern is even more striking 
when it comes to highly selective law 
schools.  A handful of these schools accounts 
for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 
United States Courts of Appeals judges, and 
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nearly 200 of the more than 600 United 
States District Court judges.  Id., at 6.
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is 
necessary that the path to leadership be 
visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All 
members of our heterogeneous society must 
have confidence in the openness and integrity 
of the educational institutions that provide 
this training. As we have recognized, law 
schools "cannot be effective in isolation from 
the individuals and institutions with which 
the law interacts." See Sweatt v. Painter, 
supra, at 634, 94 L Ed 1114, 70 S Ct 848.  
Access to legal education (and thus the legal 
profession) must be inclusive of talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our 
heterogeneous society  [*333]  may 
participate in the educational institutions that 
provide the training and education necessary 
to succeed in America.
The Law School does not premise its need 
for critical mass on "any belief that minority 
students always (or even consistently) 
express some characteristic minority 
viewpoint on any issue." Brief for 
Respondent Bollinger et al. 30.  To the 
contrary, diminishing the force of such 
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law 
School's mission, and one that it cannot 
accomplish with only token numbers of 
minority students.  Just as growing up in a 
particular region or having particular 
professional experiences is likely to affect an 
individual's views, so too is one's own, 
unique experience of being a racial minority 
in a society, like our own, in which race 
unfortunately still matters.  The Law School 
has determined, based on its experience and 
expertise, that a "critical mass" of 
underrepresented minorities is necessary to 
further its compelling interest in securing the 
educational benefits of a diverse student 
body.
B
 [***HR11]  [11] Even in the limited 
circumstance when drawing racial 
distinctions is permissible to further a 
compelling state interest, government is still 
"constrained in how it may pursue that end: 
[T]he means chosen to accomplish the 
[government's] asserted purpose must be 
specifically and narrowly framed to 
accomplish that purpose."  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U.S. 899, 908, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207, 116 S. Ct. 
1894 (1996) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The purpose of the narrow 
tailoring requirement is to ensure that "the 
means chosen 'fit' . . . the compelling goal so 
closely that there is little or no possibility that 
the motive for the classification was 
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype."  
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S., at 
493, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 706 
(plurality opinion). 
 [***HR12A]  [12A] Since Bakke, we have 
had no occasion to define the contours of the 
narrow-tailoring inquiry with respect to race-
conscious university admissions programs.  
That inquiry  [*334]  must be calibrated to fit 
the distinct issues raised by the use of race to 
achieve student body diversity in public 
higher education. Contrary to Justice 
Kennedy's assertions, we do not  [***336]  
"abandon[] strict scrutiny," see post, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 374 (dissenting opinion).  Rather, as 
we have already [**2342]  explained, ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 331, we adhere to Adarand's 
teaching that the very purpose of strict 
scrutiny is to take such "relevant differences 
into account." 515 US, at 228, 132 L Ed 2d 
158, 115 S Ct 2097 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious 
admissions program cannot use a quota 
system--it cannot "insulate each category of 
applicants with certain desired qualifications 
from competition with all other applicants."  
Bakke, supra, at 315, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S 
Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.).  Instead, a 
university may consider race or ethnicity 
only as a "'plus' in a particular applicant's 
file," without "insulating the individual from 
comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats."  Id., at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 
98 S Ct 2733.  In other words, an admissions 
program must be "flexible enough to consider 
all pertinent elements of diversity in light of 
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the particular qualifications of each applicant, 
and to place them on the same footing for 
consideration, although not necessarily 
according them the same weight." Ibid.
 [***HR1C]  [1C]  [***HR12B]  [12B]  
[***HR13A]  [13A] We find that the Law 
School's admissions program bears the 
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan.  As 
Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly 
individualized consideration demands that 
race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical 
way.  It follows from this mandate that 
universities cannot establish quotas for 
members of certain racial groups or put 
members of those groups on separate 
admissions tracks.  See id., at 315-316, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.  Nor can 
universities insulate applicants who belong to 
certain racial or ethnic groups from the 
competition for admission.  Ibid. Universities 
can, however, consider race or ethnicity more 
flexibly as a "plus" factor in the context of 
individualized consideration of each and 
every applicant.  Ibid.
 [***HR13B]  [13B]  [***HR14A]  [14A]  
[***HR15]  [15]  [*335]  We are satisfied 
that the Law School's admissions program, 
like the Harvard plan described by Justice 
Powell, does not operate as a quota.  Properly 
understood, a "quota" is a program in which a 
certain fixed number or proportion of 
opportunities are "reserved exclusively for 
certain minority groups."  Richmond v. J. A. 
Croson Co., supra, at 496, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 
109 S Ct 706 (plurality opinion).  Quotas 
"'impose a fixed number or percentage which 
must be attained, or which cannot be 
exceeded,'" Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495, 92 L. Ed. 2d 
344, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and 
"insulate the individual from comparison 
with all other candidates for the available 
seats."  Bakke, supra, at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 
98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.).  In 
contrast, "a permissible goal . . . requires only 
a good-faith effort . . . to come within a range 
demarcated by the goal itself," Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at 495, 92 L Ed 2d 
344, 106 S Ct 3019, and permits 
consideration of race as a "plus" factor in any 
given case while still ensuring that each 
candidate "competes with all other qualified 
applicants," Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 638, 
94 L. Ed. 2d 615, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
Justice Powell's distinction between  
[***337]  the medical school's rigid 16-seat 
quota and Harvard's flexible use of race as a 
"plus" factor is instructive.  Harvard certainly 
had minimum goals for minority enrollment, 
even if it had no specific number firmly in 
mind.  See Bakke, supra, at 323, 57 L Ed 2d 
750, 98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) 
("10 or 20 black students could not begin to 
bring to their classmates and to each other the 
variety of points of view, backgrounds and 
experiences of blacks in the United States").  
What is more, Justice Powell flatly rejected 
the argument that Harvard's program was 
"the functional equivalent of a quota" merely 
because it had some "'plus'" for race, or gave 
greater "weight" to race than to some other 
factors, in order to achieve student body 
diversity.  438 U.S., at 317-318, 57 L Ed 2d 
750, 98 S Ct 2733. 
 [***HR14B]  [14B]  [**2343]  The Law 
School's goal of attaining a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students does not 
transform its program  [*336]  into a quota. 
As the Harvard plan described by Justice 
Powell recognized, there is of course "some 
relationship between numbers and achieving 
the benefits to be derived from a diverse 
student body, and between numbers and 
providing a reasonable environment for those 
students admitted."  Id., at 323, 57 L Ed 2d 
750, 98 S Ct 2733.  "Some attention to 
numbers," without more, does not transform 
a flexible admissions system into a rigid 
quota. Ibid. Nor, as Justice Kennedy posits, 
does the Law School's consultation of the 
"daily reports," which keep track of the racial 
and ethnic composition of the class (as well 
as of residency and gender), "suggest[] there 
was no further attempt at individual review 
save for race itself" during the final stages of 
the admissions process.  See post, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 373 (dissenting opinion).  To the 
contrary, the Law School's admissions 
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officers testified without contradiction that 
they never gave race any more or less weight 
based on the information contained in these 
reports.  Brief for Respondents Bollinger et 
al. 43, n 70 (citing App. in Nos. 01-1447 and 
01-1516 (CA6), p 7336).  Moreover, as 
Justice Kennedy concedes, see post, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 372, between 1993 and 2000, the 
number of African-American, Latino,  and 
Native-American students in each class at the 
Law School varied from 13.5 to 20.1 percent, 
a range inconsistent with a quota. 
The Chief Justice believes that the Law 
School's policy conceals an attempt to 
achieve racial balancing, and cites 
admissions data to contend that the Law 
School discriminates among different groups 
within the critical mass. Post, at 156 L Ed 2d, 
at 371-375 (dissenting opinion).  But, as the 
Chief Justice concedes, the number of 
underrepresented minority students who 
ultimately enroll in the Law School differs 
substantially from their representation in the 
applicant pool and varies considerably for 
each group from year to year.  See post, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 375 (dissenting opinion). 
 [***HR16]  [16] That a race-conscious 
admissions program does not operate as a 
quota does not, by itself, satisfy the 
requirement of individualized consideration.  
When using race as a "plus"  [*337]  factor in 
university admissions, a university's 
admissions program must remain flexible 
enough to ensure that each applicant is 
evaluated as an individual and not in a way  
[***338]  that makes an applicant's race or 
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her 
application.  The importance of this 
individualized consideration in the context of 
a race-conscious admissions program is 
paramount.  See Bakke, supra, at 318, n. 52, 
57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of 
Powell, J.) (identifying the "denial . . . of the 
right to individualized consideration" as the 
"principal evil" of the medical school's 
admissions program).
 [***HR13C]  [13C]  [***HR17]  [17] Here, 
the Law School engages in a highly 
individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant's file, giving serious consideration 
to all the ways an applicant might contribute 
to a diverse educational environment.  The 
Law School affords this individualized 
consideration to applicants of all races.  
There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, 
of automatic acceptance or rejection based on 
any single "soft" variable.  Unlike the 
program at issue in Gratz v Bollinger, ante, 
the Law School awards no mechanical, 
predetermined diversity "bonuses" based on 
race or ethnicity. See ante, at 156 L Ed 2d 
257, 123 S Ct 2411 (distinguishing a race-
conscious admissions program that 
automatically awards 20 points based on race 
from the Harvard plan, which considered race 
but "did not contemplate that any single 
characteristic automatically ensured a 
specific and identifiable contribution to a 
university's diversity").  Like the Harvard 
plan, the Law School's admissions policy "is 
flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements of diversity in light of the particular 
qualifications of each applicant, and to place 
them on the same footing for consideration, 
although not necessarily according [**2344]  
them the same weight."  Bakke, supra, at 317, 
at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 
(opinion of Powell, J.). 
 [***HR13D]  [13D]  [***HR18A]  [18A] 
We also find that, like the Harvard plan 
Justice Powell referenced in Bakke, the Law 
School's race-conscious admissions program 
adequately ensures that all factors that may 
contribute to student body diversity are 
meaningfully considered alongside race in 
admissions decisions.  With respect  [*338]  
to the use of race itself, all underrepresented 
minority students admitted by the Law 
School have been deemed qualified.  By 
virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial 
inequality, such students are both likely to 
have experiences of particular importance to 
the Law School's mission, and less likely to 
be admitted in meaningful numbers on 
criteria that ignore those experiences.  See 
App. 120.
 [***HR18B]  [18B] The Law School does 
not, however, limit in any way the broad 
range of qualities and experiences that may 
be considered valuable contributions to 
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student body diversity. To the contrary, the 
1992 policy makes clear "there are many 
possible bases for diversity admissions," and 
provides examples of admittees who have 
lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in 
several languages, have overcome personal 
adversity and family hardship, have 
exceptional records of extensive community 
service, and have had successful careers in 
other fields.  Id., at 118-119.  The Law 
School seriously considers each "applicant's 
promise of making a notable contribution to 
the class by way of a particular strength, 
attainment, or characteristic--e.g., an unusual 
intellectual achievement, employment 
experience, nonacademic performance, or 
personal background." Id., at 83-84.  All 
applicants have the opportunity  [***339]  to 
highlight their own potential diversity 
contributions through the submission of a 
personal statement, letters of 
recommendation, and an essay describing the 
ways in which the applicant will contribute to 
the life and diversity of the Law School.
What is more, the Law School actually gives 
substantial weight to diversity factors besides 
race.  The Law School frequently accepts 
nonminority applicants with grades and test 
scores lower than underrepresented minority 
applicants (and other nonminority applicants) 
who are rejected.  See Brief for Respondents 
Bollinger et al. 10; App. 121-122.  This 
shows that the Law School seriously weighs 
many other diversity factors besides race that 
can make a real and dispositive difference for 
nonminority applicants as well.  By this  
[*339]  flexible approach, the Law School 
sufficiently takes into account, in practice as 
well as in theory, a wide variety of 
characteristics besides race and ethnicity that 
contribute to a diverse student body. Justice 
Kennedy speculates that "race is likely 
outcome determinative for many members of 
minority groups" who do not fall within the 
upper range of LSAT scores and grades. 
Post, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 371 (dissenting 
opinion).  But the same could be said of the 
Harvard plan discussed approvingly by 
Justice Powell in Bakke, and indeed of any 
plan that uses race as one of many factors.  
See 438 US, at 316, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 
2733 ("'When the Committee on Admissions 
reviews the large middle group of applicants 
who are "admissible" and deemed capable of 
doing good work in their courses, the race of 
an applicant may tip the balance in his 
favor'"). 
 [***HR19A]  [19A]  [***HR20]  [20] 
Petitioner and the United States argue that the 
Law School's plan is not narrowly tailored 
because race-neutral means exist to obtain 
the educational benefits of student body 
diversity that the Law School seeks.  We 
disagree.  Narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative.  Nor does it require a university 
to choose between maintaining a reputation 
for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to 
provide educational opportunities to 
members of all racial groups.  See Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280, n. 6, 
90 L. Ed. 2d 260, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) 
(alternatives must serve the interest "'about as 
well'"); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S., at 509- 510, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 
706 [**2345]  (plurality opinion) (city had a 
"whole array of race-neutral" alternatives 
because changing requirements "would have 
[had] little detrimental effect on the city's 
interests").  Narrow tailoring does, however, 
require serious, good faith consideration of 
workable race-neutral alternatives that will 
achieve the diversity the university seeks.  
See id., at 507, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 
706 (set-aside plan not narrowly tailored 
where "there does not appear to have been 
any consideration of the use of race-neutral 
means"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 
supra, at 280, n. 6, 90 L Ed 2d 260, 106 S Ct 
1842 (narrow tailoring  [*340]  "requires 
consideration" of "lawful alternative and less 
restrictive means"). 
 [***HR13E]  [13E]  [***HR19B]  [19B] 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
Law School sufficiently considered workable 
race-neutral alternatives.  The District Court 
took the Law School to task for failing to 
consider race-neutral alternatives such as 
"using a lottery system" or "decreasing the 
emphasis  [***340]  for all applicants on 
233
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores." App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 251a.  But these alternatives 
would require a dramatic sacrifice of 
diversity, the academic quality of all admitted 
students, or both.
The Law School's current admissions 
program considers race as one factor among 
many, in an effort to assemble a student body 
that is diverse in ways broader than race.  
Because a lottery would make that kind of 
nuanced judgment impossible, it would 
effectively sacrifice all other educational 
values, not to mention every other kind of 
diversity. So too with the suggestion that the 
Law School simply lower admissions 
standards for all students, a drastic remedy 
that would require the Law School to become 
a much different institution and sacrifice a 
vital component of its educational mission. 
The United States advocates "percentage 
plans," recently adopted by public 
undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, 
and California to guarantee admission to all 
students above a certain class-rank threshold 
in every high school in the State.  Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 14-18.  The 
United States does not, however, explain how 
such plans could work for graduate and 
professional schools.  More-over, even 
assuming such plans are race-neutral, they 
may preclude the university from conducting 
the individualized assessments necessary to 
assemble a student body that is not just 
racially diverse, but diverse along all the 
qualities valued by the university.  We are 
satisfied that the Law School adequately 
considered race-neutral alternatives currently 
capable of producing a critical mass without 
forcing the Law School to abandon the 
academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of 
its educational mission.
 [***HR21]  [21]  [***HR22A]  [22A]  
[*341]  We acknowledge that "there are 
serious problems of justice connected with 
the idea of preference itself."  Bakke, 438 
U.S., at 298, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 
(opinion of Powell, J.).  Narrow tailoring,  
therefore, requires that a race-conscious 
admissions program not unduly harm 
members of any racial group.  Even remedial 
race-based governmental action generally 
"remains subject to continuing oversight to 
assure that it will work the least harm 
possible to other innocent persons competing 
for the benefit."  Id., at 308, 57 L Ed 2d 750,
98 S Ct 2733.  To be narrowly tailored, a 
race-conscious admissions program must not 
"unduly burden individuals who are not 
members of the favored racial and ethnic 
groups."  Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 630, 111 L. Ed. 2d 445, 110 S. 
Ct. 2997 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
 [***HR22B]  [22B]  [***HR23]  [23] We 
are satisfied that the Law School's admissions 
program does not.  Because the Law School 
considers "all pertinent elements of 
diversity," it can (and does) select 
nonminority applicants who have greater 
potential to enhance student body diversity 
over underrepresented minority applicants.  
See Bakke, supra, at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 
S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.).  As Justice 
Powell recognized in Bakke, so long as a 
race-conscious admissions program uses race 
as a "plus" factor in the context of [**2346]  
individualized consideration, a rejected 
applicant 
"will not  have been foreclosed 
from all consideration for that seat 
simply because he was not the right 
color or had the wrong surname . . . .  
His qualifications would  [***341]  
have been weighed fairly and 
competitively, and he would have no 
basis to complain of unequal 
treatment under the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 438 US, at 318, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733.
 [***HR13F]  [13F]  [***HR22C]  
[22C] We agree that, in the context of its 
individualized inquiry into the possible 
diversity contributions of all applicants, the 
Law School's race-conscious admissions 
program does not unduly harm nonminority 
applicants.
 [***HR24]  [24]  [***HR25A]  [25A]  
[***HR26]  [26] We are mindful, however, 
that "[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to do away with all 
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governmentally imposed discrimination 
based on race."  Palmore v. Sidoti,  [*342]  
466 U.S. 429, 432, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421, 104 S. 
Ct. 1879 (1984).  Accordingly, race-
conscious admissions policies must be 
limited in time.  This requirement reflects 
that racial classifications, however 
compelling their goals, are potentially so 
dangerous that they may be employed no 
more broadly than the interest demands.  
Enshrining a permanent justification for 
racial preferences would offend this 
fundamental equal protection principle.  We 
see no reason to exempt race-conscious 
admissions programs from the requirement 
that all governmental use of race must have a 
logical end point.  The Law School, too, 
concedes that all "race-conscious programs 
must have reasonable durational limits." 
Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 32.
 [***HR25B]  [25B] In the context of higher 
education, the durational requirement can be 
met by sunset provisions in race-conscious 
admissions policies and periodic reviews to 
determine whether racial preferences are still 
necessary to achieve student body diversity. 
Universities in California, Florida, and 
Washington State, where racial preferences 
in admissions are prohibited by state law, are 
currently engaged in experimenting with a 
wide variety of alternative approaches.  
Universities in other States can and should 
draw on the most promising aspects of these 
race-neutral alternatives as they develop.  Cf. 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581, 
131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The States may 
perform their role as laboratories for 
experimentation to devise various solutions 
where the best solution is far from clear"). 
The requirement that all race-conscious 
admissions programs have a termination 
point "assures all citizens that the deviation 
from the norm of equal treatment of all racial 
and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a 
measure taken in the service of the goal of 
equality itself."  Richmond v. J. A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S., at 510, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 
S Ct 706 (plurality opinion); see also 
Nathanson & Bartnik, The Constitutionality 
of Preferential Treatment for Minority 
Applicants to Professional Schools,  [*343]  
58 Chicago Bar Rec. 282, 293 (May-June 
1977) ("It would be a sad day indeed, were 
America to become a quota-ridden society, 
with each identifiable minority assigned 
proportional representation in every desirable 
walk of life.  But that is not the rationale for 
programs of preferential treatment; the acid 
test of their justification will be their efficacy 
in eliminating the need for any racial or 
ethnic preferences at all"). 
 [***HR1D]  [1D] We take the Law School 
at its word that it would "like nothing better 
than to find a race-neutral admissions 
formula" and will terminate its  [***342]  
race-conscious admissions program as soon 
as practicable.  See Brief for Respondents 
Bollinger et al. 34; Bakke, supra, at 317-318, 
57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of 
Powell, J.) (presuming good faith of 
university officials in the absence of a 
showing to the contrary).  It has been 25 
years since Justice Powell first approved the 
use of race to further an interest in student 
body diversity in the context of public higher 
education. Since that time, the number of 
minority applicants with high grades and test 
scores has indeed [**2347]  increased.  See 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 43.  We expect that 25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will 
no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.
IV
 [***HR1E]  [1E]  [***HR2B]  [2B] In 
summary, the Equal Protection Clause does 
not prohibit the Law School's narrowly 
tailored use of race in admissions decisions to 
further a compelling interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body. Consequently, petitioner's 
statutory claims based on Title VI and 42 
USC §  1981 [42 USCS §  1981] also fail.  
See Bakke, supra, at 287, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 
S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Title VI . 
. . proscribes only those racial classifications 
that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment"); General 
Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-391, 73 L. 
235
Ed. 2d 835, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982) (the 
prohibition against discrimination in §  1981 
is co-extensive with the Equal Protection 
Clause).  The judgment  [*344]  of the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, accordingly, 
is affirmed. 
It is so ordered.
CONCURBY: GINSBURG; SCALIA (In 
Part); THOMAS (In Part)
CONCUR: Justice Ginsburg, with whom 
Justice Breyer joins, concurring.
The Court's observation that race-
conscious programs "must have a logical end 
point," ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 341, accords 
with the international understanding of the 
office of affirmative action.  The 
International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
ratified by the United States in 1994, see 
State Dept., Treaties in Force 422-423 (June 
1996), endorses "special and concrete 
measures to ensure the adequate development 
and protection of certain racial groups or 
individuals belonging to them, for the 
purpose of guaranteeing them the full and 
equal enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms." Annex to G. A. Res. 
2106, 20 U. N. GAOR Res. Supp (No. 14) 
47, U. N. Doc. A/6014, Art. 2(2) (1965).  But 
such measures, the Convention instructs, 
"shall in no case entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for 
different racial groups after the objectives for 
which they were taken have been achieved." 
Ibid; see also Art. 1(4) (similarly providing 
for temporally limited affirmative action); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, Annex to 
G. A. Res. 34/180, 34 U. N. GAOR Res. 
Supp (No. 46) 194, U. N. Doc. A/34/46, Art. 
4(1) (1979) (authorizing "temporary special 
measures aimed at accelerating de facto
equality" that "shall be discontinued when 
the  [***343]  objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment have been 
achieved"). 
The Court further observes that "it has been 
25 years since Justice Powell [in Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,  438 U.S. 265, 57 L. 
Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978) first 
approved the use of race to further an interest 
in student body diversity in the context of 
public higher education." Ante, at 156 L Ed 
2d, at 342.  For at least part of that  [*345]  
time, however, the law could not fairly be 
described as "settled," and in some regions of 
the Nation, overtly race-conscious 
admissions policies have been proscribed.  
See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (CA5 
1996); cf. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 
(CA1 1998) ; Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. School 
Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (CA4 1999); Johnson v. 
Board of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 
1234 (CA11 2001).  Moreover, it was only 
25 years before Bakke that this Court 
declared public school segregation 
unconstitutional, a declaration that, after 
prolonged resistance, yielded an end to a law-
enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy 
of centuries of slavery.  See Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 873, 
74 S. Ct. 686 (1954); cf. Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 3 L. Ed. 2d 5, 78 S. Ct. 1401, 79 
Ohio Law Abs. 452 (1958). 
It is well documented that conscious and 
unconscious race bias, even rank 
discrimination based on race, remain alive in 
our land, impeding realization of our highest 
[**2348]  values and ideals.  See, e.g., Gratz
v Bollinger, ante, at 156 L Ed 2d 257, 123 S 
Ct 2411 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
272-274, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Krieger, 
Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup 
Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1251, 1276-1291, 1303 (1998) .  As 
to public education, data for the years 2000-
2001 show that 71.6% of African-American 
children and 76.3% of Hispanic children 
attended a school in which minorities made 
up a majority of the student body. See E. 
Frankenberg, C. Lee, & G. Orfield, A 
Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: 
Are We Losing the Dream? p 4 (Jan. 2003), 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/res
earch/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDrea m.pdf 
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(as visited June 16, 2003, and available in 
Clerk of Court's case file).  And schools in 
predominantly minority communities lag far 
behind others measured by the educational 
resources available to them.  See id., at 11; 
Brief for National Urban League et al. as 
Amici Curiae 11-12 (citing General 
Accounting Office, Per-Pupil Spending 
Differences Between Selected Inner City and 
Suburban Schools Varied by Metropolitan 
Area, 17 (2002)).
 [*346]  However strong the public's desire 
for improved education systems may be, see 
P. Hart & R. Teeter, A National Priority: 
Americans Speak on Teacher Quality 2, 11 
(2002) (public opinion research conducted 
for Educational Testing Service); The No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub L 107-
110, 115 Stat 1425, 20 USC §  7231 [20 
USCS §  7231], it remains the current reality 
that many minority students encounter 
markedly inadequate and unequal educational 
opportunities.  Despite these inequalities, 
some minority students are able to meet the 
high threshold requirements set for admission 
to the country's finest undergraduate and 
graduate educational institutions.   [***344]  
As lower school education in minority 
communities improves, an increase in the 
number of such students may be anticipated.  
From today's vantage point, one may hope, 
but not firmly forecast, that over the next 
generation's span, progress toward 
nondiscrimination and genuinely equal 
opportunity will make it safe to sunset 
affirmative action. *
* As the Court explains, the 
admissions policy challenged here 
survives review under the standards 
stated in Adarand Constructors, Inc .
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 132 L. Ed. 2d 
158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), 
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. 
Ct. 706 (1989), and Justice Powell's 
opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 
750, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).  This case 
therefore does not require the Court to 
revisit whether all governmental 
classifications by race, whether 
designed to benefit or to burden a 
historically disadvantaged group, 
should be subject to the same 
standard of judicial review.  Cf. 
Gratz, ante, at 156 L Ed 2d 257, 123 
S Ct 2411 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 
Adarand, 515 U.S., at 274, n. 8, 132 
L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Nor does 
this case necessitate reconsideration 
whether interests other than "student 
body diversity," ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, 
at 330, rank as sufficiently important 
to justify a race-conscious 
government program.  Cf. Gratz, 
ante, at 156 L Ed 2d 257, 123 S Ct 
2411 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 
Adarand, 515 U.S., at 273-274, 132 L 
Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
DISSENTBY: REHNQUIST; Kennedy; 
Scalia (In Part); Thomas (In Part)
DISSENT: 
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The page numbers 
of this document may appear to be out of 
sequence; however, this pagination 
accurately reflects the pagination of the 
original published document.]
 [**2365contd]   [***364contd]  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice 
Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice 
Thomas join, dissenting.
I agree with the Court that, "in the limited 
circumstance when drawing racial 
distinctions is permissible," the government 
must ensure that its means are narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 
Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 335; see also 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498, 65 
L. Ed. 2d 902, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980) 
(Powell, J., concurring) ("Even if the 
government proffers a compelling interest to 
support reliance upon a suspect classification, 
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the means selected must be narrowly drawn 
to fulfill the governmental  [*379]  purpose").  
I do not believe, however, that the University 
of Michigan Law School's (Law School) 
means are narrowly tailored to the interest it 
asserts.  The Law School claims it must take 
the steps it does to achieve a "'critical mass'" 
of underrepresented minority students.  Brief 
for Respondents Bollinger et al. 13.  But its 
actual program bears no relation to this 
asserted goal.  Stripped of its "critical mass" 
veil, the Law School's program is revealed as 
a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.
As we have explained many times, "'"any 
preference based on racial or ethnic criteria 
must necessarily receive a most searching 
examination."'"  Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223, 132 L. Ed. 2d 
158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (quoting Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 273, 90 
L. Ed. 2d 260, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) 
(plurality opinion of Powell, J.)).  Our cases 
establish that, in order to withstand this 
demanding inquiry, respondents must 
demonstrate that their methods of using race 
"'fit'" a compelling state interest "with greater 
precision than any alternative means."  Id., at 
280, n. 6, 90 L Ed 2d 260, 106 S Ct 1842; 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 299, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 2733 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("When 
[political judgments] touch upon [**2366]  
an individual's race or ethnic background, he 
is entitled to a judicial determination that the 
burden he is asked to bear on that basis is 
precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental  interest"). 
Before the Court's decision today, we 
consistently applied the same  [***365]  
strict scrutiny analysis regardless of the 
government's purported reason for using race 
and regardless of the setting in which race 
was being used.  We rejected calls to use 
more lenient review in the face of claims that 
race was being used in "good faith" because 
"'more than good motives should be required 
when government seeks to allocate its 
resources by way of an explicit racial 
classification system.'"  Adarand, supra, at 
226, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097; 
Fullilove, supra, at 537, 65 L Ed 2d 902, 100 
S Ct 2758 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Racial 
classifications are simply too pernicious to 
permit any but the most exact connection 
between justification and classification").  
We likewise rejected  [*380]  calls to apply 
more lenient review based on the particular 
setting in which race is being used.  Indeed, 
even in the specific context of higher 
education, we emphasized that 
"constitutional limitations protecting 
individual rights may not be disregarded."  
Bakke, supra, at 314, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S 
Ct 2733. 
Although the Court recites the language of 
our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of 
that review is unprecedented in its deference.
Respondents' asserted justification for the 
Law School's use of race in the admissions 
process is "obtaining 'the educational benefits 
that flow from a diverse student body.'" Ante, 
at 156 L Ed 2d, at 332 (quoting Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger et al. i).  They 
contend that a "critical mass" of 
underrepresented minorities is necessary to 
further that interest.  Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
333.  Respondents and school administrators 
explain generally that "critical mass" means a 
sufficient number of underrepresented 
minority  [*381]  students to achieve several 
objectives: To ensure that these minority
students do not feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race; to provide 
adequate opportunities for the type of 
interaction upon which the educational 
benefits of diversity depend; and to challenge 
all students to think critically and reexamine 
stereotypes.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 211a; 
Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 26.  
These objectives indicate that "critical mass" 
relates to the size of the student body. Id., at 
5 (claiming that the Law School has enrolled 
"critical mass," or "enough minority students 
to provide meaningful integration of its 
classrooms and residence halls").  
Respondents further claim that the Law 
School is achieving "critical mass." Id., at 4 
(noting that the Law School's goals have 
been "greatly furthered by the presence of . . . 
a 'critical mass' of" minority students in the 
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student body).
In practice, the Law School's program bears 
little or no relation to its asserted goal of 
achieving "critical mass." Respondents 
explain that the Law School seeks to 
accumulate a "critical mass" of each
underrepresented minority group.  See, e.g., 
id., at 49, n 79 ("The Law School's . . . 
current policy . . . provides a special 
commitment to enrolling a 'critical mass' of 
'Hispanics'").  But the record demonstrates 
that the Law School's admissions practices 
with respect to these groups differ 
dramatically and cannot be defended under 
any consistent use of the term "critical mass."
From 1995 through 2000, the Law School 
admitted between 1,130 and 1,310 students.  
Of those, between 13 and 19 were Native 
American, between 91 and 108 were African-
Americans,  [***366]  and between 47 and 
56 were Hispanic.  If the Law School is 
admitting between 91 and 108 African-
Americans in order to achieve "critical 
mass," thereby preventing African-American 
students from feeling "isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race," one would 
think that a number of the same order of 
magnitude would be necessary to accomplish 
the same purpose for Hispanics and Native 
Americans.  Similarly, even if [**2367]  all 
of the Native American applicants admitted 
in a given year matriculate, which the record 
demonstrates is not at all the case, * how can 
this possibly constitute a "critical mass" of 
Native Americans in a class of over 350 
students?  In order for this pattern of 
admission to be consistent with the Law 
School's explanation of "critical mass," one 
would have to believe that the objectives of 
"critical mass" offered by respondents are 
achieved with only half the number of 
Hispanics and one-sixth the number of
Native Americans as compared to African-
Americans.  But respondents offer no race-
specific reasons for such disparities.  Instead, 
they simply emphasize the importance of 
achieving "critical mass," without any 
explanation of why that concept is applied 
differently among the three underrepresented 
minority groups. 
* Indeed, during this 5-year time 
period, enrollment of Native 
American students dropped to as low 
as three such students.  Any assertion 
that such a small group constituted a 
"critical mass" of Native Americans is 
simply absurd.
 [*382]  These different numbers, 
moreover, come only as a result of 
substantially different treatment among the 
three underrepresented minority groups, as is 
apparent in an example offered by the Law 
School and highlighted by the Court: The 
school asserts that it "frequently accepts 
nonminority applicants with grades and test 
scores lower than underrepresented minority 
applicants (and other nonminority applicants) 
who are rejected." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
335 (citing Brief for Respondents Bollinger 
et al. 10).  Specifically, the Law School states 
that "sixty-nine minority applicants were 
rejected between 1995 and 2000 with at least 
a 3.5 [Grade Point Average (GPA)] and a 
[score of] 159 or higher on the [Law School 
Admissions Test (LSAT)]" while a number 
of Caucasian and Asian-American applicants 
with similar or lower scores were admitted.  
Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 10.
Review of the record reveals only 67 such 
individuals.  Of these 67 individuals, 56 were
Hispanic, while only 6 were African-
American, and only 5 were Native American.  
This discrepancy reflects a consistent 
practice.  For example, in 2000, 12 Hispanics 
who scored between a 159-160 on the LSAT 
and earned a GPA of 3.00 or higher applied 
for admission and only 2 were admitted.  
App. 200-201.  Meanwhile, 12 African-
Americans in the same range of 
qualifications applied for admission and all 
12 were admitted.  Id., at 198.  Likewise, that 
same year, 16 Hispanics who scored between 
a 151-153 on the LSAT and earned a 3.00 or 
higher applied for admission and only 1 of 
those applicants was admitted.  Id., at 200-
201.  Twenty-three similarly qualified 
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African-Americans applied for admission and 
14 were admitted.  Id., at 198.
These statistics have a significant bearing on 
petitioner's case.  Respondents have never
offered any race-specific arguments 
explaining why  [***367]  significantly more 
individuals from one underrepresented 
minority group are needed in order to achieve 
"critical mass" or further student body 
diversity. They certainly have not explained 
why Hispanics, who they  [*383]  have said 
are among "the groups most isolated by racial 
barriers in our country," should have their 
admission capped out in this manner.  Brief 
for Respondents Bollinger et al. 50.  True, 
petitioner is neither Hispanic nor Native 
American.  But the Law School's disparate 
admissions practices with respect to these 
minority groups demonstrate that its alleged 
goal of "critical mass" is simply a sham.  
Petitioner may use these statistics to expose 
this sham, which is the basis for the Law 
School's admission of less qualified 
underrepresented minorities in preference to 
her.  Surely strict scrutiny cannot permit 
these sort of disparities without at least some 
explanation.
Only when the "critical mass" label is 
discarded does a likely explanation for these 
numbers emerge.  The Court states that the 
Law School's goal of attaining a "critical 
mass" of underrepresented minority students 
is not an interest in merely "'assuring within 
its student body some specified percentage of 
a particular group merely because of its race 
or ethnic origin.'" Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
333 (quoting  Bakke, 438 U.S., at 307, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, 
J.)).  The Court recognizes that such an 
interest "would amount to outright racial 
balancing, which is patently 
unconstitutional." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
333.  The Court concludes, however,  
[**2368]  that the Law School's use of race 
in admissions, consistent with Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke, only pays "'some 
attention to numbers.'" Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, 
at 337 (quoting Bakke, supra, at 323, 57 L Ed 
2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733). 
But the correlation between the percentage of 
the Law School's pool of applicants who are 
members of the three minority groups and the 
percentage of the admitted applicants who 
are members of these same groups is far too 
precise to be dismissed as merely the result 
of the school paying "some attention to [the] 
numbers." As the tables below show, from 
1995 through 2000 the percentage of 
admitted applicants who were members of 
these minority groups closely tracked the 
percentage of individuals in the school's 
applicant pool who were from the same 
groups.  [***368]   [*384]  
Table 1% of% ofNumber ofNumber 
ofadmittedNumber 
ofapplicantsapplicantsAfrican-
applicantsNumber ofAfrican-who 
wereadmittedAmericanwho 
werelaw schoolAmericanAfrican-
by the 
lawapplicantsAfricanYearapplic
antsapplicantsAmericanschoolad
mittedAmerican199541474049.7%1
1301069.4%199636773429.3%11701
089.2%199734293209.3%12181018.
3%199835373048.6%13101037.9%19
9934002477.3%1280917.1%2000343
22597.5%1249917.3%Table 
2Number of% of% 
ofapplicantsNumber 
ofadmittedNumber ofNumber 
ofapplicantsadmittedHispanicap
plicantslaw schoolHispanicwho 
wereby the lawapplicantswho 
wereYearapplicantsapplicantsHi
spanicschooladmittedHispanic19
9541472135.1%1130565.0%1996367
71865.1%1170544.6%199734291634
.8%1218473.9%199835371504.2%13
10554.2%199934001524.5%1280483
.8%200034321684.9%1249534.2%Ta
ble 3% of% ofNumber ofNumber 
ofadmittedNumber 
ofapplicantsapplicantsNativeap
plicantsNumber ofNativewho 
wereadmittedAmericanwho 
werelaw schoolAmericanNativeby 
the 
lawapplicantsNativeYearapplica
ntsapplicantsAmericanschooladm
ittedAmerican19954147451.1%113
0141.2%19963677310.8%1170131.1
%19973429371.1%1218191.6%19983
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537401.1%1310181.4%19993400250
.7%1280131.0%20003432351.0%124
9141.1%  [**2369]   [***369]   [*385]  For 
example, in 1995, when 9.7% of the 
applicant pool was African-American, 9.4% 
of the admitted class was African-American.  
By 2000, only 7.5% of the applicant pool was 
African-American, and 7.3% of the admitted 
class was African-American.  This 
correlation is striking.  Respondents 
themselves emphasize that the number of 
underrepresented minority students admitted 
to the Law School would be significantly 
smaller if the race of each applicant were not 
considered.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 223a; 
Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 6 
(quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. of Bollinger et 
al. 299a).  But,  as the examples above 
illustrate, the measure of the decrease would 
differ dramatically among the groups.  The 
tight correlation between the percentage of 
applicants and admittees of a given race, 
therefore, must result from careful race based 
planning by the Law School. It suggests a 
formula for admission based on the 
aspirational assumption that all applicants are 
equally qualified academically, and therefore 
that the proportion of each group admitted 
should be the same as the proportion of that 
group in the applicant pool.  See Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger et al. 43, n 70 
(discussing admissions officers' use of 
"periodic reports" to track "the racial 
composition of the developing class").
Not only do respondents fail to explain 
this phenomenon, they attempt to obscure it.  
See id., at 32, n 50 ("The Law School's 
minority enrollment percentages . . . diverged 
from the percentages in the applicant pool by 
as much as 17.7% from 1995-2000").  But 
the divergence between the percentages of 
underrepresented minorities in the applicant 
pool and in the enrolled classes is not the 
only relevant comparison.  In fact, it may not 
be the most relevant comparison.  The Law 
School cannot precisely control which of its 
admitted applicants decide to attend the 
university.  But it can and, as the numbers 
demonstrate, clearly does employ racial 
preferences in extending offers of admission.  
Indeed, the ostensibly flexible nature of the 
Law School's admissions program  [*386]  
that the Court finds appealing, see ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 337-338, appears to be, in 
practice, a carefully managed program 
designed to ensure proportionate 
representation of applicants from selected 
minority groups. 
I do not believe that the Constitution gives 
the Law School such free rein in the use of 
race.  The Law School has offered no 
explanation for its actual admissions 
practices and, unexplained, we are bound to 
conclude that the Law School has managed 
its admissions program, not to achieve a 
"critical mass," but to extend offers of 
admission to members of selected minority 
groups in proportion to their statistical 
representation in the applicant pool.  But this 
is precisely the type of racial balancing that 
the Court itself calls "patently 
unconstitutional." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
333. 
Finally, I believe that the Law School's 
program fails strict scrutiny because it is 
devoid of any reasonably precise time limit 
on the Law School's use of race in 
admissions.  We have emphasized that we 
will consider "the planned duration of the 
remedy" in determining whether a race-
conscious program is constitutional.  
Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 510, 65 L Ed 2d 902, 
100 S Ct 2758 (Powell, J. concurring); see 
also United States  [***370]  v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149, 171, 94 L. Ed. 2d 203, 107 S. 
Ct. 1053 (1987) ("In determining whether 
race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we 
look to several factors, including the . . . 
duration of the relief").  Our previous cases 
have required some limit on the duration of 
programs such as this because discrimination 
on the basis of race is invidious.
The Court suggests a possible 25-year 
limitation on the Law School's [**2370]  
current program.  See ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
341.  Respondents, on the other hand, remain 
more ambiguous, explaining that "the Law 
School of course recognizes that race-
conscious programs must have reasonable 
241
durational limits, and the Sixth Circuit 
properly found such a limit in the Law 
School's resolve to cease considering race 
when genuine race-neutral alternatives 
become available." Brief for Respondents 
Bollinger et al. 32.  These discussions of a 
time  [*387]  limit are the vaguest of 
assurances.  In truth, they permit the Law 
School's use of racial preferences on a 
seemingly permanent basis.  Thus, an 
important component of strict scrutiny--that a 
program be limited in time--is casually 
subverted.
The Court, in an unprecedented display of 
deference under our strict scrutiny analysis, 
upholds the Law School's program despite its 
obvious flaws.  We have said that when it 
comes to the use of race, the connection 
between the ends and the means used to 
attain them must be precise.  But here the 
flaw is deeper than that; it is not merely a 
question of "fit" between ends and means.  
Here the means actually used are forbidden 
by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.
Justice Kennedy, dissenting.
The separate opinion by Justice Powell 
in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v Bakke  is based 
on the principle that a university admissions 
program may take account of race as one, 
nonpredominant factor in a system designed 
to consider each applicant as an individual, 
provided the program can meet the test of 
strict scrutiny by the judiciary.  438 U.S. 265, 
289-291, 315-318, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. 
Ct. 2733 (1978).  This is a unitary 
formulation.  If strict scrutiny is abandoned 
or manipulated to distort its real and accepted 
meaning, the Court lacks authority to approve 
the use of race even in this modest, limited 
way.  The opinion by Justice Powell, in my 
view, states the correct rule for resolving this 
case.  The Court, however, does not apply 
strict scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it 
undermines both the test and its own 
controlling precedents.
Justice Powell's approval of the use of race in 
university admissions reflected a tradition, 
grounded in the First Amendment, of 
acknowledging a university's conception of 
its educational mission.  Bakke, supra, at 
312-314, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733; ante, 
at 156 L Ed 2d, at 332-333.  Our precedents 
provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of 
a university's considered judgment that racial 
diversity among  [*388]  students can further 
its educational task, when supported by 
empirical evidence.  Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
333-335. 
It is unfortunate, however, that the Court 
takes the first part of Justice Powell's rule but 
abandons the second.  Having approved the 
use of race as a factor in the admissions 
process, the majority proceeds to nullify  
[***371]  the essential safeguard Justice 
Powell insisted upon as the precondition of 
the approval.  The safeguard was rigorous 
judicial review, with strict scrutiny as the 
controlling standard.  Bakke, supra, at 291, 
57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 ("Racial and 
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently 
suspect and thus call for the most exacting 
judicial examination").  This Court has 
reaffirmed, subsequent to Bakke, the absolute 
necessity of strict scrutiny when the state 
uses race as an operative category.  Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
224, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158, 115 S. Ct. 2097 
(1995) ("Any person, of whatever race, has 
the right to demand that any governmental 
actor subject to the Constitution justify any 
racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial 
scrutiny"); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493-494, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 
109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); see id., at 519, 102 L 
Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 706 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) ("Any racial preference must face 
the most rigorous scrutiny by the courts").  
The Court confuses deference to a 
university's definition [**2371]  of its 
educational objective with deference to the 
implementation of this goal.  In the context of 
university admissions the objective of racial 
diversity can be accepted based on empirical 
data known to us, but deference is not to be 
given with respect to the methods by which it 
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is pursued.  Preferment by race, when 
resorted to by the State, can be the most 
divisive of all policies, containing within it 
the potential to destroy confidence in the 
Constitution and in the idea of equality.  The 
majority today refuses to be faithful to the 
settled principle of strict review designed to 
reflect these concerns.
The Court, in a review that is nothing short of 
perfunctory, accepts the University of 
Michigan Law School's  [*389]  assurances 
that its admissions process meets with 
constitutional requirements.  The majority 
fails to confront the reality of how the Law 
School's admissions policy is implemented.  
The dissenting opinion by The Chief Justice, 
which I join in full, demonstrates beyond 
question why the concept of critical mass is a 
delusion used by the Law School to mask its 
attempt to make race an automatic factor in 
most instances and to achieve numerical 
goals indistinguishable from quotas. An 
effort to achieve racial balance among the 
minorities the school seeks to attract is, by 
the Court's own admission, "patently 
unconstitutional." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
333; see also Bakke, 438 U. S, at 307, 57 L 
Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, 
J.).  It remains to point out how critical mass 
becomes inconsistent with individual 
consideration in some more specific aspects 
of the admissions process.
About 80 to 85 percent of the places in the 
entering class are given to applicants in the 
upper range of Law School Admissions Test 
scores and grades. An applicant with these 
credentials likely will be admitted without 
consideration of race or ethnicity. With 
respect to the remaining 15 to 20 percent of 
the seats, race is likely outcome 
determinative for many members of minority 
groups.  That is where the competition 
becomes tight and where any given 
applicant's chance of admission is far smaller 
if he or she lacks minority status.  At this 
point the numerical concept of critical mass 
has the real  [***372]  potential to 
compromise individual review.
The Law School has not demonstrated how 
individual consideration is, or can be, 
preserved at this stage of the application 
process given the instruction to attain what it 
calls critical mass. In fact the evidence shows 
otherwise.  There was little deviation among 
admitted minority students during the years 
from 1995 to 1998.  The percentage of 
enrolled minorities fluctuated only by 0.3%, 
from 13.5% to 13.8%.  The number of 
minority students to whom offers were 
extended varied by just a slightly greater 
magnitude of 2.2%, from the high of 15.6% 
in 1995 to the low of 13.4% in 1998.
 [*390]  The District Court relied on this 
uncontested fact to draw an inference that the 
Law School's pursuit of critical mass mutated 
into the equivalent of a quota Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (ED 
Mich. 2001).  Admittedly, there were greater 
fluctuations among enrolled minorities in the 
preceding years, 1987-1994, by as much as 5 
or 6%.  The percentage of minority offers, 
however, at no point fell below 12%, 
historically defined by the Law School as the 
bottom of its critical mass range.  The greater 
variance during the earlier years, in any 
event, does not dispel suspicion that the 
school engaged in racial balancing.  The data 
would be consistent with an inference that the 
Law School modified its target only twice, in 
1991 (from 13% to 19%), and then again in 
1995 (back from 20% to 13%).  The 
intervening year, 1993, when the percentage 
dropped to 14.5%, could be an aberration,  
caused by the school's miscalculation as to 
how many applicants with offers would 
accept or by its redefinition, made in April 
1992, of which minority groups were entitled 
to race-based preference.  See Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger et al. 49, n 79.  
[**2372]  
YearPercentageof 
enrolledminoritystudents198712
.3%198813.6%198914.4%199013.4%
199119.1%199219.8%199314.5%199
420.1%199513.5%199613.8%199713
.6%199813.8%The narrow fluctuation 
band raises an inference that the Law School 
subverted individual determination, and strict  
[*391]  scrutiny requires the Law School to 
overcome the inference.  Whether the 
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objective of critical mass "is described as a 
quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis 
of race and ethnic status," and so risks 
compromising individual assessment.  Bakke, 
438 US, at 289, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 
2733 (opinion of Powell, J.).  In this respect 
the Law School program compares 
unfavorably with the experience of Little Ivy 
League colleges.  Amicus Amherst College, 
for example, informs us that the offers it 
extended to students of African-American 
background during the period from 1993 to 
2002 ranged between 81 and 125 out of 950 
offers total, resulting in a fluctuation from 24 
to 49 matriculated students in a class of about 
425.  See Brief for Amherst College et al. as 
Amici Curiae [***373]  10-11.  The Law 
School insisted upon a much smaller 
fluctuation, both in the offers extended and in 
the students who eventually enrolled, despite 
having a comparable class size.
 The Law School has the burden of 
proving, in conformance with the standard of 
strict scrutiny, that it did not utilize race in an 
unconstitutional way.  Adarand Constructors, 
515 U.S. 200, 224, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S 
Ct 2097.  At the very least, the constancy of 
admitted minority students and the close 
correlation between the racial breakdown of 
admitted minorities and the composition of 
the applicant pool, discussed by The Chief 
Justice, ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 324-328, 
require the Law School either to produce a 
convincing explanation or to show it has 
taken adequate steps to ensure individual 
assessment.  The Law School does neither. 
The obvious tension between the pursuit of 
critical mass and the requirement of 
individual review increased by the end of the 
admissions season.  Most of the decisions 
where race may decide the outcome are made 
during this period.  See supra, at 156 L Ed 
2d, at 371.  The admissions officers consulted 
the daily reports which indicated the 
composition of the incoming class along 
racial lines.  As Dennis Shields, Director of 
Admissions from 1991 to 1996, stated, "the 
further [he] went into the [admissions] season 
the more frequently [he] would  [*392]  want 
to look at these [reports] and see the change 
from day-to-day." These reports would "track 
exactly where [the Law School] stood at any 
given time in assembling the class," and so 
would tell the admissions personnel whether 
they were short of assembling a critical mass 
of minority students.  Shields generated these 
reports because the Law School's admissions 
policy told him the racial make-up of the 
entering class was "something [he] needed to 
be concerned about," and so he had "to find a 
way of tracking what's going on."
The consultation of daily reports during the 
last stages in the admissions process suggests 
there was no further attempt at individual 
review save for race itself.  The admissions 
officers could use the reports to recalibrate 
the plus factor given to race depending on 
how close they were to achieving the Law 
School's goal of critical mass. The bonus 
factor of race would then become divorced 
from individual review; it would be premised 
instead on the numerical objective set by the 
Law School.
The Law School made no effort to guard 
against this danger.  It provided no guidelines 
to its admissions personnel on how to 
reconcile individual assessment with the 
directive to admit a critical mass of minority 
students.  The admissions program could 
have been structured to eliminate at least 
some of the risk that the promise of 
individual evaluation was not being kept.  
The daily consideration of racial breakdown 
of admitted students is not a feature of 
affirmative-action programs used by other 
institutions of higher learning.  The Little Ivy 
League colleges, for instance, do not keep 
ongoing tallies of racial or ethnic 
composition of their entering students.  See 
Brief for Amherst College et al. as Amici 
Curiae 10.
To be constitutional, a university's 
compelling interest in a diverse student body 
must be achieved by a  [***374]  system 
where individual assessment is safeguarded 
through the entire process.  There is no 
constitutional objection to the goal of  [*393]  
considering race as one modest factor among 
many others to achieve diversity, but an 
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educational institution must ensure, through 
sufficient procedures, that each applicant 
receives individual consideration and that 
race does not become a predominant factor in 
the admissions decisionmaking.  The Law 
School failed to comply with this 
requirement, and by no means has it carried 
its burden to show otherwise by the test of 
strict scrutiny.
The Court's refusal to apply meaningful strict 
scrutiny will lead to serious consequences.  
By deferring to the law schools' choice of 
minority admissions programs, the courts 
will lose the talents and resources of the 
faculties and administrators in devising new 
and fairer ways to ensure individual 
consideration.  Constant and rigorous judicial 
review forces the law school faculties to 
undertake their responsibilities as state 
employees in this most sensitive of areas with 
utmost fidelity to the mandate of the 
Constitution.  Dean Allan Stillwagon, who 
directed the Law School's Office of 
Admissions from 1979 to 1990, explained the 
difficulties he encountered in defining racial 
groups entitled to benefit under the School's 
affirmative action policy.  He testified that 
faculty members were "breathtakingly 
cynical" in deciding who would qualify as a 
member of underrepresented minorities.  An 
example he offered was faculty debate as to 
whether Cubans should be counted as 
Hispanics: One professor objected on the 
grounds that Cubans were Republicans.  
Many academics at other law schools who 
are "affirmative action's more forthright 
defenders readily concede that diversity is 
merely the current rationale of convenience 
for a policy that they prefer to justify on other 
grounds." Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, 
Present, and Future, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 
1, 34 (2002) (citing Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 573, 577-578 (2000); 
Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L. 
J. 427, 471 (1997)).  This is not to suggest 
the faculty at Michigan or other law schools 
do not pursue aspirations they consider 
laudable and consistent with our 
constitutional  [*394]  traditions.  It is but 
further evidence of the necessity for scrutiny 
that is real, not feigned, where the corrosive 
category of race is a factor in 
decisionmaking.  Prospective students, the 
courts, and the public can demand that the 
State and its law schools prove their process 
is fair and constitutional in every phase of 
implementation.
It is difficult to assess the Court's 
pronouncement that race-conscious 
admissions programs will be unnecessary 25 
years from now.  Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
341-342.  If it is intended to mitigate the 
damage the Court does to the concept of 
strict scrutiny, neither petitioners nor other 
rejected law school applicants will find 
solace in knowing the basic protection put in 
place by Justice Powell will be suspended for 
a full quarter of a century.  Deference is 
antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent 
with it. 
As to the interpretation that the opinion 
contains its own self-destruct mechanism,  
[**2373]  the majority's abandonment of 
strict scrutiny undermines this objective.  
Were the courts to apply a searching standard 
to race-based  [***375]  admissions schemes, 
that would force educational institutions to 
seriously explore race-neutral alternatives.  
The Court, by contrast, is willing to be 
satisfied by the Law School's profession of 
its own good faith.  The majority admits as 
much: "We take the Law School at its word
that it would 'like nothing better than to find 
a race-neutral admissions formula' and will 
terminate its race-conscious admissions 
program as soon as practicable." Ante, at 156 
L Ed 2d, at 341 (quoting Brief for 
Respondent Bollinger et al. 34). 
If universities are given the latitude to 
administer programs that are tantamount to 
quotas, they will have few incentives to make 
the existing minority admissions schemes 
transparent and protective of individual 
review.  The unhappy consequence will be to 
perpetuate the hostilities that proper 
consideration of race is designed to avoid.  
The perpetuation, of course, would be the 
worst of all outcomes.  Other programs do 
exist which will be more effective in  [*395]  
bringing about the harmony and mutual 
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respect among all citizens that our 
constitutional tradition has always sought.  
They, and not the program under review here, 
should be the model, even if the Court 
defaults by not demanding it.
It is regrettable the Court's important holding 
allowing racial minorities to have their 
special circumstances considered in order to 
improve their educational opportunities is 
accompanied by a suspension of the strict 
scrutiny which was the predicate of allowing 
race to be considered in the first place.  If the 
Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give 
strict scrutiny to the use of race in university 
admissions, it negates my authority to 
approve the use of race in pursuit of student 
diversity. The Constitution cannot confer the 
right to classify on the basis of race even in 
this special context absent searching judicial 
review.  For these reasons, though I reiterate 
my approval of giving appropriate 
consideration to race in this one context, I 
must dissent in the present case.
 [**2348contd]   [***344contd]  Justice 
Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the opinion of The Chief Justice.  As he 
demonstrates, the University of Michigan 
Law School's mystical  [*347cont]  "critical 
mass" justification for its discrimination by 
race challenges even the most gullible mind.  
The admissions statistics show it to be a 
sham to cover a scheme of racially 
proportionate admissions.
I also join Parts I through VII of Justice 
Thomas's opinion. n** I find particularly 
unanswerable his central point: that the 
[**2349]  allegedly "compelling state 
interest" at issue here is not the incremental 
"educational benefit" that emanates from the 
fabled "critical mass" of minority students, 
but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining 
a "prestige" law school whose normal 
admissions standards disproportionately 
exclude blacks and other minorities.  If that is 
a compelling state interest, everything is. 
n** Part VII of Justice Thomas's 
opinion describes those portions of 
the Court's opinion in which I concur.  
See post, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 361-364.
I add the following: The "educational 
benefit" that the University of Michigan 
seeks to achieve by racial discrimination 
consists, according to the Court, of "'cross-
racial understanding,'" ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, 
at 333, and "'better prepar[ation of] students 
for an increasingly diverse workforce and 
society,'" ibid., all of which is necessary not 
only for work, but also for good 
"citizenship," ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 334.  
This is not, of course, an "educational 
benefit" on which students will be graded on 
their Law School transcript (Works and Plays 
Well with Others: B+) or tested by the bar 
examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less 
your cross-racial understanding).  For it is a 
lesson of life rather than law--essentially the 
same lesson taught to (or rather learned by, 
for it cannot be "taught" in the usual sense) 
people three feet shorter and twenty years 
younger than the full-grown adults at the 
University of Michigan Law School, in 
institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to 
public-school kindergartens.  If properly 
considered an "educational benefit" at all, it 
is surely not one that  [***345]  is either 
uniquely relevant to law school or uniquely 
"teachable" in a formal educational setting.  
And therefore:  If it is appropriate for the 
University  [*348]  of Michigan Law School 
to use racial discrimination for the purpose of 
putting together a "critical mass" that will 
convey generic lessons in socialization and 
good citizenship, surely it is no less 
appropriate--indeed, particularly appropriate-
-for the civil service system of the State of 
Michigan to do so.  There, also, those 
exposed to "critical masses" of certain races 
will presumably become better Americans, 
better Michiganders, better civil servants.  
And surely private employers cannot be 
criticized--indeed, should be praised--if they 
also "teach" good citizenship to their adult 
employees through a patriotic, all-American 
system of racial discrimination in hiring.  The 
nonminority individuals who are deprived of 
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a legal education, a civil service job, or any 
job at all by reason of their skin color will 
surely understand.
Unlike a clear constitutional holding that 
racial preferences in state educational 
institutions are impermissible, or even a clear 
anticonstitutional holding that racial 
preferences in state educational institutions 
are OK, today's Grutter-Gratz split double 
header seems perversely designed to prolong 
the controversy and the litigation.  Some 
future lawsuits will presumably focus on 
whether the discriminatory scheme in 
question contains enough evaluation of the 
applicant "as an individual," ante, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 337, and sufficiently avoids 
"separate admissions tracks" ante, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 336, to fall under Grutter rather 
than Gratz. Some will focus on whether a 
university has gone beyond the bounds of a 
"'good faith effort'" and has so zealously 
pursued its "critical mass" as to make it an 
unconstitutional de facto quota system, rather 
than merely "'a permissible goal.'" Ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 336 (quoting Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC , 478 U.S. 421, 495, 92 L 
Ed 2d 344, 106 S Ct 3019 (1986) O'Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
Other lawsuits may focus on whether, in the 
particular setting at issue, any educational 
benefits flow from racial diversity. (That 
issue was not contested in Grutter; and while 
the opinion accords "a degree of deference to 
a university's academic decisions," ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 332, "deference does not 
imply  [*349]  abandonment or abdication of 
judicial review," Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 
U.S. 322, 340, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931, 123 S. Ct. 
1029 (2003).) Still other suits may challenge 
the bona fides of the institution's expressed 
commitment to the educational benefits of 
diversity that immunize the discriminatory 
scheme in Grutter. (Tempting targets, one 
would suppose, will be those [**2350]  
universities that talk the talk of 
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the 
courts but walk the walk of tribalism and 
racial segregation on their campuses--through 
minority-only student organizations, separate 
minority housing opportunities, separate 
minority student centers, even separate 
minority-only graduation ceremonies.) And 
still other suits may claim that the 
institution's racial preferences have gone 
below or above the mystical Grutter-
approved "critical mass." Finally, litigation 
can be expected on behalf of minority groups 
intentionally short changed in the institution's 
composition of its generic minority "critical  
[***346]  mass." I do not look forward to any 
of these cases.  The Constitution proscribes 
government discrimination on the basis of 
race, and state-provided education is no 
exception.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia
joins as to Parts I-VII, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.
Frederick Douglass, speaking to a group 
of abolitionists almost 140 years ago, 
delivered a message lost on today's majority: 
"In regard to the colored people, 
there is always more that is 
benevolent, I perceive, than just, 
manifested towards us.  What I ask 
for the negro is not benevolence, not 
pity, not sympathy, but simply justice.
The American people have always 
been anxious to know what they shall 
do with us . . . .  I have had but one 
answer from the beginning.  Do 
nothing with us!  Your doing with us 
has already played the mischief with 
us.  Do nothing with us!  If the apples 
will not remain on the tree of  [*350]  
their own strength, if they are worm-
eaten at the core, if they are early ripe 
and disposed to fall, let them fall!  . . .  
And if the negro cannot stand on his 
own legs, let him fall also.  All I ask 
is, give him a chance to stand on his 
own legs!  Let him alone!  . . .  Your 
interference is doing him positive 
injury." What the Black Man Wants: 
An Address Delivered in Boston, 
Massachusetts, on 26 January 1865, 
reprinted in 4 The Frederick Douglass 
Papers 59, 68 (J. Blassingame & J. 
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McKivigan eds. 1991) (emphasis in 
original).
Like Douglass, I believe blacks can 
achieve in every avenue of American life 
without the meddling of university 
administrators.  Because I wish to see all 
students succeed whatever their color, I 
share, in some respect, the sympathies of 
those who sponsor the type of discrimination 
advanced by the University of Michigan Law 
School (Law School).  The Constitution does 
not, however, tolerate institutional devotion 
to the status quo in admissions policies when 
such devotion ripens into racial 
discrimination. Nor does the Constitution 
countenance the unprecedented deference the 
Court gives to the Law School, an approach 
inconsistent with the very concept of "strict 
scrutiny."
No one would argue that a university could 
set up a lower general admission standard 
and then impose heightened requirements 
only on black applicants.  Similarly, a 
university may not maintain a high admission 
standard and grant exemptions to favored 
races.  The Law School, of its own choosing, 
and for its own purposes, maintains an 
exclusionary admissions system that it knows 
produces racially disproportionate results.  
Racial discrimination is not a permissible 
solution to the self-inflicted wounds of this 
elitist admissions policy.
The majority upholds the Law School's racial 
discrimination not by interpreting the 
people's Constitution, but by responding to a 
faddish slogan of the cognoscenti.  
Nevertheless, I concur in part in the Court's 
opinion.  First, I agree with the Court insofar 
as its decision, which approves of only  
[*351]  one racial classification, confirms 
that further use of race in admissions remains 
unlawful.  Second, I agree with the Court's 
holding that racial discrimination in higher 
education admissions will be  [***347]  
illegal in 25 years.  See ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, 
at 342 (stating that racial discrimination will 
no longer be narrowly tailored, or [**2351]  
"necessary to further" a compelling state 
interest, in 25 years).  I respectfully dissent 
from the remainder of the Court's opinion 
and the judgment, however, because I believe 
that the Law School's current use of race 
violates the Equal Protection Clause and that 
the Constitution means the same thing today 
as it will in 300 months.
I
The majority agrees that the Law School's 
racial discrimination should be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 331.  
Before applying that standard to this case, I 
will briefly revisit the Court's treatment of 
racial classifications. 
The strict scrutiny standard that the Court 
purports to apply in this case was first 
enunciated in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 89 L. Ed. 194, 65 S. Ct. 193 
(1944) .  There the Court held that "pressing 
public necessity may sometimes justify the 
existence of [racial discrimination]; racial 
antagonism never can."  Id., at 216, 89 L Ed 
194, 65 S Ct 193. This standard of "pressing 
public necessity" has more frequently been 
termed "compelling governmental interest," 
n1see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 299, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. 
Ct. 2733 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).  A 
majority of the Court has validated only two 
circumstances where "pressing public 
necessity" or a "compelling state interest" can 
possibly justify racial discrimination by state 
actors.  First, the lesson of Korematsu is that 
national security constitutes a "pressing 
public necessity," though the government's 
use of race to advance that objective must be 
narrowly tailored. Second, the Court has 
recognized as a compelling state interest a 
government's effort to remedy  [*352]  past 
discrimination for which it is responsible.  
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
504, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. Ct. 706 
(1989). 
n1 Throughout I will use the two 
phrases interchangeably.
The contours of "pressing public 
necessity" can be further discerned from 
those interests the Court has rejected as bases 
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for racial discrimination. For example, 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 
90 L. Ed. 2d 260, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), 
found unconstitutional a collective-
bargaining agreement between a school board 
and a teachers' union that favored certain 
minority races.  The school board defended 
the policy on the grounds that minority 
teachers provided "role models" for minority 
students and that a racially "diverse" faculty 
would improve the education of all students.  
See Brief for Respondents, O. T. 1984, No. 
84-1340, pp 27-28; 476 US, at 315, 90 L Ed 
2d 260, 106 S Ct 1842 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("An integrated faculty will be 
able to provide benefits to the student body 
that could not be provided by an all-white, or 
nearly all-white faculty").  Nevertheless, the 
Court found that the use of race violated the 
Equal Protection Clause, deeming both 
asserted state interests insufficiently 
compelling.  Id., at 275-276, at 275-276, 90 L 
Ed 2d 260, 106 S Ct 1842 (plurality opinion); 
id., at 295, 90 L Ed 2d 260, 106 S Ct 1842 
(White, J., concurring in judgment) ("None 
of the interests asserted by the [school  
[***348]  board] . . . justify this racially 
discriminatory layoff policy"). n2
n2 The Court's refusal to address 
Wygant's rejection of a state interest 
virtually indistinguishable from that
presented by the Law School is 
perplexing.  If the Court defers to the 
Law School's judgment that a racially 
mixed student body confers 
educational benefits to all, then why 
would the Wygant Court not defer to 
the school board's judgment with 
respect to the benefits a racially 
mixed faculty confers?
An even greater governmental interest 
involves the sensitive role of courts in child 
custody determinations.  In Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421, 104 
S. Ct. 1879 (1984), the Court held that even 
the best interests of a child did not constitute 
a compelling state interest that would allow a 
state court to award custody to the father 
because the mother was in a mixed-race 
marriage.  Id., at 433, 80 L Ed 2d 421, 104 S 
Ct 1879 [**2352]  (finding the interest 
"substantial" but  [*353]  holding the custody 
decision could not be based on the race of the 
mother's new husband). 
Finally, the Court has rejected an interest in 
remedying general societal discrimination as 
a justification for race discrimination.  See 
Wygant, supra, at 276, 90 L Ed 2d 260, 106 S 
Ct 1842 (plurality opinion); Croson, 488 
U.S., at 496-498, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 
706 (plurality opinion); id., at 520-521, 102 L 
Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 706 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment).  "Societal 
discrimination, without more, is too 
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially 
classified remedy" because a "court could 
uphold remedies that are ageless in their 
reach into the past, and timeless in their 
ability to affect the future."  Wygant, supra,
at 276, 90 L Ed 2d 260, 106 S Ct 1842 
(plurality opinion).  But see Gratz v. 
Bollinger, ante,156 L Ed 2d 257, 123 S Ct 
2411 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
Where the Court has accepted only national 
security, and rejected even the best interests 
of a child, as a justification for racial 
discrimination, I conclude that only those 
measures the State must take to provide a 
bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent 
violence, will constitute a "pressing public 
necessity." Cf . Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 
333, 334, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1212, 88 S. Ct. 994 
(1968) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring) 
(indicating that protecting prisoners from 
violence might justify narrowly tailored 
racial discrimination); Croson, supra, at 521, 
102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 706 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment) ("At least where 
state or local action is at issue, only a social 
emergency rising to the level of imminent 
danger to life and limb . . . can justify [racial 
discrimination]"). 
The Constitution abhors classifications based 
on race, not only because those 
classifications can harm favored races or are 
based on illegitimate motives, but also 
because every time the government places 
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citizens on racial registers and makes race 
relevant to the provision of burdens or 
benefits, it demeans us all.  "Purchased at the 
price of immeasurable human suffering, the 
equal protection principle reflects our 
Nation's understanding that such 
classifications ultimately have a destructive 
impact on the individual and our society."  
[*354]  Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 240, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S 
Ct 2097 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). 
II
Unlike the majority, I seek to define with 
precision the interest being  [***349]  
asserted by the Law School before 
determining whether that interest is so 
compelling as to justify racial discrimination. 
The Law School maintains that it wishes to 
obtain "educational benefits that flow from 
student body diversity," Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger et al. 14.  This 
statement must be evaluated carefully, 
because it implies that both "diversity" and 
"educational benefits" are components of the 
Law School's compelling state interest. 
Additionally, the Law School's refusal to 
entertain certain changes in its admissions 
process and status indicates that the 
compelling state interest it seeks to validate is 
actually broader than might appear at first 
glance.
Undoubtedly there are other ways to "better" 
the education of law students aside from 
ensuring that the student body contains a 
"critical mass" of underrepresented minority 
students.  Attaining "diversity," whatever it 
means, n3 is the  [*355]  mechanism 
[**2353]  by which the Law School obtains 
educational benefits, not an end of itself.  The 
Law School, however, apparently believes 
that only a racially mixed student body can 
lead to the educational benefits it seeks.  
How, then, is the Law School's interest in 
these allegedly unique educational "benefits" 
not simply the forbidden interest in "racial 
balancing," ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 333, that 
the majority expressly rejects? 
n3 "Diversity," for all of its 
devotees, is more a fashionable 
catchphrase than it is a useful term, 
especially when something as serious 
as racial discrimination is at issue.  
Because the Equal Protection Clause 
renders the color of one's skin 
constitutionally irrelevant to the Law 
School's mission, I refer to the Law 
School's interest as an "aesthetic." 
That is, the Law School wants to have 
a certain appearance, from the shape 
of the desks and tables in its 
classrooms to the color of the students 
sitting at them.
I also use the term "aesthetic" because 
I believe it underlines the 
ineffectiveness of racially 
discriminatory admissions in actually 
helping those who are truly 
underprivileged.  Cf . Orr v. Orr, 440 
U.S. 268, 283, 59 L. Ed. 2d 306, 99 S. 
Ct. 1102 (1979) (noting that suspect 
classifications are especially 
impermissible when "the choice made 
by the State appears to redound . . . to 
the benefit of those without need for 
special solicitude").  It must be 
remembered that the Law School's 
racial discrimination does nothing for 
those too poor or uneducated to 
participate in elite higher education 
and therefore presents only an illusory 
solution to the challenges facing our 
Nation.
A distinction between these two ideas 
(unique educational benefits based on racial 
aesthetics and race for its own sake) is purely 
sophistic--so much so that the majority uses 
them interchangeably.  Compare ante, at 156 
L Ed 2d, at 332 ("The Law School has a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse 
student body"), with ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
335 (referring to the "compelling interest in 
securing the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body" (emphasis added)).  The Law 
School's argument, as facile as it is, can only 
be understood in one way: Classroom 
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aesthetics yields educational benefits, racially 
discriminatory admissions policies are 
required to achieve the right racial mix, and 
therefore the policies are required to achieve 
the educational benefits.  It is the educational 
benefits that are the end, or allegedly 
compelling state interest, not "diversity." But 
see ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 335 (citing the 
need for "openness and integrity of the 
educational institutions that provide [legal] 
training" without reference to any 
consequential educational benefits). 
One must also consider the Law School's 
refusal to entertain changes to its current 
admissions system that  [***350]  might 
produce the same educational benefits.  The 
Law School adamantly disclaims any race-
neutral alternative that would reduce 
"academic selectivity," which would in turn 
"require the Law School to become a very 
different institution, and to sacrifice a core 
part of its educational mission." Brief for 
Respondents Bollinger et al. 33-36.  In other 
words, the Law School seeks to improve 
marginally the education it offers  [*356]  
without sacrificing too much of its 
exclusivity and elite status. n4
n4 The Law School believes both 
that the educational benefits of a 
racially engineered student body are 
large and that adjusting its overall 
admissions standards to achieve the 
same racial mix would require it to 
sacrifice its elite status.  If the Law 
School is correct that the educational 
benefits of "diversity" are so great, 
then achieving them by altering 
admissions standards should not 
compromise its elite status.  The Law 
School's reluctance to do this suggests 
that the educational benefits it alleges 
are not significant or do not exist at 
all.
The proffered interest that the majority 
vindicates today, then, is not simply 
"diversity." Instead the Court upholds the use 
of racial discrimination as a tool to advance 
the Law School's interest in offering a 
marginally superior education while 
maintaining an elite institution.  Unless each 
constituent part of this state interest is of 
pressing public necessity, the Law School's 
use of race is unconstitutional.  I find each of 
them to fall far short of this standard.
III
A
A close reading of the Court's opinion reveals 
that all of its legal work is done through one 
conclusory statement: The Law School has a 
"compelling interest in securing the 
educational benefits of a diverse student 
body." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 335.  No 
serious effort is made to explain how these 
[**2354]  benefits fit with the state interests 
the Court has recognized (or rejected) as 
compelling, see Part I, supra, or to place any 
theoretical constraints on an enterprising 
court's desire to discover still more 
justifications for racial discrimination. In the 
absence of any explanation, one might expect 
the Court to fall back on the judicial policy of 
stare decisis. But the Court eschews even this 
weak defense of its holding, shunning an 
analysis of the extent to which Justice 
Powell's opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke,  438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 
S. Ct. 2733 (1978),  [*357]  is binding, ante, 
at 156 L Ed 2d, at 330, in favor of an 
unfounded wholesale adoption of it. 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and the 
Court's decision today rest on the 
fundamentally flawed proposition that racial 
discrimination can be contextualized so that a 
goal, such as classroom aesthetics, can be 
compelling in one context but not in another.  
This "we know it when we see it" approach 
to evaluating state interests is not capable of 
judicial application.  Today, the Court insists 
on radically expanding the range of 
permissible uses of race to something as 
trivial (by comparison) as the assembling of a 
law school class.  I can only presume that the 
majority's failure to justify its decision by 
reference to any principle arises from the 
absence of any such principle.  See Part VI, 
infra.
B
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Under the proper standard, there is no 
pressing public necessity in maintaining a 
public law school at  [***351]  all and, it 
follows, certainly not an elite law school. 
Likewise, marginal improvements in legal 
education do not qualify as a compelling state 
interest.
1
While legal education at a public university 
may be good policy or otherwise laudable, it 
is obviously not a pressing public necessity 
when the correct legal standard is applied.  
Additionally, circumstantial evidence as to 
whether a state activity is of pressing public 
necessity can be obtained by asking whether 
all States feel compelled to engage in that 
activity.  Evidence that States, in general, 
engage in a certain activity by no means 
demonstrates that the activity constitutes a 
pressing public necessity, given the 
expansive role of government in today's 
society.  The fact that some fraction of the 
States reject a particular enterprise, however, 
creates a presumption that the enterprise 
itself is not a compelling state interest. In this 
sense, the absence of a public, American Bar 
Association (ABA) accredited, law school in  
[*358]  Alaska, Delaware, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, see 
ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABA-
Approved Law Schools (W. Margolis, B. 
Gordon, J. Puskarz, & D. Rosenlieb, eds. 
2004) (hereinafter ABA-LSAC Guide), 
provides further evidence that Michigan's 
maintenance of the Law School does not 
constitute a compelling state interest.
2
As the foregoing makes clear, Michigan has 
no compelling interest in having a law school 
at all, much less an elite one.  Still, even 
assuming that a State may, under appropriate 
circumstances, demonstrate a cognizable 
interest in having an elite law school, 
Michigan has failed to do so here.
This Court has limited the scope of equal 
protection review to interests and activities 
that occur within that State's jurisdiction.  
The Court held in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 83 L. Ed. 208, 59 S. 
Ct. 232 (1938), that Missouri could not 
satisfy the demands of "separate but equal" 
by paying for legal training of blacks at 
neighboring state law schools, while 
maintaining a segregated law school within 
the State.  The equal protection 
"obligation is imposed by the 
Constitution upon the States severally 
as governmental entities--each 
responsible for its own laws 
establishing the rights and duties of 
persons within its borders.  It 
[**2355]  is an obligation the burden 
of which cannot be cast by one State 
upon another, and no State can be 
excused from performance by what 
another State may do or fail to do.
That separate responsibility of each 
State within its own sphere is of the 
essence of statehood maintained 
under our dual system."  Id., at 350, 
83 L Ed 208, 59 S Ct 232 (emphasis 
added).
The Equal Protection Clause, as 
interpreted by the Court in Gaines, does not 
permit States to justify racial discrimination 
on the basis of what the rest of the Nation 
"may do or fail to do." The only interests that 
can satisfy the Equal  [*359]  Protection 
Clause's demands are those found within a 
State's jurisdiction.
The only cognizable state interests vindicated 
by operating a public law school are, 
therefore, the education of that State's 
citizens and the training  [***352]  of that 
State's lawyers.  James Campbell's address at 
the opening of the Law Department at the 
University of Michigan on October 3, 1859, 
makes this clear: 
"It not only concerns the State
that every one should have all 
reasonable facilities for preparing 
himself for any honest position in life 
to which he may aspire, but it also 
concerns the community that the Law 
should be taught and understood . . . .  
There is not an office in the State in 
which serious legal inquiries may not 
frequently arise . . . .  In all these 
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matters, public and private rights are 
constantly involved and discussed,  
and ignorance of the Law has 
frequently led to results deplorable 
and alarming . . . .  In the history of 
this State, in more than one instance, 
that ignorance has led to unlawful 
violence, and the shedding of 
innocent blood." E. Brown, Legal 
Education at Michigan 1859-1959, pp 
404-406 (1959) (emphasis added).
The Law School today, however, does 
precious little training of those attorneys who 
will serve the citizens of Michigan.  In 2002, 
graduates of the University of Michigan Law 
School made up less than 6% of applicants to 
the Michigan bar, Michigan Lawyers 
Weekly, available at 
http://www.michiganlawyersweekly.com/bar
passers0202.cfm,barpassers0702.cfm (all 
Internet materials as visited June 13, 2003, 
and available in Clerk of Court's case file), 
even though the Law School's graduates 
constitute nearly 30% of all law students 
graduating in Michigan.  Ibid. Less than 16% 
of the Law School's graduating class elects to 
stay in Michigan after law school. ABA-
LSAC Guide 427.  Thus, while a mere 27% 
of the Law School's 2002 entering class are 
from Michigan, see  [*360]  University of 
Michigan Law School Website, available at 
http://www.law.umich.edu/prospectivestuden
ts/Admissions/index.htm,  only half of these, 
it appears, will stay in Michigan.
In sum, the Law School trains few Michigan 
residents and overwhelmingly serves 
students, who, as lawyers, leave the State of 
Michigan.  By contrast, Michigan's other 
public law school, Wayne State University 
Law School, sends 88% of its graduates on to 
serve the people of Michigan.  ABA-LSAC 
Guide 775.  It does not take a social scientist 
to conclude that it is precisely the Law 
School's status as an elite institution that 
causes it to be a way-station for the rest of 
the country's lawyers, rather than a training 
ground for those who will remain in 
Michigan.  The Law School's decision to be 
an elite institution does little to advance the 
welfare of the people of Michigan or any 
cognizable interest of the State of Michigan.
Again, the fact that few States choose to 
maintain elite law schools raises a strong 
inference that there is nothing compelling 
about elite status.  Arguably, only the public 
law schools of the University of Texas, the 
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt 
Hall), and the University of Virginia maintain 
the same reputation for excellence as the Law 
School. n5 Two of [**2356]  these States, 
Texas and California, are so large that they 
could reasonably be expected to provide  
[***353]  elite legal training at a separate law 
school to students who will, in fact, stay in 
the State and provide legal services to its 
citizens.  And these two schools far outshine 
the Law School in producing in-state 
lawyers.  The University of Texas, for 
example, sends over three-fourths of its 
graduates on to work in the State of Texas, 
vindicating the State's interest (compelling or 
not) in training Texas' lawyers.  Id., at 691. 
n5 Cf. U. S. News & World 
Report, America's Best Graduate 
Schools 28 (2004 ed.) (placing these 
schools in the uppermost 15 in the 
Nation).
 [*361]  3
Finally, even if the Law School's racial 
tinkering produces tangible educational 
benefits, a marginal improvement in legal 
education cannot justify racial discrimination 
where the Law School has no compelling 
interest in either its existence or in its current 
educational and admissions policies.
IV
The interest in remaining elite and exclusive 
that the majority thinks so obviously critical 
requires the use of admissions "standards" 
that, in turn, create the Law School's "need" 
to discriminate on the basis of race.  The 
Court validates these admissions standards by 
concluding that alternatives that would 
require "a dramatic sacrifice of . . . the 
academic quality of all admitted students," 
ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 340, need not be 
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considered before racial discrimination can 
be employed. n6 In the majority's view, such 
methods are not required by the "narrow 
tailoring" prong of strict scrutiny because that 
inquiry demands, in this context, that any 
race-neutral alternative work "'about as 
well.'" Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 339 (quoting 
Wygant, 476 U.S., at 280, n. 6, 90 L Ed 2d 
260, 106 S Ct 1842).  The majority errs, 
however, because race-neutral alternatives 
must only be "workable," ante, at 156 L Ed 
2d, at 339, and do "about as well" in 
vindicating the compelling state interest. The 
Court never explicitly holds that the Law 
School's desire to retain the status quo in 
"academic selectivity" is itself a compelling 
state interest, and, as I have demonstrated, it 
is not.  See Part III-B, supra. Therefore, the 
Law School should be forced to choose 
between its classroom aesthetic and its 
exclusionary admissions system--it cannot 
have it both ways. 
n6 The Court refers to this 
component of the Law School's 
compelling state interest variously as 
"academic quality," avoiding 
"sacrifice [of] a vital component of its 
educational mission," and "academic 
selectivity." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
339-340.
With the adoption of different 
admissions methods, such as accepting all 
students who meet minimum qualifications,  
[*362]  see Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 13-14, the Law School could achieve 
its vision of the racially aesthetic student 
body without the use of racial discrimination. 
The Law School concedes this, but the Court 
holds, implicitly and under the guise of 
narrow tailoring, that the Law School has a 
compelling state interest in doing what it 
wants to do.  I cannot agree.  First, under 
strict scrutiny, the Law School's assessment 
of the benefits of racial discrimination and 
devotion to the admissions status quo are not 
entitled to any sort of deference, grounded in 
the First Amendment or anywhere else.  
Second, even if its "academic selectivity" 
must be maintained at all costs along with 
racial discrimination, the Court ignores the 
fact that other top law schools have 
succeeded in meeting their aesthetic  
[***354]  demands without racial 
discrimination.
A
The Court bases its unprecedented deference 
to the Law School--a deference antithetical to 
strict scrutiny--on an idea of "educational 
autonomy" grounded in the First 
Amendment. Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 333.  In 
my view, there is no basis for a right of 
public [**2357]  universities to do what 
would otherwise violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The constitutionalization of "academic 
freedom" began with the concurring opinion 
of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311, 
77 S. Ct. 1203 (1957).  Sweezy, a Marxist 
economist, was investigated by the Attorney 
General of New Hampshire on suspicion of 
being a subversive.  The prosecution sought, 
inter alia, the contents of a lecture Sweezy 
had given at the University of New 
Hampshire.  The Court held that the 
investigation violated due process.  Id., at 
254, 1 L Ed 2d 1311, 77 S Ct 1203.
Justice Frankfurter went further, however, 
reasoning that the First Amendment created a 
right of academic freedom that prohibited the 
investigation.  Id., at 256-267, at 256-267, 1 
L Ed 2d 1311, 77 S Ct 1203 (opinion 
concurring in result).  Much of the rhetoric in 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion was devoted to 
the personal right of Sweezy to free speech.  
See, e.g., id., at 265, 1 L Ed 2d 1311, 77 S Ct 
1203 ("For a citizen to be  [*363]  made to 
forego even a part of so basic a liberty as his 
political autonomy, the subordinating interest 
of the State must be compelling").  Still, 
claiming that the United States Reports "need 
not be burdened with proof," Justice 
Frankfurter also asserted that a "free society" 
depends on "free universities" and "this 
means the exclusion of governmental 
intervention in the intellectual life of a 
university."  Id., at 262, 1 L Ed 2d 1311, 77 S 
254
Ct 1203.  According to Justice Frankfurter: 
"It is the business of a university to provide 
that atmosphere which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment and creation.  It is an 
atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four 
essential freedoms' of a university--to 
determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may teach, what may be taught, how it 
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study.'"  Id., at 263, 1 L Ed 2d 1311, 77 S Ct 
1203 (citation omitted). 
In my view, "it is the business" of this Court 
to explain itself when it cites provisions of 
the Constitution to invent new doctrines--
including the idea that the First Amendment 
authorizes a public university to do what 
would otherwise violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The majority fails in its summary 
effort to prove this point.  The only source 
for the Court's conclusion that public 
universities are entitled to deference even 
within the confines of strict scrutiny is Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke. Justice Powell, for 
his part, relied only on Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion in Sweezy and the Court's decision in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of 
State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
629, 87 S. Ct. 675 (1967), to support his view 
that the First Amendment somehow protected 
a public university's use of race in admissions 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, at 312, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S 
Ct 2733.  Keyishian provides no answer to 
the question whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment's restrictions are relaxed when 
applied to public universities.   [***355]  In 
that case, the Court held that state statutes 
and regulations designed to prevent the 
"appointment or retention of 'subversive' 
persons in state employment," 385 US, at 
592, 17 L Ed 2d 629, 87 S Ct 675, violated 
the First Amendment for vagueness.  The 
statutes covered all public employees and 
were not invalidated only as applied to 
university  [*364]  faculty members, although 
the Court appeared sympathetic to the notion 
of academic freedom, calling it a "special 
concern of the First Amendment."  Id., at 
603, 17 L Ed 2d 629, 87 S Ct 675.  Again, 
however, the Court did not relax any 
independent constitutional restrictions on 
public universities.
I doubt that when Justice Frankfurter spoke 
of governmental intrusions into the 
independence of universities, he was thinking 
of the Constitution's ban on racial 
discrimination. The majority's broad 
deference to both the Law School's judgment 
that racial aesthetics leads to educational 
benefits and its stubborn refusal to alter the 
status quo in admissions methods finds no 
basis in the Constitution or decisions of this 
Court.
 [**2358]  B
1
The Court's deference to the Law School's 
conclusion that its racial experimentation 
leads to educational benefits will, if adhered 
to, have serious collateral consequences.  The 
Court relies heavily on social science 
evidence to justify its deference. See ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 333-335; but see also 
Rothman,  Lipset, & Nevitte, Racial 
Diversity Reconsidered, 151 Public Interest 
25 (2003) (finding that the racial mix of a 
student body produced by racial 
discrimination of the type practiced by the 
Law School in fact hinders students' 
perception of academic quality).  The Court 
never acknowledges, however, the growing 
evidence that racial (and other sorts) of 
heterogeneity actually impairs learning 
among black students.  See, e.g., Flowers & 
Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of College 
Racial Composition on African American 
Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J. of 
College Student Development 669, 674 
(1999) (concluding that black students 
experience superior cognitive development at 
Historically Black Colleges (HBCs) and that, 
even among blacks, "a substantial diversity 
moderates the cognitive effects of attending 
an HBC"); Allen, The Color of Success: 
African-American College Student  [*365]  
Outcomes at Predominantly White and 
Historically Black Public Colleges and 
Universities, 62 Harv. Educ. Rev. 26, 35 
(1992) (finding that black students attending 
HBCs report higher academic achievement 
than those attending predominantly white 
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colleges).
At oral argument in Gratz v. Bollinger ,
ante,156 L Ed 2d 257, 123 S Ct 2411 , 
counsel for respondents stated that "most 
every single one of [the HBCs] do have 
diverse student bodies." Tr. of Oral Arg. in 
No. 02-516, p 52.  What precisely counsel 
meant by "diverse" is indeterminate, but it is 
reported that in 2000 at Morehouse College, 
one of the most distinguished HBC's in the 
Nation, only 0.1% of the student body was 
white, and only 0.2% was Hispanic.  College 
Admissions Data Handbook 2002-2003, p 
613 (43d ed. 2002) (hereinafter College 
Admissions Data Handbook).  And at 
Mississippi  [***356]  Valley State 
University, a public HBC, only 1.1% of the 
freshman class in 2001 was white.  Id., at 
603.  If there is a "critical mass" of whites at 
these institutions, then "critical mass" is 
indeed a very small proportion.
The majority grants deference to the Law 
School's "assessment that diversity will, in 
fact, yield educational benefits," ante, at 156 
L Ed 2d, at 332.  It follows, therefore, that an 
HBC's assessment that racial homogeneity 
will yield educational benefits would 
similarly be given deference. n7 An HBC's 
rejection of white applicants in order to 
maintain racial homogeneity seems 
permissible, therefore, under the majority's 
view of the Equal Protection Clause .  But 
see United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 
748, 120 L. Ed. 2d 575, 112 S. Ct. 2727 
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Obviously, 
a State cannot maintain . . . traditions by 
closing particular institutions, historically 
white or historically black, to particular racial 
groups").  Contained within today's majority 
opinion is the seed of a new constitutional  
[*366]  justification for a concept I thought 
long and rightly rejected--racial segregation. 
n7 For example, North Carolina 
A&T State University, which is 
currently 5.4% white, College 
Admissions Data Handbook 643, 
could seek to reduce the 
representation of whites in order to 
gain additional educational benefits.
2
Moreover one would think, in light of the 
Court's decision in United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735, 116 S. Ct. 
2264 (1996), that before being given license 
to use racial discrimination, the Law School 
would be required to radically reshape its 
admissions process, even to the point of 
sacrificing some elements of its character.  In 
Virginia, a majority of the Court, without a 
word about academic [**2359]  freedom, 
accepted the all-male Virginia Military 
Institute's (VMI) representation that some 
changes in its "adversative" method of 
education would be required with the 
admission of women, id., at 540, 135 L Ed 2d 
735, 116 S Ct 2264, but did not defer to 
VMI's judgment that these changes would be 
too great.  Instead, the Court concluded that 
they were "manageable."  Id., at 551, n. 19, 
135 L Ed 2d 735, 116 S Ct 2264.  That case 
involved sex discrimination, which is 
subjected to intermediate, not strict, scrutiny.  
Id., at 533, 135 L Ed 2d 735, 116 S Ct 2264; 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 50 L. Ed. 
2d 397, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).  So in Virginia, 
where the standard of review dictated that 
greater flexibility be granted to VMI's 
educational policies than the Law School 
deserves here, this Court gave no deference. 
Apparently where the status quo being 
defended is that of the elite establishment--
here the Law School--rather than a less 
fashionable Southern military institution, the 
Court will defer without serious inquiry and 
without regard to the applicable legal 
standard.
C
Virginia is also notable for the fact that the 
Court relied on the "experience" of formerly 
single-sex institutions, such as the service 
academies, to conclude that admission of 
women to VMI would be "manageable."  518 
U.S., at 544-545, 135 L Ed 2d 735, 116 S Ct 
2264.  Today, however, the majority ignores 
the "experience" of those institutions that 
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have been  [***357]  forced to abandon 
explicit racial discrimination in admissions. 
 [*367]  The sky has not fallen at Boalt Hall 
at the University of California, Berkeley, for 
example.  Prior to Proposition 209's adoption 
of Cal. Const., Art. 1, §  31(a), which bars the 
State from "granting preferential treatment . . 
. on the basis of race . . . in the operation of . . 
. public education," n8 Boalt Hall enrolled 20 
blacks and 28 Hispanics in its first-year class 
for 1996.  In 2002, without deploying express 
racial discrimination in admissions, Boalt's 
entering class enrolled 14 blacks and 36 
Hispanics. n9 University of California Law 
and Medical School Enrollments, available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/acadadv/datamgmt/law
med/law-enrolls-eth2.html.  Total 
underrepresented minority student enrollment 
at Boalt Hall now exceeds 1996 levels.  
Apparently the Law School cannot be 
counted on to be as resourceful.  The Court is 
willfully blind to the very real experience in 
California and elsewhere, which raises the 
inference that institutions with "reputation[s] 
for excellence," ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 332, 
338, rivaling the Law School's have satisfied 
their sense of mission without resorting to 
prohibited racial discrimination. 
n8 Cal. Const., Art. 1, §  31(a), 
states in full: 
"The state shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment 
to, any individual or group on the 
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of 
public employment, public education, 
or public contracting." See Coalition 
for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 
F.3d 692 (CA9 1997).
n9 Given the incredible deference the 
Law School receives from the Court, I 
think it appropriate to indulge in the 
presumption that Boalt Hall operates 
without violating California law.
V
Putting aside the absence of any legal support 
for the majority's reflexive deference, there is 
much to be said for the view that the use of 
tests and other measures to "predict" 
academic performance is a poor substitute for 
a system that gives every applicant a chance 
to prove he can succeed in the study of law.  
The rallying cry that in the absence of racial 
discrimination in admissions there would be 
a true  [*368]  meritocracy ignores the fact 
that the entire process is poisoned by 
numerous exceptions to "merit." For 
example, in the national debate on racial 
discrimination in higher education 
admissions, much has been made of the fact 
that elite institutions utilize a so-called 
"legacy" preference to give the children of 
alumni an advantage in admissions.  This, 
and other, exceptions to a "true"  [**2360]  
meritocracy give the lie to protestations that 
merit admissions are in fact the order of the 
day at the Nation's universities.  The Equal 
Protection Clause does not, however, prohibit 
the use of unseemly legacy preferences or 
many other kinds of arbitrary admissions 
procedures.  What the Equal Protection 
Clause does prohibit are classifications made 
on the basis of race.  So while legacy 
preferences can stand under the Constitution, 
racial discrimination cannot. n10 I will not 
twist the Constitution to invalidate legacy 
preferences or otherwise impose my vision of 
higher education admissions on the Nation.  
The majority should  [***358]  similarly stay 
its impulse to validate faddish racial 
discrimination the Constitution clearly 
forbids. 
n10 Were this Court to have the 
courage to forbid the use of racial 
discrimination in admissions, legacy 
preferences (and similar practices) 
might quickly become less popular--a 
possibility not lost, I am certain, on 
the elites (both individual and 
institutional) supporting the Law 
School in this case.
In any event, there is nothing ancient, 
honorable, or constitutionally protected about 
"selective" admissions.  The University of 
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Michigan should be well aware that 
alternative methods have historically been 
used for the admission of students, for it 
brought to this country the German certificate 
system in the late-19th century.  See H. 
Wechsler, The Qualified Student 16-39 
(1977) (hereinafter Qualified Student).  
Under this system, a secondary school was 
certified by a university so that any graduate 
who completed the course offered by the 
school was offered admission to the 
university.  The certification regime 
supplemented, and later virtually replaced (at 
least in the Midwest), the prior regime of 
rigorous  [*369]  subject-matter entrance 
examinations.  Id., at 57-58.  The facially 
race-neutral "percent plans" now used in 
Texas, California, and Florida, see ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 340, are in many ways the 
descendents of the certificate system. 
Certification was replaced by selective 
admissions in the beginning of the 20th 
century, as universities sought to exercise 
more control over the composition of their 
student bodies.  Since its inception, selective 
admissions has been the vehicle for racial, 
ethnic, and religious tinkering and 
experimentation by university administrators.  
The initial driving force for the relocation of 
the selective function from the high school to 
the universities was the same desire to select 
racial winners and losers that the Law School 
exhibits today.  Columbia, Harvard, and 
others infamously determined that they had 
"too many" Jews, just as today the Law 
School argues it would have "too many" 
whites if it could not discriminate in its 
admissions process.  See Qualified Student 
155-168 (Columbia); H. Broun & G. Britt, 
Christians Only: A Study in Prejudice 53-54 
(1931) (Harvard).
Columbia employed intelligence tests 
precisely because Jewish applicants, who 
were predominantly immigrants, scored 
worse on such tests.  Thus, Columbia could 
claim (falsely) that "'we have not eliminated 
boys because they were Jews and do not 
propose to do so.  We have honestly 
attempted to eliminate the lowest grade of 
applicant [through the use of intelligence 
testing] and it turns out that a good many of 
the low grade men are New York City Jews.'" 
Letter from Herbert E. Hawkes, dean of 
Columbia College, to E. B. Wilson, June 16, 
1922 (reprinted in Qualified Student 160-
161).  In other words, the tests were adopted 
with full knowledge of their disparate impact.  
Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 335, 
40 L. Ed. 2d 164, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974) (per 
curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Similarly no modern law school can claim 
ignorance of the poor performance of blacks, 
relatively speaking, on the Law School 
Admissions Test (LSAT).  Nevertheless, law 
schools  [*370]  continue to use the test and 
then attempt to "correct" for black 
underperformance by using racial 
discrimination in admissions so as to obtain 
their aesthetic student body. The Law 
School's continued adherence to measures 
[**2361]  it knows produce racially skewed 
results is not entitled to deference by this 
Court.  See Part IV, supra. The Law School 
itself admits that the test is imperfect, as it 
must, given that it regularly admits students 
who score at or below  [***359]  150 (the 
national median) on the test.  See App. 156-
203 (showing that, between 1995 and 2000, 
the Law School admitted 37 students--27 of 
whom were black; 31 of whom were 
"underrepresented minorities"--with LSAT 
scores of 150 or lower).  And the Law 
School's amici cannot seem to agree on the 
fundamental question whether the test itself 
is useful.  Compare Brief for Law School 
Admission Council as Amicus Curiae 12 
("LSAT scores . . . are an effective predictor 
of students' performance in law school") with 
Brief for Harvard Black Law Students 
Association et al. as Amici Curiae 27 
("Whether [the LSAT] measures objective 
merit . . . is certainly questionable").
Having decided to use the LSAT, the Law 
School must accept the constitutional burdens 
that come with this decision.  The Law 
School may freely continue to employ the 
LSAT and other allegedly merit-based 
standards in whatever fashion it likes.  What 
the Equal Protection Clause forbids, but the
Court today allows, is the use of these 
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standards hand-in-hand with racial 
discrimination. An infinite variety of 
admissions methods are available to the Law 
School. Considering all of the radical 
thinking that has historically occurred at this 
country's universities, the Law School's 
intractable approach toward admissions is 
striking.
The Court will not even deign to make the 
Law School try other methods, however, 
preferring instead to grant a 25-year license 
to violate the Constitution.  And the same 
Court that had the courage to order the 
desegregation of all public schools in the 
South now fears, on the basis of platitudes  
[*371]  rather than principle, to force the Law 
School to abandon a decidedly imperfect 
admissions regime that provides the basis for 
racial discrimination.
VI
The absence of any articulated legal principle 
supporting the majority's principal holding 
suggests another rationale.  I believe what 
lies beneath the Court's decision today are the 
benighted notions that one can tell when 
racial discrimination benefits (rather than 
hurts)  minority groups, see Adarand, 515 
U.S., at 239, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment), and that racial discrimination is 
necessary to remedy general societal ills.  
This Court's precedents supposedly settled 
both issues, but clearly the majority still 
cannot commit to the principle that racial 
classifications are per se harmful and that 
almost no amount of benefit in the eye of the 
beholder can justify such classifications. 
Putting aside what I take to be the Court's 
implicit rejection of Adarand's holding that 
beneficial and burdensome racial 
classifications are equally invalid, I must 
contest the notion that the Law School's 
discrimination benefits those admitted as a 
result of it.  The Court spends considerable 
time discussing the impressive display of 
amicus support for the Law School in this 
case from all corners of society.  Ante, at 156 
L Ed 2d, at 333-334.  But nowhere in any of 
the filings in this Court is any evidence that 
the purported "beneficiaries" of this racial 
discrimination prove themselves by 
performing at (or even near) the same level 
as those students who receive no preferences.  
[***360]  Cf. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 
Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46 
UCLA L. Rev. 1583, 1605-1608 (1999) 
(discussing the failure of defenders of racial 
discrimination in admissions to consider the 
fact that its "beneficiaries" are 
underperforming in the classroom).
The silence in this case is deafening to those 
of us who view higher education's purpose as 
imparting knowledge and skills to students, 
rather than a communal, rubber-stamp,  
[*372]  credentialing process.  The [**2362]  
Law School is not looking for those students 
who, despite a lower LSAT score or 
undergraduate grade point average, will 
succeed in the study of law.  The Law School 
seeks only a facade--it is sufficient that the 
class looks right, even if it does not perform 
right.
The Law School tantalizes unprepared 
students with the promise of a University of 
Michigan degree and all of the opportunities 
that it offers.  These overmatched students 
take the bait, only to find that they cannot 
succeed in the cauldron of competition.  And 
this mismatch crisis is not restricted to elite 
institutions.  See T. Sowell, Race and Culture 
176-177 (1994) ("Even if most minority 
students are able to meet the normal 
standards at the 'average' range of colleges 
and universities,  the systematic mismatching 
of minority students begun at the top can 
mean that such students are generally 
overmatched throughout all levels of higher 
education").  Indeed, to cover the tracks of 
the aestheticists, this cruel farce of racial 
discrimination must continue--in selection for 
the Michigan Law Review, see University of 
Michigan Law School Student Handbook 
2002-2003, pp 39-40 (noting the presence of 
a "diversity plan" for admission to the 
review), and in hiring at law firms and for 
judicial clerkships--until the "beneficiaries" 
are no longer tolerated.  While these students 
may graduate with law degrees, there is no 
evidence that they have received a 
qualitatively better legal education (or 
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become better lawyers) than if they had gone 
to a less "elite" law school for which they 
were better prepared.  And the aestheticists 
will never address the real problems facing 
"underrepresented minorities," n11 instead 
continuing their social experiments on other 
people's children. 
n11 For example, there is no 
recognition by the Law School in this 
case that even with their racial 
discrimination in place, black men are 
"underrepresented" at the Law 
School. See ABA-LSAC Guide 426 
(reporting that the Law School has 46 
black women and 28 black men).  
Why does the Law School not also 
discriminate in favor of black men 
over black women, given this 
underrepresentation?  The answer is, 
again, that all the Law School cares 
about is its own image among know-
it-all elites, not solving real problems 
like the crisis of black male 
underperformance.
 [*373]  Beyond the harm the Law 
School's racial discrimination visits upon its 
test subjects, no social science has disproved 
the notion that this discrimination "engenders 
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, 
provoke[s] resentment among those who 
believe that they have been wronged by the 
government's use of race."  Adarand, 515 
U.S., at 241, 132 L Ed 2d 158, 115 S Ct 2097 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment).  "These programs 
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority 
and may cause them to develop dependencies 
or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' 
to preferences." Ibid.
It is uncontested that each year, the Law 
School admits a handful of blacks who would 
be admitted in the absence of racial 
discrimination. See Brief for Respondents 
Bollinger et al. 6.  Who can differentiate 
between those who belong and those who do 
not?  The majority of blacks are admitted to 
the Law School because of discrimination, 
and because of this policy all are tarred as 
undeserving.  This problem of stigma does 
not depend on determinacy as to whether 
those stigmatized are actually the 
"beneficiaries" of racial discrimination. 
When blacks take positions in the highest 
places of government,  industry, or academia, 
it is an open question today whether their 
skin color played a part in their advancement. 
The question itself is the stigma--because 
either racial discrimination did play a role, in 
which case the person may be deemed 
"otherwise unqualified," or it did not, in 
which case asking the question itself unfairly 
marks those blacks who would succeed 
without discrimination.  Is this what the 
Court means by "visibly open"?  Ante, at 156 
L Ed 2d, at 335. 
Finally, the Court's disturbing reference to 
the importance of the country's law [**2363]  
schools as training grounds meant to cultivate 
"a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes 
of the citizenry," ibid., through the use of 
racial discrimination deserves discussion.  As 
noted earlier, the Court has soundly  [*374]  
rejected the remedying of societal 
discrimination as a justification for 
governmental use of race.  Wygant, 476 U.S., 
at 276, 90 L Ed 2d 260, 106 S Ct 1842 
(plurality opinion); Croson, 488 U.S., at 497, 
102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct 706 (plurality 
opinion); id., at 520-521, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 
109 S Ct 706  (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment).  For those who believe that every 
racial disproportionality in our society is 
caused by some kind of racial discrimination, 
there can be no distinction between 
remedying societal discrimination and 
erasing racial disproportionalities in the 
country's leadership caste.  And if the lack of 
proportional racial representation among our 
leaders is not caused by societal 
discrimination, then "fixing" it is even less of 
a pressing public necessity.
The Court's civics lesson presents yet another 
example of judicial selection of a theory of 
political representation based on skin color--
an endeavor I have previously rejected.  See 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 899, 129 L. 
Ed. 2d 687, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (Thomas, 
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J., concurring in judgment).  The majority
appears to believe that broader utopian goals 
justify the Law School's use of race, but "the 
Equal Protection Clause commands the 
elimination of racial barriers, not their 
creation in order to satisfy our theory as to 
how society ought to be organized."  
DeFunis, 416 U.S., at 342, 40 L Ed 2d 164, 
94 S Ct 1704 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
VII
As the foregoing makes clear, I believe the 
Court's opinion to be, in most respects, 
erroneous.  I do, however, find two points on 
which I agree.
A
First, I note that the issue of unconstitutional 
racial discrimination among the groups the 
Law School prefers is not presented in this 
case, because petitioner has never argued that 
the Law School engages in such a practice, 
and the Law School maintains  [***362]  that 
it does not.  See Brief for Respondents 
Bollinger et al. 32, n 50, and 6-7, n 7.  I join 
the Court's opinion insofar as it confirms that 
this type of racial discrimination remains 
unlawful.  Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 330-332.  
Under today's  [*375]  decision, it is still the 
case that racial discrimination that does not 
help a university to enroll an unspecified 
number, or "critical mass," of 
underrepresented minority students is 
unconstitutional.  Thus, the Law School may 
not discriminate in admissions between 
similarly situated blacks and Hispanics, or 
between whites and Asians.  This is so 
because preferring black to Hispanic 
applicants, for instance, does nothing to 
further the interest recognized by the 
majority today. n12 Indeed, the majority 
describes such racial balancing as "patently 
unconstitutional." Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
333.  Like the Court, ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
337, I express no opinion as to whether the 
Law School's current admissions program 
runs afoul of this prohibition. 
n12 That interest depends on 
enrolling a "critical mass" of 
underrepresented minority students, 
as the majority repeatedly states.  
Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 324, 325, 
326, 333, 335, 337, 339; cf. ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 335 (referring to the 
unique experience of being a "racial 
minority," as opposed to being black, 
or Native American); ante, at 156 L 
Ed 2d, at 337 (rejecting argument that 
the Law School maintains a disguised 
quota by referring to the total number 
of enrolled underrepresented minority 
students, not specific races).  As it 
relates to the Law School's racial 
discrimination, the Court clearly 
approves of only one use of race--the 
distinction between underrepresented 
minority applicants and those of all 
other races.  A relative preference 
awarded to a black applicant over, for 
example, a similarly situated Native 
American applicant, does not lead to 
the enrollment of even one more 
underrepresented minority student, 
but only balances the races within the 
"critical mass."
B
The Court also holds that racial 
discrimination in admissions should be given 
another [**2364]  25 years before it is 
deemed no longer narrowly tailored to the 
Law School's fabricated compelling state 
interest. Ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 341.  While 
I agree that in 25 years the practices of the 
Law School will be illegal, they are, for the 
reasons I have given, illegal now.  The 
majority does not and cannot rest its time 
limitation on any evidence that the gap in 
credentials between black and white  [*376]  
students is shrinking or will be gone in that 
timeframe. n13 In recent years there has been 
virtually no change, for example, in the 
proportion of law school applicants with 
LSAT scores of 165 and higher who are 
black. n14 In 1993 blacks constituted 1.1% of 
law school applicants in that score range, 
though they represented 11.1% of all 
applicants.  Law School Admission  [***363] 
Council, National Statistical Report (1994) 
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(hereinafter LSAC Statistical Report).  In 
2000 the comparable numbers were 1.0% and 
11.3%.  LSAC Statistical Report (2001).  No 
one can seriously contend, and the Court 
does not, that the racial gap in academic 
credentials will disappear in 25 years.  Nor is 
the Court's holding that racial discrimination 
will be unconstitutional in 25 years made 
contingent on the gap closing in that time. 
n15
n13 I agree with Justice Ginsburg 
that the Court's holding that racial 
discrimination in admissions will be 
illegal in 25 years is not based upon a 
"forecast," post, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 
344 (concurring opinion).  I do not 
agree with Justice Ginsburg's 
characterization of the Court's holding 
as an expression of "hope." Ibid.
n14 I use a score of 165 as the 
benchmark here because the Law 
School feels it is the relevant score 
range for applicant consideration 
(absent race discrimination).  See 
Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 
5; App. to Pet. for Cert. 309a 
(showing that the median LSAT score 
for all accepted applicants from 1995-
1998 was 168); id., at 310a-311a 
(showing the median LSAT score for 
accepted applicants was 167 for the 
years 1999 and 2000); University of 
Michigan Law School Website, 
available at 
http://www.law.umich.edu/prospectiv
estudents/Admissions/index.htm 
(showing that the median LSAT score 
for accepted applicants in 2002 was 
166).
n15 The majority's non sequitur 
observation that since 1978 the 
number of blacks that have scored in 
these upper ranges on the LSAT has 
grown, ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 342, 
says nothing about current trends.  
First, black participation in the LSAT 
until the early 1990's lagged behind 
black representation in the general 
population.  For instance, in 1984 
only 7.3% of law school applicants 
were black, whereas in 2000 11.3% of 
law school applicants were black.  
See LSAC Statistical Reports (1984 
and 2000).  Today, however, unless 
blacks were to begin applying to law 
school in proportions greater than 
their representation in the general 
population, the growth in absolute 
numbers of high scoring blacks 
should be expected to plateau, and it 
has.  In 1992, 63 black applicants to 
law school had LSAT scores above 
165.  In 2000, that number was 65.  
See LSAC Statistical Reports (1992 
and 2000).
 [*377]  Indeed, the very existence of 
racial discrimination of the type practiced by 
the Law School may impede the narrowing of 
the LSAT testing gap.  An applicant's LSAT 
score can improve dramatically with 
preparation, but such preparation is a cost, 
and there must be sufficient benefits attached 
to an improved score to justify additional 
study.  Whites scoring between 163 and 167 
on the LSAT are routinely rejected by the 
Law School, and thus whites aspiring to 
admission at the Law School have every 
incentive to improve their score to levels 
above that range.  See App. 199 (showing 
that in 2000, 209 out of 422 white applicants 
were rejected in this scoring range).  Blacks, 
on the other hand, are nearly guaranteed 
admission if they score above 155.  Id., at 
198 (showing that 63 out of 77 black 
applicants are accepted with LSAT scores 
above 155).  As admission prospects 
approach certainty, there is no incentive for 
the black applicant to continue to prepare for 
the LSAT once he is reasonably assured of 
achieving the requisite score. It is far from 
certain that the LSAT test-taker's behavior is 
responsive to the Law School's admissions 
policies. n16  [**2365]  Nevertheless, the 
possibility remains that this racial 
discrimination will help fulfill the bigot's 
prophecy about black underperformance--just 
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as it confirms the conspiracy theorist's belief 
that "institutional racism" is at fault for every 
racial disparity in our society. 
n16 I use the LSAT as an 
example, but the same incentive 
structure is in place for any 
admissions criteria, including 
undergraduate grades, on which 
minorities are consistently admitted at 
thresholds significantly lower than 
whites.
I therefore can understand the imposition 
of a 25-year time limit only as a holding that 
the deference the Court pays to the Law 
School's educational judgments and refusal to 
change its admissions policies will itself 
expire.  At that point these policies will 
clearly have failed to "'eliminate  [*378]  the 
[perceived] need for any racial or ethnic'" 
discrimination because the academic 
credentials gap will still be there.  Ante, at 
156 L Ed 2d, at 341 (quoting Nathanson & 
Bartnika, The Constitutionality of 
Preferential Treatment for Minority 
Applicants to Professional Schools,  58 
Chicago Bar Rec. 282, 293 (May-June 
1977)).  The Court defines this time limit in 
terms of narrow tailoring,  [***364]  see 
ante, at 156 L Ed 2d, at 342, but I believe this 
arises from its refusal to define rigorously the 
broad state interest vindicated today.  Cf. Part 
II, supra. With these observations, I join the 
last sentence of Part III of the opinion of the 
Court. 
* * *
For the immediate future, however, the 
majority has placed its imprimatur on a 
practice that can only weaken the principle of 
equality embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence and the Equal Protection 
Clause.  "Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens."  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559, 41 L. Ed. 256, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  It has been nearly 
140 years since Frederick Douglass asked the 
intellectual ancestors of the Law School to 
"[d]o nothing with us!" and the Nation 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. Now we 
must wait another 25 years to see this 
principle of equality vindicated.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent from the remainder of the 
Court's opinion and the judgment.
